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Assessing U.S. 1990s – 2000s China Trade Policy’s Effects on U.S. National Security

Assad Raza is a retired U.S. Army Civil Affairs Officer with deployment experience throughout the Middle East. He holds a M.A. in Diplomacy with a concentration in International Conflict Management from Norwich University, and a M.M.A.S from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He can be found on Twitter @assadraza12. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing U.S. 1990s – 2000s China Trade Policy’s Effects on U.S. National Security

Date Originally Written:  May 23, 2023.

Date Originally Published:  June 5, 2023.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that the trade policy between the U.S. and China during the 1990s to 2000s resulted in the growth of China and wider socioeconomic disparities within the U.S. due to the relocation of manufacturing overseas.

Summary:   During the 1990s and 2000s, U.S. trade policies hurt the U.S. middle class as manufacturing jobs moved China. This movement enabled China to become an economic powerhouse and greater military threat to U.S. interests. However, recent policy developments offer hope for rebalancing trade between the two nations and revitalizing domestic manufacturing to fortify the U.S. middle class, as it had been before the end of the Cold War.

Text:  After World War II, the U.S. experienced a significant increase in demand for manufacturing, both in the private sector and the military industrial complex. The post-war population began spending more on a wide range of goods, including new cars and home appliances. Simultaneously, the government invested heavily in military equipment, primarily due to the escalating Cold War tensions with the Soviet Union. This surge in manufacturing activity not only created numerous job opportunities across the nation but also played a pivotal role in fostering the development of one of the strongest middle classes in U.S. history[1]. However, with the conclusion of the Cold War, the United States initiated trade liberalization with multiple countries, particularly China. This shift in trade policies facilitated China’s rise as a global power but had a detrimental impact on the U.S. middle class, as numerous manufacturing jobs were outsourced overseas.

The U.S. failed to foresee the ramifications of opening up trade with China in the 1990s to 2000s, which had a significant impact on the middle class and contributed to China’s emergence as a strategic competitor. U.S. Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA) highlighted these effects in a Foreign Affairs article, stating that “Since 1998, the widening U.S. trade deficit has resulted in the loss of five million well-paying manufacturing jobs and the closure of nearly 70,000 factories[2].” Khanna also emphasized how the decline in manufacturing jobs had a particularly negative effect on Americans without college degrees, limiting their ability to achieve middle-class status. These adverse effects were largely accelerated by a policy passed in 2000 that named China as a permanent free trade partner for the United States.

In the year 2000, the U.S. Congress passed the Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China (PNTR) bill, which aggressively opened up trade with China. The bill received approval in the House with a vote of 237 to 197 and in the Senate with an 83 to 15 majority[3]. However, in 2016, economists reported that the predicted emergence of new jobs to replace those lost did not materialize following the exodus of manufacturing jobs to China as trade relations normalized[4]. While the intention behind this policy was to benefit U.S. economic interests and foster normalized ties with China[5], it came at the expense of the U.S. middle class, as evidenced fifteen years later.

These policies, which prioritized cheaper goods over U.S. middle-class jobs, have played a significant role in driving China’s rapid economic growth. Consequently, China’s economy has the potential to surpass that of the United States and become the world’s largest economy by 2050. Alongside its large population and increased military capabilities, this economic growth positions China as the most significant threat to the United States[6]. The long-term effects of the trade imbalance between the two countries have escalated tensions between the powers and continue to impact the U.S. domestic manufacturing job market. However, it is important to note that the responsibility for these consequences does not solely lie with the United States. China has engaged in various controversial practices to manipulate the situation in its favor, exacerbating the adverse effects of the trade dynamics.

The historical combination of low wages and an undervalued currency in China has provided strong incentives for numerous U.S. companies to relocate their manufacturing operations there. The availability of a large labor force, along with a lower cost of living and fewer labor regulations, allowed Chinese companies to exploit their workers with low compensation[7]. Additionally, the Chinese government over the years has implemented currency management policies, intentionally keeping the value of its currency relatively low in comparison to major currencies such as the U.S. dollar[8]. This combination of factors, including low wages and an undervalued currency, created a significant cost advantage for U.S. companies engaged in manufacturing in China. By shifting production to China, these companies manufactured goods at a lower cost, thereby increasing their profit margins or enabling them to offer products at competitive prices in the global market. These practices, which have caused controversy, are meant to give China an economic edge by producing cheaper exports that add to the U.S. trade deficit and result in fewer domestic manufacturing jobs.

It is worth noting that the United States is taking steps to address the trade imbalance between China and the U.S. This inequality has persisted for over 20 years, and steps are being taken to encourage the return of manufacturing to the U.S. This return will not only help revive the middle class, but also reduce dependence on China, particularly in light of the global supply chain disruptions caused by COVID-19. The U.S. government has introduced several initiatives to achieve this goal, such as the Inflation Reduction Act, which aims to increase domestic energy production and manufacturing by 40 percent by 2030[9]. Another initiative is the CHIPS and Science Act, which offers incentives for domestic semiconductor production in response to the impact of the pandemic[10]. Despite these efforts, the loss of manufacturing jobs to China has already taken a toll on the U.S. middle class, and it may be difficult for them to fully recover to the level it was at the conclusion of the Cold War.

Endnotes:

[1] Pruitt, S. (2020, May 14). The post World War II boom: How America got into gear. History.com. https://www.history.com/news/post-world-war-ii-boom-economy  

[2] Khanna, R. (2022a, December 20). The new industrial age. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/ro-khanna-new-industrial-age-america-manufacturing-superpower  

[3] Tankersley, J. (2016, March 21). What republicans did 15 years ago to help create Donald Trump today. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/21/how-republicans-helped-create-donald-trump-more-than-15-years-ago/  

[4] Autor, D., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. (2016). The China shock: Learning from labor market adjustment to large changes in trade. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w21906  

[5] Clinton, W. J. (2000, May 24). Remarks by the president on passage of permanent normal trade relations with China: The Rose Garden. U.S. Department of State. https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/eap/000524_clinton_china.html  

[6] Spillane, J. (2023, March 20). Can China surpass the United States as the next world superpower?. LSE International Development. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/internationaldevelopment/2023/03/20/can-china-surpass-the-united-states-as-the-next-world-superpower/  

[7] Plekhanov, D. (2017, December 13). Is China’s era of cheap labor really over? The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/is-chinas-era-of-cheap-labor-really-over/  

[8] Morrison, W. M., & Labonte, M. (2013, July 22). China’s currency policy: An analysis of the economic issues – CRS report RS21625. Congressional Research Service (CRS). https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21625/70  

[9] U.S. Senate. (2022). Summary: The inflation reduction act of 2022 – senate. Senate.Gov. https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/inflation_reduction_act_one_page_summary.pdf  

[10] Bennet, M. (2022). Chips and science act of 2022 section-by-section summary – U.S. Senator Michael Bennet. U.S. Senate.Gov. https://www.bennet.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/4/0/40919cb4-ff63-4434-8ae2-897a4a026b30/7BCDD84F555A6B85BEC800514F1D3AFD.chips-and-science-act-of-2022-section-by-section.pdf

Assad Raza Assessment Papers China (People's Republic of China) Governing Documents and Ideas Trade United States
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Assessing the People’s Republic of China’s Current Multi-Decade Offensive Against Taiwan

Editor’s Note:  This article is part of our 2023 Writing Contest called The Taiwan Offensive, which took place from March 1, 2023 to July 31, 2023.  More information about the contest can be found by clicking here.

David Degenhardt is a Major in the United States Army who has previously deployed to Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. He currently works at Headquarters, Department of the Army G-1 as a Diversity Planner.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing the People’s Republic of China’s Current Multi-Decade Offensive Against Taiwan

Date Originally Written:  May 15, 2023.

Date Originally Published:  May 28, 2023.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is an active-duty U.S. military officer who believes that self-determination is a legal right and a key principle of international law. 

Summary:  The People’s Republic of China has been engaged in an offensive again Taiwan using all four instruments of national power for decades. This offensive is intended to isolate Taiwan, increase dependence on China, control the narrative on Taiwan’s status, and weaken Taiwan’s military. Counteracting this offensive requires Taiwan to recognize this reality and respond to each element of China’s strategy.

Text:  Current speculation on the possibility of armed conflict between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan does not address the reality that the PRC has been engaged in an ongoing offensive for decades across all elements of national power. The goal of the PRC’s strategy is to isolate Taiwan from other nations, increase Taiwan’s dependence on China, control the narrative on Taiwan’s independence, and weaken Taiwan in preparation for direct military action. Rush Doshi described the basic form of this strategy as a multi-pronged methodology to place China at the center of a new global order using political, economic, and military instruments[1]. For Taiwan to respond successfully, it must also consider information as an element of national power and respond to all levels of China’s offensive. Because China has been engaging in a complex offensive toward Taiwan for some time, a military invasion of Taiwan would be the culmination of China’s offensive rather than the beginning.

Beginning with the political instrument of national power, China has used diplomatic pressure over the last five decades to reduce the number of countries officially recognizing Taiwan from 56 to 13[2]. Much of the pressure that China applies to accomplish these changes in diplomatic recognition depends on the economic instrument of national power, using continued access to Chinese markets or direct payoffs of development funds as in the case of the Solomon Islands[3]. Although effective, analysts observe that this coercion is motivating some countries to push back by drawing closer to Taiwan and making joint statements about defending the island from invasion[4]. Aside from the obvious response of strengthening relationships with remaining allies, Taiwan could also pursue agreements with those allies to conduct pass-through trade to maintain access to markets in countries China has pressured into compliance.

In addition to using the economic instrument to support its diplomatic efforts, China is also attempting to intertwine its economy with Taiwan’s. According to the Foreign Policy Research Institute this policy is intended to encourage economic dependence, cultivate pro-China factions, and restrict Taiwan’s pursuit of independence and democracy[5]. While some Chinese corporations are nominally independent, under President Xi Jinping the Chinese government has increased pressure on corporations to act in service of government aims or acquired corporations as state-owned enterprises[6]. Even when the Chinese government is not directing corporate engagement in Taiwan, it exercises its authority to permit or encourages these activities. Despite China’s efforts, the Heritage Foundation recently found that changes in U.S. policy and other factors are causing the interdependence of the two economies to grow more slowly or even reverse in some sectors[7]. Taiwan could continue to support businesses driving this trend and consider additional measures such as tax breaks and preference in government contracts for companies that move investment and production facilities out of China.

Turning to the information instrument, China’s uses information efforts to support the other three instruments by influencing foreign and local perception of Taiwan. Doshi describes China’s information strategy as an attempt “to shape public opinion… for political purposes,” citing efforts to intimidate journalists using libel laws and harassment campaigns as well as an incident where a major Taiwanese media company began publishing pro-China stories after a businessman tied to China purchased it in 2008[8]. China has also attempted to leverage United Nations Resolution 2758, which recognized the PRC as the government of China, to push the message that Taiwan is an inseparable element of Chinese territory[9]. Building on this message the PRC claims that the entirety of the Taiwan Strait lies within its territory, making free use of the channel a threat to Chinese sovereignty[10]. Shaping the narrative about Taiwan helps China to delegitimizes the Taiwanese government and lays the groundwork to claim future military action as an internal security matter. To fight these efforts Taiwan might continue to push for de facto and real recognition of its status as an autonomous government through international agreements and high-profile visits of foreign government representatives.

Finally, China has already begun using the military instrument of national power in its offensive against Taiwan through increasingly frequent incursions into Taiwanese air space. China sent planes into Taiwan’s airspace more than 1,700 times in 2022 and more than 600 times in the first four months of 2023[11]. Taiwan is effectively forced to respond to these incursions because not responding would accept China’s right to enter Taiwan’s airspace and run the risk of allowing China to achieve surprise in an actual invasion. Each response degrades Taiwan’s military equipment and incurs maintenance costs, rising into the hundreds of thousands of dollars due to the flight hour cost of Taiwan’s F-16 fleet[12][13]. These incursions also provide valuable intelligence to Chinese forces concerning how quickly the Taiwanese military can detect and respond to their presence. By normalizing activities around Taiwan, China can also increase complacency and blunt response speed in the event of an invasion. Although Taiwan must logically respond to each incursion, Taiwanese forces could intentionally alter their response patterns and speed to create uncertainty about the real state of their military’s capabilities. 

Xi Jinping has stated that China’s goal is reunification with Taiwan, whether that goal is accomplished peacefully or through force[14]. The PRC’s all-instrument offensive against Taiwan is aligned with these principles, allowing for multiple methods to achieve China’s goal while allowing for a military solution. A sufficiently isolated Taiwan might accept a diplomatic agreement with China, pressured by economic concerns as it loses access to markets. Increasing economic interdependence and influence operations could shift public perception to support pro-China political factions in Taiwan. If China resorts to force, international acceptance of China’s narrative on Taiwan’s status would limit the support Taiwan receives from abroad. An actual invasion of Taiwan following China’s ongoing incursion campaign would face worn down defenders whose response times and patterns are well known and incorporated into China’s plans. Taiwanese hopes of defeating such a comprehensive campaign require acknowledging the complexity of the threat and responding in an equally comprehensive manner.

Endnotes:

[1] Doshi, R. (2021, August 2). The long game: China’s grand strategy to displace American order. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/essay/the-long-game-chinas-grand-strategy-to-displace-american-order/.

[2] Cheung, E. (2023, March 26). Honduras establishes diplomatic ties with China, severs them with Taiwan. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/25/asia/honduras-cuts-diplomatic-ties-with-taiwan-intl-hnk/index.html.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Herscovitch, B. (2022, July 5). China’s efforts to isolate and intimidate Taiwan are pushing U.S. allies closer. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/07/05/chinas-efforts-to-isolate-and-intimidate-taiwan-are-pushing-u-s-allies-closer/.

[5] Chang, C. C., & Yang, A. H. (2020). Weaponized interdependence: China’s economic statecraft and social penetration against Taiwan. Orbis, 64(2), 312–333. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2020.02.002.

[6] Wakabayashi, D., Che, C., & Fu, C. (2022, October 17). In Xi’s China, the business of business is state-controlled. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/17/business/china-xi-jinping-business-economy.html.

[7] Chiang, M. H. (2023, March 23). Taiwan’s economy is breaking away from China’s. The Heritage Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/taiwans-economy-breaking-away-chinas.

[8] Doshi, R. (2020, January 9). China steps up its information war in Taiwan. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-01-09/china-steps-its-information-war-taiwan.

[9] Drun, J. & Glaser, B. S. (2022, March 24). The distortion of UN resolution 2758 and limits on Taiwan’s access to the United Nations. The German Marshall Fund of the United States. https://www.gmfus.org/news/distortion-un-resolution-2758-and-limits-taiwans-access-united-nations. 

[10] Liu, Z. (2022, June 13). China insists it has sovereign rights over Taiwan Strait. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3181554/china-insists-it-has-full-sovereign-rights-over-taiwan-strait.

[11] Brown, G.C. & Lewis, B. (2023, May 7) Taiwan ADIZ violations. Retrieved May 7,  2023 from https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit#gid=2015900050. 

[12] Government Accountability Office. (2022, November 10) GAO-23-106217: Weapon Sustainment, pg. 232. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-106217. 

[13] Chung, L. (2021, September 7) Taiwan’s air force budget reveals the high cost of China’s aggressive military flights around the island. South China Morning Post. https://www.businessinsider.com/taiwan-air-force-budget-reveals-cost-of-china-military-flights-2021-9. 

[14] Tian, Y. L. & Blanchard, B. (2022, October 16) China will never renounce right to use force over Taiwan, Xi says. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/xi-china-will-never-renounce-right-use-force-over-taiwan-2022-10-16/.

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Options for Taiwan’s Response to a Conventional Missile Strike by the People’s Republic of China

Editor’s Note:  This article is part of our 2023 Writing Contest called The Taiwan Offensive, which took place from March 1, 2023 to July 31, 2023.  More information about the contest can be found by clicking here.

Thomas J. Shattuck is the Global Order Program Manager at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House, a member of Foreign Policy for America’s NextGen Foreign Policy Initiative and the Pacific Forum’s Young Leaders Program, as well as a Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute and Foreign Policy Research Institute. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation:  The People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducts a conventional missile strike against a military air base in central Taiwan.

Date Originally Written:  May 9, 2023.

Date Originally Published:  May 22, 2023.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The article is written from the point of view of Taiwan towards the PRC.

Background:  In response to the election of the Democratic Progressive Party’s candidate as President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 2032, the leadership in Beijing decides that peaceful unification is no longer possible and that steps must be taken to remind Taiwan of where they stand. The PRC’s People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force conducts a conventional missile strike on Ching Chuan Kang Air Base in Taichung, Taiwan. The attack results in the destruction of the air base and two wings of F-16 fighters, and the death of 200 military personnel and 50 civilians.

Significance:  Beijing ordered the missile strike to remind the Taiwanese public of the power of the Chinese military and the immense destruction of an all-out invasion. The PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the attack was conducted to thwart the “expansion of Taiwan independence separatists” and warns that progress must be made on peaceful unification or additional strikes “will once and for all quash the Taiwan independence movement and achieve the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation.” Taipei promises to retaliate to this breach of sovereignty and to defend every inch of its territory against Chinese military attacks.

The strike is viewed as the first step toward an invasion of Taiwan as it is the first time since the Cold War that PRC forces attacked Taiwan. The United States and its regional allies and partners worry that additional missile strikes will occur, causing Taipei respond to these military incursions and escalating the situation into a war. Washington sends additional carrier strike groups to the region, and Japan prepares its southern islands for war. Estimates put the global economic costs of a cross-Strait war at a figure of at least $2 trillion[1]. Conflict in the Taiwan Strait would test U.S. resolve to protect a longstanding partner, put regional allies at risk, and decimate the global economy.

Option #1:  Taipei conducts a missile strike against Shuimen Air Base in Fujian Province, PRC. 

Risk:  Ordering a retaliatory strike on a Chinese military base will escalate the already tense situation. Such a response could result in Beijing launching additional strikes throughout Taiwan. By fearing to look weak in the face of a Taiwanese challenge, Beijing may not limit its response to military bases and could consider striking cities in Taiwan as it views attacks on the “Chinese Mainland” as off limits in cross-Strait provocations. Beyond escalatory strikes throughout Taiwan, Taipei would risk the safety and freedom of Taiwanese citizens living in China. A military response aimed at mainland China would allow Beijing justify a number of responses, including a military blockade and seizure of Taiwan’s islands in the South China Sea, and paint Taiwan as the escalatory actor internationally. PRC military leaders would undoubtedly pressure the Chinese Communist Party leaders at Zhongnanhai to destroy the Taiwanese military as punishment. Beijing would not allow any retaliation by Taiwan to go unpunished as it would provide the Chinese military with further justification to diminish Taiwan’s sovereignty and destroy additional military assets and infrastructure.

Gain:  By launching a retaliatory military strike against Shuimen Air Base, Taipei demonstrates to not only Beijing but also to the rest of the international community, particularly the United States and its allies, that it is willing to respond to Chinese provocations and will not sit by idly as China attacks Taiwan’s sovereignty. Option #1 is a wake-up call for Beijing, whose leadership believed that Taipei would not respond in-kind to its initial strike. The tit-for-tat strikes point to stronger-than-expected resolve in Taiwan, especially as the people of Taiwan rally to defend their country against a stronger enemy.

Option #2:  Taipei uses its newly commissioned submarines to sink the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning, which is participating in a military exercise in the Western Pacific, but does not take credit for, or acknowledge its role in, the attack.

Risk:  Sinking China’s first aircraft carrier runs the risk of the People’s Liberation Army – Navy (PLAN) initiating a blockade of Taiwan to prevent further attacks against Chinese vessels. Demonstrating such a weakness in the PLAN could result in over-compensation by China in asserting control and sovereignty in the Taiwan Strait. By not taking credit for the surprise sinking of the Liaoning, Taipei risks looking weak domestically by not forcefully (and publicly) retaliating against China. Non-acknowledgment also provides space for Beijing to claim domestically that the exercise’s purpose was to simulate the destruction of an aircraft carrier and to retire the now-obsolete Liaoning.

Gain:  The submarine attack avoids the controversy and risk of attacking the mainland, which would assuredly result in significant reprisals, and provides Taiwan with plausible deniability regarding who sunk the vessel. Taipei’s strike on the Liaoning demonstrates weaknesses of the PLAN, which was not able to successfully defend one of its carriers against a perceived weaker and less sophisticated enemy, causing leadership in China to question the chances of success of a military invasion of Taiwan. Option #2 also exhibits the power and ability of Taiwan’s long-doubted indigenous military capabilities. The successful sinking of the Liaoning reinvigorates Taiwan’s military, which had been suffering from low morale for years. Due to the difficulty in accrediting the perpetrator of the attack, Taipei limits Beijing’s ability to further retaliate in Taiwan.

Other Comments:   Washington privately warns Taipei that any retaliation outside of a limited strike would result in the U.S. military not providing any assistance in the event of further escalation into full-fledged war.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] Vest, C., Kratz, A., & Goujon, R. (2022, December 13). The global economic disruptions from a taiwan conflict. Rhodium Group. https://rhg.com/research/taiwan-economic-disruptions/. 

2023 - Contest: The Taiwan Offensive China (People's Republic of China) Option Papers Taiwan Thomas J. Shattuck
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Call for Papers: Investing and Divesting

Background:

Divergent Options is a non-politically aligned non-revenue generating national security website that, in 1,000 words or less, provides unbiased, dispassionate, candid articles that assess a national security situation, present multiple options to address the situation, and articulate the risk and gain of each option.  Please note that while we assess a national security situation and may provide options, we never recommend a specific option.

Below you will see a Call for Papers.  If you are not interested in writing on this topic, we always welcome individual articles on virtually any national security situation an author is passionate about.  Please do not let our call for papers cause you to hesitate to send us your idea. We look forward to hearing from you!

Call for Papers:

Divergent Options is calling for national security papers assessing situations or discussing options related to Investing and Divesting.

For the purpose of this Call for Papers, investing and divesting refers to choices made, in a resource constrained environment, to address existing or future national security situations.  For example, the U.S. divested addressing threats in Afghanistan and invested in addressing threats posed by the People’s Republic of China.  What investment or divestment decisions are being made?  What investment or divestment decisions are not being made?  Are these the right decisions?  What factors are driving action or inaction related to national security investment or divestment?

Please limit your article to 1,000 words and write using our Options Paper or Assessment Paper templates which are designed for ease of use by both writers and readers alike.

Please send your article to submissions@divergentoptions.org by June 30, 2023.

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Assessing Guatemalan Military Relationships

Juan Manuel Perez has served in the Guatemalan Army. He presently is retired. Throughout his military career, he took various military training courses as part of his professionalization including Strategic High Studies, War College, Command and Staff College, Human Rights, and Peacekeeping Operations. He can be found on Twitter @r_juanmanuel. 

Title:  Assessing Guatemalan Military Relationships 

Date Originally Written:  April 10, 2023. 

Date Originally Published:  April 24, 2023.  

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is a retired military member who believes trust builds strong international military relationships. This article includes the author’s great experiences working together with U.S. Southern Command leaders between 2016-2017.

Summary:  The Guatemalan Military is able to meet the challenges it faces through its various partnerships.  Its partnership with the U.S. Southern Command builds capacity and capabilities to counter threat networks and prepare for and respond to disasters and humanitarian crises.  Its partnerships with border sharing nations such as Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, and an adjacency zone with Belize enable all involved to address common threats.

Text:  The diplomatic relation between the U.S. Government and Guatemala has existed since 1849[1].  This partnership between the U.S. Government and Guatemala has improved Guatemalan Military capabilities and competencies to address trans-regional challenges.  

Guatemala is part of 31 countries that encompass the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR).  In this AOR, trans-regional and transnational threats affect security and governance. Drug trafficking is also a significant security challenge.  However, due to the close proximity of the U.S. and the USSOUTHCOM AOR, U.S. support can be provided and strong relationships built.

USSOUTHCOM provides different levels of support to countries in its AOR: strategic, operational, and tactical. This support assists host nation militaries and security forces with training, equipment, and planning as part of the U.S. Department of Defense contribution to regional strategy. 

USSOUTHCOM support to the Guatemalan Military has been critical to building capacity to counter regional threat networks and preparing for and responding to disasters and crises.  Organizations supporting the Guatemalan Military also include the greater U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Army South, the Arkansas National Guard, and the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 

Through the Interagency Task Force (IATF) in combating drug trafficking[2], USSOUTHCOM strengthened the Guatemalan Military and National Police through counter narcotics aid and technical assistance. The IATF consisted in three task forces which operate close to the Guatemala’s main porous borders.  

The first Task Force was called “Tecun Uman” which operated in western border with Mexico. The second Task Force was called “Chorti” which operated in the eastern region of the Guatemala adjacent to the border region with Honduras.  The third Task Force was called “Xinca”, which operated adjacent to the border region with El Salvador. In 2016-2017 the project of a fourth Task Force “Jaguar” was planned, which was going to be focused to work in the northern region of Guatemala bordering Mexico.  

The Guatemalan Military must also be prepared to handle natural disasters during the rainy season, the possibility of eruption of one of the chain of volcanos, and the latent hazard of earthquakes.  USSOUTHCOM has worked with the Guatemalan Military to enhance Humanitarian and Disaster Relief capabilities. The U.S. has share advanced technology which have help to predict, avert, or mitigate before natural threats happens. The exchange of experiences and lesson learned have created trust between partners nations, in real crisis responses. The U.S. capabilities also have aided to delivery quick humanitarian supplies for people in need, especially in time of hurricanes or tropical floods. These efforts have helped improved interoperability and institutionalize preparedness and responses measures.

Guatemala has developed a security strategy based on the competencies and capabilities that each government institution possesses. These competencies and capabilities generate synergy through partnerships with friendly countries which share a common border with Guatemala such as Salvador, Honduras, Mexico and an adjacency zone with Belize. 

Another source of assistance to the Guatemalan Military is both Surveillance and intelligence technology through the Cooperative Situational Information Integration (CSII) system[3] collecting threat data to counter illicit organizations. Guatemala’s strategic relationship with Mexico enables the high-level group for security (GANSEG) to hold meetings on Intelligence, International Security and Terrorism, Organized Crime and Legal cooperation, and Public and Border Security.  

Guatemala coordinates with the Belize Defense Forces to conduct patrols with the scope of the Confidence Building Measures[4] along the adjacency zone, with the purpose of fighting the threats towards both countries.  

Guatemala also enhanced border security efforts with Honduras through the high-level group for security and justice (GANSEJ).  Other Central America countries have developed protocols on different topics, including natural disasters and peace operations within dynamics of the Central America Armed Forces Conference (CFAC)[5]. 

Efforts by USSOUTHCOM through its entire AOR, and the Guatemalan Military with both USSOUTHCOM and its partners and neighbors, have enhanced security throughout the region, both from trans-regional threats and natural disasters. These efforts have built long-lasting relationships and interoperability that will enable Guatemala, and other countries in the USSOUTHCOM AOR to work together in the future to address any challenge that comes along.

Endnotes:

 [1] U.S. Department of State. (2021, November 9). U.S. relations with Guatemala – United States Department of State. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved April 23, 2023, from https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-guatemala/

[2] Oak, G. S. (2015, February 9). Building the guatemalan interagency task force Tecún Umán. RAND Corporation. Retrieved April 23, 2023, from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR885.html

[3] US, Latin American countries demonstrate, assess new information-sharing technology. DVIDS. (n.d.). Retrieved April 23, 2023, from https://www.dvidshub.net/news/122355/us-latin-american-countries-demonstrate-assess-new-information-sharing-technology

[4] OAS: Belize and Guatemala Sign Agreement on Negotiation Framework and Confidence Building Measures. (n.d.). Retrieved April 23, 2023, from https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-188/05

[5] Valle/Diálogo, K. (2022, August 2). CFAC strengthens alliances in Central America. Diálogo Américas. Retrieved April 23, 2023, from https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/cfac-strengthens-alliances-in-central-america/#.ZEUX8S_MIzw

Allies & Partners Assessment Papers Capacity / Capability Enhancement Guatemala Juan Manuel Perez
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Assessing the National Guard State Partnership Program and Possible Impact on U.S./Latin America Relations: Is the State Partnership Program Being Leveraged to Its Fullest Potential?

Travis L. Eddleman is a Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Army. He is currently Battalion Commander of the 875th Engineer Battalion, Arkansas Army National Guard. He earned his Doctor of Science (D.Sc.) in Civil Security Leadership, Management, and Policy from New Jersey City University. His research focuses on civil-military relations and the challenges of the traditional drilling guardsman. He can be found on Twitter @tleddleman. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group. 

Title:  Assessing the National Guard State Partnership Program and Possible Impact on U.S./Latin America Relations: Is the State Partnership Program Being Leveraged to Its Fullest Potential?

Date Originally Written:  March 9, 2023.

Date Originally Published:  March 13, 2023.

Author and/or Article Point of View:  The author is a U.S. Army National Guard Officer. The author believes in the inherent strengths of the State Partnership Program and that the program should be leveraged to its fullest potential to strengthen security cooperation in Latin America, preserving U.S. influence in the hemisphere.

Summary:  With continuous involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last two decades, the United States has neglected relationships in Latin America. Several countries within the U.S. sphere of influence have been subjected to Chinese and Russian influence. The National Guard State Partnership Program has produced strong, long-term relationships that can be leveraged to strengthen continued security cooperation in Latin America. 

Text:  The concept of security cooperation involves developing and fostering defense relationships promoting specific U.S. security interests[1] and “aligning security cooperation programs, activities, and resources with defense strategy and priorities[2].” Of the many programs encompassed under the umbrella of security cooperation, the State Partnership Program (SPP) directly involves individual states’ National Guard forces and provides them an avenue to assist in accomplishing strategic level objectives and policy goals for both the Department of Defense and the Department of State[3]. Since its inception over 25 years ago, the SPP has increased to include 85 partnerships with 93 different nations across all Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs)[4]. The SPP does not seek to increase self-sustainment among partner militaries but to establish and maintain important security relationships between the U.S. and other nations with common interests and goals[5]. 

The Monroe Doctrine, originally issued by U.S. President James Monroe in 1823, established the western hemisphere as the United States’ “sphere of interest.” The subsequent Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine further instituted the U.S. intent to police the western hemisphere in defense and preservation of U.S. interests there[6]. The Roosevelt Corollary was the first U.S. attempt to achieve global security for its own interests[7]. Since that time, these policies have largely focused southward to Latin America. However, with the two-decade long involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States, according to some analysts, quickly turned its back on our Latin American partners[8]. 

The diversion of U.S. attention from activities in Latin America created opportunity for increased Russian and Chinese influence[9] along with numerous concerning shifts in the countries of Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia[10]. In a 2021 assessment, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence identified several concerning security issues ongoing in Latin America. Due to continuing sanctions against Russia, the Russian government has expanded relations with and in support of Venezuela, Cuba, and other Latin American nations to increase commerce agreements and offset the impact of U.S. sanctions. In addition, widespread frustration, and concern over economic woes in Latin America brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, further threatened regional security and stability[11]. 

As the first quarter of the 21st century draws to a close, security cooperation in Latin America has become more important than it has been in decades, and the National Guard possesses the ability to increase U.S. influence and strengthen continued security cooperation between the U.S. and friendly nations to the south though the State Partnership Program. As the United States looks to extend and fortify its strategic influence, policy makers would be wise to consider this currently existing, well-established program, as it could have a significant impact on the achievement of national strategic objectives. Currently the U.S. has 24 existing SPP relationships in Latin America[12], more than any other GCC[13]. Yet, despite these 24 existing relationships, the SPP seems an afterthought at most and a completely missed opportunity at worst[14]. The National Guard brings a key aspect to relationships with their foreign partners. Guardsmen tend to stay in place for years, sometimes even decades in the same unit. They initiate and develop long-term, robust relationships with their foreign partners that add a very personal dimension to these important security cooperation agreements[15]. In many instances, relationships between National Guard forces and their foreign partners have become so strong the foreign militaries have deployed oversees with their National Guard counterparts in both Iraq and Afghanistan[16]. 

Despite a nearly 30-year existence of the SPP, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) only recently implemented new budgeting measures to allocate funding based upon the importance of a particular SPP relationship and how closely that relationship aligns with U.S. strategic goals and desired outcomes[17]. The NGB allocated funding for fiscal year 2022 based upon assignment of each state partnership to one of three prioritized groups. More detailed management and budgetary alignment of resources of this sort will prove instrumental to U.S. security cooperation agreements as the U.S. turns its attention back to changing political environments in Latin America and concern about America’s standing there.

Doug Bandow, a Senior Fellow at the CATO Institute, suggested the U.S. needs to learn better ways to manage its own neighborhood: Latin America[18]. The means to reassert the influence once enjoyed under the Monroe Doctrine and the subsequent Roosevelt Corollary and capitalize on existing security cooperation efforts already exists in the form of the National Guard SPP. Policy makers and senior leaders can continue to leverage the quality relationships the SPP has have built in those countries now buffeted by concerning influence. General Daniel Hokanson, Chief of the NGB, referenced the SPP as “a process among friends[19].” With rapid change and growing Russian and Chinese influence in Latin America, the United States would do well to remember its friends and capitalize on these long-standing relationships forged between U.S. citizen-soldiers and their foreign partners. 

Endnotes:

[1] U.S. Department of Defense. (2016, December 29). DOD directive 5132.03, December 29, 2016 – U.S. department of defense. Retrieved March 3, 2023, from https://open.defense.gov/portals/23/Documents/foreignasst/DoDD_513203_on_Security_Cooperation.pdf 

[2] Department of Defense. (2023). Security Cooperation. Retrieved March 7, 2023, from https://open.defense.gov/Transparency/Security-Cooperation/#:~:text=The Office of the Under,with defense strategy and priorities. 

[3] Security Cooperation, 2023.

[4] Department of Defense. (2022, March 23). Department of Defense Strategic Evaluation the Office of the deputy … defense.gov. Retrieved March 6, 2023, from https://open.defense.gov/portals/23/documents/security_cooperation/state_partnership_program.pdf 

[5] Lengyel, J. (2018). “Securing the nation one partnership at a time.” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Fall, 3-9. 

[6] National Archives and Records Administration. (2022, May 10). Monroe Doctrine (1823). Retrieved March 6, 2023, from https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/monroe-doctrine 

[7] Ricard, S. (2006). “The Roosevelt Corollary,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 36, 17-26.

[8] Youngers, C. (2003, June 6). The U.S. and Latin America after 9-11 and Iraq. Americas Program. Retrieved March 8, 2023, from https://www.americas.org/1807/ 

[9] Gaffney, F. (2022, June 21). Paging president Monroe. Center for Security Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2023, from https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/paging-president-monroe/ 

[10] Bandow, D. (2022, June 29). Latin America Rises: Whither the Monroe Doctrine. Cato.org. Retrieved March 3, 2023, from https://www.cato.org/commentary/latin-america-rises-whither-monroe-doctrine 

[11] Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2021, April 9). Annual Threat Estimate of the U.S. Intelligence Community. dni.gov. Retrieved March 5, 2023, from https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf

[12] Lengyel, 2018.

[13] SOUTHCOM’s 2022 Posture Statement to Congress. (2022, March 8). Retrieved March 6, 2023, from https://www.southcom.mil/Media/Special-Coverage/SOUTHCOMs-2022-Posture-Statement-to-Congress/ 

[14] Warbrick, M. (2022, February 25). Time to integrate State Partnership Program in Pentagon Planning. Breaking Defense. Retrieved March 4, 2023, from https://breakingdefense.com/2022/02/time-to-integrate-state-partnership-program-in-pentagon-planning/ 

[15] Garamone, J. (2021, November 12). Guard Partnership Program adapts, continues to grow. U.S. Department of Defense. Retrieved March 5, 2023, from https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2842285/guard-partnership-program-adapts-continues-to-grow/ 

[16] Lengyel, 2018.

[17] Sherman, T. (2022, July 12). State Partnership Program: DOD should ensure partner Record Completed Activities and Clarify Appropriate Authorities. Retrieved March 4, 2023, from https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104672.pdf 

[18] Bandow, 2022.

[19] Garamone, 2021.

Assessment Papers Capacity / Capability Enhancement Latin America Non-Full-Time Military Forces (Guard, Reserve, Territorial Forces, Militias, etc) Travis L. Eddleman U.S. Army
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Call for Papers: Security Cooperation

Background:

Divergent Options is a non-politically aligned non-revenue generating national security website that, in 1,000 words or less, provides unbiased, dispassionate, candid articles that assess a national security situation, present multiple options to address the situation, and articulate the risk and gain of each option.  Please note that while we assess a national security situation and may provide options, we never recommend a specific option.

Below you will see a Call for Papers.  If you are not interested in writing on this topic, we always welcome individual articles on virtually any national security situation an author is passionate about.  Please do not let our call for papers cause you to hesitate to send us your idea. We look forward to hearing from you!

Call for Papers:

Divergent Options is calling for national security papers assessing situations or discussing options related to Security Cooperation.  For the purpose of this Call for Papers, Security Cooperation is defined as “Interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and to conduct operations, and provide peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations.”

Please limit your article to 1,000 words and write using our Options Paper or Assessment Paper templates which are designed for ease of use by both writers and readers alike.

Please send your article to submissions@divergentoptions.org by April 14, 2023.

 

Call For Papers
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Options for the United States to Arm Anti-Assad Factions in Syria with Defensive Weapons

Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, and United States Army. In addition to Divergent Options, he has been published in the Center for Maritime Strategy, the Center for International Maritime Security, the Washington Monthly, Merion West, Wisdom of Crowds, Braver Angels, and more. He can be found on Twitter at @MDPurzycki, on Medium at https://mdpurzycki.medium.com/, and on Substack at The Non-Progressive Democrat.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Options for the United States to Arm Anti-Assad Factions in Syria with Defensive Weapons

Date Originally Written:  February 27, 2023.

Date Originally Published:  March 6, 2023.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author fears that political reconciliation between Turkey and Syria, undertaken with the goal of returning refugees displaced during the Syrian Civil War from Turkey back to Syria, could precipitate massive, destabilizing refugee flows, and could vastly increase the level of violence inflicted on Syrian civilians by Syrian regime and Russian forces. The author believes the United States could consider providing defensive weapons, such as surface-to-air missiles[1], to Syrians who continue to resist the regime of Bashar al-Assad, to help them protect themselves against future attacks. 

Background:  Since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, Turkey, led by President Recep Erdogan, has sought the ouster of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and has supported armed groups resisting Assad’s rule[2]. Recently, however, Erdogan and Assad have explored possible reconciliation, to the degree that their respective defense ministers met in person on December 28, 2022, for the first time since the war began[3]. Erdogan has explored this fence-mending with a view to returning Syrian refugees in Turkey to Syria, as Turkish public opinion toward the refugees is largely negative[4]. However, many refugees are unwilling to return to Syria, fearing persecution and violence from the Assad regime if they do[5]. The earthquake that struck both Syria and Turkey on February 6, 2023, has made refugees’ lives even more difficult, and their prospects more daunting[6].

In 2015, Russia intervened militarily in the Syrian Civil War on the side of the Assad regime. Since then, Syrian regime and Russian forces have repeatedly launched air and artillery strikes against civilian targets in regions of Syria controlled by opponents of the regime[7][8][9][10][11]. The 2015 refugee crisis, in which millions of people (many of them Syrian) arrived in Europe fleeing war and persecution[12], occurred in part due to the deliberate uses of force against civilians[13]. The refugees’ arrival was deeply controversial in many European countries, producing widespread political backlash[14][15][16]. Approximately 3.6 million Syrians are refugees in Turkey[17], while approximately 6.9 million are displaced within Syria[18].

Significance:  If a Turkey-Syria reconciliation precipitates another massive flow of Syrian refugees into Europe, it could weaken European solidarity in arming Ukraine against Russia’s invasion[19]. Russian President Vladimir Putin benefited politically from the difficulties Europe experienced due to refugee flows in 2015[20], and would likely experience similar benefits from a new Syrian refugee crisis. Such events could occur in tandem with massacres of Syrian civilians by Syrian regime and Russian forces on a scale larger than is currently ongoing.

Option #1: The United States removes the terrorist designation from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and provides them defensive weapons.

Risk:  HTS is considered a terrorist organization by the United States, a designation stemming from the group’s predecessor, Jabhat al-Nusra, being previously affiliated with al-Qaeda[21][22]. Removing that designation, let alone providing HTS with weapons of any kind, would be extremely controversial within the U.S. political context. Furthermore, HTS has been accused of extensive human rights violations in the portion of northwestern Syria it controls [23].

Gain:  Arming HTS with defensive weapons could provide at least a limited shield to civilians in Idlib province, the portion of Syria currently most frequently targeted by the Syrian military and its Russian ally[24][25]. Furthermore, HTS is a well-structured organization with approximately 10,000 fighters[26], obviating the need for the U.S. to engage in creating a fighting force from scratch.

Option #2: The United States provides defensive weapons to factions within the Syrian National Army (SNA).

Risk:  The SNA is supported by the government of Turkey[27], and many of its factions may not be amenable to aligning with U.S. interests, particularly if U.S. and Turkish interests conflict. Also, the portions of northern Syria controlled by the SNA do not include Idlib province[28], the region facing the most frequent strikes by regime and Russian forces. Furthermore, some SNA factions have been accused of various forms of brutality against civilians[29].

Gain:  Arming factions of the SNA would take advantage of the fact that well-organized, armed groups opposed to the Assad regime already exist within Syria[30], saving the U.S. the time and effort of trying to create such groups from scratch. Furthermore, if some SNA factions refuse to support Turkey-Syria political reconciliation, providing them with defensive weapons could improve their chances of surviving as an anti-Assad force in a period of renewed, expanded conflict – a force that would likely be grateful to the U.S. for helping them defend themselves. 

Option #3: The United States organizes new groups of anti-Assad Syrians and provides them with defensive weapons.

Risk:   U.S. attempts in 2014-2015 to organize new armed groups in Syria to fight the Islamic State fared poorly, yielding far fewer fighters than hoped for[31]. It is unclear whether any attempt to organize similar groups to defend against the Assad regime and Russia would be any more successful.

Gain:  Creating new groups, if successful, would allow the U.S. to defend Syrian civilians against attacks without the moral complications that might arise from arming HTS or portions of the SNA.

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] Purzycki, Michael D. “SAMs to Syria: Can the Marines Weaken Putin on Another Front?” Center for Maritime Strategy, October 5, 2022. https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/publications/sams-to-syria-can-the-marines-weaken-putin-on-another-front/

[2] Siccardi, Francesco. “How Syria Changed Turkey’s Foreign Policy.” Carnegie Europe, September 14, 2021. https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/09/14/how-syria-changed-turkey-s-foreign-policy-pub-85301

[3] France 24. “Russian, Syrian, Turkish defence ministers meet in Moscow for first talks since 2011.” December 28, 2022. https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20221228-russian-syrian-turkish-defence-ministers-meet-in-moscow-for-first-talks-since-2011

[4] Khoury, Nabeel A. “Erdoğan’s Rapprochement with Assad Spells Trouble for Syrian Refugees.” Arab Center Washington DC, February 1, 2023. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/erdogans-rapprochement-with-assad-spells-trouble-for-syrian-refugees/

[5] Levkowitz, Joshua. “Syrian refugees in Turkey watch uneasily as Erdogan warms to Assad.” Al-Monitor, January 15, 2023. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/01/syrian-refugees-turkey-watch-uneasily-erdogan-warms-assad

[6] Dawi, Akmal. “After Earthquake, Some Syrian War Refugees Look Beyond Turkey.” Voice of America, February 22, 2023. https://www.voanews.com/a/after-earthquake-some-syrian-war-refugees-look-beyond-turkey-/6974321.html.

[7] Hill, Evan, Christiaan Triebert, Malachy Browne, Dmitriy Khavin, Drew Jordan and Whitney Hurst. “Russia Bombed Four Syrian Hospitals. We Have Proof.” New York Times, October 13, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/middleeast/100000005697485/russia-bombed-syrian-hospitals.html

[8] Breslow, Jason. “Russia showed its playbook in Syria. Here’s what it may mean for civilians in Ukraine.” NPR, March 1, 2022. https://www.npr.org/2022/03/01/1083686606/ukraine-russia-civilian-casualties-syria

[9] “Syria: Deadly attacks affecting IDP camps.” United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, November 8, 2022. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/11/syria-deadly-attacks-affecting-idp-camps

[10] “Syria/Russia: 12 Civilians Dead in Idlib Artillery Attacks.” ReliefWeb, December 8, 2021. https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syriarussia-12-civilians-dead-idlib-artillery-attacks-enar

[11] “Ten Killed in Syria Regime Rocket Strikes: Monitor.” Defense Post, November 7, 2022. https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/11/07/syria-regime-rocket-strikes/

[12] “Is this humanitarian migration crisis different?” OECD Migration Policy Debates, September 2015. https://www.oecd.org/migration/Is-this-refugee-crisis-different.pdf

[13] “Russian bombing in Syria ‘fuels refugee crisis’ says US official as airstrike kills 39.” Guardian, January 9, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/09/imprecise-russian-bombing-syria-fuelling-refugee-crisis-us-official

[14] Garrett, Amanda. “The Refugee Crisis, Brexit, and the Reframing of Immigration in Britain.” EuropeNow, August 1, 2019. https://www.europenowjournal.org/2019/09/09/the-refugee-crisis-brexit-and-the-reframing-of-immigration-in-britain/

[15] Karnitschnig, Matthew. “Backlash grows against Merkel over refugees.” Politico, September 11, 2015. https://www.politico.eu/article/backlash-merkel-refugees-migration-germany-coalition-pressure/

[16] Cienski, Jan. “Why Poland doesn’t want refugees.” Politico, May 21, 2017. https://www.politico.eu/article/politics-nationalism-and-religion-explain-why-poland-doesnt-want-refugees/

[17] Ridgwell, Henry. “Facing Poverty and Hostility, Refugees in Turkey Mull Return to War-Torn Syria.” Voice of America, December 9, 2022. https://www.voanews.com/a/facing-poverty-and-hostility-refugees-in-turkey-mull-return-to-war-torn-syria/6869601.html

[18] “Syria Refugee Crisis Explained.” USA for UNHCR, July 8, 2022. https://www.unrefugees.org/news/syria-refugee-crisis-explained/

[19] Fix, Liana, and Jeffrey Mankoff. “Europe Has to Step Up on Ukraine to Keep the U.S. From Stepping Back.” Council on Foreign Relations, December 9, 2022. https://www.cfr.org/article/europe-has-step-ukraine-keep-us-stepping-back

[20] Ellyatt, Holly. “Putin ‘weaponizing’ migrant crisis to hurt Europe.” CNBC, March 2, 2016. https://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/02/putin-weaponizing-migrant-crisis-to-hurt-europe.html

[21] “Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.” National Counterterrorism Center, October 2022. https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/hts_fto.html

[22] Solomon, Christopher. “HTS: Evolution of a Jihadi Group.” Wilson Center, July 13, 2022. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/hts-evolution-jihadist-group

[23] “The Most Notable Hay’at Tahrir al Sham Violations Since the Establishment of Jabhat al Nusra to Date.” Syrian Network for Human Rights, January 31, 2022. https://snhr.org/blog/2022/01/31/57274/

[24] Ben Hamad, Fatma. “‘We’ve gotten used to air strikes’: A Syrian documents Russian attacks in Idlib.” France 24, August 16, 2022. https://observers.france24.com/en/middle-east/20220816-syrie-idlib-frappes-doubles-raids-russe-crimes-de-guerre

[25] Waters, Gregory. “Idlib is under siege.” Middle East Institute, February 22, 2023. https://www.mei.edu/blog/idlib-under-siege

[26] Solomon.

[27] Kasapoglu, Can. “The Syrian National Army and the Future of Turkey’s Frontier Land Force.” Jamestown Foundation, March 12, 2021. https://jamestown.org/program/the-syrian-national-army-and-the-future-of-turkeys-frontier-land-force/

[28] Balanche, Fabrice. “The Assad Regime Has Failed to Restore Full Sovereignty Over Syria.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 10, 2021. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/assad-regime-has-failed-restore-full-sovereignty-over-syria

[29] Tsurkov, Elizabeth. “The Gangs of Northern Syria: Life Under Turkey’s Proxies.” December 7, 2022. https://newlinesinstitute.org/syria/the-gangs-of-northern-syria-life-under-turkeys-proxies/

[30] Özkizilcik, Ömer. “The Syrian National Army (SNA): Structure, Functions, and Three Scenarios for its Relationship with Damascus.” Geneva Centre for Security Policy, October 2020. https://dam.gcsp.ch/files/doc/sna-structure-function-damascus

[31] Ackerman, Spencer. “US has trained only ‘four or five’ Syrian fighters against Isis, top general testifies.” Guardian, September 16, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/sep/16/us-military-syrian-isis-fighters

Capacity / Capability Enhancement Civil War Michael D. Purzycki Option Papers Refugees Syria Turkey United States
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Writing Contest: The Taiwan Offensive

Once again Divergent Options has enlisted Kori Schake of the American Enterprise Institute, Wayne Hugar of the National Intelligence University, and Ali Wyne of EurasiaGroup’s Global Macro-Geopolitics practice to be the judges for a writing contest which this time around we are calling The Taiwan Offensive.

What:  A 1,000 word Options Paper or Assessment Paper looking at an offensive of some kind related to Taiwan.

Context:  This contest is purposely broad and depending on the writers to establish the offensive.

Is China conducting an offense against Taiwan?  If so, what can Taiwan do to defend itself?  Writers can discuss what Taiwan would do at the time of China’s offensive, or what Taiwan must do now to prepare itself.

Where and how does the offensive occur?  Is the offensive on land, sea, air, space, cyberspace, or a combination?  While an offensive may traditionally imply military actions, what would a diplomatic, informational, or economic offensive look like?  Does the offensive occur during peacetime, crisis, conflict, or war?

Are other countries conducting an offensive against China in response to Chinese aggression against Taiwan?  Are non-state actors involved in the offensive?

Are China’s Belt and Road Initiative and emerging Global Development Initiative efforts now potential hostages?  Did China stretch itself out so far globally that it is unable to dominate locally?

When:  Submit your 1,000 word Options Paper or Assessment Paper between March 1, 2023 and July 31, 2023 to submissions@divergentoptions.org.

Why:  To refine your thoughts on national security situations related to Taiwan.  Writers will have a chance to win $500 for 1st Place, $300 for 2nd Place, $100 for 3rd Place, or be one of three Honorable Mentions who receives $50.

How:  Submissions will be judged by strength of argument, relevance, uniqueness, adherence to format, adherence to length, and grammar, spelling, and punctuation.  Submissions will be published during and after the contest closes.  Submissions will be judged during August 2023 and winners announced during September 2023.

Other Comments:  For the purposes of this contest we encourage writers to think in an unconstrained manner and to not worry about what authority or what organization would be used to execute a given option.

2023 - Contest: The Taiwan Offensive
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Assessing the Need for the Battlefield Scavenger

Shawn Moore is Principal of the Russell Area Technology Center. He has studied abroad as a Fulbright Scholar in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Japan. He has conducted research studies in China and the Republic of Korea. Shawn is an Officer in the South Carolina State Guard and recipient of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers‘ Peter Jasin Graduate Fellowship. Shawn holds a Bachelor of Science in History and Geography from Morehead State University, a Master of Arts in Counseling, and a Masters of Arts in Leadership. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing the Need for the Battlefield Scavenger

Date Originally Written:  January 14, 2023.

Date Originally Published:  January 30, 2023.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that a new type of support soldier is necessary for the battlefields of today.

Summary:  The decisive impact of autonomous systems on the battlefield today coupled with supply chain interruptions during major combat operations will lead to the novel creation of the battlefield scavenger. This scavenger will retrieve, repurpose, repair, and return autonomous systems to operational status, reducing supply chain dependence and enhancing combat effectiveness.

Text:  The war in Ukraine has shown the demands for a wide range of technical capabilities across all facets of conflict. Autonomous systems, for the purposes of this article, refers to “any particular machine or system capable of performing an automated function and potentially learning from its experiences to enhance its performance[1].”

Autonomous systems in Ukraine have carried out surveillance, kinetic strikes, electronic warfare, and resupply missions either independently or operating collaboratively. When employed in combat, autonomous systems provide operational advantages over an adversary. The Ukraine War has also shown the rapid rate in which materiel is consumed in modern war. These autonomous devices may not be costly, but the technology becomes increasingly difficult to obtain as factories and supply lines fall under attack. Further, in a Great Power Conflict, access to raw materials to produce autonomous systems will be contested.

The worldwide diffusion of technology has the potential to offset some of the supply and procurement problems in Ukraine. Officials in Europe addressed these problems publicly with the revelation that Russian Soldiers were seen cannibalizing components and microchips from refrigerators and washing machines to use for military purposes[2]. The Russian Military proved that autonomous systems being removed from the battlespace results in lives lost and the loss of valuable time at critical periods of battle. The Ukraine Military has turned to commercially available autonomous systems and modified them for combat operations.

The reliance on autonomous systems will require a new type of combat service support soldier who will scavenge the battlespace for discarded scrap, damaged autonomous systems, and devices that could be repurposed. Inspired by the Jawas of the film “Star Wars,” this article will refer to this new combat service support soldier also as JAWAS, though this is an acronym for Joint LAnd Water Air Scavenger. In “Star Wars,” Jawas[3] were passionate scavengers, combing the deserts of Tatooine for droids or scraps which they would capture and sell to the local residents, forming a codependent circle of trade. In a not too distant future, the side that is able to innovate and employ JAWAS the quickest will have an advantage over the adversary.

The JAWAS will work in on land, water, air, and even space. The JAWAS will be composed of individuals with exceptional imagination, the ability to think laterally while having the physical stamina to engage in scavenging the battle space and defending their area of operations. JAWAS will station close to the front line to reduce the response time operating as a self-contained company from a mobile platform that includes workshops. The JAWAS will operate on the Golden Hour, a term familiar to military medicine. The Golden Hour is the ability to get wounded warfighters off the battlefield and delivered to the care of a full-scale military hospital within an hour[4]. JAWAS will roam the environment to quickly retrieve, repurpose, repair and return autonomous systems to an operational status.

Once a system is acquired, relying on field expedient materials in theater and limited supplies, the JAWAS will undertake the process of designing, fabricating, programming, and assembling autonomous systems for combat on land, water, or air. JAWAS will need to be a special type of soldier coming from the science, technology, engineering and mathematics fields, but also have with an exceptional imagination. They will use power tools, hand tools, and advanced diagnostic equipment to support multidomain operations. The leadership from junior officers and noncommissioned officers of JAWAS will be no less than that required by combat troops.

JAWAS support combat operations by leveraging autonomous systems to create advantages over adversaries. Furthering the reliance on locally sourced materials will limit the supply and procurement requests for parts and components. This local sourcing will allow scarce transportation to be dedicated to moving war materiel into the theater. While JAWAS may not exist now, the demand signal is coming, and employing untrained soldiers in this manner will result in confusion, panic, and possible defeat.

Endnotes:

[1] James Rands, “Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems on the Battlefield – Proof.” Posted 28 February 2019, (accessed May 2, 2020); Richard J. Sleesman, and Todd C. Huntley. “Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: An Overview.” Army Lawyer, no. 1, Jan. 2019, p. 32+, (access May 2, 2020).

[2] Nardelli, A., Baschuk, B., & Champion, M. (2022, October 29). Putin Stirs Worry That Russia Is Stripping Home-Appliance Imports for Arms. Time. Retrieved January 29, 2023, from https://time.com/6226484/russia-appliance-imports-weapons/

[3] Jawa. Wookieepedia. (n.d.). Retrieved January 29, 2023, from https://starwars.fandom.com/wiki/Jawa

[4] Aker, J. (2022, June 14). Military Medicine Is Preparing for the Next Conflict. Medical Education and Training Campus. Retrieved January 29, 2023, from https://www.metc.mil/METC-News/News/News-Display/Article/3062564/military-medicine-is-preparing-for-the-next-conflict/.

Assessment Papers Autonomous Weapons Systems Capacity / Capability Enhancement Emerging Technology Shawn Moore
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Assessing Terrorism and Artificial Intelligence in 2050

William D. Harris is a U.S. Army Special Forces Officer with six deployments for operations in Iraq and Syria and experience working in Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Israel, and other regional states. He has commanded from the platoon to battalion level and served in assignments with 1st Special Forces Command, 5th Special Forces Group, 101st Airborne Division, Special Operations Command—Central, and 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment.  William holds a Bachelor of Science from United States Military Academy, a Master of Arts from Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, a Masters from the Command and General Staff College, and a Masters from the School of Advanced Military Studies.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  AssessingTerrorism and Artificial Intelligence in 2050

Date Originally Written:  December 14, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  January 9, 2023.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is an active-duty military member who believes that terrorists will pose increasing threats in the future as technology enables their operations.  

Summary:  The proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) will enable terrorists in at least three ways.  First, they will be able to overcome their current manpower limitations in the proliferation of propaganda to increase recruitment.  Second, they will be able to use AI to improve target reconnaissance.  Third, terrorists can use AI to improve their attacks, including advanced unmanned systems and biological weapons.

Text:  Recent writing about the security implications of artificial intelligence (AI) has focused on the feasibility of a state like China or others with totalitarian aspirations building a modern panopticon, combining ubiquitous surveillance with massive AI-driven data processing and pattern recognition[1].  For years, other lines of research into AI have analyzed the application of AI to fast-paced conventional warfare.  Less has focused on how AI could help the sub-state actor, the criminal, insurgent, or terrorist.  Nevertheless, history shows that new technologies have never given their user an enduring and decisive edge.  Either the technology proliferates or combatants find countermeasures.  Consequently, understanding how AI technology could enable terrorists is a first step in preventing future attacks.

The proliferation of AI has the potential to enable terrorists similar to the way that the proliferation of man-portable weapons and encrypted communications have enabled terrorists to become more lethal[2].  Terrorists, or other sub-state entrepreneurs of violence, may be able to employ AI to solve operational problems.  This preliminary analysis will look at three ways that violent underground groups could use AI in the coming decades: recruitment, reconnaissance, and attack.

The advent of mass media allowed the spread of radical ideological tracts at a pace that led to regional and then global waves of violence.  In 1848, revolutionary movements threatened most of the states in Europe.  Half a century later, a global yet diffuse anarchist movement led to the assassination of five heads of state and the beginning of World War I[3].  Global revolutionary movements during the Cold War and then the global Islamist insurgency against the modern world further capitalized on the increasing bandwidth, range, and volume of communication[4].  The sleek magazine and videos of the Islamic State are the latest edition of the terrorists’ use of modern communications to craft and distribute a message intended to find and radicalize recruits.  If they employ advanced AI, terrorist organizations will be able to increase the production rate of quality materials in multiple languages, far beyond what they are currently capable of producing with their limited manpower.  The recent advances in AI, most notably with OpenAI’s Chatbot, demonstrate that AIs will be capable of producing quality materials.  These materials will be increasingly sophisticated and nuanced in a way to resonate with vulnerable individuals, leading to increased radicalization and recruitment[5].

Once a terrorist organization has recruited a cadre of fighters, then it can begin the process of planning and executing a terrorist attack, a key phase of which is reconnaissance.  AI could be an important tool here, enabling increased collection and analysis of data to find patterns of life and security vulnerabilities.  Distributed AI would allow terrorists conducting reconnaissance to collect and process vast quantities of information as opposed to relying on purely physical surveillance[6].  This AI use will speed up the techniques of open source intelligence collection and analysis, enabling the organization to identify the pattern of life of the employees of a targeted facility, and to find gaps and vulnerabilities in the security.  Open-source imagery and technical information could provide valuable sources for characterizing targets.  AI could also drive open architecture devices that enable terrorists to collect and access all signals in the electromagnetic spectrum and sound waves[7].  In the hands of skilled users, AI will able to enable the collection and analysis of information that was previously unavailable, or only available to the most sophisticated state intelligence operations.  Moreover, as the systems that run modern societies increase in complexity, that complexity will create new unanticipated failure modes, as the history of computer hacking or even the recent power grid attacks demonstrate[8].  

After conducting the target reconnaissance, terrorists could employ AI-enabled systems to facilitate or execute the attack.  The clearest example would be autonomous or semi-autonomous vehicles.  These vehicles will pose increasing problems for facilities protection in the future.  However, there are other ways that terrorists could employ AI to enable their attacks.  One idea would be to use AI agents to identify how they are vulnerable to facial recognition or other forms of pattern recognition.  Forewarned, the groups could use AI to generate deception measures to mislead security forces.  Using these AI-enabled disguises, the terrorists could conduct attacks with manned and unmanned teams.  The unmanned teammates could conduct parts of the operation that are too distant, dangerous, difficult, or restricted for their human teammates to action.  More frighteningly, the recent successes in applying machine learning and AI to understand deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and proteins could be applied to make new biological and chemical weapons, increasing lethality, transmissibility, or precision[9].  

Not all terrorist organizations will develop the sophistication to employ advanced AI across all phases of the organizations’ operations.  However, AI will continue and accelerate the arms race between security forces and terrorists.  Terrorists have applied most other human technologies in their effort to become more effective.  They will be able to apply AI to accelerate their propaganda and recruitment; target selection and reconnaissance; evasion of facial recognition and pattern analysis; unmanned attacks against fortified targets; manned-unmanned teamed attacks; and advanced biological and chemical attacks.  

One implication of this analysis is that the more distributed AI technology and access become, the more it will favor the terrorists.  Unlike early science fiction novels about AI, the current trends are for AI to be distributed and more available unlike the centralized mainframes of earlier fictional visions.  The more these technologies proliferate, the more defenders should be concerned.

The policy implications are that governments and security forces will continue their investments in technology to remain ahead of the terrorists.  In the west, this imperative to exploit new technologies, including AI, will increasingly bring the security forces into conflict with the need to protect individual liberties and maintain strict limits on the potential for governmental abuse of power.  The balance in that debate between protecting liberty and protecting lives will have to evolve as terrorists grasp new technological powers.

Endnotes:

[1] For example, see “The AI-Surveillance Symbiosis in China: A Big Data China Event,” accessed December 16, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ai-surveillance-symbiosis-china-big-data-china-event; “China Uses AI Software to Improve Its Surveillance Capabilities | Reuters,” accessed December 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-uses-ai-software-improve-its-surveillance-capabilities-2022-04-08/.

[2] Andrew Krepinevich, “Get Ready for the Democratization of Destruction,” Foreign Policy, n.d., https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/15/get-ready-for-the-democratization-of-destruction/.

[3] Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017).

[4] Ariel Victoria Lieberman, “Terrorism, the Internet, and Propaganda: A Deadly Combination,” Journal of National Security Law & Policy 9, no. 95 (April 2014): 95–124.

[5] See https://chat.openai.com/

[6] “The ABCs of AI-Enabled Intelligence Analysis,” War on the Rocks, February 14, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/02/the-abcs-of-ai-enabled-intelligence-analysis/.

[7] “Extracting Audio from Visual Information,” MIT News | Massachusetts Institute of Technology, accessed December 16, 2022, https://news.mit.edu/2014/algorithm-recovers-speech-from-vibrations-0804.

[8] Miranda Willson, “Attacks on Grid Infrastructure in 4 States Raise Alarm,” E&E News, December 9, 2022, https://www.eenews.net/articles/attacks-on-grid-infrastructure-in-4-states-raise-alarm/; Dietrich Dörner, The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Error in Complex Situations (Reading, Mass: Perseus Books, 1996).

[9] Michael Eisenstein, “Artificial Intelligence Powers Protein-Folding Predictions,” Nature 599, no. 7886 (November 23, 2021): 706–8, https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-021-03499-y.

Artificial Intelligence / Machine Learning / Human-Machine Teaming Assessment Papers Emerging Technology Violent Extremism William D. Harris
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Call for Papers: Ukraine in 2023

Source:  https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ukraine/

Background:

Divergent Options is a non-politically aligned non-revenue generating national security website that, in 1,000 words or less, provides unbiased, dispassionate, candid articles that assess a national security situation, present multiple options to address the situation, and articulate the risk and gain of each option.  Please note that while we assess a national security situation and may provide options, we never recommend a specific option.

Below you will see a Call for Papers.  If you are not interested in writing on this topic, we always welcome individual articles on virtually any national security situation an author is passionate about.  Please do not let our call for papers cause you to hesitate to send us your idea. We look forward to hearing from you!

Call for Papers:

Divergent Options is calling for national security papers assessing situations or discussing options related to Ukraine in 2023.

Please limit your article to 1,000 words and write using our Options Paper or Assessment Paper templates which are designed for ease of use by both writers and readers alike.

Please send your article to submissions@divergentoptions.org by February 11, 2023.

Below is a list of prompts that may inspire potential writers:

– What does Ukraine look like at the end of 2023?

– What is being neglected due to the focus on the Russian invasion of Ukraine?

– What does Russia look like at the end of 2023?

– What correct lessons have been learned from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?

– What actions will Russia’s invasion of Ukraine encourage throughout the world?

– What incorrect lessons have been learned from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?

– What actions will Russia’s invasion of Ukraine discourage throughout the world?

– What national security thought has been validated during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?

– How will lessons learned from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine be incorporated into policies, strategies, plans, and equipping?

– What national security thought has been invalidated during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?

– Is Russia learning lessons from their invasion of Ukraine that will make them more dangerous in the future?

– What national security thought has been re-validated during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?

Call For Papers Ukraine
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Assessing The Network-State in 2050

Bryce Johnston (@am_Bryce) is an U.S. Army officer currently serving in the 173 rd Airborne Brigade. He is a West Point graduate and a Fulbright Scholar. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing The Network-State in 2050

Date Originally Written:  December 12, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  December 26, 2022.   

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is an active-duty U.S. Army officer whose studies intersect technology and politics. His assessment combines Balaji Srinivasan’s concept of the network-state with Chamath Palihapitiya’s[1] claim that the marginal cost of energy and computation will eventually reach zero. The article is written from the point of view of an advisor to nation-states.

Summary:  Online communities have become an integral part of life in 2022. As money, computing power, and energy become cheaper, citizens may find themselves identifying more with an immersive online network than their nation. If this trend continues, the world’s balance of power may soon include powerful network-states that do not respect political boundaries and control important aspects of the globe’s information domain. 

Text:  The nation-state was the primary actor in international affairs for the last two centuries; advances in digital technology may ensure the network-state dominates the next two centuries. The network-state, as conceived by Balaji Srinivasan, is a cohesive digital community that is capable of achieving political aims and is recognized as sovereign by the international community[2]. The citizens of the network-state are not tied to a physical location. Instead, they gain their political and cultural identity through their affiliation with a global network connected through digital technology. The idea of the network-state poses an immediate challenge to the nation-state whose legitimacy comes through its ability to protect its physical territory.  By 2050, nation-states like the United States of America could compete with sovereign entities that exist within their borders. 

An accepted definition of a state is an entity that has a monopoly on violence within its territory[3]. While a network-state may have a weak claim to a monopoly of physical violence, they could monopolize an alternate form of power that is just as important. Most aspects of modern life rely on the cooperation of networks. A network-state that has a monopoly over the traffic that comes through it could very easily erode the will of a nation-state by denying its citizens the ability to move money, communicate with family, or even drive their car. One only has to look at China today to see this sort of power in action. 

Culturally, citizens in developed countries have grown used to spending most of their time online. The average American spends about eight hours online engaged with digital media[4]. Digital communities such as QAnon and WallStreetBets have been able to coordinate their members to affect the physical world. These communities were able to distill a strong sense of identity in their members even though they only ever interacted with each other in an online forum. Advances in generative media, virtual reality hardware, and digital currencies will only make these communities more engaging in the near future. 

The network-state is not inevitable. Three conditions are necessary to create the technology needed to sustain a politically viable digital community that spans the world by 2050. First, the marginal cost of capital must approach zero. The last decade saw interest rates stay near zero. Cheap money leads to the misallocation of capital towards frivolous endeavors, but it also nudges technologists to place a higher value on innovations that have a longer time horizon[5]. Artificial intelligence, crypto, and virtual reality all need significant investments to make them viable for the market. These same technologies also make up the building blocks of the network-state.

Second, the marginal cost of computing must approach zero. The technologies mentioned above require vast amounts of computational power. To persuade millions of users to make their online community the core of their identity, online communities will need to provide a persistent level of immersion that is not feasible today. This technical challenge is best understood by looking at the billions of dollars it took to allow Mark Zuckerberg’s metaverse citizens to traverse their community on legs[6]. Moore’s Law, which states that the number of transistors on microchips will double every year, has remained largely true for the last forty years[7]. While this pattern will likely come to an end, other technologies such as NVIDIA’s specialized graphic chips and quantum computing will ensure that the cost of computing power will drop over time[8].

Finally, the marginal cost of energy must approach zero. Improvements in computing technology will likely make systems more energy efficient, but digital communities that encompass a majority of mankind will require a large amount of energy. The ability to transfer this energy to decentralized nodes will become important as network-states span vast swaths of the earth. Solar panels and battery stations are already becoming cheap enough for individuals to buy. As these materials become cheaper and more reliable, most of the citizens in a network-state likely provide their own power. This decoupling from national grids and fossil fuels will not only allow these citizens to run their machines uninhibited but make them less vulnerable to coercion by nation-states who derive their power from energy production. 

The likelihood of these conditions occurring by 2050 is high. Investors like billionaire Chamath Palihapitiya are already betting on a drastic reduction in the cost of energy and computing power[9].  Assuming these three trends do allow for the creation of sovereign network-states, the balance of power on the global stage will shift. A world in which there is a unipolar moment amongst nation-states does not preclude the existence of a multipolar balance amongst network-states. Nation-states and network-states will not compete for many of the same resources, but the proliferation of new sovereign entities creates more opportunities for friction and miscalculation.

If war comes, nation-states will consider how to fight against an adversary that is not bound by territorial lines. Nation-states will have an advantage in that they control the physical means of production for commodities such as food and raw materials, but as the world becomes more connected to the internet, networks will still have a reach into this domain. The rise of the network-state makes it more important than ever for nation-states to control their physical infrastructure and learn to project power in the cognitive domain. Advanced missile systems and drones will do little to threaten the power of the network-state; instead, offensive capabilities will be limited to information campaigns and sophisticated cyber-attacks will allow the nation-state to protect its interests in a world where borders become meaningless.

Endnotes:

[1] Fridman, L. (November 15, 2022). Chamath Palihapitiya: Money, Success, Startups, Energy, Poker & Happiness (No. 338). Retrieved December 1, 2022, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFQUDCgMjRc

[2] Balaji, S. (2022, July 4). The Network-state in One Sentence. The Network-state. https://thenetworkstate.com/the-network-state-in-one-sentence

[3] Waters, T., & Waters, D. (2015). Politics As Vocation. In Weber’s Rationalism and Modern Society (pp. 129-198). Palgrave MacMillan, New York.

[4] Statista Research Department. (2022, August 16). Time spent with digital media in the U.S. 2011-2024. Statista Media. https://www.statista.com/statistics/262340/daily-time-spent-with-digital-media-according-to-us-consumsers

[5] Caggese, A., & Perez-Orive, A. (2017). Capital misallocation and secular stagnation. Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 9.

[6] Klee, M. (2022, October 12). After Spending Billions on the Metaverse, Mark Zuckerberg Is Left Standing on Virtual Legs. Rolling Stone. https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/capital-misallocation-and-secular-stagnation.html

[7] Roser, M., Ritchie, H., & Mathieu, E. (2022, March). Technological Change. Our World in Data. https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/transistors-per-microprocessor

[8] Sterling, B. (2020, March 10). Preparing for the end of Moore’s Law. Wired. https://www.wired.com/beyond-the-beyond/2020/03/preparing-end-moores-law/

[9] Fridman, L. (November 15, 2022). Chamath Palihapitiya: Money, Success, Startups, Energy, Poker & Happiness (No. 338). Retrieved December 1, 2022, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFQUDCgMjRc

 

Assessment Papers Bryce Johnston Emerging Technology Government Information Systems
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Assessing “Reflections on Net Assessment” by Andrew W. Marshall, Edited by Jeffrey S. McKitrick and Robert G. Angevine

Phil Walter is the founder of Divergent Options.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing “Reflections on Net Assessment” by Andrew W. Marshall, Edited by Jeffrey S. McKitrick and Robert G. Angevine

Date Originally Written:  October 16, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  December 19, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is a graduate of the American Academy for Strategic Education’s Net Assessment and Competitive Strategy course.  The author is fortunate to count members and alumni of the Department of Defense Office of Net Assessment as friends and mentors.  Mr. Marshall’s idea regarding the Office of Net Assessment being “diagnostic but not prescriptive” is what inspired the author to start the website Divergent Options.  The author was contacted by The Andrew W. Marshall Foundation[1], asked to review this book, and provided a free copy of it.

Summary:  U.S. national security is recovering from over twenty years of Instant Gratification Warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The threat posed by the People’s Republic of China requires the U.S. to think in decades instead of in deployment cycles, and develop strategies and plans in an integrated manner.  “Reflection on Net Assessment” is the perfect book for someone who needs to shake off organizationally-incentivized impatience and focus on long-term threats.

Text:  Andrew W. Marshall was born in 1921 and worked at the RAND Corporation in the 1950s and 1960s.  In the late 1960s, Henry Kissinger recruited Andy to apply his approaches in the National Security Council, where Andy worked for several years before becoming the first Director of Net Assessment, a post he held for the next 43 years.  Andy retired from government service in 2015 at the age of 94 and dedicated the remaining four years of his life to supporting all those who sought his counsel and writing his own short essays on the history and practice of defense analysis[2].     

The Andrew W. Marshall Foundation and the Institute for Defense Analyses[3] released “Reflections on Net Assessment: Interviews with Andrew W. Marshall[4],” on October 4, 2022.  The book features twelve interviews with Mr. Marshall that were conducted between 1993 and 1999 by defense analyst Kurt Guthe and others.  These interviews discuss Mr. Marshall’s 25 years at the RAND Corporation, and over 40 years in the Department of Defense Office of Net Assessment.  The interviews were woven together by Jeffrey S. McKitrick and Robert G. Angevine and each interview is preceded by a description of world events happening at the time.  These descriptions help frame the reader’s mindset before the interview transcript begins.

For those who have not heard of the term Net Assessment, Department of Defense Directive 5111.11 defines it as “[T]he comparative analysis of military, technological, political, economic, and other factors governing the relative military capability of nations. Its purpose is to identify problems and opportunities that deserve the attention of senior defense officials.”  The Secretary of Defense assigned the Director of Net Assessment the responsibility to “Develop and coordinate independent net assessments of the standing trends, and future prospects of U.S. military capabilities and national potential in comparison with those of other countries or groups of countries so as to identify emerging or future threats or opportunities for the United States, consistent with the April 14, 2017 and October 1, 2019 Secretary of Defense Memorandums. Pursuant to Section 904(b) of Public Law 113-291, these net assessments may be communicated to the Secretary of Defense, without obtaining the approval or concurrence of any other DoD official.”  The net assessments include “current and projected U.S. and foreign military capabilities by theater, region, domain, function, or mission; and specific current and projected U.S. and foreign capabilities, operational concepts, doctrine, and weapon systems[5].”

We are all products of the time in which we live.  In my case, I grew up during the Cold War and participated in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The problem U.S. national security currently faces is that the intellectual underpinnings for the U.S. strategy that won the Cold War came from a generation that won a war.  The intellectual underpinnings for today’s strategies for the U.S. to compete with China and Russia come from a generation that lost two Authorizations for the Use of Military Force.  In the context of U.S. national security having to re-learn Cold War techniques and determine if they are applicable to our present national security situation, this book will help immensely.

The twelve interviews in this book are an absolute treasure.  These interviews illustrate Mr. Marshall’s mindset, and how this mindset evolved over time based on both external national security stimuli and internal bureaucratic friction.  Someone reading this book will close the cover on the last page having not only received a class from a master of strategic thought but will have also learned how to survive and make progress in a large bureaucracy taking into account that “There is only so much stupidity one man can prevent[6].”

Mr. Marshall was highly motivated to ask the right question.  He believed that “Poor, mediocre answers to good questions are more important than getting splendid answers to poor questions.  That means that getting the questions right is very, very important.  Most analysis spends far too little time on what the questions really are[7].”  Mr. Marshall also believed that getting the right people in the room to discuss a topic was a must, even if these people were outside of his organization.  He believed that “…the objective in any analysis is to do the best that this country can do, not just the best that RAND or whatever organization you’re talking about can do[8].”  Mr. Marshall disliked it when organizations would “…rather die than bring in anybody else[9],” and discusses his views on how the Central Intelligence Agency became more insular and therefore less impactful over time.   

Mr. Marshall believed that there were people who focused on reality and wanted to know how the world really functioned and those who focused on their models or hypotheses and barely looked at the world[10].  This reality drove him to observe that during the Cold War there was a tendency “…to treat the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance as a real alliance, rather than the situation of a major power and a bunch of protectorates[11].”  Office of Net Assessment research during the Cold War reflected realities such as the Soviet Navy having more weapons than sensors to find targets and Israel and Egypt having the same number of tanks during the 1973 war but Israel’s tanks were able to get into battle three times if damaged and Egypt’s only once[12].  

Imposing cost on a competitor is discussed throughout the book and Mr. Marshall even looks at health care and environmental pollution as factors that the Soviet Union may have to address ahead of military investment[13].  Regarding Soviet operations in Afghanistan, Mr. Marshall speaks to measuring costs from a Soviet perspective, and trying to determine what costs meant the most to them, instead of what costs would mean the most to the U.S. if it were in the same situation[14].

My biggest take away from this book is the idea that, if the U.S. competition with the Soviet Union began in 1947, the impacts of U.S. strategies began to be felt by the Soviets in 1977.  These impacts set the conditions for the 1980s Cost Imposition and Competitive Strategies approaches, neither of which would have worked in the 1950s or 1960s when the Soviet economy was strong.  U.S. national security personnel would do well to embrace this timeline when thinking about the People’s republic of China.  Overall, I found this book to be highly interesting, extremely motivating, and very applicable to current events.  While most of us never met Mr. Marshall, this book gives us the opportunity to learn an immense amount from him.   

“So I have come away, really for the rest of my life, with the belief that what should happen is, if you have a problem, you get the very best people to work on it, and it doesn’t matter if they’re in your organization or not[15].” 

Endnotes:

[1] The Andrew W. Marshall Foundation can be found at:  www.andrewwmarshallfoundation.org/

[2] About Andrew W. Marshall, The Andrew W. Marshall Foundation, https://www.andrewwmarshallfoundation.org/andrew-w-marshall

[3] The Institute for Defense Analyses can be found at:  http://www.ida.org/

[4] “Reflections on Net Assessment: Interviews with Andrew W. Marshall,” ISBN-13: 9780578384221, can be found at: https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/reflections-on-net-assessment-andrew-w-marshall/1141455631

[5] DoD Directive 5111,11, “Director of Net Assessment,” April 14, 2020, can be found at: https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/511111p.pdf

[6] “Reflections on Net Assessment: Interviews with Andrew W. Marshall,” ISBN-13: 9780578384221, Page 14, https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/reflections-on-net-assessment-andrew-w-marshall/1141455631

[7] “Reflections on Net Assessment: Interviews with Andrew W. Marshall,” ISBN-13: 9780578384221, Page 16, https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/reflections-on-net-assessment-andrew-w-marshall/1141455631

[8] “Reflections on Net Assessment: Interviews with Andrew W. Marshall,” ISBN-13: 9780578384221, Page 18, https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/reflections-on-net-assessment-andrew-w-marshall/1141455631

[9] “Reflections on Net Assessment: Interviews with Andrew W. Marshall,” ISBN-13: 9780578384221, Page 18, https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/reflections-on-net-assessment-andrew-w-marshall/1141455631

[10] “Reflections on Net Assessment: Interviews with Andrew W. Marshall,” ISBN-13: 9780578384221, Page 63, https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/reflections-on-net-assessment-andrew-w-marshall/1141455631

[11] “Reflections on Net Assessment: Interviews with Andrew W. Marshall,” ISBN-13: 9780578384221, Page 61, https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/reflections-on-net-assessment-andrew-w-marshall/1141455631

[12] “Reflections on Net Assessment: Interviews with Andrew W. Marshall,” ISBN-13: 9780578384221, Page 199, https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/reflections-on-net-assessment-andrew-w-marshall/1141455631

[13] “Reflections on Net Assessment: Interviews with Andrew W. Marshall,” ISBN-13: 9780578384221, Page 198, https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/reflections-on-net-assessment-andrew-w-marshall/1141455631

[14] “Reflections on Net Assessment: Interviews with Andrew W. Marshall,” ISBN-13: 9780578384221, Page 229, https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/reflections-on-net-assessment-andrew-w-marshall/1141455631

[15] “Reflections on Net Assessment: Interviews with Andrew W. Marshall,” ISBN-13: 9780578384221, Page 65-66, https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/reflections-on-net-assessment-andrew-w-marshall/1141455631

Andrew W. Marshall Assessment Papers DoD Office of Net Assessment Jeffrey S. McKitrick Phil Walter Robert G. Angevine
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An Assessment of U.S. Military Thinking on Cislunar Space Based on Current Doctrine

Louis Melancon, PhD made his own green-to-blue leap from the U.S. Army to the U.S. Space Force where he currently serves in Space Systems Command. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group. 

Title:  An Assessment of U.S. Military Thinking on Cislunar Space Based on Current Doctrine 

Date Originally Written:  December 4, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  December 12, 2022. 

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that doctrine shapes the mindsets and the eventual culture of military organizations. Current U.S. military space doctrine is insufficient to create the mindsets and culture to face the emerging challenges of cislunar operations. 

Summary:  The U.S. military mindset for space myopically focues on orbital regimes, similar to a green water navy staying in littoral waters.  If this mindset continues, the U.S. military cannot compete in cislunar space (the area of space between the earth and the moon or the moon’s orbit) in the same way in which a blue water navy competes in the open ocean.  The maritime theory of Sir Julian Corbett is useful as a lens to understand the current mindset constraints and shortfalls. 

Text:  The race for cislunar space is underway. The recent the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Artemis mission heralding an impending return of manned space flight beyond orbital regimes is an inspiring early leg. At least six nations are currently pursing efforts beyond geocentrism and its orbital regimes, pursuing moon missions and other activities at positions in space where objects sent there tend to stay put, known as LaGrange Points[1]. The ability to operate reliably in cislunar space is not just a matter of national pride, it is a demonstration of and mechanism by which to grow multiple aspects of national power. There are clear reasons for this: cislunar space offers a new frontier for economic development and if mankind permanently lives beyond the Earth, it will be in cislunar space. 

Elements of the U.S. government are fully ready enter into this race. The recent National Cislunar Science and Technology Strategy is a bold call for action. This document recognizes the importance of scientific and commercial development of cislunar space and the importance this will play for the future of U.S. national power[2]. It is with some, but not much, hyperbole that this strategy seems like a homage to Sir Julian Corbett, perhaps not the most well known, but in the author’s opinion the most thoughtful theorist on naval and maritime power. 

For the purposes of this article, there are a handful of applicable insights from Corbett’s seminal work, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy that are useful to assess the importance of the U.S. military being involved in cislunar space. Corbett proposes that a naval force alone rarely wins a war. Rather than the decisive fleet action of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Corbett sees a larger maritime picture[3]. It is not just a naval force but the economy through trade, communications, and naval capability of a state altogether traversing that common of the world’s oceans. Preserving and growing this strength requires command of the sea, and that is what Corbett suggests non-continental, maritime states leverage to be successful in conflict rather than simply relying on a powerful fleet. Command of the sea is not a constant condition. It is fleeting, pursued at positively at times, denied to adversaries at times, wholly up for grabs between adversaries at other times. But you do have to be there to compete. This brings us to the another insight, about the necessity of a fleet. 

Corbett also believes it is necessary to have a fleet in being to establish command of the sea. This is a different definition than the modern parlance which describes ships in a defended port. Here it is more about the fleet existing and operating somewhere, creating the potential for command of the sea by, at a minimum, denying an adversary the ability to feel they have a fully secured command of the sea[4]. The only type of force that can provide this is, using modern terms, a “blue water navy,” a force that can operate across the isolation of the wide, open oceans. In the space domain cislunar is the wide, open ocean. 

The problem is that the doctrinal space heuristic in the U.S. military doesn’t account for this Corbettian concept of command of the sea. There is a mismatch between the orbital regime heuristic and cislunar space as an area of competition. Whether one is looking at the unclassified summary of the Defense Space Strategy[5], Joint Publication 3-14 Space Operations[6], or the U.S. Space Force’s (USSF) Spacepower[7], the geocentric/orbital regime is the dominant, truthfully sole, heuristic. This single view results in mindsets and concepts that create a “green water navy” — a force that only operates within its littoral and neighboring waters, i.e. the orbital regimes near Earth, not a blue water navy that can establish and challenge command of the sea in cislunar space. 

Don’t misunderstand: it is absolutely critical that the USSF operate and dominate in the littoral waters of the orbital regimes. As the USSF Chief of Space Operations has publicly stated, all the other military services require space to fulfill their missions[8]. It is not an exaggeration that space is the glue binding how the U.S. joint force prefers to fight its wars. USSF must then operate effectively in the orbital regimes, enabling the rest of the military. This orbital regime mindset too aligns beautifully with Corbett, but Corbett pointed out that this is not sufficient[9]. Yes, different forms of equipment are needed between a green water and blue water force, but placing equipment differences aside, a blue water force can accomplish the functions of a green water force. The inverse doesn’t hold. Each breeds different mindsets, doctrines, and thus heuristics. A blue water force must cultivate and rely on a mission command, an independent mindset, that is not a requirement for a littoral focused force. 

The doctrinal documents mentioned don’t preclude cislunar operations. Spacepower mentions cislunar three times. But it does so in relation to orbital regimes, not a distinct area for operational and conceptual development. The argument that cislunar space isn’t precluded in the doctrine is weak, because cislunar presents a wholly different challenge, thus demanding new thinking patterns. The previous mental construct simply is an ill fit. Heuristics provide easy button when encountering roughly similar problems, but that’s also their danger. Not realizing the problems aren’t similar means a failed fit and tends to crowd out new ideas. This is where U.S. military space doctrine currently finds itself, potentially applying a way of thinking with which they are comfortable to a new problem that doesn’t suit that solution. 

Navies have and can evolved from green to blue water. But that takes time, lots of time. Other players in the U.S. government, other nations, and some commercial actors are not taking that time. There are bold efforts to create new heuristics for this space. The question becomes if the U.S. military feels it should slowly evolve or have a revolutionary leap, challenging its newest military service with jumping rather than crawling from green water force tethered to Earth through orbital regimes or a blue water force independently operating in cislunar space.  If it is the latter, these efforts will be stymied due to current heuristics and doctrine with limited cislunar vision.

Endnotes:

[1] Duffy, L., & Lake, J., (2021). Cislunar Spacepower the New Frontier.Space Force Journal. Retrieved December 4, 2022, from https://spaceforcejournal.org/3859-2/.

[2] Cislunar Technology Strategy Interagency Working Group (2022). National Cislunar Science and Technology Strategy. National Science and Technology Council. 

[3] Corbett, J. S. (2004). Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Courier Corporation.

[4] Ibid. 

[5] Esper, M. (2020). Defense Space Strategy Summary. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

[6] Joint Staff (2020). Joint Publication 3-14 Space Operations. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

[7] Raymond, J. (2020). Spacepower: Doctrine for Space Forces. US Space Force. 

[8] Pope, C. (2022, Nov 2).  “Saltzman formally elevated to Space Force’s highest position – Chief of Space Operations.” https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article/3207813/saltzman-formally-elevated-to-space-forces-highest-position-chief-of-space-oper/

[9] Corbett. Principles.

Assessment Papers Governing Documents and Ideas Space U.S. Space Force
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2023 Call for Papers Topics

Background:

Divergent Options is a non-revenue generating non-politically aligned national security website that does not conduct political activities.  In 1,000 words or less, we provide unbiased, dispassionate, candid articles that assess a national security situation, present multiple options to address the situation, and articulate the risk and gain of each option.  Please note that while we assess a national security situation and may provide options, we never recommend a specific option.

Below you will see a 2023 Call for Papers Schedule.  Our Call for Papers process is meant to motivate, not exclude.  If you are not interested in writing on these topics, we always welcome individual articles on virtually any national security situation an author is passionate about.  Please do not let our call for papers cause you to hesitate to send us your idea. We look forward to hearing from you!

Writing for Divergent Options:

We are very excited that you are interested in writing for Divergent Options!

Please send us your original, unpublished, un-submitted-elsewhere article, or participate in one of our Call for Papers below, by emailing us at:  submissions@divergentoptions.org

At Divergent Options we write using a specified format.  Are you interested in assessing a national security situation and providing options to address it?  Then our Options Paper format is for you.  Are you interested in assessing a national security situation only?  Then our Assessment Paper is for you.  Are you a bit anxious?  Then check out our Writer Testimonial page.

Please note that a national security situation can be one that is externally focused e.g. what is Country X going to do about County Y or internally focused e.g. Country X should invest more in Y capability.

2023 Call for Papers Topics:

Topic:  Ukraine in 2023

Call for Papers Begins:  January 2023

Call for Papers Ends:  Mid-February 2023

Publish Date:  Late-February 2023

Topic:  Security Cooperation

Call for Papers Begins:  March 2023

Call for Papers Ends:  Mid-April 2023

Publish Date:  Late-April 2023

Topic:  Investing and Divesting

Call for Papers Begins:  May 2023

Call for Papers Ends:  Mid-June 2023

Publish Date:  Late-June 2023

Topic:  Diminishing China

Call for Papers Begins:  July 2023

Call for Papers Ends:  Mid-August 2023

Publish Date:  Late-August 2023

Topic:  Space and National Security

Call for Papers Begins:  September 2023

Call for Papers Ends:  Mid-October 2023

Publish Date:  Late-October 2023

Topic:  Nuclear Threats

Call for Papers Begins:  November 2023

Call for Papers Ends:  Mid-December 2023

Publish Date:  Late-December 2023

Call For Papers
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Assessment of the Risk of a Nuclear Exchange with Russia: Is the U.S. Whistling Past the Nuclear Graveyard?

Neil Snyder is a U.S. Army Colonel.  The views expressed in this article are his own.  His research focuses on national security decision-making and civil-military relations. He earned a PhD in Political Science from Stanford University as a Goodpaster Scholar of the United States Army Strategic Plans and Policy Program (ASP3).  Follow him on Twitter @neilsny.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessment of the Risk of a Nuclear Exchange with Russia: Is the U.S. Whistling Past the Nuclear Graveyard?

Date Originally Written:  November 11, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  November 14, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that risk of a nuclear exchange in Ukraine is not solely due to Putin’s aggression. Instead, risk is a consequence of strategic interaction between the U.S. and Russia, meaning a consequence of both Putin’s actions and U.S. decision-making.

Summary:  There is uncertainty over how the U.S. might respond to Putin’s threats of nuclear weapon use in Ukraine, which raises curiosity about the sources of nuclear risk.  This risk includes three aspects of U.S. policymaking: presidential leadership, creativity and engagement of forward-thinking nuclear planners, and the flexibility of the bureaucracy in the face of crisis. The conclusion is that the U.S. may own some of the risk of a nuclear exchange over Ukraine.

Text:  Russian President Vladimir Putin has threatened to use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, prompting comparisons to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis[1]. Fortunately, Putin has recently issued statements tempering the threat[2], but the war in Ukraine is not over. Russia appears to be losing badly, suggesting Putin might play the one (nuclear) card he has left.  

Unfortunately, the risk of nuclear exchange over Ukraine is not widely understood because the public discourse has been confusing.  Some reporting suggests that Putin’s threats are real[3], but prominent commentators have also dismissed the threats[4]. There is also uncertainty over how the U.S. might respond to Russian nuclear aggression. U.S. Army General (Retired) David Petraeus recently argued that the U.S. would most likely respond to Russian nuclear action with a massive conventional response[5]. Even so, it is not clear how a massive conventional response would not trigger further escalation, given Russia’s already precarious strategic position.

One narrative is that Putin is singularly responsible for the current nuclear risk because of his blatant attempt at nuclear blackmail[6] and his “record of folly and recklessness[7].” Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is clearly a moral wrong and he precipitated the crisis, but the U.S. may nonetheless contribute to the risk of this crisis in unforeseen ways. A rigorous assessment requires considering both Putin’s aggression and how the U.S responds. 

Seventy years of U.S. nuclear planning for Russian, Chinese, North Korean, and terrorist-related contingencies has not prepared the U.S. well for the current crisis. Ukraine is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A Russian nuclear attack on Ukraine does not encumber the U.S. with the same obligations as an attack on a formal ally. It is not altogether clear how the U.S. should respond to an attack on a partner, especially if Russia employs low-yield weapons, performs a nuclear demonstration, or takes other actions lower on the so-called nuclear ladder[8]. 

This highly contingent situation motivates a closer look into the black box of U.S. nuclear response planning to see how the U.S.’s own nuclear structures might contribute to today’s risk. U.S. presidential leadership, policy advocacy (or lack thereof) by nuclear policy analysts, and the bureaucratic politics of the U.S. defense enterprise all affect how the U.S. has responded to prior nuclear crises. 

U.S. President John F. Kennedy’s management of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is perhaps the canonical example of presidential leadership amidst a nuclear crisis. Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision illustrates how Kennedy’s personal leadership was necessary to structure decision-making and tamp down escalation risk[9]. Kennedy challenged advisors’ assumptions, forced the Executive Committee or “ExComm” to generate alternatives to the escalatory options advisors initially favored, and expanded the bargaining range with Nikita Khrushchev, the Premier of the Soviet Union. Kennedy’s intrusive leadership during the crisis was necessary to reduce escalation risk over Cuba, following the model of the “unequal dialogue” advanced by Elliot Cohen[10]. 

However, Kennedy’s steady hand may be more the exception than the rule. Multiple presidents have taken the U.S. to the nuclear brink. President Dwight Eisenhower contemplated nuclear escalation in Korea. President Richard Nixon made multiple proposals to use nuclear weapons in Vietnam. Most recently, President Donald Trump threatened “Fire and Fury” against North Korea. As Keith Payne has observed, leaders have pursued “surprising goals and risked national security in ways…considered highly unlikely and even irrational at the time[11].”

U.S. Presidents’ personal management style, experiences[12], and heuristics affect U.S. nuclear risk during crises[13]. Even “ideal” presidents have limits because they are human. Kahneman and Tversky’s seminal work illustrates that all decision-makers suffer from debilitating cognitive biases[14]. The late Robert Jervis argued that leaders’ misperceptions could increase the probability of nuclear conflict in some situations[15]. All of the preceding suggests taking a close look at how the White House and the National Security Council is weathering the current crisis in Ukraine. Unfortunately for the public, presidents’ deliberations over sensitive national security matters are normally done behind a wall of secrecy (which, ironically, could be another source of risk). 

Even clear-eyed U.S. presidents rely on the options developed by the national security bureaucracy. Those nuclear response options (or the lack thereof) have frequently been a source of risk for escalation. Fred Kaplan’s remarkable book on the ebbs and flows of U.S. nuclear policy reveals that, throughout U.S. nuclear history, true progress and reform of nuclear plans depended on the actions of a small number of enterprising defense intellectuals who challenged assumptions and led change[16]. Entrepreneurial defense experts are key to the risk equation during nuclear crises because, as Tom Nichols recently pointed out, the “military and the nuclear establishment are resistant to change[17].” Without experts’ advocacy and influence from within the national security bureaucracy, U.S. presidents are likely to have fewer and less suitable response options.  

Furthermore, a Russian nuclear attack on Ukraine does not map cleanly to the kinds of situations nuclear planners have historically focused on. As Scott Sagan has observed, the defense establishment often relies on rigid plans[18]. It should not surprise readers that the defense establishment relies on standard operating procedures instead of doing the hard work to chart a new course.  And today’s crisis in Ukraine exists within the rich context of the U.S. Defense Department’s ongoing operations, activities, and investments. Skepticism that this vast U.S. national security enterprise has the organizational agility to adapt quickly in the face of a dynamic crisis like the situation in Ukraine is healthy. That lack of strategic agility is evident today, as routine exercises have been identified as a source of increasing risk[19].

Each of these U.S.-internal sources of risk causes concern because if a Russian nuclear attack in Ukraine is a frightening, then the thought of a nuclear exchange between Russia and the U.S. is altogether more terrifying. Deterrence seems to be holding but, as Colin Gray famously argued, there is “no objectively correct answer” to questions of nuclear risk[20].  Assessing nuclear risk is extremely difficult[21]. Putin clearly deserves blame for provoking the crisis and, though there is no moral equivalency between Putin’s actions and potential U.S. responses, U.S. policymakers would gain from remaining strategically humble and assess themselves as source of risk, too. 

Endnotes:

[1] “Russia’s Lavrov Needles Biden over Cuban Missile Crisis and Ukraine,” Reuters, October 30, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-lavrov-needles-biden-over-cuban-missile-crisis-ukraine-2022-10-30/.

[2] “Putin Says ‘no Need’ for Using Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine,” PBS NewsHour, October 27, 2022, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/vladimir-putin-rules-out-using-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine.

[3] Helene Cooper, Julian E. Barnes, and Eric Schmitt, “Russian Military Leaders Discussed Use of Nuclear Weapons, U.S. Officials Say,” The New York Times, November 2, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/02/us/politics/russia-ukraine-nuclear-weapons.html.

[4] Greg Myre, “How Likely Is a Russian Nuclear Strike in Ukraine?,” NPR, October 4, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/10/04/1126680868/putin-raises-the-specter-of-using-nuclear-weapons-in-his-war-with-ukraine; Timothy Snyder, “How Does the Russo-Ukrainian War End?,” Thinking About… (blog), October 5, 2022, https://snyder.substack.com/p/how-does-the-russo-ukrainian-war.

[5] Olafimihan Oshin, “Petraeus Predicts US Would Lead NATO Response to ‘Take out’ Russian Forces If Putin Uses Nuclear Weapon,” The Hill, October 2, 2022, https://thehill.com/homenews/sunday-talk-shows/3671100-petraeus-predicts-us-would-lead-nato-response-to-take-out-russian-forces-if-putin-uses-nuclear-weapon/.

[6] Andriy Zagorodnyuk, “Bowing to Putin’s Nuclear Blackmail Will Make Nuclear War More Likely,” Atlantic Council (blog), October 18, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/bowing-to-putins-nuclear-blackmail-will-make-nuclear-war-far-more-likely/.

[7] “Putin Threatens Nuclear War. The West Must Deter Disaster.,” Washington Post, October 3, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/10/03/putin-nuclear-war-ukraine-deter/.

[8] Michael Fitzsimmons, “The False Allure of Escalation Dominance,” War on the Rocks (blog), November 16, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/false-allure-escalation-dominance/; Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960).

[9] Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Longman, 1999).

[10] Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command (New York, NY: Free Press, 2002).

[11] Keith B. Payne, “The Great Divide in US Deterrence Thought,” Strategic Studies Quarterly Summer (2020): 16–48.

[12] Michael C. Horowitz and Allan C. Stam, “How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders,” International Organization 68, no. 3 (2014): 527–59.

[13] Elizabeth N. Saunders, Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).

[14] Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011).

[15] Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[16] Fred Kaplan, The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2020).

[17] Tom Nichols, “The Nuclear Question America Never Answers,” The Atlantic, November 1, 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/11/biden-nuclear-posture-review-2022/671949/.

[18] Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Norton, 2003).

[19] Kate Hudson, “NATO, Russia War Games Are Making Nuclear Risks Worse,” Al Jazeera, October 24, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/10/24/biden-is-making-putins-nuclear-threat-worse.

[20] Colin Gray, Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 2.

[21] Amy J. Nelson and Alexander H. Montgomery, “How Not to Estimate the Likelihood of Nuclear War,” Brookings (blog), October 19, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/10/19/how-not-to-estimate-the-likelihood-of-nuclear-war/.

 

Assessment Papers Neil Snyder Nuclear Issues Russia Ukraine
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Call for Papers: Threats and Opportunities in 2050

Background:

Divergent Options is a non-politically aligned non-revenue generating national security website that, in 1,000 words or less, provides unbiased, dispassionate, candid articles that assess a national security situation, present multiple options to address the situation, and articulate the risk and gain of each option.  Please note that while we assess a national security situation and may provide options, we never recommend a specific option.

Below you will see a Call for Papers.  If you are not interested in writing on this topic, we always welcome individual articles on virtually any national security situation an author is passionate about.  Please do not let our call for papers cause you to hesitate to send us your idea. We look forward to hearing from you!

Call for Papers:

Divergent Options is calling for national security papers assessing situations or discussing options related to Threats and Opportunities in 2050.

We understand 2050 is a long way off, and finding sources for predictions is challenging, and on that note we offer our previous work with Alternative Futures to show potential writers something similar to what this Call for Papers is looking for:  https://divergentoptions.org/category/topics/alternative-futures-histories-counterfactuals/

Please limit your article to 1,000 words and write using our Options Paper or Assessment Paper templates which are designed for ease of use by both writers and readers alike.

Please send your article to submissions@divergentoptions.org by December 18, 2022.

Below is a list of prompts that may inspire potential writers:

– What does military force design and its supporting industrial base look like in 2050?

– In 2050, what threats and opportunities face Ukraine?

– Describe career management for national security personnel in 2050.

– What does the civil-military divide look like in 2050?

– What threats and opportunities face the People’s Republic of China in 2050?

– What does quantum computing look like in 2050 and what are the national security implications?

– In 2050, what threats and opportunities face Taiwan?

– Technology X finally matured in 2050, what are the national security implications?

– What threats and opportunities face Russia in 2050?

– Describe military training and education in 2050.

– What threats and opportunities are present in 2050 related to artificial intelligence?

– What does terrorism look like in 2050?

– What threats and opportunities are present in 2050 related to influence activities?

– What threats and opportunities are present in 2050 related to cyber?

Call For Papers
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Options for Ukraine to Defend Civilian Centers from Russian Strikes

Michael C. DiCianna is a consultant in the national security field, and a staff member of the Center for International Maritime Security. He can be found on Twitter @navy_tobacco.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation:  Ukraine requires additional capabilities to defend its civilian centers from Russian strikes.

Date Originally Written:  October 25, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  October 31, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that with Ukrainian civilian centers defended from Russian strikes, the Ukrainian armed forces will be better able to focus on locating, closing with, and destroying Russian forces occupying Ukraine.

Background:  After the bombing of the Kerch Strait Bridge that links Russia to Ukraine’s Crimea —unclaimed but likely attributed to Ukrainian sabotage, Russia responded with missile strikes on civilian targets in Kyiv. As of the time of this writing, 19 people have been killed, and hundreds wounded. Some of these strikes used Kalibr cruise missiles, launched from ships in the Black and Caspian Seas[1]. Russia’s long-range missiles and artillery continue to threaten Ukrainian lives and allow Russian President Vladimir Putin to commit what amounts to war crimes[2][3]. Putin ordering his forces to shoot upwards of 100 missiles at civilian centers instead of the military targets reaffirms his commitment to use terror tactics to cover up for Russian military losses.

Significance:  Ukraine’s autumn counteroffensive has continued to degrade the Russian military on the front line. Western allies supplying arms and training continue to assist the Ukrainian military in its liberation efforts, but the Ukrainian capital and other major civilian centers are still being struck by Russian attacks. Protecting civilian lives and enabling the Ukrainian Armed Forces to focus on the front line will be vital to repelling the invasion.

Option #1:  Western allies increase Ukraine’s anti-ship capabilities.

Risk:  Putin has made it clear that the Kremlin will view all Western support to Ukraine as an escalation. Russian officials have made nearly weekly overt or implied nuclear threats. Previously, Russia implied that it would strike Western arms shipments in Ukraine, regardless of the point of delivery or casualties to North Atlantic Treaty Organization member countries. All increases to Ukrainian offensive and defensive capabilities risk Russian escalation, though this risk must be balanced against the importance of defending Ukrainian sovereignty. The addition of increased anti-ship and anti-submarine capabilities might see reciprocal Russian assaults on Ukraine’s maritime infrastructure, or further attacks on major civilian centers. If Ukraine uses these hypothetical armaments to destroy Black Sea Fleet ships or infrastructure, Russa may feel even more cornered. Attacks against Crimea especially could increase the Kremlin’s perception of being “cornered.” Control of the Crimean Peninsula, including Sevastopol and thus a year-long naval base in the Black Sea, has been a core strategic objective of Russia since 2014.

Gain:  Destroying Russian long-range missile capabilities will be more effective at defending Ukraine’s population than relying on air defense systems.  Even the best air defense systems can be penetrated or overwhelmed. Ukrainians using Western-provided anti-ship capabilities to destroy Russian ships in the Black Sea not only removes Russian offensive capabilities, but it also damages the Russian strategic mission. Much like the loss of the illegally annexed territory of Lyman is a deep wound to the Russian agenda, a sunken Black Sea Fleet makes the Russian occupation of Crimea more and more irrelevant.

Increasing Ukrainian capability to strike Russian targets continues to degrade the Russian threat to the rest of Europe. Ukraine is fighting this war against Russia, and hopefully winning it, so that a similar war with Russia does not happen in Finland, Poland, or the Baltic States. This situation does not devalue the heroism of the Ukrainian cause, but it is a reminder to other European capitals that there is also a hard calculus behind supporting Ukraine. The Russian Army is being annihilated, and the Russian Air Force has taken serious losses. Losses to the Black Sea Fleet—already in a subpar state of upkeep—would be another drastic hit to Putin’s regime.

Option #2:  Western allies provide Ukraine limited air defense capabilities.

Risk:  Air defense systems will never be a complete shield over a city or other broad target. Even extensive air defense grids will leave gaps, and saturation strikes will overwhelm them. Providing Ukraine limited air defense capabilities will force Ukrainian military and civilian leaders to prioritize protection. Russian attacks could be targeting based on outdated maps, making it harder for Ukraine to predict which areas will be targeted[4]. Air defenses are vital to protecting civilian lives and military infrastructure, but limited Western support might not be enough in the face of further Russian bombardment. 

Gain:  An arms package containing limited air defense systems and provides Ukraine with no advanced long-range strike or antiship capabilities is likely viewed from a Western lens as a less escalatory option. Russia views all U.S. and Western arms deals for Ukraine as escalation and interference with a war it views as within its own periphery, but the Kremlin will still need to somehow maintain its own redlines[5]. Air defense systems designed to destroy Russian cruise missiles and drones are not as much of a threat to the Russian military as missiles designed to destroy Russian warships.

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] The Economist Newspaper. (2022, October 10). Russia launches a wave of missiles across Ukraine. The Economist. Retrieved October 17, 2022, from https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/10/10/russia-launches-a-wave-of-missiles-across-ukraine

[2] Specia, M., Kramer, A. E., & Maria Varenikova, M. (2022, October 17). Buzzing Drones Herald Fresh Attacks on Kyiv, Killing Four. The New York Times. Retrieved October 17, 2022, from https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/10/17/world/russia-ukraine-war-news.

[3] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 8, paragraph 2.

[4] Knowles, D (Host). (2022, October 12). Private mercenaries, GCHQ’s nuclear response and on the ground in the Donbas. In Ukraine: The Lastest. The Telegraph. https://open.spotify.com/episode/14CJ4WAtCtuGP14e60S0q6?si=d86626ee3e334514

[5] Ellyatt, H. (2022, March 12). Western arms convoys to Ukraine are ‘legitimate targets,’ Russia warns. CNBC. Retrieved October 17, 2022, from https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/11/ukraine-needs-more-weapons-the-west-fears-provoking-war-with-russia.html

 

Capacity / Capability Enhancement Option Papers Russia Ukraine
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Call for Papers: Coordinating All The Things.

 Approval / Concurrence / Coordination / Consultation / Deconfliction / Notification

Background:

Divergent Options is a non-politically aligned non-revenue generating national security website that, in 1,000 words or less, provides unbiased, dispassionate, candid articles that assess a national security situation, present multiple options to address the situation, and articulate the risk and gain of each option.  Please note that while we assess a national security situation and may provide options, we never recommend a specific option.

Below you will see a Call for Papers.  If you are not interested in writing on this topic, we always welcome individual articles on virtually any national security situation an author is passionate about.  Please do not let our call for papers cause you to hesitate to send us your idea. We look forward to hearing from you!

Call for Papers:

Divergent Options is calling for national security papers assessing situations or discussing options related to Coordinating All The Things.

Please limit your article to 1,000 words and write using our Options Paper or Assessment Paper templates which are designed for ease of use by both writers and readers alike.

Please send your article to submissions@divergentoptions.org by October 15, 2022.

Below is a list of prompts that may inspire potential writers:

– In the context of a global threat, assess whether existing coordination mechanisms within a specified national security organization are sufficient.

– In the context of a global threat, if existing coordination mechanisms within a specified national security organization are insufficient, provide options to improve said mechanisms.

– If two national security organizations with competing interests coordinate with each other and an impasse results, provide criteria / options that could help guide resolving the impasse.

– Assess the psychological impact and / or value of terms like Approval / Concurrence / Coordination / Consultation / Deconfliction / Notification within a national security organization.

– Assess whether all the things need to be coordinated.

– Assess whether Country X or Organization X has a culture that values coordination.

– Assess whether a career that emphasizes speed and decisiveness eventually backfires when a person rises to a level that is indifferent to tempo and values organization-wide coordination over execution.

– Provide options to identify employees with a coordination-mindset early, and put them on a career track that values coordinartion.

– Assess whether training and educational structures within a national security organizations are teaching their students to value coordination.

– If training and educational structures within national security organizations are not teaching their students to value coordination, provide options to remedy this situation.

– Assess the impact of choosing not to coordinate.

– Assess the impact of choosing to over-coordinate.

– Assess whether Global Coordination is possible in a specified national security organization.

– Provide options to improve Global Coordination in a specified national security organization.

Call For Papers
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Assessing the Role of China’s Aircraft Carriers in a Taiwan Invasion

Michael G. Gallagher is an American expatriate and independent researcher living in Seoul, South Korea, with his Korean wife. He has MA and Ph.D. degrees in International Relations from the University of Miami in Coral, Gables, Florida.  Prior to residing in South Korea, he has lived in Mainland China and Hong Kong.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing the Role of China’s Aircraft Carriers in a Taiwan Invasion

Date Originally Written:  June 1, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  July 11, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that China in its present form poses a grave threat to the United States and its allies and that insufficient attention-at least in public- has been paid to certain aspects of Chinese military planning. This inattention may be the result of the U.S. Navy’s (USN) projecting its views of aircraft carrier strength onto its view of China.

Summary:  Despite the publicity China’s carrier force has received in the press, the huge ships, as impressive as they are, may only play a secondary role in Chinese naval operations during a Taiwan invasion. The function of China’s carrier force will be to clean up any remaining opposition after Chinese forces decisively defeat the U.S. and Japanese fleets using a blizzard of cyberattack and missile barrages.

Text:  China’s aircraft carriers have been in the news over the last few months.  The Liaoning and its escorts conducted exercises in the South China Sea May of this year[1].  China’s second carrier and its first domestically built one, the Shandong, was recently spotted with several drones on its flight deck[2]. Meanwhile, the Chinese have just launched a third carrier, the Fujian,  and planning for a fourth carrier, possibly nuclear-powered, is in the works[3]. There is even discussion of six People’s Liberation Army – Navy (PLAN) carrier groups by 2035[4].

Traditional reasons for building aircraft carriers includes sea control, showing the flag, having a mobile airfield that you and only you control, and the sheer prestige of having a large carrier force. However, none of these reasons cancel out the fact that aircraft carriers are an increasingly vulnerable weapons system that is already over 100 years old. The first full-fledged carrier was a converted battlecruiser, the  Royal Navy’s HMS Furious. The Furious entered service during World War I in 1917[5]. The first specifically designed carrier was the Japanese Hosho, launched in 1921[6].

Apart from its carrier force, China has expended enormous resources since the mid-1990s on capabilities that are specifically designed to sink the USN’s nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and wrest control of the waters of the Western Pacific from the United States and its allies. To achieve this strategic end, the PLAN has acquired an impressive arsenal of land-based ballistic missiles like the DF-21 land-based anti-ship ballistic missile and the DF-26 “Guam Killers” Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, which also has an anti-ship mode, H-6 medium-range bombers armed with ship-killing cruise missiles, a 79 boat strong submarine force, and numerous frigates and destroyers armed with anti-ship missiles[7][8][9][10]. 

If any assault against Taiwan is delayed until the late 2020s, China’s emerging hypersonic capability will likely play a significant role in in its attack plans. Mounted on  either  JL-2 or JL-3 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles or land-based weapons like the DF-26 Medium Range Ballistic Missile and the longer-range DF-41 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), nonnuclear hypersonic glide vehicles using kinetic energy impacts would devastate Anderson Air Force Base on Guam, Pearl Harbor, and the U.S. Navy’s huge Pacific Fleet base at San Diego[11][12][13].

Non-nuclear hypersonic warheads mounted on ICBMs could even strike high-value civilian targets in the U.S. like Boeing’s huge Everett, Washington factory. These weapons would be doubly effective if they could be deployed as Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles. This potentially revolutionary advance was hinted at during China’s July 2021 hypersonic weapon test when the glide vehicle, mounted on a ballistic missile, may have released an extra payload while in flight[14].

Current U.S. Anti-Ballistic Missile systems like THAAD, Patriot-3 and the US Navy’s family of Standard missiles would have limited effectiveness against such weapons. And that gap in defensive capability may not be filled until around 2030[15].

The PLAN’s strong anti-carrier posture, when combined with the fiscal reality that it is less expensive to use a missile than put a carrier at risk, points to China’s carriers playing a clean-up role in a Taiwan invasion scenario.  This scenario would begin with a blizzard of cyberattack and missile barrages, accompanied by wave after wave of cruise and ballistic missile strikes against American and Japanese bases on Guam, Okinawa and elsewhere. PLAN carriers would then sink any remaining hostile warships and force the smaller nations of Southeast Asia, plus Australia and New Zealand, to bend their knee to Beijing[16].

Still, even if China scored huge gains early in any conflict over Taiwan, the stealthy U.S. and Japanese submarine fleets could cripple any Chinese naval campaign.  Chinese planners may assume that any enemy submarines at sea when the war began would be cut off from repair and resupply and would eventually wither on the vine.  This may be a valid assumption if the Chinese plans do involve strikes on U.S. home ports and possibly parts of U.S. industrial infrastructure.  However, until these U.S. and Japanese submarine forces run out of food, fuel, or munitions, they are still a threat.

Taiwan, the target of China’s violent, high velocity, high-technology assault, would almost certainly be forced to surrender. With Taiwan’s two potential saviors, the U.S. and Japanese fleets, having carriers resting on the bottom of the Pacific, the island democracy would be cut off from all possible aid by an impenetrable Chinese naval blockade.  Messy amphibious assaults against contested beaches would not be necessary.

China’s carrier force may wind up playing the same role the US Navy’s fast battleships did in the Pacific during World War Two. Those powerful warships, once the queens of battle, found themselves relegated to back up roles, providing fire support for amphibious landings and using their formidable antiaircraft batteries to help defend the now dominant carriers from air attack[17].

Endnotes:

[1] D, M. (2022, May 23). Chinese Carrier Group now operating in the East China Sea. USNI.org. Retrieved July 6, 2022, from https://news.usni.org/2022/05/23/chinese-carrier-strike-group-now-operating-in-east-china-sea

[2] A, W. (2022, June 3). Drones included in Refit for China’s second aircraft carrier Shandong. South China Morning Post. Retrieved July 6, 2022, from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3180265/drones-included-refit-chinas-second-aircraft-carrier-shandong

[3] K, M & D, R.(2022, June 17). China launches hi-tech aircraft carrier in naval milestone. Retrieved July 6, 2022, AP News. from https://apnews.com/article/beijing-china-shanghai-government-and-politics-6ce51d1901b3a5658cc9ef7e62b65000

[4] World’s biggest Naval Power: Can China Develop Six Aircraft Carriers By 2035 & Challenge Its Arch-Rival USA Eurasian Times Desk. (2021, December 23). Retrieved July 6, 2022 from https://eurasiantimes.com/worlds-biggest-naval-power-can-china-develop-six-aircraft-carriers-by-2035-challenge-its-arch-rival-usa/

[5] History’s First Aircraft Carrier. Naval Encylopedia.com. (2021). Retrieved June 26, 2022 from https://naval-encyclopedia.com/ww1/uk/hms-furious-1917.php

[6] The Hosho, world’s first purpose built aircraft carrier. Naval Encylopedia.com. (2021). Retrieved June 26, 2022 from https://naval-encyclopedia.com/ww2/japan/hosho.php

[7] DF-21 (CSS-5). Missile Threat: CSIS Missile Defense Project (2022, March 28). Retrieved July 6, 2022 from https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-21/

[8] DF-26. Missile Threat: CSIS Missile Defense Project (2021, August 6) Retrieved July 6, 2022 from https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/dong-feng-26-df-26/

[9] Hanyang H-6 Medium Bomber. Military-Today.com. (2022).  Retrieved July 6, 2022 from http://www.military-today.com/aircraft/h6k.htm

[10] 2022 China Military Strength. Globalfirepower.com. (2022).. Retrieved July 6, 2022 from https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=china

[11] Missiles of China. Missile Threat: CSIS Missile Defense Project. (2021, April 12). Retrieved July 6, 2022 from https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/

[12] Missiles of China.  Missile Threat: CSIS Missile Defense Project. (2021, April 12). Retrieved July 6, 2022 from https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/

[13] DF-41 (Dongfeng-41/CSS-X-20). Missile Threat: CSIS Missile Defense Project. (2021, July 31). Retrieved July, 6 from https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-41/

[14] N, T, R &, T, T, J. (2021, November 3). China’s Hypersonic Mystery Weapon Released Its Own Payload And Nobody Knows Why (Updated). The War Zone. Retrieved July 6, 2022 from https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43242/chinas-hypersonic-mystery-weapon-released-its-own-payload-and-nobody-knows-why

[15] A, E. (2022, May 23). Just getting started: Too early to say when hypersonic interceptor will go live. Breaking Defense. Retrieved July 6, 2022 from https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/just-getting-started-too-early-to-say-when-hypersonic-interceptor-will-go-live/

[16] S,R.( 2021, June 21). China’s Third Aircraft Carrier is Aimed at a Post-US Asia. Foreign Policy. Retrieved July 6, 2022 from https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/21/china-third-aircraft-carrier-fujian/

[17] F,R.(2020, July 13). Rethinking the Technological Story of the Pacific Theater of the Second World War. The Diplomat. Retrieved July 9, 2022 from https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/rethinking-the-technological-story-of-the-pacific-theater-of-the-second-world-war/

 

Assessment Papers China (People's Republic of China) Major Regional Contingency Maritime Michael G. Gallagher Taiwan
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Call for Papers: COVID19 and National Security

Background:

Divergent Options is a non-politically aligned non-revenue generating national security website that, in 1,000 words or less, provides unbiased, dispassionate, candid articles that assess a national security situation, present multiple options to address the situation, and articulate the risk and gain of each option.  Please note that while we assess a national security situation and may provide options, we never recommend a specific option.

Below you will see a Call for Papers.  If you are not interested in writing on this topic, we always welcome individual articles on virtually any national security situation an author is passionate about.  Please do not let our call for papers cause you to hesitate to send us your idea. We look forward to hearing from you!

Call for Papers:

Divergent Options is calling for national security papers assessing situations or discussing options related to COVID19 and National Security.

Please limit your article to 1,000 words and write using our Options Paper or Assessment Paper templates which are designed for ease of use by both writers and readers alike.

Please send your article to submissions@divergentoptions.org by August 21, 2022.

Call For Papers
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Options for the U.S. to Approach India as a Fellow Superpower

Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, and United States Army. In addition to Divergent Options, he has been published in the Center for International Maritime Security, the Washington Monthly, Merion West, Wisdom of Crowds, Charged Affairs, Braver Angels, and more. He can be found on Twitter at @MDPurzycki, on Medium at https://mdpurzycki.medium.com/, and on Substack at The Non-Progressive Democrat.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Options for the U.S. to Approach India as a Fellow Superpower

Date Originally Written:  June 12, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  June 27, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes good relations between the United States and India, including respect for India as a fellow superpower, are vital for confronting challenges to U.S. interests, especially those presented by China. The author views India as a fellow superpower to the U.S. due to its population, gross domestic product, economic expansion in recent decades, military strength, and possession of nuclear weapons.

Background:  Across the early 21st century, the U.S. has developed closer political and security relations with India. The two countries participate in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“the Quad”)[1], a forum for coordinating security activities and holding joint military exercises[2], alongside U.S. allies Australia and Japan. In 2016, the U.S. designated India a Major Defense Partner (MDP), a status similar to that of Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA)[3].

Significance:  How Washington chooses to approach India will have extremely important implications for U.S. foreign policy, particularly U.S. efforts to confront and balance China. Respecting India as a fellow superpower will help the U.S. maximize the potential for positive bilateral relations.

Option #1:  The U.S. upgrades its MDP with India to a bilateral military alliance, placing India on the level of a fellow North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member.

Risk:  A formal U.S.-India alliance would frighten and anger China, seemingly confirming the fears of Chinese officials that the U.S. is seeking to surround it militarily. China would likely seek to increase its already close military and political ties with Russia[4]. Furthermore, if China believes it is about to be completely encircled geopolitically, it may believe it has a limited window of opportunity to bring Taiwan under its control, thus encouraging an invasion of the island.

This option would also frighten and anger Pakistan, a nuclear-armed state that has been a rival of India since their mutual independence from British rule in 1947. Although Pakistan is an MNNA of the U.S.[5], it is also a long-standing partner of China, a relationship motivated in large part by their shared rivalry with India[6]. Among other things, Pakistan may respond by refusing to cooperate with the U.S. in its approach to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.

Gain:  The prospect of two nuclear-armed states allied against China could make Beijing think twice about any aggressive move it made against the U.S. (either directly, or against a U.S. ally or partner like Japan or Taiwan) or against India (such as renewed border conflicts in the Himalayas)[7]. Option #1 would also mean that all of the U.S.’s fellow Quad members would be treaty allies[8][9], potentially turning the Quad into an Indo-Pacific equivalent of NATO. A formal alliance with the U.S. could also pull India away from Russia; the effects of India’s close relations with the Soviet Union, including in the area of arms sales, have lingered into the 21st century[10].

Option #2:  The U.S. tightens its security links to India short of a formal alliance, including efforts to build up India’s defense industrial base.

Risk:  Even without a formal alliance, any increase in U.S.-India defense cooperation will still worry China and Pakistan. Additionally, U.S. efforts to make India less dependent on foreign sources for its military equipment could irritate France, which sees increased defense exports to many countries, including India[11], as a key component of its security policy[12]. The diplomatic row in 2021 over Australia’s decision to cancel its purchase of French submarines in favor of U.S. vessels is a precedent the U.S. may want to avoid repeating[13].

Gain:  As well as deepening U.S.-India security cooperation, the U.S. building up India’s defense industry can decrease its reliance on Russia as a major provider of military equipment[14].

Option #3:  The U.S. Navy reactivates the First Fleet, and assigns a portion of the Indian Ocean as its area of responsibility.

Risk:  If the First Fleet takes waters away from the Seventh Fleet[15], it risks dividing the Indian and Pacific portions of U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. This division could complicate any comprehensive U.S. effort to balance and counter Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific region[16].

Gain:  Devoting a numbered fleet to the Indian Ocean[17] would signal a U.S. commitment to good relations with India, indicating that a good relationship is not merely an adjunct of Washington’s approach to China.

Option #4:  The U.S. defers to India as de facto hegemon of South Asia, intentionally putting U.S. interests in South Asia second to India’s.

Risk:  If the U.S. treats part of the world as India’s sphere of influence without any prioritization of U.S. interests there, it could set a dangerous precedent. This option would give rhetorical ammunition to Russia in its attempt to forcibly incorporate Ukraine (as well as potential attempts to bring other Eastern European countries into its sphere), and to China in its desire to gain control of Taiwan and expand its control in the South China Sea.

Encouraging India to see itself as rightfully dominant in its region could also make conflict between India and China more likely in locations where both powers have security interests, such as Afghanistan[18] and Tajikistan[19][20]. Option #4 would also run the risk of making Pakistan more anxious, and of curtailing U.S. efforts to fight Islamist extremism in Afghanistan.

Gain:  Deferring to India in South Asia would free up U.S. time, attention, and resources to protect its interests elsewhere, particularly interests related to competition with China in the Western Pacific, and with Russia in Eastern Europe. 

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendations:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Japan-Australia-India-U.S.(Quad) Leaders’ Meeting.” May 24, 2022. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1e_000402.html

[2] Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. “The Quad Conducts Malabar Naval Exercise.” The Diplomat, August 27, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/the-quad-conducts-malabar-naval-exercise/

[3] U.S. Department of State. “U.S. Security Cooperation With India.” January 20, 2021. https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-india.

[4] Kofman, Michael. “The Emperors League: Understanding Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation.” War on the Rocks, August 6, 2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/the-emperors-league-understanding-sino-russian-defense-cooperation/

[5] U.S. Department of State. “Major Non-NATO Ally Status.” January 20, 2021. https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/

[6] Khalid, Masood. “Pakistan-China Relations in a Changing Geopolitical Environment.” Institute of South Asian Studies, November 30, 2021. https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/pakistan-china-relations-in-a-changing-geopolitical-environment/

[7] Slater, Joanna. “Soldiers injured in fresh border skirmish between India and China.” Washington Post, January 25, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/india-china-clash-sikkim/2021/01/25/7d82883c-5edb-11eb-a177-7765f29a9524_story.html

[8] U.S. Department of State. “U.S. Relations With Japan.” January 20, 2020. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-japan/

[9] U.S. Department of State. “U.S. Relations With Australia.” June 9, 2022. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-australia/

[10] Sharma, Ashok. “India to boost arms output, fearing shortfall from Russia.” Associated Press, April 7, 2022. https://abc17news.com/news/2022/04/07/india-to-boost-arms-output-fearing-shortfall-from-russia/.

[11] Shiraishi, Togo and Moyuru Baba. “France and India partner on weapons tech in blow to Russia.” Nikkei Asia, May 6, 2022. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/France-and-India-partner-on-weapons-tech-in-blow-to-Russia.

[12] Mackenzie, Christina. “Here’s what’s behind France’s 72% jump in weapons exports.” Defense News, March 10, 2020. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/03/10/heres-whats-behind-frances-72-jump-in-weapons-exports/

[13] Willsher, Kim. “France recalls ambassadors to US and Australia after Aukus pact.” Guardian, September 17, 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/17/france-recalls-ambassadors-to-us-and-australia-after-aukus-pact

[14] Banerjee, Vasabjit and Benjamin Tkach. “Helping India Replace Russia in the Value Arms Market.” War on the Rocks, May 20, 2022. https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/helping-india-replace-russia-in-the-value-arms-market/

[15] “USN Fleets (2009).” Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:USN_Fleets_(2009).png

[16] White House. “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States.” February 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf

[17] Eckstein, Megan. “SECNAV Braithwaite Calls for New U.S. 1st Fleet Near Indian, Pacific Oceans.” USNI News, November 17, 2020. https://news.usni.org/2020/11/17/secnav-braithwaite-calls-for-new-u-s-1st-fleet-near-indian-pacific-oceans

[18] Adlakha, Hemant. “Will the China-Pakistan-Taliban troika in Afghanistan make India irrelevant?” Hindustan Times, January 18, 2022. https://www.hindustantimes.com/ht-insight/international-affairs/will-the-china-pakistan-taliban-troika-in-afghanistan-make-india-irrelevant-101642409043057.html

[19] Dutta, Sujan. “India renews interest in running its first foreign military base in Tajikistan.” Print, October 11, 2018. https://theprint.in/defence/india-renews-interest-in-running-its-first-foreign-military-base-in-tajikistan/132454/

[20] Shih, Gerry. “In Central Asia’s forbidding highlands, a quiet newcomer: Chinese troops.” Washington Post, February 18, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-central-asias-forbidding-highlands-a-quiet-newcomer-chinese-troops/2019/02/18/78d4a8d0-1e62-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html

Great Powers & Super Powers India Michael D. Purzycki Option Papers United States
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Assessing China as a Superpower

James Ridley-Jones is a PhD student at King’s College London currently researching Geostrategy in Central Asia. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title: Assessing China as a Superpower

Date Originally Written:  June 14, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  June 20, 2022.   

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is a PhD student studying Foreign Policy in Central Asia. The author believes that perception plays a key role in global power structures. The article is written from the point of view of the international community toward Chinese power.

Summary:  The Russian invasion of Ukraine exposed the gap between how the world assessed Russia’s might and influence and its actual performance.  Prior to a conflict, “power perceived is power achieved” is common.  When looking at China’s might and influence, and taking into account recent revelations during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, questions remain regarding what China can actually achieve in the long run.  

Text:  From a global power perspective the conflict in Ukraine taught the United States a significant lesson about reality comparative to perception. Russia was perceived to be a significant challenge to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces militarily, an economic influencer to Europe even if not the predominant economy, and a country with global influence across Europe, the Middle East, Africa, across Asia, and even holding some influence in South America. The reality is that although Russia is still considered a challenge in these areas, the challenge is not to the level believed prior to the conflict in Ukraine. This assessment however does not look to debate on Russia, their actions, capabilities or intentions, but rather to question if a superpower needs to possess such things, or just be perceived to possess such attributes, all in relation to China.

When considering military might, China is often assessed to be a significant player on potential capabilities. China has the largest military in the world, are significantly developing their technological capabilities, advancing new training programs, and reorganising their command structures. These changes demonstrate that China perceives problems within its military however, institutional change does not always guarantee success. China’s evolving military capabilities come with a host of their own problems and questions, not all of which there is evidence of resolutions. With growth comes organisation issues, technology requires application, and there is no demonstrated successful application of some technologies China might be developing. All of these problems plague even the most successful of militaries, but that doesn’t detract from these problems as considerations, especially given China’s more significant nature i.e. its size and development. Also evident is the limited combat experience of the Chinese military.  The last full conflict the Chinese military fought was against Vietnam in 1979 with limited experience beyond that other than peacekeeping missions and occasional sparring with the Indian military in the Himalayas, China lacks modern conflict experience[2].

Even with these military considerations, China prefers to employ economic and Soft Power, which merits consideration when envisioning China as a superpower.

When looking at the Chinese economy, the slowdown is a factor to consider. Chinese economic strength presently affords them significant sway globally.  If this economic strength were to slowdown, it is questionable as to whether China’s sway would continue to the same degree. Although there are considerably debated variables in the literature, Riikka Nuutilainen and Jouko Rautava suggest that as China’s economic growth slows, its contribution to Russia’s growth performance will likely decline as well[2]. Although their study is specific to Russia, it is more widely indicative of the potential impact to other countries of a withdrawal of Chinese investment, purchasing of raw materials, and slowing energy demand. If this slowdown were to happen, given Chinese utilization of such mechanisms for diplomatic engagement, there would be noticeable knock on effects.

In South America, Chinese economic relations and diplomatic positioning in the region has had an effect. Both the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua most recently flipped their positions toward Taiwan after being offered financial incentives by China, including loans and infrastructure investments[3]. In this case a Chinese economic incentive has led to enough diplomatic pressure being exerted to change national relationships between several nations, specifically in South America, with Taiwan. These cases demonstrate that economic might can be wielded successfully as a tool to exert influence.

Another example case is Serbia, where Chinese economic power is perceived to be significant in the country, comparative to the reality. Forty percent of Serbians think that China gives the country the most aid of all those that contribute, when in actuality China is not even close to giving significant amounts of aid[4]. Of the 56 million Euros that China has pledged to Serbia since 2009, only 6.6 million has actually been delivered, which is significantly less that the European Union, who has given 1.8 billion, or even Germany who has given 189 million[5]. Although a specific case,  Serbia demonstrates that perceptions of Chinese economic influence and power are significantly higher than actuality.

In Central Asia, it is assumed that Chinese investment has had significant affect, but often this is not to the extent that is perceived as Chinese Soft Power fails to connect with the wider population beyond the national elites[6]. This Chinese failure demonstrates a lack of influence at a different level to government and could potentially have a significant impact over time should it not be addressed. Such failures merit review in other regions of the world as part of a wider understanding of actual Chinese global influence compared to the U.S. current view of it.

Given the changing nature of the Chinese economy from a production based manufacturing economy to a more consumer based economy, it is questionable as to whether the country will be able exert similar pressure as a customer and consumer, rather than its current position as a producer and investor.

U.S. current assessments of Chinese potential as a superpower is based heavily on perceptions of potential Chinese exertion of power with limited cases of exertion, rather than necessarily them having that actual power. South America illustrates successful economic influence, but to what extent is it perception based similarly to the case of Serbia, such details are currently lacking.

Whilst remaining cautious in order to not underestimate Chinese capabilities in any of their foreign policy, it is important to analyse more closely Chinese accomplishments to obtain a better understanding of Chinese potential in becoming a superpower, both to ensure a better position to challenge Chinese actions as well as to cooperate where possible.

Endnotes:

[1] Blasko, D. (2015). Ten Reasons Why China Will Have Trouble Fighting a Modern War – War on the Rocks. War on the Rocks. Retrieved 8 June 2022, from https://warontherocks.com/2015/02/ten-reasons-why-china-will-have-trouble-fighting-a-modern-war/. 

[2] Nuutilainen, R., & Rautava, J. (2019). Russia and the slowdown of the Chinese economy [Ebook] (2nd ed.). Bank of Finland, BOFIT. Retrieved 8 June 2022, from https://helda.helsinki.fi/bof/bitstream/handle/123456789/16551/bpb0220.pdf.

[3] Roy, D. (2022). China’s Growing Influence in Latin America. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 8 June 2022, from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri. 

[4] Institute for Economic Affairs, 2020 in Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. (2020). Who Gives The Most Aid To Serbia? [Image]. Retrieved 8 June 2022, from https://www.rferl.org/a/who-gives-the-most-aid-to-serbia-/30660859.html. 

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ridley-Jones, J. (2020). Assessing the Development of Chinese Soft Power in Central Asia. Divergent Options. Retrieved 8 June 2022, from https://divergentoptions.org/2020/09/23/an-assessment-of-the-development-of-chinese-soft-power-in-central-asia/. 

 

Assessment Papers China (People's Republic of China) Competition Governing Documents and Ideas Great Powers & Super Powers James Ridley-Jones
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Assessing that Canada will be the Last Superpower

Sharon Burke is a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense and is currently the President of Ecospherics, a Washington, DC-based research and advisory organization focusing on environmental security. She can be found on Twitter @burkese and occasionally writes for the website tipofthesphere.substack.com and The Boston Globe. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing that Canada will be the Last Superpower

Date Originally Written:  May 26, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  June 6, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is a former U.S. defense official who believes that natural resource issues and industrial age legacy pollution will be shaping factors for the 21st century strategic landscape.

Summary:  If the world’s industrial nations fail to cut greenhouse gas emissions in the near term, global environmental conditions will likely become increasingly inhospitable for human societies throughout the 21st and 22nd centuries. Canada, with its cold climate, vast territory, “green” mineral wealth, stable political culture, and its relative inaccessibility has the best prospects for adapting to a more extreme climate and becoming the next superpower, perhaps by default.

Text:  Even as global consensus about climate change has strengthened, greenhouse gas emissions have steadily increased[1]. Absent an abrupt geopolitical about face toward a massive global economic transformation[2], climate change will continue unabated for centuries to come. And while the Earth has experienced significant climate variability throughout its 4.5-billion-year geological history[3], humanity has not[4]. Whether the changes unfurl slowly over the next 50-200 years or suddenly if certain tipping points occur[5], the effects and impacts will hit all parts of the globe, if unevenly within countries and across regions[6]. Populations in sub-tropical, tropical, and dry or desert regions, for example, are already struggling with high heat[7] and changes in precipitation[8], which result in everything from adverse human health impacts to prolonged droughts to an increase in wildfires. In disadvantaged communities or countries with weak underlying political, legal, social, and economic foundations, these conditions can be unaffordable and destabilizing[9].

The current “Great Powers,” the United States and China, are relatively well positioned to manage climate change, both in terms of adaptive capacity and the comparatively mild, mid-latitudes climate. Both countries, however, have vulnerable communities as well as dry and sub-tropical areas that are likely to be heavily impacted by high heat and volatile weather, with the possibility of significant internal displacement[10]. In addition, shifts in access to resources, including water, arable land, energy, and critical minerals, will likely challenge economic growth and social cohesion for both nations[11].

While countries in the most northern latitudes will also have to contend with access to resources and more volatile natural conditions, including sea level rise[12], shifts in precipitation, and extreme weather events, they have more potential to absorb shocks. Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland currently rank among the most stable countries in the world[13], the most resilient to climate change[14], and all have low population density, given the cold temperatures and harsh conditions in much of their territory. These Arctic and boreal regions are warming at least twice as fast as the rest of the world[15], and the land left behind by retreating ice and melting permafrost may eventually be suitable for agriculture, forestry, and habitation. While the rest of the world will be struggling with managed and chaotic retreat from increasingly uninhabitable areas, the northern countries may well be contending with a managed advance into new territory. Though to be sure, this advance would be highly disruptive, too, given the release of additional greenhouse gases and destruction of existing Arctic ecosystems and native cultures.

Based upon the above mentioned global environmental conditions, Canada has the potential to not only adapt but emerge a superpower. The world’s second largest country, Canada’s population is today almost entirely clustered along the southern border. The vast majority of the land mass is uninhabited or lightly populated by indigenous peoples uniquely adapted to current, disappearing conditions. With the world’s longest coastline, Canada will have entirely new sea lines of communication through the Arctic Ocean. Furthermore, Canada’s only contiguous neighbor is the United States, which will be dealing with climate displaced populations but is unlikely to have as much northward out migration as more heavily impacted areas with lower adaptive capacity, such as sub-Saharan Africa. Canada also has significant natural resources, including digital age minerals critical to modern military and energy technology and agricultural adaptation[16]. Again, no country will be immune to the negative effects of climate change, but with a stable, migrant-friendly political culture, Canada has the potential to manage this transition better than any other nation. As a high north country, Russia should enjoy these relative advantages, too, but the rigidity of their authoritarian form of government, the opportunity cost of their bellicosity, proximity to highly affected populations, lack of preparation for climate change, including the disruption to infrastructure built on permafrost, and unwelcoming culture for migrants all suggest a declining power.

The United States faces a range of options for how to deal with the geopolitics of climate change. First, it is always an option to do nothing, and either hope that the projections and models are incorrect, or that the current adaptive capacity in the United States is sufficient. Early experiences with extreme weather attributed to climate change suggest this would not be a prudent choice[17]. Fatalism is also an option – the scope and scale of the economic transformation required to change course is daunting and arguably infeasible, though such fatalism could prove devastating for an already fractious and restive polity. Another option is for the United States to place the highest domestic and foreign policy priority on expediting global cuts in greenhouse gasses. That would involve significantly larger outlays for research and development and climate-resilient economic development at home and around the world, but may present unacceptable opportunity costs for other priorities, such as strategic competition with China. Another option is to focus resources only on adaptation to changing conditions, which ultimately is another form of fatalism. The United States could also pursue a mixed option, making energy transition investments, including in the diversification of critical minerals supplies, and also building resilience and preparedness for shifting weather patterns. Across all options, the United States could consider deepening the bilateral relationship with its closest ally, Canada, given the country’s relative strength for a disrupted future.

Note that this is a highly speculative assessment, given that this level of environmental change is unprecedented for humanity, and a thawing cryosphere will have unpredictable consequences[18].

Endnotes:

[1] IPCC (2022). Climate change 2022: Impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Retrieved May 24, 2022 at https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/

[2] Dupont E, Germain M, Jeanmart H (2021, 11 May). Feasibility and economic impacts of the energy transition.  Retrieved May 20, 2022 at https://doi.org/10.3390/su13105345

[3] Westerhold, Thomas et al (2020, 11 September). An astronomically dated record of Earth’s climate and its predictability over the last 66 million years. Retrieved May 20, 2022 at https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.aba6853

[4] Rockström, J., Steffen, W., Noone, K. et al (2009, 23 September). A safe operating space for humanity. Retrieved May 21, 2022 at https://doi.org/10.1038/461472a

[5] Ripple, William J, et al (2021, September). World scientists’ warning of a climate emergency 2021.  Retrieved May 21, 2022 at https://doi.org/10.1093/biosci/biab079

[6] Schiermeier, Quirin (2018, April 20). Clear signs of global warming will hit poorer countries first. Retrieved May 26, 2022 at doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-018-04854-2

[7] Zachariah, Mariam et al (2022, May 23). Climate change made devastating early heat in India and Pakistan 30 times more likely. Retrieved May 23, 2022 at https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/wp-content/uploads/India_Pak-Heatwave-scientific-report.pdf

[8] Ayugi, B., Eresanya, E., Onyango, A.O. et al (2022, March 14). Review of meteorological drought in Africa: Historical trends, impacts, mitigation measures, and prospects. Retrieved May 19, 2022 at https://doi.org/10.1007/s00024-022-02988-z

[9] National Intelligence Council (2021, October). National intelligence estimate: Climate change and international responses increasing challenges to US national security through 2040. Retrieved May 24, 2022 at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIE_Climate_Change_and_National_Security.pdf

[10] Lustgarten, Abrahm (2020, September 15). How climate migration will reshape America. Retrieved May 26, 2022 at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/09/15/magazine/climate-crisis-migration-america.html

[11] IPCC (2022). Climate change 2022: Impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. See especially chapter 10: Asia and Chapter 14: North America. Retrieved May 24, 2022 at https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/

[12] Note that if the certain climate tipping points occur, the magnitude of sea level rise could be catastrophic and overwhelm even the most resilient country’s adaptive capacity. See Slater, T., Hogg, A.E. & Mottram, R (2020). Ice-sheet losses track high-end sea-level rise projections. Retrieved May 26, 2022 at https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0893-y

[13] The Fund for Peace (2021). Fragile states index. Retrieved May 24, 2022 at https://fragilestatesindex.org

[14] Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) country index. Retrieved May 25, 2022 at https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/

[15] Turton, Steve (2021, March 6). Climate explained: why is the Arctic warming faster than other parts of the world? Retrieved May 26, 2022 at https://council.science/current/blog/climate-explained-why-is-the-arctic-warming-faster-than-other-parts-of-the-world/

[16] Maloney, James (2021, June). From mineral exploration to advanced manufacturing: Developing value chains for critical minerals in Canada. Retrieved May 25, 2022 at https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-2/RNNR/report-6/

[17] Ornes, Stephen (2018, August 14). How does climate change influence extreme weather? Impact attribution research seeks answers. Retrieved May 23, 2022 at https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1811393115

[18] Newton, A (2010). Arctic ice across the ages.  Retrieved May 25, 2022 at https://doi.org/10.1038/ngeo861

Canada Environmental Factors Great Powers & Super Powers Sharon Burke
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Assessing Superpowers in 2050 – The Great Game Redefined

Rocco P Santurri III is a Wargame Analyst, independent Financial Consultant, and an American Football Coach. Currently he is also a graduate student in Strategic Communications at the War Studies Department of King’s College London. Additionally, he serves as a Major in the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command with the 457th Civil Affairs Battalion in Germany.  He has conducted Civil Affairs operations since 2011 throughout Asia and Europe.  He can be found on LinkedIn.com at www.linkedin.com/in/RoccoPSanturri3. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.  

Title:  Assessing Superpowers in 2050 – The Great Game Redefined

Date Originally Written:   May 6, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  May 30, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that the United States must transition from its current definition of Great Power Competition (GPC) to one that will reflect the operating environment in 2050.  He is concerned that the lobbying efforts of the Military-Industrial Complex will continue to result in policies being driven by the production of lucrative weapon systems with limited future utility, instead of being determined by realities in the operating environment. These lobbyist-driven policies will leave the U.S. prepared for the last conflict but not the next. The currently narrow focus on large conventional engagements must be shifted to one that embraces Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov’s often misunderstood concept of total, not hybrid, warfare, specifically within growing areas of conflict such as Artificial Intelligence, Cyberwarfare, Economics, Sub-Threshold Operations, and Information Operations. These are areas China has prioritized in its future planning concepts and will contribute to its ascension in 2050 to world’s dominant superpower.

Summary:  GPC in 2050 will be between China, Russia, and the United States. China will emerge as the world’s preeminent superpower, on the strength of its understanding of the future operating environment in 2050, as well as possession of the requisite resources to support its ambitions.  Russia and the United States will remain powerful, but as regional hegemons, due to deficiencies in mind for one, and in means for the other.

Text:  The world is changing, rapidly.  Geopolitics is certainly not immune to change, as GPC has seen significant, fundamental changes in recent years. The binary nature of the Cold War that gave way to one superpower has seen the rise of other competitors and a return to GPC[1].  Over the coming years this multipolar contest will produce a dominant superpower, but the competition itself will change in response to a different geopolitical operating environment[2]. New criterion will emerge and demand a new approach for GPC success.   

While some have written of new challengers in GPC, the run-up to 2050 for the title of top superpower plays like an enticing but predictable Hollywood rerun.  China, Russia, and the U.S., each with their strengths, each with their weaknesses, remain the three most qualified contestants for the title of dominate world superpower.  The strengths of the three are both seen and unseen: enormous populations and territories, economic strength, powerful militaries, robust clandestine services, and perhaps most important, permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council, or UNSC[3]. Their collective weaknesses are similar in visibility: aging or declining populations, internal political strife, and international overextension, to name but a few. But on aggregate, these three remain the principal contenders.  While fellow UNSC members and historic powers England and France, as well as emerging contenders Brazil and India, are also in the discussion, none warrant consideration in GPC circa 2050.  Instead, the focus remains on the “Big Three”. Analysis begins with examining their key strengths and weaknesses.

With over one billion people and $3 trillion in currency exchange reserves[4], China presents an economic powerhouse that is now acquiring a greater hunger for superpower status. President Xi Jinping has aggressively pursued a new role for China on the world stage.  China’s military continues to undergo a rapid upgrade in both size and quality. The Chinese navy, the largest in the world, continues to expand its presence in the South China Sea, while Belt and Road initiatives entice countries from Africa to South America to side with China while being rewarded with lavish infrastructure funding that also opens the door for Chinese military expansion[5].  China’s strengths are not without weaknesses; these include an aging population, underconsumption, few allies, international condemnation for its treatment of Uighurs, and an enormous police state that carefully tracks a populace that regularly protests restrictions on freedom[6]. These weaknesses make the Chinese ascent anything but guaranteed. 

The revanchism of Russian President Vladimir Putin has catapulted Russia back into GPC after a prolonged hangover following the dissolution of the Soviet Union[7].  However, the book cover of Russia has proven more impressive than the contents.  Russia’s stumbles in Ukraine in 2022 have shown its military to be a shadow of its former self. Despite abundant resources, Russia remains a country with a relatively small economy that is dependent upon gas and oil exports[8]. Additionally, there appears to be no succession plan when Mr. Putin is no longer de facto dictator of Russia[9].  With an all-pervasive security apparatus often faced inward to quell domestic unrest, Russia’s path to 2050 is littered with crucial questions, with the likely answers not boding well for Russian GPC aspirations. 

Boasting the world’s largest economy and military, the U.S. seems well-positioned to maintain its dominant superpower status.  But there are cracks in the armor that are becoming more visible with the passage of time.  Political gridlock, social unrest, a ballooning deficit, and an isolationist sentiment after the misadventures in Afghanistan and Iraq cast the U.S. as more of a fading superpower, and not an ascending one[10]. Furthermore, the ever-present military lobby in the U.S. threatens to leave the U.S. prepared for current warfare, but not that of the future. Lastly, U.S. commitments to North Atlantic Treaty Organization, especially to “alliance a la carte” allies such as Hungary and Turkey, further complicate and undermine the U.S. focus on GPC while these countries actively support GPC adversaries China and Russia.  

In 2050, the world will witness China emerge as the winner of GPC, with Russia second.  The U.S. places a distant third due to its inability to perceive and adapt to the true nature of the future operating environment.  Epitomizing the adage of “fighting the last war”, the U.S. will continue to measure superpower qualifications on outdated criterion and fail to grasp the sweeping changes not on the horizon, but already upon us.  While the U.S. remains fixed on kinetic engagements with peer and near-peer adversaries, China capitalizes on its superior understanding of the future operational environment.  The U.S. wins the current paradigm of GPC, but it will lose the future incarnation.  The passing of the torch has already begun.  While the lobby of the Military-Industrial Complex keeps the U.S. fixated on weapon systems worth billions, China perceptively pushes ahead on a foundation of four specific areas.  These areas are economics, information operations, chemical and cyberwarfare, and technological advances, specifically advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI). Careful to avoid disastrous engagements such as the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq, China skillfully employs a long term view based on economic strength and the leverage it creates.

The world will be a drastically different place in 2050.  The future is often uncertain and difficult to predict.  No country’s leadership has a mastery of prognosticative skills, but some are certainly better than others.  Blending ancient beliefs, a long term view, an acute study of modern history, and a determined leader focused on his country’s ascent, China scores highest due its abilities in visualizing and navigating the way forward while possessing the resources to support the journey.  While Russia has similar qualities in terms of vision, its ability to exploit this advantage is limited by economic strength dependent upon the demand for its resources; this limits Russia to a distant second place position. And the U.S. relinquishes its top spot and is relegated to regional hegemon, a victim of fighting the previous war amid a world of competitors who have long since lost their “reverential awe[11]” for the American Empire. 

Endnotes:

[1] Kroenig, M. (2020). The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy versus Autocracy from the Ancient World to the U.S. and China / Matthew Kroenig. Oxford University Press.

[2] Jones, B. (2017). Order from Chaos: The New Geopolitics. Retrieved on February 15, 2022, from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/11/28/the-new-geopolitics/

[3] Bosco, D. Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

[4] Xu, M. et al. (2021). China’s FOREX Reserves Rise in October for First Time Since July. Retrieved on February 15, 2022, from https://www.reuters.com/business/chinas-forex-reserves-rise-oct-first-time-since-july-2021-11-07/

[5] Shephard, W. (2020). How China’s Belt and Road Initiative Became a Global Trail of Trouble. Retrieved on May 4, 2022, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2020/01/29/how-chinas-belt-and-road-became-a-global-trail-of-trouble/?sh=49dcc5ad443d

[6] Human Rights Watch. (2022). China: Events of 2021. Retrieved on May 4, 2022, from https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/china-and-tibet#:~:

[7] Jenkins, B. (2016). Dealing with a Revanchist Russia. The Rand Blog.  Retrieved on February 1, 2022, from https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/02/dealing-with-a-revanchist-russia.html

[8] Gobles, P. (2018). Russia More Dependent on Exports Now Than in 2018. The Jamestown

Foundation.  Retrieved on February 1, 2022, from https://jamestown.org/program/russia-more-dependent-on-raw-materials-exports-now-than-in-2008/

[9] Luhn, A. (2020). Who Will Replace Putin? Politico.  Retrieved on February 1, 2022, from https://www.politico.eu/article/who-will-replace-valdimir-putin-russia-kremlin/

[10] Ferguson, N. (2020). The Future of American Power. The Economist. Retrieved on February 1, 2022, retrieved from https://www.economist.com/by invitation/2021/08/20/niall-ferguson-on-why-the-end-of-americas-empire-wont-be peaceful

[11] Gibbon, & Milman, H. H. (2008). A History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire Volume 1. Project Gutenberg.

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Options for Defining the Next U.S. Defense Challenge

Marco J. Lyons is a U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel who has served in tactical and operational Army, Joint, and interagency organizations in the United States, Europe, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and in the Western Pacific. He is currently a national security fellow at Harvard Kennedy School where he is researching strategy and force planning for war in the Indo-Pacific. He may be contacted at marco_lyons@hks.harvard.edu. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature, nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation:  The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has a new classified National Defense Strategy (NDS), not yet released in an unclassified version, which is an occasion to consider what the next central defense challenge should be. The central defense challenge shapes prioritization of ends, ways, means, and helps define risk for U.S. defense policy makers. 

Date Originally Written:  May 15, 2022. 

Date Originally Published:  May 23, 2022. 

Author and / or Article Point of View:  If well-articulated, the NDS-established central defense challenge can drive the defense establishment to field more relevant forces, with decisive capabilities, that are postured to bolster deterrence and assurance in ways that help the U.S. avoid great power war. The author believes the 2018 central defense challenge – revisionist power plays – should be updated based on an assessment of the emerging security environment. 

Background:  The first NDS of the Biden administration is complete. A classified NDS was submitted to Congress in late March 2022, and an unclassified version is planned for release later in May or June, according to a Defense Department fact sheet[1]. The geostrategic situation is rapidly changing and where world politics and the international system are headed is hard to predict. Foreign policy expert Zalmay Khalilzad and defense expert David Ochmanek wrote in the late 1990s that the United States had not yet settled on any fundamental principles to guide national strategy[2]. The situation doesn’t seem that different today, and American defense discussions reference various state and non-state threats as primary. Great powers, bloc-based rivalry, and the possibility of major power war seem to be on the rise. National consensus on the central defense challenge will help lay a foundation for coherent security policy. 

Significance:  The emerging U.S. national security situation is especially volatile with the potential for major war, protracted violent competition, and weakening international order. The geopolitical commentator George Friedman has highlighted Chinese and Russian vulnerabilities – economic and military – while emphasizing that the United States has the opportunity to be the greatest of the great powers and steer international system to peace and stability[3]. The United States still possesses great capabilities and opportunities, but defense analysts need to clearly see the emerging situation to successfully navigate the threats and changes. 

How U.S. defense leaders prioritize challenges affects foreign perceptions of American commitment. U.S.-driven sanctions and materiel aid in the current Russo-Ukrainian war demonstrate that American power will continue to be directed toward stability and improving European security. The truth remains that U.S. great power is preferable to the hegemony of any other great power in the world[4]. Still, it is well for the United States to guard against overreaching. American policymakers face a problem of spreading national security resources too thin by prioritizing multiple state challengers, like China, Russia, and Iran or North Korea[5]. The next central defense challenge needs to prioritize U.S. military resources, planning, and posture – the full breadth of defense activities. 

More than at any time since 1991, as some kind of multipolar great power international system emerges in the coming years, U.S. policy makers can ensure the best investment in capabilities for achieving objectives over time by properly prioritizing challenges. 

Option #1:  The Secretary of Defense identifies China’s ability to impose regional military hegemony as the central defense challenge. This option would prioritize investing in a Joint Force that demonstrates the ability to counter hard military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has twice the U.S. number of active duty soldiers, a larger surface navy, the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile and DF-17 hypersonic missile, as well as increasingly capable joint commands[6]. Some researchers point to China’s recent fielding of powerful space-based capabilities to allow for real-time targeting of moving targets without ground support[7]. This option acknowledges that the geostrategic pivot for U.S. security is in Eurasia and especially the far eastern part. 

Risk:  Prioritizing the challenge from the PLA may embolden Russia, North Korea, and other capable threat actors as they assume American leaders will overfocus on one region and one great power rival. Development of capabilities for China and particularly the Western Pacific may leave the Joint Force poorly equipped for large-scale combined arms operations based on heavy, protected, mobile firepower and closer-range fires. A future force designed for maritime, air, and littoral environments might lack the ability to conduct prolonged urban combat. 

Gain:  Identifying PLA capabilities for regional hegemony as the primary defense challenge will make it easier to marshal resources and plan to employ joint forces in high-technology, protracted warfare – a more cost-intensive force development. Even a smaller-scale war with China would require prodigious amounts of long-range fires, air, surface, sub-surface, space, and cyberspace warfighting systems because of China’s potential economic and diplomatic power, and the ranges involved in reaching high-value PLA targets. 

Option #2:  The Secretary of Defense identifies the Russian Armed Forces’ ability to defeat U.S.-European security ties as the central defense challenge. This option would prioritize investing in a more capable North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) through Joint Force capabilities that are substantially more combined/coalition interoperable than today. This option acknowledges the Russian Armed Forces that invaded Ukraine in February 2022, after threatening Kyiv to varying degrees since 2014, and suggests that NATO deterrence was ineffective in convincing Moscow that military aggression was a losing policy. 

Risk:  Over-focusing on building alliance capabilities to counter Russian tank and artillery formations might inhibit needed modernization in U.S. air, maritime, and space capabilities, including artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and fully networked joint/combined command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. 

Gain:  The Russian Armed Forces will likely continue to rely on hybrid forms of warfare, mixing conventional force employment with irregular ways, including information and psychological warfare, due to economic limitations. Focusing on building U.S. capabilities for state-based hybrid warfare will allow the future Joint Force to operate effectively along the full spectrum of conflict. 

Option #3:  The Secretary of Defense identifies transregional, non-state threats like climate change as the central defense challenge. This option acknowledges that non-state threats to U.S. interests are mixing with traditional military threats to create an especially complicated security environment[8]. Focusing on transregional, non-state threats aligns with prioritizing a stable global trade and financial system to the benefit of U.S. and partner economic interests. 

Risk:  The defense capabilities to address transregional, non-state threats do not have extensive overlap with those needed for state-based threats, conventional maneuver warfare, or great power war. The United States could reduce investment in great power war just when the chances of this form of conflict is rising. 

Gain:  Investment in addressing transregional, non-state threats could make the Joint Force more affordable in the long-term if breakthrough capabilities are developed such as new forms of energy production and transportation. 

Other Comments:  Core defense issues are always contentious as committed constituencies leverage establishment processes for the resources needed to realize their aims – this is true today about how to prioritize resources for the most capable future Joint Force. There are impassioned pleas for investing in military capabilities for competition, limited conflicts, and gray zone challenges[9]. Others argue that investing for gray zone conflict is a waste[10]. U.S. defense leaders are at a fork in the road. 

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] U.S. Department of Defense, “Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy,” Defense-dot-gov, March 28, 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/28/2002964702/-1/-1/1/NDS-FACT-SHEET.PDF. 

[2] Zalmay M. Khalilzad and David A. Ochmanek, Strategic Appraisal 1997: Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA325070.pdf. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. defense leaders have opted for ambiguity in defining defense challenges primarily because the nation faced so many. The options here assume that as the United States loses its unipolar dominance, the value of stricter prioritization of challenges will become clearer. 

[3] George Friedman, “The Beginning of a New Era,” Geopolitical Futures, May 3, 2022, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-beginning-of-a-new-era/. 

[4] Robert Kagan, “The World After the War,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-04-06/russia-ukraine-war-price-hegemony. 

[5] Francis P. Sempa, “Our Elites Need to Recognize that America’s ‘Unipolar Moment’ is Over,” RealClearDefense, March 24, 2022, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/03/24/our_elites_need_to_recognize_that_americas_unipolar_moment_is_over_823466.html. 

[6] Shawn Yuan, “Just How Strong is the Chinese Military?” Al Jazeera News, October 29, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/29/just-how-strong-is-the-chinese-military. 

[7] Ashish Dangwal, “Shadowing F-22 Raptor – China Plans To Turn Its Low-Cost Satellites Into Spy Platforms That Can Even Track Fighter Jets,” Eurasian Times, April 8, 2022, https://eurasiantimes.com/china-plans-to-turn-its-satellites-into-spy-fighter-jets/. 

[8] Sean MacFarland, “Joint Force Experimentation for Great-Power Competition,” Heritage Foundation, November 17, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/military-strength-topical-essays/2021-essays/joint-force-experimentation-great-power-competition. 

[9] Justin Magula, “Rebalancing the Army for Military Competition,” Modern War Institute, April 5, 2022, https://mwi.usma.edu/rebalancing-the-army-for-military-competition/. 

[10] Lyle Goldstein, “Commentary: The New Indo-Pacific Strategy is Too Shallow,” Defense News, February 24, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/02/24/the-new-indo-pacific-strategy-is-too-shallow/. 

Governing Documents and Ideas Marco J. Lyons Option Papers United States
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Options for the U.S. Army to Build More Combat Condition Resilient Soldiers

J. Caudle is a Civilian Defense Contractor and a Captain in the U.S. Army Reserves with 18 years of experience in all three U.S. Army components. He has specialties in Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear, Cavalry, and Armor operations and has a M.A. in National Security. He can be found on Twitter @MOPP_Ready. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation:  The United States Army overemphasizes safety during training which has the potential to create risk adverse Soldiers and Commanders.

Date Originally Written:  April 25, 2022.

Date Originally Published: May 16, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author has served in the Active Army Component, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserves as both an officer and a Non-Commissioned Officer. The author believes that soldiering is a dangerous business and that while Commanders should look out for the well-being of their Soldier, this looking out should not sacrifice combat effectiveness.

Background:  Soldiers that are treated like professional warfighters from day one and expected to embrace tough, realistic combat conditions will be less surprised by, and more resilient to, the stresses of combat. Commanders require the freedom to prioritize training Soldiers as warfighters over risk adversity.

Significance:  Commanders that are trained to be timid and driven by a fear of being relieved due to safety incidents in training may not be effective in combat. This ineffectiveness will negatively impact U.S. National Security. Soldiers led and trained by timid leaders have less potential to develop the aggressiveness and decisiveness needed to win battles. As Carl von Clausewitz said, “Given the same amount of intelligence, timidity will do a thousand times more damage in war than audacity[1].”

Option #1:  The U.S. Army increases hardships to produce tougher, more resilient warfighters.

Napoleon Bonaparte’s Maxim #58 says “The first qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and privation. Courage is only the second; hardship, poverty, and want are the best school for the soldier[2].” The ability to endure fatigue, privation, hardship, poverty and want can be trained just like any other skill. Battlefield conditions require that leaders develop resilient Soldiers. One hardship that Soldiers endure on the battlefield is constant exposure to extreme weather conditions. Leaders can increase the amount of time their Soldiers are exposed to the weather while training. To enhance focus on the tactical mission instead of administrative box checking, the Army Physical Fitness Uniform could be abandoned in favor of the duty uniform during daily fitness training and during the Army Combat Fitness Test. Increasing the amount of training conducted in using Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JLIST) can also be done. Training in the JLIST increases Soldier proficiency in a simulated chemical warfare environment, adds physical stress into field problems, and trains the Soldier to focus on their mission instead of their physical discomfort in the suit. Leaders could also conduct training on a reverse cycle i.e. training at night and sleeping during the day. This reverse cycle would enable Soldiers to better know how they react to sleep deprivation so they can be effective in combat.

Risk:  Recruiting and retention would suffer as some Soldiers would not like this lifestyle. The Army will need a focused narrative on justifying this option. Army recruiting commercials would show these hardships for expectation management and also to attract a different type of recruit. There is also a safety risk as training gets harder, more mishaps are bound to occur.

Gain:  This option produces tougher, more resilient Soldiers. However, this option will only succeed if Soldiers are treated like professional warfighters. Training Soldiers in the ability to endure fatigue, privation, hardship, poverty and want not only serves their unit and ultimately the nation, but may have a lifelong impact on the resilience of the Soldier and their mental health.

Option #2:  The U.S. Army reevaluates its use of DD Form 2977, the Deliberate Risk Assessment Worksheet (DRAW).

The author has seen DRAWs up to 28 pages long that never make it down to the individual Soldiers it is designed to protect which establishes the perception that the DRAW itself is more important than actually implementing safety. In addition to the DRAW not being accessible to the Soldiers it is designed to protect, the U.S. Army’s implementation of the DRAW also ensures Commanders prioritize not being relieved due to a training mishap over conducting realistic training.

Better use of the DRAW would ensure the contents of the form are briefed to the Soldiers involved in the training. Additionally, Commanders would not let the DRAW overly restrain them in conducting realistic training. Keeping Soldiers unaware and training safely instead of realistically does not enable the U.S. Army “To deploy, fight, and win our Nation’s wars by providing ready, prompt, and sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the Joint Force[3].”

Risk:  The option will increased the probability of training accidents.

Gain:  This option will build risk tolerant leaders within the U.S. Army. It will also build more resilient Soldiers that are experienced in completing more realistic training. This realistic training will increase Soldier resiliency by exposing them to battlefield stressors.

Other Comments:  Colonel David Hackworth, U.S. Army (retired) states “Training for war must be realistic at all costs. We can’t just discontinue a curriculum when something bad happens, provided that something is not the result of misconduct on the parts of sadistic or unqualified instructors.” He later states “Training casualties, tragic as they may be, must be accepted as an occupational hazard in the tough and dangerous business of soldiering. The emphasis on safety at the expense of realism…sets up soldiers it presumably is protecting for failure by stunting their growth and inhibiting their confidence in themselves and their supporting weapons[4]”.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1]U.S. Army. (2019). ADP 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army

[2] Bonaparte, N. (1902). Napoleon’s Maxims of War. (G. D’Aguilar, Trans.) Philadelphia: David McKay. Retrieved from Military-Info.com.

[3] U.S. Army. (2022). Army.mil. Retrieved from https://www.army.mil/about/

[4] Hackworth, D. H., & Sherman, J. (1989). About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior. New York: Simon and Schuster.

 

 

Capacity / Capability Enhancement Governing Documents and Ideas J. Caudle Leadership Option Papers Readiness U.S. Army
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Assessing the Benefits of India’s Frustrating Pragmatic Energy

Chandler Myers is an officer in the U.S. Air Force. He holds a BS in English from the Air Force Academy and a MA in international relations with a focus in cyber diplomacy from Norwich University. Chandler contributes to WAR ROOM, the U.S. Army’s online national security journal. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing the Benefits of India’s Frustrating Pragmatic Energy 

Date Originally Written:  May 3, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  May 9, 2022. 

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that India’s position on the Russian invasion has proven that it can champion international institutions and norms while being ferociously aware of its limitations.

Summary:  India choosing to fully condemn or support the Russian invasion of Ukraine at the United Nations would have negative consequences. India needs Russian military equipment. At the same time, India’s geography requires continual dialogue with China to resolve territorial disputes. With chilling precision, India’s unmistakable neutral position suits their complex, globally-integrated interest.

Text:  Efforts to keep a sufferable neutral status as Moscow encourages ever-more horrific atrocities in Ukraine has raised important Western concerns on New Delhi’s position. India has, for good reason, abstained from every resolution at the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly on this matter[1]. Though this decision may look different with time, one can argue that New Dehli’s related position is improving its global status. India’s Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Damodardas Modi, recently speaking in Berlin, communicated: “we believe that no party can emerge victorious in this war.” He is right. But, that does not mean India cannot profit from Russia’s violence towards Ukraine. The Germany-India bilateral discussions on May 2, 2022, ended in documented agreements that supplement both country’s on-going sustainable development. The agreements cover wide ranging technical cooperation and German financial assistance in areas related to clean energy, sustainable urban development, climate adaptations, research and development, environmental protections, and so on[2]. Add to that, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz also invited PM Modi, for what will be India’s fourth annual consecutive appearance, as a guest to the G-7 summit in June. 

On the opposite end, India is likely enjoying discounted Russian crude oil amidst ordinary buyers closing their ports due to Moscow’s war. According to India’s Ministry of Commerce, in 2021 Russian imported oil only made up 2% of India’s total imports[3]. This 2% is an obvious small share compared to a recent report by Kpler, a commodities research company. Captured in a British Broadcasting Corporation article, Kpler reported a higher figure of contracted purchased quantity of Russian oil from India in months spanning March through June (of 2022) than all of 2021. From that data, one can opine that India is having less trouble than the U.S., United Kingdom (UK) , and European Union (EU), if any at all, contending with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. India will not plagiarize U.S., UK, and EU sanction decisions toward Russia as its decision lays elsewhere. 

Indian-Russo ties are well documented, most of which focus on defense. Stimson Center analysts estimated 85 percent of India’s military equipment is of Russian or Soviet origin[4]. Other estimates are figured as low as 45 percent[5]. Knowing this, India’s territorial disputes with Pakistan and China, who are allies of Russia, have intensified India’s views of its defense inventory. As recent as March 10, 2022, Pakistan claimed that a surface-to-surface missile shot from India into its Punjab province[6]. Additionally, Chinese and Indian counter claims over parts of the Kashmir region remain unchanged. Even with unresolved storied challenges, China and Russia have found a nation expected to be the most populous by 2030 seemingly on its side and they intend to take advantage. 

Before Russia’s February 24, 2022, invasion of Ukraine, the world saw numerous Western diplomats and heads of state meet with Kremlin leadership in hopes to reverse Moscow’s hardening language and military buildup. In Ukraine, the same and different leaders continue to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to offer symbolic and material support. As the war lengthens, similar leaders from the West have met with counterparts in India to deepen cooperation. Before Modi’s trip to European countries that include Germany, Denmark, and France in May 2022, he met with European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, in April. The specific details of the two-day meeting have yet to be uncovered, however, both parties signaled strengthening economic and technology cooperation with the creation of a new Trade and Technology Council[7]. India’s pragmatic stance is also seeing benefits from deeper security cooperation between it and the United Kingdom[8]. 

New Dehli’s position has also attracted Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi. In a meeting between him and his Indian counterpart, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Wang sought a cooling relationship between the two countries. Quoted in a Reuters article, Wang explained, “The two sides should … put the differences on the boundary issue in an appropriate position in bilateral relations, and adhere to the correct development direction of bilateral relations[9].”

The diplomatic atmosphere is not confined to governments meeting with one another either. The Hoover Institution, a conservative think tank based in the U.S., has decided to use this opportunity to launch a new series, “India’s Opportunities in the 2020s[10].” It is without question that—for now—interest in India is finding enlarged footing by all sides.

Prime Minister Modi’s ethical scorecard has been declining long before Russia’s recent invasion. India voting at the United Nations to condemn or show full support of the Russian invasion of Ukraine would likely result in serious consequences for India. Rather than choose between the stated options, Modi has found, with exceptional clarity, the sweet spot. As frustrating it is for the United States, China wants to normalize relations with India. And in the same vein, Western countries want to deepen cooperation in areas like security, clean energy, and technology as Russian oil is on the cheap. Even with domestic troubles abound, Modi has cushioned criticism from abroad and elevated India’s attractiveness onto the world stage.  

Endnotes: 

[1] Mohan, C. “For India, Putin’s War Starts to Look like a Gift”. Foreign Policy, March 30, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/30/india-ukraine-russia-war-china-oil-geopolitics/ 

[2] News On Air. “India and Germany to launch an Indo-German Partnership for Green and Sustainable Development”. 3 May, 2022. https://newsonair.com/2022/05/03/india-and-germany-to-launch-an-indo-german-partnership-for-green-and-sustainable-development/

[3] Menon, Shruti. “Ukraine crisis: Why India is buying more Russian oil”. BBC News, 26 April 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-60783874 

[4] O’Donnell, F. and Vasudeva, A. “Between a Rock and Hard Place: India’s Stance on the Russia-Ukraine Crisis”. Stimson Center, 4 March 2022. https://www.stimson.org/2022/between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-indias-stance-on-the-russia-ukraine-crisis/ 

[5] Tharoor, S. “Modi’s Big Mistake How Neutrality on Ukraine Weakens India”. 27 April, 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2022-04-27/modis-big-mistake 

[6] Associated Press. “Military says unarmed missile from India ends up in Pakistan”. 10 March, 2022. https://apnews.com/article/india-new-delhi-pakistan01cb6d4d7ce5d8aee98cd6135615712c 

[7] Kijewski, L. “EU and India vow to ramp up cooperation with new Trade and Technology Council”. 25 April, 2022. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-and-india-vow-to-ramp-up-cooperation-with-new-trade-and-technology-council/ 

[8] Parkin, B. and Parker, G. Boris Johnson set to offer Narendra Modi increased UK-India defence co-operation”. 21 April, 2022. https://www.ft.com/content/7cd277bd-d17c-426e-9d63-addcb5405523 

[9] Das, K. and Miglani, S. “Chinese minister seeks normal India ties, Delhi says ease border tension first”. 25 March, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinese-foreign-minister-see-indian-counterpart-surprise-meeting-2022-03-25/ 

[10] Hoover Institution. “India’s Opportunities in the 2020s”. 17 May, 2022. https://www.hoover.org/events/indias-opportunities-2020s 

Assessment Papers Chandler Myers China (People's Republic of China) India Russia Ukraine United Nations
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An Assessment of Thinking Big About Future Warfare 

Marco J. Lyons is a U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel who has served in tactical and operational Army, Joint, and interagency organizations in the United States, Europe, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and in the Western Pacific. He is currently a national security fellow at Harvard Kennedy School where he is researching strategy and force planning for war in the Indo-Pacific. He may be contacted at marco_lyons@hks.harvard.edu. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature, nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group. 

Title:  An Assessment of Thinking Big About Future Warfare 

Date Originally Written:  April 15, 2022. 

Date Originally Published:  May 2, 2022.

Summary:  There are critical, outstanding disconnects between U.S./western military theory, forces, and doctrine that hamper linking military strategy to national policy. Big ideas about future warfare matter primarily around seizing and maximizing advantages over potential adversaries to compel favorable policy outcomes. The big ideas are useful and matter because identifying, developing, and deploying warfighting advantages unfolds over long periods of time.

Text:  Far more than any particular revolution in military affairs, western powers are witnessing what may be called an extended revolution in strategic affairs. Such dramatic and wide-reaching change in warfare and how it is conceived involves 1) fundamental questions of the utility and most effective forms of power and diplomacy; 2) challenges to future force planning caused by advances in information technologies, long-range, precision fires, and hybrid combinations of symmetrical and asymmetrical capabilities, and whether these define a new warfighting regime and character of war; and 3) influences of globalization – or more specifically, the security environments created by the various forces making up social and economic globalization – on militaries. Bringing these three dynamics together – and more may be added to the list – in a deeply integrated way will almost certainly yield a new paradigm of warfare. 

Both change and continuity are expected characteristics of the future security environment. Thinking about future big ideas is really only possible because there is enough continuity in history and military affairs[1]. Understanding future war is helped by elaborating on seven critical contexts or broad categories of circumstances: political, social-cultural, economic, military-strategic, technological, geographical, and historical[2].

It is difficult if not impossible to talk about big ideas in future warfare without referencing the possibilities for revolutionary change. One of the more popular ideas about the likelihood of new forms of warfare is the revolution in military affairs, or RMA, which nearly dominated defense publications and discussions in the 1990s. The term has a special linguistic power by implying historic, almost inevitable change[3]. Examinations of military history yield periods of profound change in war’s ever-changing character, and sometimes these periods may be called revolutionary, but these assessments are still difficult to complete in a fully persuasive manner[4]. There is no consensus view of the RMA as a way of thinking about future warfare. 

The early days of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) seemed to fall both within and outside the more traditional lines of western war[5]. But just because the U.S. Air Force contributed the core capabilities that allowed Joint Force commanders to achieve effects with air power in Afghanistan following the 9/11 terrorist attacks did not mean that the character of military operations more broadly had changed. Early OEF was a case of what was possible given the seven critical contexts identified above. Although there are convincing reasons to believe that the character of future warfare will change, and probably change in significant ways, the fundamental nature of war will remain the same[6].

Defense planners thinking about the character of future warfare will be well-served by using a simplified list of four operational challenges. These operational challenges could be used to explore needed capabilities and force postures. The four might be: 1) early halt of an invasion with depth (e.g., Ukraine) or without (e.g., the Baltic states); 2) early attack and early counteroffensive to destroy an enemy combined arms army without the benefit of a massive force buildup first (e.g., Taiwan); 3) effective and low-risk intervention in an ongoing, complex conflict zone or region; and 4) effective low-risk peace enforcement in complex terrain including megacities[7]. There is nothing revolutionary about these four. 

It is inherently difficult to predict the exact course of future change, especially since future enemies will invariably have a say in these eventualities. Nonetheless it is important for defense planners to have a clear sense of the character and general scope of future conflict. While technology will almost certainly continue to evolve, including in the critical areas of reconnaissance and long-range precision fires, there is no overwhelming evidence that the character of future operations will change dramatically for ground forces in most types of missions, and especially in close combat in complex and urban terrain[8]. Tactical continuity is supreme. 

Big ideas about future warfare matter primarily around seizing and maximizing advantages over potential adversaries. Generally, the big ideas are useful and matter because identifying, developing, and deploying warfighting advantages always unfolds over longer periods of time. Finally, the exact nature of future warfighting advantages is highly situational – or contextual – and potential adversaries are presumably trying to counter friendly attempts to secure advantages[9]. The tension in “big idea versus context” illustrates the interactive nature of war. 

Doctrine and the other dimensions of force development are profoundly shaped by the reigning big ideas that capture the attention of military leaders and organizations. Those big ideas sketch what the organizations in question are prepared to do, against which opponents, in which operational environments[10]. So the U.S. Army, on the one hand, may want to cling to the big idea that the most consequential future conflicts will be major theater, conventional forces, maneuver and fire campaigns. Nonetheless, the indicators are that irregular fights – alongside large-scale combat operations – in complex hybrid combinations are not going anywhere. 

Implementing big ideas involves turning vision into things, concepts into capabilities and formations, and orchestrating grand actions in accordance with the vision[11]. Big ideas matter but after all, success is judged by adaptation.

Land forces, and particularly the U.S. Army, have been affected more than other military forces by the existential crisis in supposed relevance caused by the end of the Cold War, the lopsided victory in the First Gulf War, the advent of information technologies, revival of irregular and stability operations, and globalization. There are critical, outstanding disconnects between U.S./western military theory, forces, and doctrine that are, most likely, hampering the effective linking of military strategy to national policy. 

Endnotes:

[1] Colin S. Gray, “Another Bloody Century?” Infinity Journal, no. 4 (Fall 2011): 4–7, https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Infinity_Journal_Special_Edition_war_and_strategy_back_to_basics.pdf#page=14. Gray makes some of the most reasonable and persuasive arguments against assuming too much change in the character of war over time. 

[2] Colin S. Gray, “The 21st Century Security Environment and the Future of War,” Parameters 38, no. 4 (2008): 18, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol38/iss4/7/. Also see Warren Chin, “Technology, War and the State: Past, Present and Future,” International Affairs 95, no. 4 (July 2019): 765–783. Chin concludes that the relationship between war and the state may be in for dramatic change – an existential crisis – as another wave of industrialization, impacts of artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies on societies and economies, as well as possible global climate emergencies tax the modern state to the point of breakdown. 

[3] Lawrence Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 1998), 7–8. 

[4] Carlo Alberto Cuoco, The Revolution in Military Affairs: Theoretical Utility and Historical Evidence, Research Paper, no. 142 (Athens, Greece: Research Institute for European and American Studies, April 2010), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/115259/rieas142b.pdf. 

[5] Colin McInnes, “A Different Kind of War? September 11 and the United States’ Afghan War,” Review of International Studies 29, no. 2 (2003): 165–184, https://library.fes.de/libalt/journals/swetsfulltext/16323302.pdf. 

[6] David J. Lonsdale, The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future (London: Frank Cass, 2004). Also see P.E.C. Martin, “Cyber Warfare Schools of Thought: Bridging the Epistemological/Ontological Divide, Part 1,” Royal Canadian Air Force Journal 5, no. 3 (Summer 2016): 43–69, https://rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/assets/AIRFORCE_Internet/docs/en/cf-aerospace-warfare-centre/elibrary/journal/2016-vol5-iss3-summer.pdf#cyber-warfare-schools-of-thought. 

[7] Paul K. Davis, David C. Gompert, Richard Hillestad, and Stuart Johnson, Transforming the Force: Suggestions for DoD Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1998), https://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP179.html. 

[8] Michael E. O’Hanlon, The Future of Land Warfare (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/25774. 

[9] Colin S. Gray, The Airpower Advantage in Future Warfare: The Need for Strategy (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, Airpower Research Institute, December 2007), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA477043.pdf. 

[10] Terry Terriff, “The Past as Future: The U.S. Army’s Vision of Warfare in the 21st Century,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 15, no. 3 (2014): 195–228, https://jmss.org/article/view/58119/43736. 

[11] Robert H. Scales, Future Warfare: Anthology (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA365316.pdf. 

Assessment Papers Defense and Military Reform Governing Documents and Ideas Marco J. Lyons Policy and Strategy U.S. Army
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Call for Papers: The Next Superpower

Background:

Divergent Options is a non-politically aligned non-revenue generating national security website that, in 1,000 words or less, provides unbiased, dispassionate, candid articles that assess a national security situation, present multiple options to address the situation, and articulate the risk and gain of each option.  Please note that while we assess a national security situation and may provide options, we never recommend a specific option.

Below you will see a Call for Papers.  If you are not interested in writing on this topic, we always welcome individual articles on virtually any national security situation an author is passionate about.  Please do not let our call for papers cause you to hesitate to send us your idea. We look forward to hearing from you!

Call for Papers:

Divergent Options is calling for national security papers assessing situations or discussing options related to The Next Superpower.  For the purposes of this Call for Papers, “Superpower” is defined as “a state that possesses military and economic might and global influence vastly superior to that of other states.”  Beyond this definition, writers could envision several states coming together via a cooperative agreement of some kind to assume a “superpower-like” status.

Please limit your article to 1,000 words and write using our Options Paper or Assessment Paper templates which are designed for ease of use by both writers and readers alike.

Please send your article to submissions@divergentoptions.org by June 12, 2022.

Call For Papers
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Assessing the Costs of Expecting Easy Victory

Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, and United States Army. In addition to Divergent Options, he has been published in the Center for International Maritime Security, the Washington Monthly, Merion West, Wisdom of Crowds, Charged Affairs, Braver Angels, and more. He can be found on Twitter at @MDPurzycki, and on Medium at https://mdpurzycki.medium.com/.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing the Costs of Expecting Easy Victory

Date Originally Written:  April 10, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  April 25, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes American leaders’ expectation of quick victory in post-9/11 wars, and the concomitant refusal to ask for material sacrifice by the American public, undermined the ability to win those wars.

Summary:  Unlike World War II, America’s post-9/11 conflicts did not involve shared material sacrifice, such as tax increases or reducing oil use. Previous success during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and initial U.S. success in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks led then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to doubt the need for large troops deployments to Iraq. These factors left the U.S., as a whole, unprepared for the reality of post-conflict stabilization.

Text:  Like the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led to widespread popular support for war[1]. In both cases, the deaths of thousands of Americans catalyzed lengthy deployments of U.S. troops overseas. However, the two eras varied widely in the extent to which Americans outside the military were asked to sacrifice to win the wars.

While 16 million Americans served in the military during World War II[2], the entirety of American society was mobilized. At least 20 million Victory Gardens supplied 40% of the country’s produce by 1944[3]. Citizens were urged to carpool to save fuel and rubber[4]. The war saw the introduction of income tax withholding, turning a tax previously limited to wealthy Americans into a way ordinary citizens funded the war effort[5].

No such ethos of sacrifice emerged after 9/11. A month after the attacks, President George W. Bush argued, “We cannot let the terrorists achieve the objective of frightening our nation to the point where we don’t conduct business, where people don’t shop[6].” In 2003, President Bush signed a reduction in income tax rates[7]. Whatever the economic pros and cons of doing so, the decision to cut taxes during a war did not indicate the government intended to ask the public to sacrifice.

In the twelve years before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, major operations the U.S. led were brief and included relatively few American casualties. The 1991 Gulf War lasted six weeks, including only four days of ground combat, and fewer than 300[8] of the more than 500,000[9] Americans deployed were killed. The American-led interventions in Bosnia (lasting three weeks in 1995) and Kosovo (eleven weeks in 1999) consisted of air and missile strikes followed by deployments of NATO peacekeeping missions[10][11]. No Americans were killed in combat during the former conflict, and only two were killed in a training exercise during the latter[12]. After 9/11, the U.S. relied largely on air and missile strikes to oust the Taliban from control of Afghanistan in ten weeks; Afghan allies carried out most of the fighting on the ground[13].

Expecting a quick victory – and expecting Iraq to quickly stabilize after Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was overthrown – Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Commander of U.S. Central Command General Tommy Franks underestimated the number of troops needed to stabilize Iraq. Before the invasion, General Eric Shinseki, then Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that stabilization would require “several hundred thousand soldiers[14].” Similarly, Middle East policy expert Kenneth Pollack argued for “two to three hundred thousand people altogether[15].” By contrast, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld expected the war to last a matter of months[16], while Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz dismissed Shinseki’s estimate, saying “It is hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in a post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself[17].”

When the invasion was launched, 145,000 U.S. troops were involved[18], along with 70,000 Kurdish Peshmerga fighters[19], 45,000 British troops[20], and others. A year later, the U.S.-led coalition troops in Iraq numbered 162,000[21]. This proved inadequate to stabilize Iraq, particularly after the disbanding of the Iraqi army in 2003[22]. Until the “surge” of 2007, in which more than 28,000 additional troops[23] were deployed, brutal fighting between Iraqi factions was rife – more than 96,000 Iraqi civilians were killed from 2003-2007[24]. More than 3,900 Americans were killed from 2003-2007[25], compared to fewer than 600 from 2008-2011[26]. Meanwhile, American popular support for the war declined, from 72% in 2003 to 43% in 2007[27].

The role of oil in the debates surrounding the Iraq war links to the lack of shared sacrifice[28][29]. From 2002 to 2006, 12% of crude oil imported[30] into the U.S. came from Saudi Arabia[31]. Analysts such as New York Times journalist Thomas Friedman argued for a large increase in the federal gasoline tax[32], which would have echoed the reduction of fuel use during World War II. However, U.S. officials did not make decreased reliance on Middle Eastern oil a Policy priority.

Fuel dependence was also a factor in American casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to a 2009 report by the Army Environmental Policy Institute, from 2003 to 2007, one in every 24 fuel and water resupply convoys in Afghanistan, and one in every 38 in Iraq, resulted in an American casualty[33]. But while the military has sought to reduce fossil fuel use in recent years[34], Americans at home were not asked to sacrifice for it at the height of the Iraq war.

While many factors contributed to America’s post-9/11 military struggles, one factor was the expectation of quick victory. Between underestimating the difficulty of stabilization and refusing to ask for material sacrifice by the public, American leaders were unprepared for a long struggle. This lack of preparation can serve as a lesson for leaders debating whether to fight future conflicts and preparing for difficult fights if they do.

Endnotes:

[1] Washington Post. “Post-ABC Poll: Terrorist Attacks.” September 13, 2001. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data091401.htm

[2] National World War II Museum. “WWII Veteran Statistics.” https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/wwii-veteran-statistics

[3] Smithsonian Gardens. “Victory Garden at the National Museum of American History.” https://gardens.si.edu/gardens/victory-garden/#:~:text=Roughly%20one%20half%20of%20all,by%20victory%20gardens%20by%201944

[4] Yale University. “’When you ride ALONE you ride with Hitler!’ U.S. Government Propaganda Poster, 1943. https://energyhistory.yale.edu/library-item/when-you-ride-alone-you-ride-hitler-us-government-propaganda-poster-1943

[5] Hill, Adriene. “How tax withholding became the norm for American workers.” Marketplace, July 31, 2017.  https://www.marketplace.org/2017/07/31/how-tax-withholding-became-norm-american-workers/

[6] C-SPAN. “Presidential News Conference.” October 11, 2001. https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4552776/user-clip-bush-shopping-quote

[7] White House. “President Bush Helped Americans Through Tax Relief.” https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/factsheets/taxrelief.html

[8] Defense Casualty Analysis System. “U.S. Military Casualties – Persian Gulf War Casualty Summary Desert Storm.” https://dcas.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_gulf_storm.xhtml

[9] U.S. Department of Defense. “Desert Storm: A Look Back.” January 11, 2019. https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/story/Article/1728715/desert-storm-a-look-back/

[10] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR)

in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” https://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm

[11] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “NATO’s role in Kosovo.” https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm

[12] BBC News. “Two die in Apache crash.” May 5, 1999. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/335709.stm

[13] Council on Foreign Relations. “The U.S. War in Afghanistan: 1999 – 2021.” https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan

[14] Mills, Nicolaus. “Punished for telling truth about Iraq war.” CNN, March 20, 2013. https://www.cnn.com/2013/03/20/opinion/mills-truth-teller-iraq/index.html

[15] Lemann, Nicholas. “The Next World Order.” New Yorker, March 24, 2002. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/04/01/the-next-world-order

[16] Esterbrook, John. “Rumsfeld: It Would Be A Short War.” CBS News, November 15, 2002. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/rumsfeld-it-would-be-a-short-war/

[17] Mills, Nicolaus. “The General who Understood Iraq from the Start.” Dissent, April 25, 2008. https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/the-general-who-understood-iraq-from-the-start

[18] Mills, March 20, 2013.

[19] Peltier, Major Isaac J. “Surrogate Warfare: The Role of U.S. Army Special

Forces.” School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2005. http://www.jezail.org/03_archive/manuals_monogrms/Surrogate_war_UW.pdf

[20] NBC News. “Britain says most troops out of Iraq by June.” December 10, 2008. https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna28161917

[21] Carney, Stephen A. “Allied Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Center for Military History, United States Army, 2011. https://history.army.mil/html/books/059/59-3-1/CMH_59-3-1.pdf

[22] Thompson, Mark. “How Disbanding the Iraqi Army Fueled ISIS.” TIME, May 28, 2015. https://time.com/3900753/isis-iraq-syria-army-united-states-military/

[23] BBC News. “US Iraq troop surge ‘starts now.’” June 15, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6757329.stm

[24] Statista. “Number of documented civilian deaths in the Iraq war from 2003 to February 2022.” https://www.statista.com/statistics/269729/documented-civilian-deaths-in-iraq-war-since-2003/

[25] Statista. “Number of U.S. soldiers killed in the Iraq war from 2003 to 2020.”  https://www.statista.com/statistics/263798/american-soldiers-killed-in-iraq/

[26] Ibid.

[27] Pew Research Center. “Public Attitudes Toward the War in Iraq: 2003-2008.” March 19, 2008. https://www.pewresearch.org/2008/03/19/public-attitudes-toward-the-war-in-iraq-20032008/

[28] Ahmed, Nafeez. “Iraq invasion was about oil.” Guardian, March 20, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/mar/20/iraq-war-oil-resources-energy-peak-scarcity-economy

[29] Tyagi, Tal. “The Iraq War Was Not About Oil.” Quillette, May 6, 2019. https://quillette.com/2019/05/06/the-iraq-war-was-not-about-oil/

[30] U.S. Energy Information Administration. “U.S. Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products.” https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MTTIMUS1&f=M

[31] U.S. Energy Information Administration. “U.S. Imports from Saudi Arabia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products.” https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MTTIMUSSA1&f=M

[32] Friedman, Thomas L. “The Real Patriot Act.” New York Times, October 5, 2003. https://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/05/opinion/the-real-patriot-act.html

[33] Army Environmental Policy Institute. “Sustain the Mission Project: Casualty Factors

for Fuel and Water Resupply Convoys.” September 2009. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADB356341.pdf

[34] Gardner, Timothy. “U.S. military marches forward on green energy, despite Trump.” Reuters, March 1, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-green-energy-insight/u-s-military-marches-forward-on-green-energy-despite-trump-idUSKBN1683BL

Assessment Papers Governing Documents and Ideas Michael D. Purzycki United States
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U.S. Army Options to Regain Land Power Dominance

Marco J. Lyons is a U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel who has served in tactical and operational Army, Joint, and interagency organizations in the United States, Europe, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and in the Western Pacific. He is currently a national security fellow at Harvard Kennedy School where he is researching strategy and force planning for war in the Indo-Pacific. He may be contacted at marco_lyons@hks.harvard.edu. Although the analysis presented here is the author’s alone, he has benefitted extensively from discussions with Dr. Ron Sega of U.S. Army Futures Command and Dr. Anthony “Tony” Tether a former Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature, nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group. 

National Security Situation:  The U.S. Army has a modernization enterprise that is second-to-none but facing the highly capable militaries of China and Russia is an unprecedented challenge. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army planned to have a Taiwan invasion capability no later than the early 2020s[1]. The Russian military will probably have substantially increased its missile-based stand-off capabilities by the mid-2020s[2]. More alarmingly, Russia has succeeded in modernizing approximately 82 percent of its nuclear forces[3]. Russian conventional and nuclear modernization have both been factors in Moscow’s recent three-pronged invasion of Ukraine. 

Date Originally Written:  April 5, 2022. 

Date Originally Published:  April 18, 2022. 

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author has researched future operational concept development through the Army Science Board. The author believes that U.S. Army decision makers and analysts can more aggressively leverage past future force initiatives to address emerging threats from China and Russia. 

Background:  The ability to operate directly against adversary centers of gravity defines dominance. Dominant land power refers here to the ability of a land force to operate directly against the most decisive points that sustain an adversary force[4]. In land operations, a final decision requires control – through seizure, occupation, or retention – of terrain, people and resources using actual or threatened destruction or presence, or both[5]. America’s position as a global leader rests on its dominant land power[6]. 

Significance:  The character of warfare, the increasing interaction between the levels of war, and a concomitant need for higher echelon commanders to exercise military art on a broader scale and wider scope than earlier in history, all demand the U.S. Army refocus on the operational level[7]. The planning and command challenges at the operational level are more demanding than current doctrine would suggest. Moreover, the consequences of failure in major operations are difficult to overcome[8]. What has been called the theater-strategic level of war, or higher operational art, is poorly understood[9]. Three decades of post-Cold War stability and support operations, and two decades of counterinsurgency have helped the U.S. Army lose touch with the art of major operations. 

In only a few years China will have a trained, equipped, and cohesive invasion force and Russia will have a combat-capable force with recent experience in cross-domain operations. U.S. Army strategic leaders are already pressing for force transformation against these large-scale threats[10]. The Army can build on more than five years of modernization, the 2018 multi-domain operations concept, and a new global posture strategy to maintain the momentum needed to break the mold of the Brigade Combat Team-centric, Unified Land Operations-based force[11]. Importantly, U.S. Army planners can rapidly harvest important work done since the end of the Vietnam era. In competition, crisis, and armed conflict – in war – the United States needs a ready land force to deter unwanted escalation, assure allies and key partners, and compel beneficial geostrategic outcomes through force, if necessary. 

Option #1:  The U.S. Army revives and updates AirLand Battle–Future (ALBF). ALBF was meant to be a follow-on doctrine to AirLand Battle but was interrupted by the end of the Cold War and breakup of the Soviet Union. ALBF took the fundamentals of AirLand Battle and applied them to nonlinear battlefields and to advanced-technology capabilities – the same dynamics seen in the emerging operational environment. Additionally, ALBF extended operational concepts to operations short of war – like the competition short of armed conflict idea today[12]. 

Risk:  Major additions to the U.S. Army’s current doctrine development projects run the risk of delaying progress. Adding ALBF to the current Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) doctrine development may impose additional testing and validation demands. 

Gain:  An updated ALBF would provide a ready road map for the U.S. Army to move from the narrowly conceived 2018 Army in MDO concept to a published MDO doctrine which would replace Unified Land Operations. With the incorporation of a detailed view of multi-domain battle – still the heart of the MDO concept – an updated ALBF would provide the broad-based, low- to high-intensity doctrinal framework for the coming decades. 

Option #2:  The U.S. Army reinstitutes an updated Army of Excellence (AOE). The AOE was the last organization designed against a specified threat force – the Soviet Army and similarly-equipped enemy forces. The original rationale for the AOE was to reduce force “hollowness” by bringing personnel and materiel requirements within the limits of Army resources, enhance U.S. Army Corps-level capabilities to influence battle, and improve strategic mobility for immediate crisis response in regional conflicts[13]. This rationale is still relevant. Building on this rationale and using the Chinese People’s Liberation Army as a specified threat force, the Army could update the AOE (Light) Division to a “hybrid warfare” force and the AOE (Heavy) Division to a “high-technology, cross-domain maneuver” force. Echelons above division, with a reinstitution of corps-directed battle, could focus on layering advanced technology with multi-domain operations capabilities to conduct nonlinear and deep operations. 

Risk:  AOE was resource-intensive and a new AOE might also demand resources that may not materialize when needed. 

Gain:  An updated AOE organization would provide a familiar blueprint for fielding the land force for a more fully developed MDO doctrine. A new AOE would quickly restore robust and more survivable formations. 

Option #3:  The U.S. Army restarts the Army After Next (AAN). AAN locked on to technological maturation timelines that turned out to be wildly optimistic[14]. But many of the concepts, not least information dominance, precision fires, and focused logistics, were valid in the mid-1990s and remain so – the challenges are in testing, validation, and integration. Today, some of the early-envisioned AAN capabilities will soon be fielded. Various new fires systems, including Extended Range Cannon Artillery and Long-Range Precision Fire missiles, will provide the greatly extended range and higher accuracy needed to destroy enemy anti-access, area denial systems. As part of MDO, these new fires systems can be linked with forward operating F-35 multirole combat aircraft and ideally a constellation of low earth orbiting sensor platforms to achieve unprecedented responsiveness and lethality. The first battery of tactical directed energy weapons are in development, and even the combat cloud imagined by AAN planners, now called the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (or an alternative capability solution), is a near-term reality[15]. 

Risk:  AAN may not have focused enough on lethality at the operational level of war, and so in reviving the effort, it is possible this same shortcoming could hamper MDO against near-peer enemy forces. 

Gain:  What AAN provided that is missing today is a comprehensive blueprint to channel the Army’s genuine and ‘unifying’ modernization campaign under Army Futures Command[16]. 

Other Comments:  The U.S. Army’s strategy defines a land power dominant force by 2028[17]. Under the current Army Chief of Staff, beginning in 2020, the U.S. Army is trying to more closely link readiness, modernization, posture, and force structure under a broad plan for “transformation”[18]. To focus force transformation, the American Army could revive past work on nonlinear warfare, corps battle command, and technologically-enabled, globally integrated operations. 

Recommendation:  None. 

Endnotes:

[1] Franz-Stefan Gady, “Interview: Ben Lowsen on Chinese PLA Ground Forces: Assessing the future trajectory of PLA ground forces development,” The Diplomat, April 8, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/interview-ben-lowsen-on-chinese-pla-ground-forces/. 

[2] Fredrik Westerlund and Susanne Oxenstierna, eds., Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective – 2019 (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2019), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337948965_Russian_Military_Capability_in_a_Ten-Year_Perspective_-_2019. 

[3] Dakota L. Wood, ed., 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2021), https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/2021_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength_WEB_0.pdf. 

[4] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020: America’s Military – Preparing for Tomorrow (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2000), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a526044.pdf. 

[5] Michael A. Vane and Robert M. Toguchi, “The Enduring Relevance of Landpower: Flexibility and Adaptability for Joint Campaigns,” Association of the United States Army, October 7, 2003, https://www.ausa.org/publications/enduring-relevance-landpower-flexibility-and-adaptability-joint-campaigns. 

[6] Williamson Murray, ed., Army Transformation: A View from the U.S. Army War College (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/1560.pdf. 

[7] David Jablonsky, “Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I,” Parameters 17, no. 1 (1987): 65-76, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA516154.pdf. 

[8] Milan Vego, “On Operational Leadership,” Joint Force Quarterly 77 (2nd Quarter 2015): 60-69, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-77/Article/581882/on-operational-leadership/. 

[9] Michael R. Matheny, “The Fourth Level of War,” Joint Force Quarterly 80 (1st Quarter 2016): 62-66, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-80/Article/643103/the-fourth-level-of-war/. 

[10] James C. McConville, Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict, Chief of Staff Paper #1, Unclassified Version (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, March 16, 2021), https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2021/03/23/eeac3d01/20210319-csa-paper-1-signed-print-version.pdf. 

[11] Billy Fabian, “Back to the Future: Transforming the U.S. Army for High-Intensity Warfare in the 21st Century,” Center for a New American Security, November 19, 2020, https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/back-to-the-future-transforming-the-u-s-army-for-high-intensity-warfare-in-the-21st-century. One recent study concluded that Unified Land Operations does not sufficiently focus on large-scale war against an enemy force. See Alan P. Hastings, Coping with Complexity: Analyzing Unified Land Operations Through the Lens of Complex Adaptive Systems Theory (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2019), https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p4013coll3/id/3894/download. 

[12] Terry M. Peck, AirLand Battle Imperatives: Do They Apply to Future Contingency Operations? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1990), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a234151.pdf. 

[13] Pat Ford, Edwin H. Burba, Jr., and Richard E. Christ, Review of Division Structure Initiatives, Research Product 95-02 (Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research Organization, 1994), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA297578. 

[14] Robert H. Scales, “Forecasting the Future of Warfare,” War on the Rocks, April 9, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/forecasting-the-future-of-warfare/. 

[15] Dan Gouré, “Creating the Army After Next, Again,” RealClearDefense, August 16, 2019, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/08/16/creating_the_army_after_next_again_114670.html. 

[16] U.S. Army, 2019 Army Modernization Strategy: Investing in the Future (Fort Eustis, VA: Army Futures Command, 2019), 1,  https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/2019_army_modernization_strategy_final.pdf.

[17] The United States Army, “The Army’s Vision and Strategy,” Army.mil, no date, https://www.army.mil/about/. The Army’s “WayPoint 2028” focused on concepts and modernization. The United States Army, “Gen. Michael Garrett Visit,” U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, August 18, 2020, https://usacac.army.mil/node/2739. The Army’s “AimPoint Force” structure plan was meant to revive capable warfighting echelons above brigade. Andrew Feickert, “In Focus: The Army’s AimPoint Force Structure Initiative,” Congressional Research Service, May 8, 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF11542.pdf. The “AimPoint Force” was about designing networked capabilities for overmatch. Devon Suits, “Futures and Concepts Center evaluates new force structure,” Army.mil, April 22, 2020, https://www.army.mil/article/234845/futures_and_concepts_center_evaluates_new_force_structure. 

[18] Association of the United States Army, “McConville Advocates for Aggressive Transformation,” Association of the United States Army, October 14, 2020, https://www.ausa.org/news/mcconville-advocates-aggressive-transformation. 

Capacity / Capability Enhancement Defense and Military Reform Governing Documents and Ideas Major Regional Contingency Marco J. Lyons Option Papers U.S. Army
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Assessing the Tension Between Privacy and Innovation

Channing Lee studies International Politics at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. She can be found on Twitter @channingclee. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing the Tension Between Privacy and Innovation

Date Originally Written:  April 1, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  April 11, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is a student of international politics. 

Summary:  Given the importance of data to emerging technologies, future innovation may be dependent upon personal data access and a new relationship with privacy. To fully unleash the potential of technological innovation, societies that traditionally prize individual privacy may need to reevaluate their attitudes toward data collection in order to remain globally competitive.

Text:  The U.S. may be positioning itself to lag behind other nations that are more willing to collect and use personal data to drive Artificial Intelligence (AI) advancement and innovation. When the COVID-19 pandemic began, the idea of conducting contact tracing to assess virus exposure through personal devices sounded alarm bells across the United States[1]. However, that was not the first time technologies were engaged in personal data collection. Beyond the pandemic, the accumulation of personal data has already unlocked enhanced experiences with technology—empowering user devices to better accommodate personal preferences. As technology continues to advance, communities around the world will need to decide which ideals of personal privacy take precedence over innovation.

Some experts like Kai-Fu Lee argue that the collection of personal data may actually be the key that unlocks the future potential of technology, especially in the context of AI[2]. AI is already being integrated into nearly all industries, from healthcare to digital payments to driverless automobiles and more. AI works by training algorithms on existing data, but it can only succeed if such data is available. In Sweden, for example, data has enabled the creation of “Smart Grid Gotland,” which tracks electricity consumption according to wind energy supply fluctuations and reduces household energy costs[3]. Such integration of technology with urban planning, otherwise known as “smart cities,” has become a popular aspiration of governments across the globe to make their cities safer and more efficient. However, these projects also require massive amounts of data.

Indeed, data is already the driving force behind many research problems and innovations, though not without concerns. For example, AI is being used to improve cancer screening in cervical and prostate cancer, and AI might be the human invention that eventually leads scientists to discover a cancer cure[4]. Researchers like Dr. Fei Sha from the University of Southern California are working to apply big data and algorithmic models to “generate life-saving biomedical research outcomes[5].” But if patients deny access to their healthcare histories and other information, researchers will not have the adequate data to uncover more effective methods of treatment. Similarly, AI will likely be the technology that streamlines the advancement of digital payments, detecting fraudulent transactions and approving loan applications at a quicker speed. Yet, if people resist data collection, the algorithms cannot reach their full potential. As these examples demonstrate, “big data” can unlock the next chapter of human advances, but privacy concerns stand in the way.

Different societies use different approaches to deal with and respond to questions of data and privacy. In Western communities, individuals demonstrate strong opposition to the collection of their personal information by private sector actors, believing collection to be a breach of their personal privacy privileges. The European Union’s (EU) General Data Protection Regulation  and its newly introduced Digital Services Act, Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, and California’s Consumer Privacy Act curb the non-consensual collection of personal information by businesses, thereby empowering individuals to take ownership of their data. Recently, big tech companies such as Meta and Google have come under public scrutiny for collecting personal data, and polls reveal that Americans are increasingly distrustful of popular social media apps such as Facebook and Instagram[6]. 

Still, the American public is not as guarded as it may appear. Video-focused social media app TikTok, whose parent company Bytedance is based in China, reported more than 100 million daily U.S. users in August 2020, up 800% since January 2018[7]. Despite warnings that the Shanghai-based company could potentially share personal data with Beijing, including threats by the Trump administration to “ban TikTok” for national security reasons, nearly a third of Americans continue to use the application on a daily basis, seemingly ignoring privacy concerns. While lawmakers have attempted to regulate the collection of data by large corporations, especially foreign companies, public opinion appears mixed.

Norms in the Eastern hemisphere tell a different story. Privacy laws exist, such as China’s Personal Information Protection Law and Japan’s upcoming ​​Amended Act on Protection of Personal Information, but the culture surrounding them is completely distinct, particularly when it comes to government collection of personal data. At the height of the pandemic, South Korea introduced a robust contact tracing campaign that relied on large databases constructed by data from credit card transactions[8]. Taiwan succeed in contact tracing efforts by launching an electronic security monitoring system that tracks isolating individuals’ locations through their cell phones[9]. In China, almost everything can be achieved through a single app, WeChat, which allows users to post pictures, order food, message friends, hire babysitters, hail a cab, pay for groceries, and more. This technological integration, which has transformed Chinese society, works because enough personal information is stored and linked together in the application. 

Some may argue that not all the data being collected by governments and even corporations has been neither voluntary nor consensual, which is why collection discussions require legal frameworks regarding privacy. Nevertheless, governments that emphasize the collective good over personal privacy have fostered societies where people possess less paranoia about companies utilizing their information and enjoy more technological progress. Despite aforementioned privacy concerns, WeChat topped more than one billion users by the end of 2021, including overseas users[10].

Regardless of a nation’s approach to technological innovation, one thing must be made clear: privacy concerns are real and cannot be diminished. In fact, personal privacy as a principle forms the foundation of liberal democratic citizenship, and infringements upon privacy threaten such societal fabrics. Law enforcement, for example, are more actively optimizing emerging technologies such as facial recognition and surveillance methods to monitor protests and collect individual location data. These trends have the potential to compromise civil liberties, in addition to the injustices that arise from data biases[11].

Yet there is also no doubt that the direction global privacy laws are headed may potentially stifle innovation, especially because developing technologies such as AI requires large quantities of data. 

The U.S. will soon need to reevaluate the way it conceives of privacy as it relates to innovation. If the U.S. follows the EU’s footsteps and tightens its grip on the act of data collection, rather than the technology behind the data collection, it might be setting itself up for failure, or at least falling behind. If the U.S. wants to continue leading the world in technological advancement, it may pursue policies that allow technology to flourish without discounting personal protections. The U.S. can, for example, simultaneously implement strident safeguards against government or corporate misuse of personal data and invest in the next generation of technological innovation. The U.S. has options, but these options require viewing big data as a friend, not a foe.

Endnotes:

[1] Kate Blackwood, “Study: Americans skeptical of COVID-19 contact tracing apps,” Cornell Chronicle, January 21, 2021, https://news.cornell.edu/stories/2021/01/study-americans-skeptical-covid-19-contact-tracing-apps.

[2] Kai-Fu Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order (Boston: Mariner Books, 2018).

[3] “Data driving the next wave of Swedish super cities,” KPMG, accessed March 12, 2022, https://home.kpmg/se/sv/home/nyheter-rapporter/2020/12/data-driving-the-next-wave-of-swedish-super-cities.html.

[4] “Artificial Intelligence – Opportunities in Cancer Research,” National Cancer Institute, accessed February 15, 2022, https://www.cancer.gov/research/areas/diagnosis/artificial-intelligence.

[5] Marc Ballon, “Can artificial intelligence help to detect and cure cancer?,” USC News, November 6, 2017, https://news.usc.edu/130825/can-artificial-intelligence-help-to-detect-and-cure-cancer/.

[6] Heather Kelly and Emily Guskin, “Americans widely distrust Facebook, TikTok and Instagram with their data, poll finds,” The Washington Post, December 22, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/12/22/tech-trust-survey/.

[7] Alex Sherman, “TikTok reveals detailed user numbers for the first time,” CNBC, August 24, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/24/tiktok-reveals-us-global-user-growth-numbers-for-first-time.html.

[8] Young Joon Park, Young June Choe, Ok Park, et al. “Contact Tracing during Coronavirus Disease Outbreak, South Korea, 2020,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 26, no. 10 (October 2020):2465-2468. https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/26/10/20-1315_article.

[9] Emily Weinstein, “Technology without Authoritarian Characteristics: An Assessment of the Taiwan Model of Combating COVID-19,” Taiwan Insight, December 10, 2020, https://taiwaninsight.org/2020/11/24/technology-without-authoritarian-characteristics-an-assessment-of-the-taiwan-model-of-combating-covid-19/.

[10] “WeChat users & platform insights 2022,” China Internet Watch, March 24, 2022, https://www.chinainternetwatch.com/31608/wechat-statistics/#:~:text=Over%20330%20million%20of%20WeChat’s,Account%20has%20360%20million%20users.

[11] Aaron Holmes, “How police are using technology like drones and facial recognition to monitor protests and track people across the US,” Business Insider, June 1, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/how-police-use-tech-facial-recognition-ai-drones-2019-10.

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Options to Modify Title 10 U.S. Code to Improve U.S. Security Force Assistance

Major James P. Micciche is a U.S. Army Strategist and Civil Affairs Officer. He holds degrees from the Fletcher School at Tufts University and Troy University and can be found on Twitter @james_micciche. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the USG. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature, nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group. 

National Security Situation:  Without modifications to Title 10 U.S. Code (USC), Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 16, §321 and §333, U.S. Security Force Assistance (SFA) contributions to strategic competition will not be fully realized.

Date Originally Written:  March 23, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  April 4, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes SFA can address strategic competitors’ most likely and most dangerous courses of action while also supporting competitive efforts through other instruments of national power. 

Background:  The DoD defines SFA as “activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions[1].”   SFA improves the ability of the Joint Force to support, enable, and enhance campaigning across all elements of the competition continuum[2].  Despite SFA’s prominent role in supporting the Integrated Deterrence concept underlying the 2022 National Defense Strategy, current statutory authorities limit SFA’s effectiveness. The 2022 National Defense Authorization Act’s (NDAA) Section 1323 (Study on Certain Security Cooperation Programs) and Section 1261 (Report on Security Cooperation Authorities and Associated Resourcing in Support of the Security Force Assistance Brigades) of the Senate’s proposed NDAA signal Congressional interest in improving SFA authorities to address strategic competition[3][4].  

Significance:  Allies and Partners are a cornerstone of U.S. policy. The first National Security Strategy identified an “area of U.S. strength and Soviet weakness is alliance relationships[5].” Current DoD leadership continues to emphasize Allies and Partners as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities testified to the House Armed Service Committee “The U.S. network of alliances and partnerships is a strategic advantage our competitors cannot match[6].” That advantage enables the realization of Integrated Deterrence, the foundation of the 2022 National Defense Strategy. Integrated Deterrence synchronizes Joint Force and Interagency capabilities with those of Allies and Partners to deter or compel strategic competitors[7]. SFA builds the requisite partnerships and interoperability with Allies and Partners in key locations to generate Integrated Deterrent effects mitigating threats to U.S. interests. 

Sun Tzu prioritized negating an adversary’s strategy and then destabilizing their alliances[8]. China, America’s identified pacing threat, did this by investing in capabilities preventing the deployment of U.S. military power. China also uses diplomatic, information, and economic instruments of national power to degrade U.S. access, influence, and presence globally. From Anti-Access Area Denial technologies to coercive economic and diplomatic practices, China is denying options and increasing the costs for the U.S. military. Due to these concerted efforts, the Joint Force now faces two strategic challenges, “time and distance[9].” 

SFA provides options for combatant commanders to compete below levels of armed conflict through establishing or maintaining access, presence, and influence while improving partners’ military capability and interoperability with U.S. forces. SFA increases adversarial escalation costs and allows the Joint Force to begin conflict at a positional advantage. Despite SFA’s capabilities, the current statutory authorities do not enable the DoD to maximize its employment of purpose-built SFA formations, like the Army’s Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) and the Air Force’s Mobility Support Advisory Squadrons.

Title 10 USC, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 16, authorizes the majority of DoD security cooperation activities, of which SFA is a subset. The current chapter 16 authorities represent the unipolar world of 1991-2003 or the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) from 2001-2017. Within the current legislative framework §321 (Training with Friendly Countries) and §333 (Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity) are the primary mechanisms for the DoD to conduct SFA. Each authority has limitations and strengths but neither is optimized for strategic competition. 

Option #1:  Congress changes “only with the military forces” to “security forces” within the limitation clause of §321.

§321 authorizes general-purpose forces of the United States to train only with the militaries of partners for the overall benefit of the U.S. unit[10]. §321 prevents the development of new partner capabilities and restricts materiel, construction, or contract support to training events only. While §321 is a flexible option for combatant commanders to establish access, presence, and influence it limits the development and integration to indirect benefits of training with U.S. forces. 

Risk:  Expanding the amount and type of security forces that U.S. conventional units can train without State Department concurrence risks over-militarizing aspects of U.S. foreign policy and delegitimizing whole of government efforts to develop capacity in non-defense sectors. §321 expansion risks potentially duplicating authorities within §322 (Special operations forces: training with friendly foreign forces) without an overarching program manager like U.S. Special Operations Command’s Joint Combined Exchange Training. 

Gain:  Increasing the aperture of who U.S. conventional forces can train with increases the flexibility and utility of using §321 to establish access, presence, and influence. This is especially beneficial within nations that have internally-focused security forces that are not part of a traditional military architecture. 

Option #2:  Congress creates a tenth capacity category authorizing “improved combined military interoperability” in §333.

§333 authorizes materiel, training, and operational support to foreign partner forces in developing capabilities across nine different mission types with seven of the nine being focused on GWOT-era objectives. Unlike §321 activities, §333 missions require Department of State concurrence and coordination and have specific Congressionally appropriated funding through the international security cooperation programs account. 

Risk:  Despite developing long-term partner capabilities, §333 activities take 18-24 months to approve, preventing its use in emergent and unforeseen requirements. Additionally, both conventional and special operations forces use §333 and its associated funds and adding additional mission types will increase competition for an already limited resource, especially with the loss of overseas contingency operations funding. 

Gain:  SFA works best over prolonged periods through persistent presence. §333’s ability to build partner capacity and provide materiel and operational support make it ideal for improving the effectiveness of partner forces to deter aggression and generating interoperability with U.S. Forces. Department of State concurrence and monitoring of §333 also facilitates the integration of other instruments of national power.  

Option #3:  Congress creates an SFA-specific authority and funding source. 

§321 broadly allows combatant commanders some flexibility in where they conduct SFA requiring months to approve and fund but vastly limits the long-term impact of their activities. Inversely, §333 is specific in allowing concerted efforts with a given partner that takes years to approve and its codified mission types constrain use to developing nations. Creating a responsive SFA-specific authority and funding source provides the Joint Force the ability to address strategic competition and prioritizes Partners and Allies.

Risk:  After the failures of the Afghan National Security Forces in August 2021 and the deaths of four U.S. Army Special Forces Soldiers during an ambush in 2017, there is substantial pushback on increasing the autonomy of the DoD to execute SFA. Increasing SFA’s ability to employ military members in advisory roles requires Congress to assume risk and put faith back into the DoD to execute global competition missions. 

Gain:  An SFA-specific authority and funding source highlights U.S. commitment to allies, partners, and strategic competition. This authority, with an accompanying appropriated funding source, will generate the long-term strategies needed to maximize the effects of SFA. 

Other Comments:  Combatant commanders continue to warn of legislative inaction in a world defined by competition between autocracies and democracies. In competition autocratic states enjoy an asymmetric advantage in speed, responsiveness, and reach due to no bureaucratic restrictions or adherence to international norms and laws. The Commander of U.S. Africa Command highlighted the issue of speed warning that U.S. assistance, “can sometimes take a long time to unfold, and that sometimes forces our African partners to go with the bird in hand, which is sometimes China, sometimes Russia[11].” The Commander of U.S. Southern Command outlined the need for flexibility when asking Congress to explore a “21st century flexible and responsible tool to allow us to outcompete and win by meeting our partner’s needs[12].” Inaction risks potential degradation of U.S. access, presence, and influence needed to establish integrated deterrence.

Recommendations:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] Joint Chiefs of Staff (2021), DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. page 192. Retrieved from https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf

[2] Joint Chiefs of Staff (2019) Competition Continuum (Joint Doctrine Note 1-19). Retrieved from https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_19.pdf?ver=2019-06-10-113311-233 defines three competition as having three nonlinear elements nonexclusive elements cooperation, competition below levels of armed conflict, and conflict.  

[3] United States. (2022). National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year: Conference report. Washington, D.C: U.S. G.P.O. Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1605/text

[4] United States. Congress. Conference Committees 2022. (2022). JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT TO ACCOMPANY THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022: Washington :U.S. Govt. Print. Off.. Retrieved from https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/17S1605-RCP117-21-JES-U1.pdf 

[5] Reagan, Ronald  (1987). National security strategy of the United States of America. Executive Office of The President Washington DC Washington United States. Retrieved from https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1987.pdf

[6] C-SPAN (2022). Defense and State Officials Testify on U.S. Engagement with Allies. Retrieved from https://www.c-span.org/video/?518194-1/defense-state-officials-testify-us-engagement-allies 

[7] Garamone, Jim (2021). “Concept of Integrated Deterrence Will Be Key to National Defense Strategy, DOD Official Says.” U.S. Department of Defense – DOD News. Retrieved from https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2866963/concept-of-integrated-deterrence-will-be-key-to-national-defense-strategy-dod-o/ 

[8] Griffith, S. B. (1963). Sun Tzu: The art of war (Vol. 39). London: Oxford University Press.

[9] McConville, James (2021).  Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict, Chief of Staff Paper #1. Headquarters Department of the Army. Retrieved from https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2021/03/23/eeac3d01/20210319-csa-paper-1-signed-print-version.pdf 

[10] 10 U.S.C. § 321 (2016), accessed 5 March 2021, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2016-title10/html/USCODE-2016-title10-subtitleA-partI-chap16-subchapIII.htm.

[11] Senate Armed Service Committee. (2022). HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE POSTURE OF UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND AND UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND a.” Retrieved from https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/22-12_03-15-2022.pdf 

[12] House Armed Service Committee. (2021). National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activity in North and South America.” Retrieved from https://armedservices.house.gov/2021/4/full-committee-hearing-national-security-challenges-and-u-s-military-activity-in-north-and-south-america  

Allies & Partners Capacity / Capability Enhancement Competition James P. Micciche Option Papers U.S. Air Force U.S. Army
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Assessing the Forces Driving the Redesign of U.S. Army Land Power

Marco J. Lyons is a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army who has served in tactical and operational Army, Joint, and interagency organizations in the United States, Europe, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and in the Western Pacific. He is currently a national security fellow at Harvard Kennedy School where he is researching strategy and force planning for war in the Indo-Pacific. He may be contacted at marco_lyons@hks.harvard.edu. Although the ideas here are the author’s alone, he benefitted from feedback provided by Colonel George Shatzer (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College) on an earlier draft. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature, nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group. 

Title:  Assessing the Forces Driving the Redesign of U.S. Army Land Power 

Date Originally Written:  March 23, 2022. 

Date Originally Published:  March 28, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that threat, geopolitical, and technological changes necessitate a reassessment of broad U.S. Army future force design parameters. Without this reassessment, the U.S. Army and the Joint Force risk wasting resources on obsolete conceptions. 

Summary:  Redesigning U.S. Army land power for the twenty-first century will require policy makers and defense leaders to negotiate numerous conflicting dynamics. Future U.S. Army forces will need to be immediately ready for crises but also adaptable. They will need to be powerful enough for major combat operations and organizationally flexible, but also tailored to missions and tasks. 

Text:  The principles that have historically guided U.S. Army force planning—size, mix, and distribution—to meet strategic needs include: early use of the Regular Component in a contingency; reliance on the Reserve Component for later-arriving forces; primacy of defeating an aggressor in major combat operations; capabilities for short-notice deployments; and the importance of readiness to deploy over cost considerations[1]. These principles will likely persist. 

Future technological factors will shape U.S. Army strategy, force structure, and planning decisions. Important technological changes that may decisively influence future U.S. Army force design include advances in information acquisition, processing, distribution, and utilization; capabilities for light, medium, and heavy forces; integrated air defense and protection; and changes to support and maintenance requirements for advanced systems. Demands to reconfigure forces for a broad range of contingencies will not shrink in the foreseeable future. The overriding imperative for air deploy-ability will not change significantly[2]. Like in the 1990s, come-as-you-are wars are still likely, but these require reconceptualization in a Great Power context. 

There will continue to be missions and tasks that only Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, or Airmen can realistically accomplish. Military power employment and military power integration and significantly different – the sum, integrated, is greater than the parts, acting independently. Missions and tasks of the future joint force will be assigned based on military necessity and objectives, and not based on predetermined formulas or a desire for equitability. Future force planning will balance forms of military power and the different major components within land power with the understanding that high-/low-technology mixes are generally superior to a reliance on only one end of the technology spectrum[3]. 

Military affairs are evolving rapidly as events in Ukraine illustrate. Ballistic missiles, precision strikes, unmanned systems, space and cyberspace, and weapon of mass destruction technologies are spreading to various areas around the world. The means and ways of warfare are changing. Battle space in the air, sea, space, and cyberspace domains, in which U.S. forces have enjoyed various degrees of dominance, is becoming increasingly contested[4]. This contestation directly threatens U.S. integration of joint functions, especially fires, movement and maneuver, and sustainment. 

Globalization creates both economic wealth and activity, along with security vulnerabilities. For many advanced economies, the range of security threats is expanding and becoming more varied. The twenty-first century is likely to see more so-called coalitions of the willing than formalized alliance structures like during World War Two. It is not clear that traditional military forces and capabilities will still retain their value and utility[5]. 

The unclassified summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) recognized a weakening, post-1945 international order. The 2018 NDS also called for increased strategic flexibility and freedom of action to manage a high volume of change[6]. Although accurately forecasting the future strategic environment is inherently prone to error, it is also practical to assume that major changes will happen rapidly in the wake of particular high-impact events[7]. 

Because future great power competitors will likely have formidable escalation capabilities, the importance of designing for escalation advantage in future force planning will increase. Part of the complexity being generated in the emerging operational environment is caused by the increasing number of competition-warfighting domains, expanding options for synergy between them, and their disparate considerations with respect to speed, range, and lethality. As the reach, penetrability, and effectiveness of sensors, networks, and weapon systems improve, the demands for integration of capabilities and effects across domains multiply[8]. One characteristic of the emerging operational environment worth watching is that more power centers have more ways to push events on the international stage to their liking[9]. This pushing might be called hyper-competition[10]. 

Future adversaries will almost invariably be fighting on or near land, near their home or otherwise controlled territory, with shorter and simpler lines of communications. Platform for platform, land ones are cheaper, less technologically complex, easier to produce in large numbers, and quicker to replace than their air and maritime counterparts[11]. Part of what makes the twenty-first century military challenge so seemingly intractable is that the drivers of change appear to be forcing adaptation across the full breadth of policy, security, and military dimensions[12]. This means that these traditional factors will almost certainly change in the near- to mid-future: federated military forces based on physical domains; alliances and partnerships of convenience; and “runaway” technological advances that are formulated for purely civilian use. 

Numerous dynamics suggest that the future joint force will be smaller but will still need to retain technological overmatch, rapid deploy-ability, joint and multinational interoperability, and organizational agility[13]. Force development is about getting the joint force to do what it does better while force design is about getting the joint force to do new things in new, more disruptive ways[14]. Changes to both force development and force design are needed to protect current and future overmatch. For national security, and for getting to the future force needed, force development is best when linked directly to the right kinds of research clusters looking at disruptive technologies, that can then be integrated quickly into the right kinds of military capabilities[15]. As for force design, U.S. Army Futures Command is a primary vehicle for delivering rapid technological integration to ground forces. Integrating various technological, research, and military activities based on a coherent view of future national security will take reformed national policy. 

Redesigning U.S. Army land power for the twenty-first century will require policy makers and defense leaders to negotiate numerous conflicting dynamics. Future U.S. Army forces will need to be immediately ready for crises but also adaptable. They will need to be powerful enough for major combat operations and organizationally flexible, but also tailored to missions and tasks. Countering Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine or the Chinese People’s Liberation Army will take forces dominant in and through the land domain while being fully relevant in all competition-warfighting domains – properly integrated with other forms of domain power. 

Endnotes:

[1] Joshua Klimas and Gian Gentile, Planning an Army for the 21st Century: Principles to Guide U.S. Army Force Size, Mix, and Component Distribution (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE291/RAND_PE291.pdf. 

[2] National Research Council, Board on Army Science and Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1992), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a275948.pdf. 

[3] William T. Johnsen, Redefining Land Power for the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA349014.pdf. 

[4] John Gordon IV, Igor Mikolic-Torreira, et al, Army Fires Capabilities for 2025 and Beyond (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2124.html. 

[5] The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century Major Themes and Implications, The Phase I Report on the Emerging Global Security Environment for the First Quarter of the 21st Century, September 15, 1999, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=2087. 

[6] James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=807329. 

[7] John A. Shaud, Air Force Strategy Study 2020-2030 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, Air Force Research Institute, January 2011), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a540345.pdf. 

[8] Training and Doctrine Command, The Operational Environment, 2035-2050: The Emerging Character of Warfare (Fort Eustis, VA: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, n.d.), https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/mad-scientist/m/articles-of-interest/217736. 

[9] Richard Kaipo Lum, “A Map with No Edges: Anticipating and Shaping the Future Operating Environments,” Small Wars Journal, November 2020, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/map-no-edges-anticipating-and-shaping-future-operating-environments. 

[10] Cf. Nathan P. Freier, John Schaus, and William G. Braun III, An Army Transformed: USINDOPACOM Hypercompetition and U.S. Army Theater Design (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2020), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/912. 

[11] Shmuel Shmuel, “The American Way of War in the Twenty-first Century: Three Inherent Challenges,” Modern War Institute, June 30, 2020, https://mwi.usma.edu/american-way-war-twenty-first-century-three-inherent-challenges/. 

[12] National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense—National Security in the 21st Century, Report of the National Defense Panel, Arlington, VA, December 1997, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=1834. 

[13] See Prepared Statement by Dr. Mike Griffin, Senate Hearing 115-847, Accelerating New Technologies to Meet Emerging Threats, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 115th Congress, 2nd Session, April 18, 2018, U.S. Government Publishing Office, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg41257/html/CHRG-115shrg41257.htm. 

[14] Jim Garamone, “National Military Strategy Addresses Changing Character of War,” Department of Defense (website), July 12, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1903478/national-military-strategy-addresses-changing-character-of-war/. 

[15] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operating Environment, JOE 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 14, 2016), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joe_2035_july16.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162059-917. 

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Assessing the Cameroonian Anglophone Crisis and Potential Impacts of U.S. Inaction

Sam Gitlitz is Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy currently assigned in Washington D.C.  He previously was assigned in the Pentagon, where he supported OPNAV N2N6. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization or any group.

Title:  Assessing the Cameroonian Anglophone Crisis and Potential Impacts of U.S. Inaction

Date Originally Written:  February 20, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  March 21, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author deployed to Cameroon in 2015-2016.  The instability caused by the Anglophone crisis threatens Cameroonian security and regional stabilization.  Based on his experience, the author believes that failure to recognize the strategic importance of the situation and plan accordingly will have negative, lasting second and third order effects.

Summary:  The Anglophone Conflict stems from 2016 when Anglophone teachers and lawyers mounted protests demanding better representation in Cameroon’s legal and educational systems.  The conflict is estimated to have killed thousands of people and displaced close to a million[1].  With the onset of the crisis, the U.S. reduced security assistance to the country with few other efforts to resolve the crisis.  Inaction by the U.S. could lead to further destabilization.

Text:  Cameroon is an amalgamation of former French and British territories combined into a single country in 1961. The North-West and South-West Regions (NWSW) of Cameroon are home to most of the country’s English-speaking population (Anglophones), roughly 20% of the total population.  The Anglophone Conflict stems from 2016 when Anglophone teachers and lawyers mounted protests demanding better representation in Cameroon’s legal and educational systems.  What started as peaceful protests quickly turned violent as demonstrators clashed with security personnel.  Cameroon President Paul Biya’s response included deploying U.S. trained special forces[2], curfews, and implementing regional communications blackouts. In 2017, Anglophone protestors switched tactics from wanting increased representation to demanding an independent state.  On October 1, 2017, Anglophone separationists unilaterally claimed independence from Cameroon creating the Federal Republic of Ambazonia which would be led by an interim government.

Ambazonia is now in quasi-civil war albeit with limited recognition from President Biya in Cameroon’s capital Yaoundé.  He maintains that the conflict is a terrorist/criminal issue, which he promises to resolve through bureaucratic maneuvering and force[3].  The struggle continues to grow deadlier, with more improvised explosive device attacks taking place in the first five months of 2021 than all other years of the conflict combined[4]. The situation continues to deteriorate with separatists beginning kidnap for ransom operations and the Cameroonian state conducting cross border operations of questionable legality into Nigeria. The Cameroonian government’s harsh tactics against its citizenry prompted allegations of human rights abuses.

The magnitude of the crisis and numerous filmed events obtained by international aid organizations lends strong credence to the allegations.  As a result of the abuses, the U.S. cut military aid to Cameroon in 2019[5]. The U.S. is in a difficult position as Cameroon is a key ally against Islamist terrorism in the region, through their contribution to the Multi-national Joint Task Force and allowing U.S. forces to operate from bases in the country[6].  

Little is likely to be resolved in the immediate future.  The government is unable to claim victory, and the separatists have not gained and held ground, leading to in-fighting[7]. The separatists seek to change their fortunes through an alliance with Nigerian separatists and the purchase of weapons from foreign powers[8]. Another element to consider is President Biya.  At 89, Biya is the oldest elected official on the continent and the second longest serving.  Many, if not most, Cameroonians do not know life without Biya.  He has no intention of ceding power, and more importantly does not have any clear succession plans.  Disorganization from Biya’s hospitalization, death, or cessation of power may give Amabazonia the relief it needs to find better footing.

For a country battling Islamist terrorists in the north and separatists in the south, the death of an autocrat may be the final straw.  The U.S. would be well advised to consider response options to the Anglophone crisis beyond advocating for human rights. If the U.S. continues to ignore the Anglophone crisis and does not develop solid response options, it risks ceding regional leadership and allowing the problem to spiral. Considering the NWSW regions’ coastline and other natural resources, the area will draw international attention for cocoa, oil, or an Atlantic Port. In 2019, China wrote off a substantial portion of Cameroon’s debt[9], and is building the region’s largest deep-water port[10].  China is presumably ready to and willing to fill any partnership void caused by U.S. inaction.

There are several possible outcomes.  The first, already underway, is the continued stagnation of the crisis.  With neither side moving towards peace and conflict increasing, the growth of criminal activity, extremism, and continued human rights abuses is likely.  Combined with other regional instability and increased piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, the equivalent of a West coast Somalia is an unattractive prospect.  

Second, should the crisis escalate, and Cameroon prove ineffective at containing the situation, say in the case of Biya’s death, would regional intervention be justified?  Is the U.S. prepared or able to, with Leahy Law requirements, support regional action to stabilize the area?  How would the U.S. react to Nigeria retaking the Bakassi peninsula under the premise of a responsibility to protect intervention?

Given the vast uncertainty facing Cameroon post-Biya, the U.S. and international community should not be shocked by  renewed claims of Ambazonian independence. Should Anglophone Cameroonians coalesce, they may prove more capable at maintaining security in the region than Yaoundé. The Anglophone Camerronians  would then have a solid footing for seeking recognition, which could prompt additional calls for succession from groups like the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta in neighboring Nigeria. As evidenced by recent events, a country seeking de jure recognition has the potential to disrupt the international order, in this case that could occur in an already unstable region which could prove disastrous for U.S. regional efforts.

The current situation is the culmination of bad international politics in the 1960’s which amalgamated peoples regardless of their language and culture.  The crisis will not be resolved as is and risks creating a generation of disenfranchised, displaced people nursing a grievance.

Endnotes:

[1] International Crisis Group, “Cameroon,” Crisis Group, accessed February 20, 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon.

[2] Gareth Browne, “Cameroon’s Separatist Movement Is Going International – Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, May 13, 2019, https://foreignpolicy-com.proxyau.wrlc.org/2019/05/13/cameroons-separatist-movement-is-going-international-ambazonia-military-forces-amf-anglophone-crisis/.

[3] Paul Biya, “Head of State’s New Year Message to the Nation – 31 December 2021,” accessed February 3, 2022, https://www.prc.cm/en/news/speeches-of-the-president/5611-head-of-state-s-new-year-message-to-the-nation-31-december-2021.

[4] Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Populations at Risk: Cameroon,” Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, December 1, 2021, https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/cameroon/.

[5] Edwin Kindzeka, “Cameroon Is a Good Counterterrorism Partner, but US Cannot Ignore Alleged Atrocities, Says AFRICOM Head,” Military Times, February 7, 2019, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/02/07/cameroon-is-a-good-counterterrorism-partner-but-us-cannot-ignore-alleged-atrocities-says-africom-head/.

[6] Joshua Hammer, “Hunting Boko Haram: The U.S. Extends Its Drone War Deeper Into Africa With Secretive Base,” The Intercept (blog), February 25, 2016, https://theintercept.com/2016/02/25/us-extends-drone-war-deeper-into-africa-with-secretive-base/.

[7] Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Cameroon’s Rival Separatist Groups Clash, Kill Fighters,” VOA, February 16, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/cameroon-s-rival-separatist-groups-clash-kill-fighters-/6444121.html.

[8] Browne, “Cameroon’s Separatist Movement Is Going International.”

[9] Jenni Marsh, “China Just Quietly Wrote off a Chunk of Cameroon’s Debt. Why the Secrecy?,” CNN, February 4, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/04/china/cameroon-china-debt-relief-intl/index.html.

[10] Xinhua, “From Blueprint to Reality, China-Africa Cooperation Bearing Rich Fruit,” From blueprint to reality, China-Africa cooperation bearing rich fruit, September 5, 2019, http://www.news.cn/english/2021-09/05/c_1310169378.htm.

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Assessing the Foundation of Future U.S. Multi-Domain Operations

Marco J. Lyons is a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army who has served in tactical and operational Army, Joint, and interagency organizations in the United States, Europe, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and in the Western Pacific. He is currently a national security fellow at Harvard Kennedy School where he is researching strategy and force planning for war in the Indo-Pacific. He may be contacted at marco_lyons@hks.harvard.edu. The author thanks David E. Johnson for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature, nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group. 

Title:  Assessing the Foundation of Future U.S. Multi-Domain Operations 

Date Originally Written:  February 15, 2022. 

Date Originally Published:  March 14, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:   The author believes that U.S. adversaries pose a greater threat if they outpace the U.S. in both technological development and integration.

Summary:  Both U.S. Joint Forces and potential adversaries are trying to exploit technology to lock in advantage across all domains. Through extensive human-machine teaming and better ability to exploit both initiative (the human quality augmented by AI/ML) and non-linearity, Army/Joint forces will lose the fight unless they perform better, even if only marginally better, than adversaries – especially at the operational level. 

Text:  The 2018 U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) 2028 is a future operational concept – not doctrine – and not limited to fielded forces and capabilities[1]. A future operational concept consists of a “problem set,” a “solution set,” and an explanation for why the solution set successfully addresses the problem set[2]. Since 2018, there have been ongoing debates about what MDO are – whether they are revamped AirLand Battle or they are a next evolution of joint operations[3]. Before the Army finishes translating the concept into doctrine, a relook at MDO through historical, theoretical, and doctrinal lenses is necessary. 

The historical context is the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the Korean War, and the European and Pacific Theaters of World War Two. The theoretical basis includes Clausewitzian war, combined arms, attrition, and Maneuver Warfare. The doctrinal basis includes not just AirLand Battle, but also AirLand Battle – Future (ALB–F), Non-Linear Operations, and the 2012 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. ALB–F was meant to replace AirLand Battle as the Army’s operational concept for the 1990s, before the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union interrupted its development. Never incorporated into Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, ALB–F emphasized the nonlinear battlefield and conceived of combat operations through information-based technologies[4]. 

This assessment presupposes the possibility of great power war, defines potential enemies as the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Russian Armed Forces, assumes the centrality of major theater operations, and accepts that the Army/Joint force may still have to operate in smaller-scale contingencies and against enemy forces that represent subsets of the PLA and Russian Armed Forces. By assuming the PLA and Russian Armed Forces, this conceptual examination is grounded in the characteristics of opposing joint forces, mechanized maneuver, and primarily area fires. 

The Army/Joint force faces a core problem at each level of war. At the strategic level, the problem is preclusion, i.e., potential adversaries will use instruments of national power to achieve strategic objectives before the U.S./coalition leaders have the opportunity to respond[5]. At the operational level, the central problem is exclusion[6]. Anti-access/area denial is just one part of operational exclusion. Potential adversaries will use military power to split combined/joint forces and deny U.S./coalition ability to maneuver and mass. The tactical problem is dissolution. By exploiting advantages at the strategic and operational levels, potential adversaries will shape tactical engagements to be close-to-even fights (and potentially uneven fights in their favor), causing attrition and attempting to break U.S./coalition morale, both in fighting forces and among civilian populations. 

The best area to focus conceptual effort combines the determination of alliance/coalition security objectives of the strategic level of warfare with the design of campaigns and major operations of the operational level of warfare. The Army/Joint force will only indirectly influence the higher strategic-policy level. The problem of preclusion will be addressed by national-multinational policy level decisions. The tactical level of warfare and its attendant problems will remain largely the same as they have been since 1917[7]. If Army/Joint forces are not able to win campaigns at the operational level and support a viable military strategy that is in concert with higher level strategy and policy, the outcomes in great power war (and other major theater wars) will remain in doubt. 

The fundamentals of operational warfare have not changed substantially, but the means available have shrunk in capacity, become outdated, capabilities have atrophied, and understanding has become confused. Today’s Unified Land Operations (ULO) doctrine is, not surprisingly, a product of full-dimensional and full-spectrum operations, which were themselves primarily informed by a geopolitical landscape free of great power threats. Applying ULO or even earlier ALB solution sets to great power threats will prove frustrating, or possibly even disastrous in war. 

Given the primary operational problem of contesting exclusion by peer-adversary joint and mechanized forces, using various forms of multi-system operations, future Army/Joint forces will have to move under constant threat of attack, “shoot” at various ranges across multiple domain boundaries, and communicate faster and more accurately than the enemy. One way to look at the operational demands listed above is to see them as parts of command and control warfare (C2). C2 warfare, which has probably always been part of military operations, has emerged much more clearly since Napoleonic warfare[8]. Looking to the future, C2 warfare will probably evolve into something like “C4ISR warfare” with the advent of more automation, autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and deep neural networks. 

With technological advances, every force – or “node,” i.e., any ship, plane, or battalion – is able to act as “sensor,” “shooter,” and “communicator.” Command and control is a blend of intuition, creativity, and machine-assisted intelligence. Maximum exploitation of computing at the edge, tactical intranets (communication/data networks that grow and shrink depending on their AI-/ML-driven sensing of the environment), on-board deep data analysis, and laser/quantum communications will provide the technological edge leaders need to win tactical fights through initiative and seizing the offense. Tactical intranets are also self-defending. Army/Joint forces prioritize advancement of an “internet of battle things” formed on self-sensing, self-organizing, and self-healing networks – the basic foundation of human-machine teaming[9]. All formations are built around cross-domain capabilities and human-machine teaming. To maximize cross-domain capabilities means that Army/Joint forces will accept the opportunities and vulnerabilities of non-linear operations. Linear warfare and cross-domain warfare are at odds. 

Future major operations are cross-domain. So campaigns are built out of airborne, air assault, air-ground and air-sea-ground attack, amphibious, and cyber-ground strike operations – all enabled by space warfare. This conception of MDO allows service forces to leverage unique historical competencies, such as Navy’s Composite Warfare Commander concept and the Air Force’s concept of multi-domain operations between air, cyberspace, and space. The MDO idea presented here may also be seen – loosely – as a way to scale up DARPA’s Mosaic Warfare concept[10]. To scale MDO to the operational level against the potential adversaries will also require combined forces for coalition warfare. 

MDO is an evolution of geopolitics, technology, and the character of war – and it will only grow out of a complete and clear-eyed assessment of the same. Army/Joint forces require a future operational concept to expeditiously address emerging DOTMLPF-P demands. This idea of MDO could create a formidable Army/Joint force but it cannot be based on superiority, let alone supremacy. Great power war holds out the prospects for massive devastation and Army/Joint forces for MDO are only meant to deter sufficiently (not perfectly). Great power war will still be extended in time and scale, and Army/Joint forces for MDO are principally meant to help ensure the final outcome is never substantially in doubt. 

Endnotes:

[1] U.S. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 (Fort Eustis, VA: Government Printing Office, 2018). 

[2] U.S. Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 71-20-3, The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Concept Development Guide (Fort Eustis, VA: Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, December 6, 2011), 5–6. 

[3] See Dennis Wille, “The Army and Multi-Domain Operations: Moving Beyond AirLand Battle,” New America website, October 1, 2019, https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/army-and-multi-domain-operations-moving-beyond-airland-battle/; and Scott King and Dennis B. Boykin IV, “Distinctly Different Doctrine: Why Multi-Domain Operations Isn’t AirLand Battle 2.0,” Association of the United States Army website, February 20, 2019, https://www.ausa.org/articles/distinctly-different-doctrine-why-multi-domain-operations-isn’t-airland-battle-20. 

[4] Stephen Silvasy Jr., “AirLand Battle Future: The Tactical Battlefield,” Military Review 71, no. 2 (1991): 2–12. Also see Jeff W. Karhohs, AirLand Battle–Future—A Hop, Skip, or Jump? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1990). 

[5] This of course reverses what the Army identified as a U.S. advantage – strategic preclusion – in doctrinal debates from the late 1990s. See James Riggins and David E. Snodgrass, “Halt Phase Plus Strategic Preclusion: Joint Solution for a Joint Problem,” Parameters 29, no. 3 (1999): 70–85. 

[6] U.S. Joint Forces Command, Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0 (Norfolk, VA: Department of Defense, December 2006), 49–50. The idea of operational exclusion was also used by David Fastabend when he was Deputy Director, TRADOC Futures Center in the early 2000s. 

[7] World War I was a genuine military revolution. The follow-on revolutionary developments, like blitzkrieg, strategic bombing, carrier warfare, amphibious assaults, and information warfare, seem to be essentially operational level changes. See Williamson Murray, “Thinking About Revolutions in Military Affairs,” Joint Force Quarterly 16 (Summer 1997): 69–76. 

[8] See Dan Struble, “What Is Command and Control Warfare?” Naval War College Review 48, no. 3 (1995): 89–98. C2 warfare is variously defined and explained, but perhaps most significantly, it is generally included within broader maneuver warfare theory. 

[9] Alexander Kott, Ananthram Swami, and Bruce J. West, “The Internet of Battle Things,” Computer: The IEEE Computer Society 49, no, 12 (2016): 70–75. 

[10] Theresa Hitchens, “DARPA’s Mosaic Warfare — Multi Domain Ops, But Faster,” Breaking Defense website, September 10, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/09/darpas-mosaic-warfare-multi-domain-ops-but-faster/. 

Artificial Intelligence / Machine Learning / Human-Machine Teaming Assessment Papers Governing Documents and Ideas Marco J. Lyons United States
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Options to Mitigate Cognitive Threats

John Chiment is a strategic threat intelligence analyst and has supported efforts across the Department of Defense and U.S. Intelligence Community. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the LinQuest Corporation, any of LinQuest’s subsidiaries or parents, or the U.S. Government.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group. 

National Security Situation:  Cognitive attacks target the defender’s ability to accurately perceive the battlespace and react appropriately. If successful, these attacks may permit an attacker to defeat better equipped or positioned defenders. Defenders who deploy defenses poorly matched against the incoming threat – either due to mischaracterizing that threat or by rushing to respond – likely will suffer greater losses. Mitigation strategies for cognitive attacks all carry risks.

Date Originally Written:  January 31, 2022.

Date Originally Published:   March 7, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is an American threat intelligence analyst with time in uniform, as a U.S. government civilian, and as a DoD contractor. 

Background:  Effectively countering an attack requires the defender to detect its existence, recognize the danger posed, decide on a course of action, and implement that action before the attack completes its engagement. An attacker can improve the odds of a successful strike by increasing the difficulty in each of these steps (via stealth, speed, deception, saturation, etc.) while defenders can improve their chances through preparation, awareness, and technical capabilities. Correct detection and characterization of a threat enables decision-makers to decide which available defense is the most appropriate. 

Significance:  A defender deploying a suboptimal or otherwise inappropriate defense benefits the attacker. Attackers who target the defender’s understanding of the incoming attack and their decision-making process may prompt defenders to select inappropriate defenses. Technological superiority – long a goal of western militaries – may be insufficient against such cognitive manipulations that target human decision-making processes rather than the capabilities the defender controls.

Option #1:  Defenders increase their number of assets collecting Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) data in order to more rapidly detect threats.

Risk:  Increasing ISR data collection consumes industrial and financial resources and may worsen relationships with other powers and the general public. Increasing collection may also overwhelm analytic capabilities by providing too much data [1].

Gain:  Event detection begins the defender’s process and earlier detection permits the defender to develop more options in subsequent stages. By increasing the number of ISR assets that can begin the defender’s decision-making process, the defender increases their opportunities to select an appropriate defense.

Option #2:  The defender increases the number of assets capable of analyzing information in order to more rapidly identify the threat.

Risk:  Increasing the number of assets capable of accurately processing, exploiting, and disseminating (PED) information consumes intellectual and financial resources. Threat characterization decisions can also be targeted in the same ways as defense deployment decisions [2].

Gain:   A larger network of available PED analysts may better address localized spikes in attacks, more evenly distribute stress among analysts and analytic networks within supporting agencies, and lower the risk of mischaracterizing threats, likely improving decision-maker’s chances of selecting an appropriate defense.

Option #3:  The defender automates defense deployment decisions in order to rapidly respond with a defense.

Risk:  Automated systems may possess exploitable logical flaws that can be targeted in much the same way as defender’s existing decision-making process. Automated systems operate at greater speeds, limiting opportunities for the defender to detect and correct inappropriate decisions [3].

Gain:  Automated systems operate at high speed and may mitigate time lost to late detection or initial mischaracterization of threats. Automating decisions also reduces the immediate cognitive load on the defender by permitting defensive software designers to explore and plan for complex potentials without the stress of an incoming attack.

Option #4:  The defender increases the number of assets authorized to make defense deployment decisions in order to more likely select an appropriate defense.

Risk:  Increasing the available pool of authorized decision-makers consumes communication bandwidth and financial resources. Larger communication networks have larger attack surfaces and increase the risk of both data leaks and attackers maliciously influencing decisions into far-off engagements. Attacking the network segment may produce delays resulting in defenders not deploying appropriate defenses in time [4].

Gain:  A larger network of authorized decision-makers may better address localized spikes in attacks, more evenly distribute stress among decision-making personnel, and lower the risk of rushed judgements that may prompt inappropriate defense deployments.

Option #5:  The defender trains authorized decision-makers to operate at higher cognitive loads in order to more likely select an appropriate defense.

Risk:  Attackers likely can increase attacks and overwhelm even extremely well-trained decision-makers.  As such, this option is a short-term solution. Increasing the cognitive load on an already limited resource pool likely will increase burnout rates, lowering the overall supply of experienced decision-makers [5].

Gain:  Improving decision-maker training can likely be achieved with minimal new investments as it focusses on better utilization of existing resources.

Option #6:  The defender prepositions improved defenses and defense response options in order to better endure attacks regardless of decision-making timelines.

Risk:  Prepositioned defenses and response options consume logistical and financial resources. Actions made prior to conflict risk being detected and planned for by adversaries, reducing their potential value. Rarely used defenses have maintenance costs that can be difficult to justify [6].

Gain:  Prepositioned defenses may mitigate attacks not detected before impact by improving the targeted asset’s overall endurance, and attackers knowledgeable of the defender’s defensive capabilities and response options may be deterred or slowed when pursuing goals that will now have to contend with the defender’s assets.

Other Comments:  Risks to the decision-making processes cannot be fully avoided. Options #3 and #6 attempt to make decisions before any cognitive attacks target decision-makers while Options #2 and #4 attempt to mitigate cognitive attack impact by spreading the load across a larger pool of assets. Options #1 and #2 may permit decision-makers to make better decisions earlier in an active attack while Option #5 attempts to improve the decision-making abilities of existing decision-makers. 

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] Krohley, N. (2017, 24 October). The Intelligence Cycle is Broken. Here’s How To Fix It. Modern Warfare Institute at West Point. https://mwi.usma.edu/intelligence-cycle-broken-heres-fix/

[2] Corona, I., Giancinto, G., & Roli, F. (2013, 1 August). Adversarial attacks against intrusion detection systems: Taxonomy, solutions and open issues. Information Sciences, 239, 201-225. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2013.03.022

[3] Eykholt, K., Evtimov, I., Fernandes, E., Li, B., Rahmati, A. Xiao, C., Prakash, A., Kohno, T., & Song, D. (2018). Robust Physical-World Attacks on Deep Learning Visual Classification [Paper Presentation]. Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.08945v5

[4] Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2016, 21 December). Countering Threat Networks (JP 3-25). https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_25.pdf

[5] Larsen, R. P. (2001). Decision Making by Military Students Under Severe Stress. Military Psychology, 13(2), 89-98. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327876MP1302_02

[6] Gerritz, C. (2018, 1 February). Special Report: Defense in Depth is a Flawed Cyber Strategy. Cyber Defense Magazine. https://www.cyberdefensemagazine.com/special-report-defense-in-depth-is-a-flawed-cyber-strategy/

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Assessing China as a Case Study in Cognitive Threats

John Guerrero is currently serving in the Indo-Pacific region. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing China as a Case Study in Cognitive Threats

Date Originally Written:  February 1, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  February 28, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is currently serving in the Indo-Pacific region.  The author believes that China is more mature than the U.S. in projecting force in the cognitive space. This increased maturity is largely due to the China’s insistence on operating outside of the rules-based system. 

Summary:  China has largely been effective in pursuing their national interests through cognitive threats. In this cognitive space, China influences public opinion through propaganda, disinformation campaigns, censorship, and controlling critical nodes of information flow.  China’s understanding of U.S. politics, and its economic strength, will enable it to continue threatening U.S. national security. 

Text:  China is pursuing its national interests through its effective employment of cognitive threats- efforts undertaken to manipulate an adversary’s perceptions to achieve a national security objective. Cognitive threats generally include psychological warfare which target the enemy’s decision-making calculus causing him to doubt himself and make big blunders. Psychological warfare also includes strategic deception, diplomatic pressure, rumor, false narratives, and harassment[1].  Chinese actions illustrate their use of all of the above.  

The cognitive threat area illustrates the disparity between U.S. defensive efforts and China’s offensive actions below the threshold of war. The United States remains wedded to the state-versus-state construct that has kept strategists occupied since 1945. The stave-versus-state construct is antiquated and the commitment to it hamstrings the U.S. from pursuing more effective options.

China’s efforts in the cognitive space  exceed any other state. China understands the importance of influencing its competitors’ thinking. There are four lines of effort in China’s pursuit of favorable global public opinion. China aims to influence public opinion through propaganda, disinformation campaigns, censorship, and controlling critical nodes of information flow[2].

Globalization complicates problems in the cognitive space. Globalization creates opportunities, but it also creates multiple areas a nefarious actor can exploit. Corporations, as an example, are multi-national and have influence across borders. There are clear incentives for corporations to transact with the Chinese market. Chinese exposure for a corporation oftentimes translates into an uptick in revenue. However, there are consequences. Corporations are “expected to bend, and even violate, their interests and values when the Party demands[3].”

China’s reach into the United States is vast. One area of significant importance is the American pension plan. American pensioners are “underwriting their own demise” by contributing to their retirement accounts that may be tied to China[4]. Planning a financially stable future is noble, but it is not without unforeseen consequences. There are 248 corporations of Chinese origin listed on American stock exchanges[5]. The Chinese government enjoys significant influence over these corporations through their program called “Military-Civil Fusion[6].” Many index funds available to Americans include Chinese corporations. China’s economic strengths facilitate censorship over dissenters and any information aimed at painting the government in an unfavorable light. In another example of China’s expansive reach, they have recently placed an advertisement on digital billboards in Times Square attempting to sway onlookers into their favor[7].

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) understands that while global opinion is important, they cannot ignore domestic public opinion. Despite reports on their treatment of ethnic minorities[8], the Party continues to push the idea that they enjoy “political stability, ethnic unity and social stability[9].” China’s domestic news agencies critical to Party and Party leadership are few and far between. There are incentives to march to the Party’s tune- corporate survival.  

China’s efforts, and the U.S. response, in cognitive threats will progress along the four lines of effort discussed. China’s economic strength enables their strategic efforts to sway global public opinion in their favor. Few state, and non-state, actors can do this at this scale, but it does not preclude them from partaking. These smaller states, and non-states, will serve as proxies for China. 

China understands U.S. domestic politics. This understanding is critical to their national interests. The current state of U.S. domestic politics is divisive and presents opportunities for China. For example, China has exploited the U.S. media’s coverage of brutal treatment by law enforcement officers on Americans. China widens the division between Americans over these tragic events and accuses the United States of hypocrisy[10]. 

China is attempting to control, curate, and censor information for Americans and the world. Hollywood is the latest node of influence. “China has leveraged its market to exert growing influence over exported U.S. films, censoring content that could cast China in a negative light and demanding the addition of scenes that glorify the country[11].” Movies are not the full extent of Hollywood’s reach and influence. Celebrities active on social media could be advancing China’s interests and influence unknowingly. China’s adversaries, peer governments, aren’t the target of these cognitive threats. Rather, they target the ordinary citizen. In a democratic government, the ordinary citizen is the center of gravity- a fact the Chinese know very well. 

The cognitive threat arena is dynamic and evolves at a staggering pace. Technological advancements, while beneficial, presents opportunities for exploitation. The PRC continues to advance their footprint in this space. This is dangerous as it has far-reaching effects on the United States and its ability to pursue its national interests. Strategists should keep a watchful eye at how this pervasive and omnipresent threat progresses. These threats will continue to influence future conflicts.  

Endnotes:

[1] Sean McFate, The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder, First edition (New York, NY: William Morrow, an Imprint of HarperCollins Publishers, 2019).

[2] Sarah Cook, “China’s Global Media Footprint,” National Endowment for Democracy, February 2021, 24.

[3] Luke A. Patey, How China Loses: The Pushback against Chinese Global Ambitions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021).

[4] Joe Rogan, “General H.R. McMaster,” accessed January 27, 2022, https://open.spotify.com/episode/2zVnXIoC5w9ZkkQAmWOIbJ?si=p1PD8RaZR7y1fA0S8FcyFw.

[5] “Chinese Companies Listed on Major U.S. Stock Exchanges” (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 13, 2021), https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinese-companies-listed-major-us-stock-exchanges.

[6] U.S. Department of State, “Military-Civil Fusion and the People’s Republic of China” (Department of State, 2021 2017), https://2017-2021.state.gov/military-civil-fusion/index.html.

[7] Eva Fu, “Chinese State Media Uses Times Square Screen to Play Xinjiang Propaganda,” http://www.theepochtimes.com, January 7, 2022, https://www.theepochtimes.com/chinese-state-media-uses-times-square-screen-to-play-xinjiang-propaganda_4200206.html.

[8] Adrian Zenz, “Uighurs in Xinjiang Targeted by Potentially Genocidal Sterilization Plans, Chinese Documents Show,” News Media, Foreign Policy, July 1, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-uighur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/.

[9] PRC Government, “China’s National Defense in the New Era” (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, July 2019), https://armywarcollege.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/pid-25289-dt-announcement-rid-963503_1/courses/19DE910001D2/China-White%20Paper%20on%20National%20Defense%20in%20a%20New%20Era.pdf.

[10] Paul D. Shinkman, “China Leverages George Floyd Protests Against Trump, U.S. | World Report | US News,” June 9, 2020, https://www.usnews.com/news/world-report/articles/2020-06-09/china-leverages-george-floyd-protests-against-trump-us.

[11] Gabriela Sierra, “China’s Starring Role in Hollywood,” accessed January 28, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/chinas-starring-role-hollywood.

Assessment Papers China (People's Republic of China) Governing Documents and Ideas Influence Operations John Guerrero United States
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Call for Papers: Societal, Organizational, and Personal Impacts of 2001-2021 National Security Decisions

Background:

Divergent Options is a non-politically aligned non-revenue generating national security website that, in 1,000 words or less, provides unbiased, dispassionate, candid articles that assess a national security situation, present multiple options to address the situation, and articulate the risk and gain of each option.  Please note that while we assess a national security situation and may provide options, we never recommend a specific option.

Below you will see a Call for Papers.  If you are not interested in writing on this topic, we always welcome individual articles on virtually any national security situation an author is passionate about.  Please do not let our call for papers cause you to hesitate to send us your idea. We look forward to hearing from you!

Call for Papers:

Divergent Options is calling for national security papers assessing situations or discussing options related to Societal, Organizational, and Personal Impacts of 2001-2021 National Security Decisions.

National security decisions made from 2001-2021 impacted both the victors and the vanquished.  Let’s talk about those impacts.  Below is a list of prompts that may inspire potential writers:

– Societal:  Assess the impact of small unit technology developed during 2001-2021 becoming available to private citizens.

– Societal:  Assess the impact of broad legislative authorities for the use of military force on future national security situations.

– Societal:   Asses the impact of an authorization for the use of military force being used instead of a war declaration following the 9/11 attacks.

– Organizational:  Provide options for the military recruiting process to assess mental resiliency to try to build a force that is less susceptible to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.

– Organizational:  Assess how rapid unit growth to meet combat demands negatively impacted that unit’s traditional mission / skill set.

– Organizational:  Assess how years of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns negatively impacted the military’s ability to fight a near-peer competitor or perform any other missions.

– Personal:  Assess how your service from 2001-2021 has personally impacted you.

– Personal:  Assess how your service from 2001-2021 has impacted your professional group.

– Personal:  Assess how your service from 2001-2021 has impacted your family.

– Personal:  Assess whether, knowing what you know now, you would do it again?

Please limit your article to 1,000 words and write using our Options Paper or Assessment Paper templates which are designed for ease of use by both writers and readers alike.

Please send your article to submissions@divergentoptions.org by April 10, 2022.

Call For Papers
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Assessing China’s Strategy to “Hide Capabilities and Bide Time”

Michael Losacco is a former active-duty U.S. Army officer who served in Afghanistan in 2017. He currently studies at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service where he focuses on U.S. National Security Policy and China relations. He can be found on Twitter @mplosacco. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing China’s Strategy to “Hide Capabilities and Bide Time”

Date Originally Written:  January 20, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  February 21, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:   The author is a former U.S. Army combat arms officer who served in South Asia. He is currently pursuing a Master of Security Studies at Georgetown University. 

Summary:  Since 2008, China has emerged on the world stage as a global power. Its growth within the political, economic, and military domains in international affairs has caught the world off guard. China’s success resulted from efforts undertaken to manipulate perceptions in Washington D.C., known as “hiding capabilities and biding time,” to achieve its core national security objectives.

Text:  China has made major achievements in its economic, military, and political development. With a gross domestic product rising from 54 trillion to 80 trillion yuan, it has maintained its position as the world’s second-largest economy[1]. Militarily, the Peoples Liberation Army has increased its ability to implement a sea-control strategy in the Indo-Pacific by implementing new technology and structural reform. Politically and economically, China has created a favorable external environment through the Belt and Road Initiative and regional institutions. China’s core national security objective—to achieve a “community of common destiny”—drives its success[2].  Under this objective, Western powers do not dictate, influence, or shape China’s political, economic, or security domains.

China’s current success resulted from a deception strategy pursued at the end of the Cold War, designed to manipulate Chinese threat perceptions in Washington. This deception campaign kept U.S. attention away from China, while it focused on building its economic and political might at home. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the U.S. was the only superpower in the international system. If there was any perception that China wanted to challenge this status, the U.S. would have likely intervened and stopped it. As a result, it was in China’s interest to divert attention and mask its successes on the world stage.  

To understand China’s deception strategy, the reader must first consider the game-theory scenario of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, Robert Jervis, Ph.D. explains the Prisoner’s Dilemma as an individual’s decision, after being arrested, on whether to cooperate with their co-prisoner and remain loyal or defect and testify on behalf of law enforcement[3]. Each choice can lead to varying levels of reward and punishment and is further compounded by the other party’s choice. Notably, neither prisoner is aware of the other’s intentions and, thus, fear of being exploited drives the decision-making process. 

Important to this decision-making process is how vulnerable the prisoner feels. Specifically, how each prisoner perceives the other prisoner’s likelihood to cooperate or defect. While neither prisoner will likely know the other’s true intentions, the perception of the other, based on previous history and actions, is critical in predicting the outcome of the dilemma. 

For example, if Prisoner A is predisposed to see Prisoner B as an adversary, Prisoner A will react more strongly and quickly than if either saw the other as benign. In this scenario, Prisoner A is more likely to readily testify against Prisoner B, capitalizing on the benefits of cooperating with law enforcement. Conversely, if perceptions stay hidden or are unknown, the playing field is equal, and neither prisoner can utilize their knowledge to take advantage of the other.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma directly reflects the strategy China pursued at the end of the Cold War. After the Tiananmen Square Massacre, the Gulf War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, China went from viewing the U.S. as a potential partner to a potential adversary[4]. China knew it could not become powerful if it was perceived as a growing threat in Washington because the U.S. would intervene—economically, or perhaps militarily—to prevent it from challenging its position as a global hegemon. Thus, China began a deception campaign across political, military, and economic domains, coined under the phrase “hiding capabilities and biding time.” This campaign sought to mask growth and prevent the U.S. from predisposing China as an adversary. 

China focused on avoiding a security dilemma with the U.S. in the military domain by prioritizing its military strategy on sea denial, whereby China denies the enemy’s ability to use the sea without necessarily attempting to control the sea for its own use[4]. Sea denial was an inexpensive way to avoid setting off alarms and prevent the U.S. from traversing or intervening in the waters near China. China invested in inexpensive asymmetrical weapons such as the world’s largest mine arsenal, the world’s first anti-ship missile, and the world’s largest anti-submarine fleet. Compared to sea control, these efforts avoided a strategy focused on holding distant maritime territory that would raise concern in Washington. 

At the political level, China sought to join regional institutions to inhibit Washington from building an Asian order that could prevent China from growing[4]. China joined organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and Asian Nations Regional Forum under the guise that it was open to transitioning to the liberal order, with a hidden agenda to blunt American power. China’s membership in these organizations allowed it to stall progress, wield institutional rules to constrain U.S. freedom to maneuver, and persuade worried neighbors that a U.S. balancing coalition was not its only option. 

China moved to couple at the economic level rather than decoupling from U.S. economic institutions[4]. Recognizing its dependence on the U.S. market, and that a strategy of decoupling would weaken China and raise alarm, China sought to strengthen its economic relationship with the U.S. and lobby for the removal of annual congressional renewal of Most Favored Nation status. By eliminating this procedural rule and making it permanent, China was able to expand investment opportunities and strengthen economic and trade exchanges, while deconstructing potential economic leverage that could be imposed by the U.S., particularly with trade sanctions, tariffs, and technology restrictions.  

In sum, China’s path to sustained growth required a strategy that masked its true intent to become a great power. By “hiding capabilities and biding time,” China simultaneously grew politically, economically, and militarily, while avoiding actions that could lead to U.S. suspicions. Like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, China understood that if the U.S. became predisposed to think China had ulterior motives to become a power and challenge the U.S., the U.S. would have intervened and taken advantage of China’s weakened state following the Cold War. Thus, China’s ability to manipulate its adversary’s perceptions was critical to achieving its core national security objectives. 

Endnotes:

[1] Jinping, X. (2017). 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. In Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era (pp. 1–6). Beijing. 

[2] Rolland, N. (2020). (Rep.). China’s Vision for a New World Order (83rd ed., pp. 35–41). Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research.

[3] Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214. https://doi.org/10.2307/2009958.

[4] Doshi, R. (2021). Introduction. In The Long Game (pp. 11–12). Essay, Oxford University Press. 

Assessment Papers China (People's Republic of China) Governing Documents and Ideas Michael Losacco
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Options to Address Disinformation as a Cognitive Threat to the United States

Joe Palank is a Captain in the U.S. Army Reserve, where he leads a Psychological Operations Detachment. He has also previously served as an assistant to former Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson. He can be found on Twitter at @JoePalank. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization or any group.

National Security Situation:  Disinformation as a cognitive threat poses a risk to the U.S.

Date Originally Written:  January 17, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  February 14, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is a U.S. Army Reservist specializing in psychological operations and information operations. He has also worked on political campaigns and for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. He has studied psychology, political communications, disinformation, and has Masters degrees in Political Management and in Public Policy, focusing on national security.

Background:  Disinformation as a non-lethal weapon for both state and non-state actors is nothing new.  However the rise of the internet age and social media, paired with cultural change in the U.S., has given this once fringe capability new salience. Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist organizations pose the most pervasive and significant risks to the United States through their increasingly weaponized use of disinformation[1]. 

Significance:  Due to the nature of disinformation, this cognitive threat poses a risk to U.S. foreign and domestic policy-making, undercuts a foundational principle of democracy, and has already caused significant disruption to the U.S. political process. Disinformation can be used tactically alongside military operations, operationally to shape the information environment within a theater of conflict, and strategically by potentially sidelining the U.S. or allies from joining international coalitions.

Option #1:  The U.S. focuses domestically. 

The U.S. could combat the threat of disinformation defensively, by looking inward, and take a two-pronged approach to prevent the effects of disinformation. First, the U.S. could adopt new laws and policies to make social media companies—the primary distributor of disinformation—more aligned with U.S. national security objectives related to disinformation. The U.S. has an asymmetric advantage in serving as the home to the largest social media companies, but thus far has treated those platforms with the same laissez faire approach other industries enjoy. In recent years, these companies have begun to fight disinformation, but they are still motivated by profits, which are in turn motivated by clicks and views, which disinformation can increase[2]. Policy options might include defining disinformation and passing a law making the deliberate spread of disinformation illegal or holding social media platforms accountable for the spread of disinformation posted by their users.

Simultaneously, the U.S. could embark on widescale media literacy training for its populace. Raising awareness of disinformation campaigns, teaching media consumers how to vet information for authenticity, and educating them on the biases within media and our own psychology is an effective line of defense against disinformation[3]. In a meta-analysis of recommendations for improving awareness of disinformation, improved media literacy training was the single most common suggestion among experts[4]. Equipping the end users to be able to identify real, versus fake, news would render most disinformation campaigns ineffective.

Risk:  Legal – the United States enjoys a nearly pure tradition of “free speech” which may prevent the passage of laws combatting disinformation.

Political – Passing laws holding individuals criminally liable for speech, even disinformation, would be assuredly unpopular. Additionally, cracking down on social media companies, who are both politically powerful and broadly popular, would be a political hurdle for lawmakers concerned with re-election. 

Feasibility –  Media literacy training would be expensive and time-consuming to implement at scale, and the same U.S. agencies that currently combat disinformation are ill-equipped to focus on domestic audiences for broad-scale educational initiatives.

Gain:  A U.S. public that is immune to disinformation would make for a healthier polity and more durable democracy, directly thwarting some of the aims of disinformation campaigns, and potentially permanently. Social media companies that are more heavily regulated would drastically reduce the dissemination of disinformation campaigns worldwide, benefiting the entire liberal economic order.

Option #2:  The U.S. focuses internationally. 

Strategically, the U.S. could choose to target foreign suppliers of disinformation. This targeting is currently being done tactically and operationally by U.S. DoD elements, the intelligence community, and the State Department. That latter agency also houses the coordinating mechanism for the country’s handling of disinformation, the Global Engagement Center, which has no actual tasking authority within the Executive Branch. A similar, but more aggressive agency, such as the proposed Malign Foreign Influence Response Center (MFIRC), could literally bring the fight to purveyors of disinformation[5]. 

The U.S. has been slow to catch up to its rivals’ disinformation capabilities, responding to disinformation campaigns only occasionally, and with a varied mix of sanctions, offensive cyber attacks, and even kinetic strikes (only against non-state actors)[6]. National security officials benefit from institutional knowledge and “playbooks” for responding to various other threats to U.S. sovereignty or the liberal economic order. These playbooks are valuable for responding quickly, in-kind, and proportionately, while also giving both sides “off-ramps” to de-escalate. An MFIRC could develop playbooks for disinformation and the institutional memory for this emerging type of warfare. Disinformation campaigns are popular among U.S. adversaries due to the relative capabilities advantage they enjoy, as well as for their low costs, both financially and diplomatically[7]. Creating a basket of response options lends itself to the national security apparatus’s current capabilities, and poses fewer legal and political hurdles than changing U.S. laws that infringe on free speech. Moreover, an MFIRC would make the U.S. a more equal adversary in this sphere and raise the costs to conduct such operations, making them less palatable options for adversaries.

Risk:  Geopolitical – Disinformation via the internet is still a new kind of warfare; responding disproportionately carries a significant risk of escalation, possibly turning a meme into an actual war.

Effectiveness – Going after the suppliers of disinformation could be akin to a whack-a-mole game, constantly chasing the next threat without addressing the underlying domestic problems.

Gain:  Adopting this approach would likely have faster and more obvious effects. A drone strike to Russia’s Internet Research Agency’s headquarters, for example, would send a very clear message about how seriously the U.S. takes disinformation. At relatively little cost and time—more a shifting of priorities and resources—the U.S. could significantly blunt its adversaries’ advantages and make disinformation prohibitively expensive to undertake at scale.

Other Comments:  There is no reason why both options could not be pursued simultaneously, save for costs or political appetite.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] Nemr, C. & Gangware, W. (2019, March). Weapons of Mass Distraction: Foreign State-Sponsored Disinformation in the Digital Age. Park Advisors. Retrieved January 16, 2022 from https://2017-2021.state.gov/weapons-of-mass-distraction-foreign-state-sponsored-disinformation-in-the-digital-age/index.html 

[2] Cerini, M. (2021, December 22). Social media companies beef up promises, but still fall short on climate disinformation. Fortune.com. Retrieved January 16, 2022 from https://fortune.com/2021/12/22/climate-change-disinformation-misinformation-social-media/

[3] Kavanagh, J. & Rich, M.D. (2018) Truth Decay: An Initial Exploration of the Diminishing Role of Facts and Analysis in American Public Life. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/t/RR2314

[4] Helmus, T. & Keep, M. (2021). A Compendium of Recommendations for Countering Russian and Other State-Sponsored Propaganda. Research Report. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA894-1.html

[5] Press Release. (2020, February 14). Following Passage of their Provision to Establish a Center to Combat Foreign Influence Campaigns, Klobuchar, Reed Ask Director of National Intelligence for Progress Report on Establishment of the Center. Office of Senator Amy Klobuchar. https://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2020/2/following-passage-of-their-provision-to-establish-a-center-to-combat-foreign-influence-campaigns-klobuchar-reed-ask-director-of-national-intelligence-for-progress-report-on-establishment-of-the-center

[6] Goldman, A. & Schmitt, E. (2016, November 24). One by One, ISIS Social Media Experts Are Killed as Result of F.B.I. Program. New York Times. Retrieved January 15, 2022 from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/world/middleeast/isis-recruiters-social-media.html

[7] Stricklin, K. (2020, March 29). Why Does Russia Use Disinformation? Lawfare. Retrieved January 15, 2022 from https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-does-russia-use-disinformation

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Assessing Strategy and Organized Crime

Juan Manuel Perez has served in the Guatemalan Army. He presently is retired. Throughout his military career, he took various military training courses as part of his professionalization including Strategic High Studies, War College, Command and Staff College, Human Rights, and Peacekeeping Operations. He can be found on Twitter @r_juanmanuel. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing Strategy and Organized Crime

Date Originally Written:  September 15, 2021. 

Date Originally Published:  February 7, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View: The author is a retired military member. He believes the deep understanding of strategic theory helps people educate and discipline their thinking to align ends, ways, and means to protect national interests. 

Summary:  Organized crime organizations have stablished a global criminal system.  This influence and power wielded by this system has allowed them to damage the geopolitics, economic, social, and security situation in many countries. The deep understanding of both the threats posed by organized crime organizations, and the capabilities and limitations of strategy, will assure effectiveness when fighting these criminal organizations.

Text:  Illicit money is serious and appealing to criminals. Criminal activities pursuing illicit money progressively scale into criminal networks.  Drug trafficking also enables a criminal modality, establishing the core of organized groups where gangs, maras, and mafias play a starring role. 

The tracking and detection of illegal money into legal economies is a challenge.  Governments struggle to disrupt and cut off illicit capital flows.  This evil advances and progresses between a legal and illegal economy, resulting in a large-scale global network with geopolitical and geostrategic repercussions.  These criminal networks embedded into the financial system become practically undetectable, using technology, artificial intelligence, big data, social media, modern transportation, etc. to conceal and protect their activities[1].   

Criminal networks use geography to their advantage.  Robert D. Kaplan, in his book “The Revenge of Geography[2]” wrote about what the maps predict regarding coming conflicts and the battle against fate. In this sense, the mafia uses geography when it moves illicit shipments, controls multiple regions, zones, and places. The mafia’s global effect and quick process of replacement allow criminal partners to generate new routes and maps, and increase their criminal activity, including the movement and sale of illegal drugs.

The flow of illegal drugs is and will continue to be a critical social problem.  The use of drugs fuels the traffic of them leaving death and violence in its path.  American researchers Edwin Stier and Peter Richards write widely and rigorously about organized crime and point out its evolution in three fields of action.  Stier and Richards make an analogy of biological functions of living beings, where they describe the structural causes and reasons of gestation and development[3]. 

The first phase:  called the predatory phase, is the beginning and characterized by territorial reaffirmation of criminal groups that spread their power through violence, trying to defend their organizations, eliminate rivals, and gaining physical space and to hold their private monopoly on the use of force.  

The second phase:  called the parasitic phase, sees organized crime gain notable economic and political influence combined with a powerful capacity to corrupt public and private organizations.

The third phase:  called the symbiotic phase, is the final state and sees the political and economic system becoming so dependent on the parasite (the organized crime organization) that it expands its activity to satisfy the parasites needs.

Stier and Richards’ analogy symbolizes, in many ways, the features of Hydra, the fresh-water organisms, with many heads and the ability to regrow its tentacles when maimed. 

While Colin S. Gray, one of the great strategic thinkers of his age wrote: ‘’Strategy has a complex nature and a function that is unchanging over the centuries[4]’’, the development and execution of strategy in order to fight organized crime and the threats associated to it (i.e. illegal migration, drug trafficking, cybercrime, weapons trafficking, etc.) require constant reevaluation.  Harry R. Yarger’s book “Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The little book on big Strategy[5],” aligns well with the dynamic threat posed by organized crime organizations.  As resources or budgets (means) are always limited, it is important to invest enough time defining, designing, and developing appropriate strategic guidance to reach the desired outcome. 

Finally, organized crime has taken advantage of the pandemic, increasing their criminal activities by others means. Right now, the organized crime is an authentic threat that affects the societies, governments, states, the security of financial institutions even the functioning of democracy and the international geopolitical equilibrium.  The security, defense, and protection of the citizens will continue one of the top priorities for the states.  

Endnotes:

[1] Phil Williams, “Crime Illicit Markets, and Money Laundering”

[2] Robert D. Kaplan, “The Revenge of Geography”

[3] Edwin Stier and Peter Richards, “Strategic Decision Making in Organized Crime Control: The Need for a Broadened Perspective”

[4] Colin S. Gray, “Modern Strategy,” Oxford: Oxford University Press

[5] Harry R. Yarger, “Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The little book on big Strategy,” https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/20753/Strategic%20Theory%20for%20the%2021st%20Century.pdf

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Options to Address the Risk from Elected Officials Concurrently in the National Guard or Reserves

Marshall McGurk serves in the United States Army and has deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. He presently works at the Joint Readiness Training Center as a Special Operations Forces Observer-Coach/Trainer. He can be found on Twitter @MarshallMcGurk and writes for the Havok Journal website. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation:  Elected Officials who concurrently serve in the National Guard or Reserves politicize the U.S. Armed Forces.

Date Originally Written:  January 13, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  January 31, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is an active duty U.S. Army Officer. The author believes in the responsibilities and duties of military service.  The article is written from the point of view that boundaries must be made or enforced to prevent politicization within the Armed Forces.

Background:  Currently, there are 14 members of the 117th Congress still serving in the Armed Forces of the United States. “Six House Members and one Senator are still serving in the reserves, and seven House Members are still serving in the National Guard[1].” Veteran candidates for political office and those serving while elected find themselves under increased scrutiny.  This scrutiny comes from a public with different opinions regarding the January 6, 2021 attempted insurrection at the U.S. Capitol Building in response to the 2020 election, a nation no longer at war in Iraq or Afghanistan, and a crippling global pandemic that has threatened the U.S. economy and national security.  Due to these events, numerous retired military officers from O-5 to General Officer/Flag Officer rank have publicly expressed their concerns for or against previous or current U.S. Presidents[2][3].

None of the options outlined hereafter prohibit non-partisan elected or appointed service allowed by Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 1344.10, “Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces.”

Significance:  In light of the background and the increasing airing of grievances, having elected officials serving concurrently in the military is a national security concern. The use of military uniforms, rank-based trappings, and influence in the electoral process is ripe for exploitation by foreign intelligence services. This situation sows seeds of division among military members, could negatively affect the trust that civilians and military members place in their elected officials, and could create undue influence of rank upon military members when the ballot is cast.

There is also a waning of civilian trust in the U.S. military. A November 2021 Reagan Foundation survey found only 45% of those surveyed had a great deal of confidence in the military institution[4]. Civilian trust in the military institution is vital for national defense. Serving while in elected office may lead to conflicts of interest while developing response options to foreign interference in U.S. elections.

Option #1:  DoD Requires Elected Military Members to Enter the Individual Ready Reserve

The Department of Defense could create regulations that place elected military members or those appointed to partisan national positions in the Individual Ready Reserve, without pay, benefits, or activation, for the duration of their elected service. The strictures of DoDD 1344.10 remain in place, allowing the elected official to state their military affiliation, while also confirming the primacy of their elected position. 

Risk:  Elected officials maintaining military affiliation through the little-known Individual Ready Reserve may lead to confusion within the electorate about roles and responsibilities of their elected officials. This may also trigger conflict of interest concerns if language in the legislation does not prohibit activation of concurrently serving officials for overseas or Defense Support of Civil Authorities missions. 

Gain:  Option #1 would allow for a possible win-win-win for military members seeking elected office, for the Legislative Branch, and for the Department of Defense. Elected officials could maintain affiliation to a trusted and respected institution, and the Legislative Branch and electorate would not endure their Representatives and Senators deploying to dangerous missions outside of their legislative duties.

Option #2:  DoD Prohibits Military Members from Seeking Elected Office

Another option is for the Department of Defense to modify DoDD 1344.10, “Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces[5],” so military members are prohibited from seeking elected office entirely. Those seeking state or national elected office would have to agree to an honorable discharges or retirement from military service before declaring candidacy. This option includes all services, components, military occupational specialties, and functional areas.

Risk:  Option #2 would remove a historical precedent of concurrent service in the Legislative and Executive Branches of government going back to the founding of the United States and the Continental Congress. An adjustment to this precedent would spark debate in the Department of Defense, the greater Executive Branch, the Legislative branches, as well as debate in the public sphere by those wishing to maintain the status quo.  

Gain:  Option #2 reinforces the non-partisan nature of the United States Armed Forces in accordance with the spirit and intent of DoDD 1344.10.

Option #3:  Congress Bars Members from Reserve or National Guard Membership

One option is for Congress to pass legislation barring national elected officials or those appointed to partisan national positions from serving in the Reserve or National Guard. The newly elected or appointed official must resign or retire from their military position prior to their inauguration. There is historical precedent for this option as President Dwight D. Eisenhower resigned his military commission in 1952 prior to his presidency[6].

Risk:  This change in legislation would only affect those elected to national office.  This means states would have to make their own choices about whether or not to change their legislation. Human Resource departments within the Armed Forces may not be prepared to process resignations or retirements of elected officials currently serving.

Gain: The gain from option #3 is a removal of risk, a removal of misinformation and disinformation opportunities, and a clear delineation of military and civil responsibilities.

Other Comments:  All three options would require DoDD 1344.10 to be re-written, coordinated, adjudicated, and its new version approved by the Secretary of Defense.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] Congress.gov. (2022, January 3). Membership of the 117 Congress: A profile. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved January 15, 2022 from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46705 

[2] Open letter from retired generals and admirals. Flag Officers 4 America. (2021, May). Retrieved January 15, 2022, from https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/fb7c7bd8-097d-4e2f-8f12-3442d151b57d/downloads/2021%20Open%20Letter%20from%20Retired%20Generals%20and%20Adm.pdf?ver=1620643005025 

[3] Eaton, P. D., Taguba, A. M., & Anderson, S. M. (2022, January 6). Opinion | 3 retired generals: The military must prepare now for a 2024 insurrection. The Washington Post. Retrieved January 15, 2022, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/12/17/eaton-taguba-anderson-generals-military/ 

[4] Beacon Research (2021, November) U.S. National Survey Of Defense Attitudes On Behalf Of The Ronald Reagan Foundation Final Topline Results Retrieved January 15, 2022 from https://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/Reagan%20Foundation%20-%20November%202021%20Survey%20-%20Topline%20Results.pdf 

[5] FVAP.gov  (2008, February 19) Department of Defense Directive Number 1344.10. Department of Defense. Retrieved January 15, 2022 from https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/134410p.pdf   

[6] U.S. Department of the Interior. (n.d.). Eisenhower Military Chronology. National Parks Service. Retrieved January 16, 2022, from https://www.nps.gov/features/eise/jrranger/chronomil1.htm 

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An Assessment of Nigeria’s Security Situation in 2021

Damimola Olawuyi has served as a Geopolitical Analyst for SBM Intelligence. He now works for a leading airline in Nigeria. He can be found on Twitter @DAOlawuyi. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization or any group.

Title:  An Assessment of Nigeria’s Security Situation in 2021

Date Originally Written:  January 8, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  January 24, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View: The open-source data on Nigeria’s security-related casualties indicates that insecurity remains a persistent threat in the country. The high number of deaths recorded between October 2020 and September 2021 shows that the nation is at war with itself.

Summary:  Quantitative definitions of armed conflicts relies on measuring casualties over time to determine violence intensity. One of the most popular and influential approaches was developed by David Singer and Melvin Small in the framework of the ‘Correlates of War (COW)’ project at Michigan University. This defines war as an armed conflict where at least 1,000 combatants are killed annually. By this definition, it is indisputable that Nigeria is at war on multiple fronts.

Text:  The recent analysis of combatant casualties compiled by SBM Intelligence paints a grim picture of Nigeria’s security situation[1]. SBM’s report, compiled using open-source data, was summarised with an infographic that listed the number of dead personnel belonging to various security agencies of the Nigerian state and armed groups all over the country. It covers the calendar year period from Q4 2020 to Q3 2021. The findings are summarized in the table below:

SBM’s report correlates with data collected by the Council on Foreign Relations and analysed by HumAngle Media[2][3]. Between January 1 and December 27, 2021, 10,398 persons were killed across Nigeria. This count includes 4,835 civilians, 1,760 Boko Haram members, 890 security personnel, 107 robbers and 92 kidnappers. This count makes 2021 the deadliest year for Nigeria since 2015 when 12, 795 people were killed. The data also indicates that 5,287 people were kidnapped in 2021, almost double the number abducted in 2020.

The Nigerian government is unwilling to disclose accurate personnel losses, especially in areas of major combat operations[4]. This unwillingness has led to the arrest of members of the press[5][6] aside from other punitive measures[7]. There have also been calls on the Nigerian media to tone down their reporting on security matters regardless of the accuracy of such reports[8]. These efforts to stifle frank security discussions aren’t isolated to the military as other law enforcement and security personnel, and violent non-state actors, have violated the rights of journalists carrying out their constitutionally protected duties[9][10][11][12][13][14]. When coupled with the tyranny of landmass and geography, it is safe to conclude that Nigeria’s conflict tolls are underreported.

The casualty statistics tell a tale of a country that has failed to pull itself together after 61 years of independence. They also make clear the inability of the state to exercise its authority over every part of its domain. The availability of ungoverned spaces, coupled with a proliferation of illicit arms[15], have created no man’s lands in various portions of the country where bad actors can dominate and wreak havoc. Political maladministration means that socioeconomic issues are left to fester until they cause violence. Corruption and mismanagement in law enforcement and security agencies mean that these organisations are unable to fulfill their mandates as laid out in the law[16][17][18][19][20].

One feature of governance and security operations in Nigeria is that low-level violence is usually ignored when civil authority and social interventions might still prove useful. Often, the complete breakdown of law and order is reached, necessitating the deployment of the armed forces. The high number of casualties in the military points to the intensity of internal military operations. Despite the proliferation of security services across the country, they have failed to step up and contribute extensively to safeguarding the nation. That airstrikes have been needed to lead attacks on various bandit camps shows how entrenched these non-state actors have become, and the weakness of the ground forces that need to establish a persistent presence and deny them spaces to regroup[21].

Attacks on police stations and checkpoints have become a feature of the secession agitation in the South East and South-South of the country[22]. This inability to protect themselves shows inadequacies in the current policing structure of the country. The aftermath of the Lekki Tollgate Massacre, and continued police brutality, will hamper efforts to build stable relationships between the police and the communities they are supposed to protect. The recent rejection by President Muhammadu Buhari of the devolution of armed police institutions to the various states shows that the deep institutional reforms needed will face significant hurdles[23]. The rejection also ignores the various security arrangements already established across the country including Amotekun, Yan Sakai, Onyabo, Ebube Agu and the Civilian Joint Task Force. Any conversation about addressing the lingering security problems without a thoughtful examination of the problems of policing a country with the size and population of Nigeria will fail.

As general elections approach, Nigeria’s history of political violence, and the focus on the gaining and retaining of political office, means that security issues might be exacerbated by armed groups pledging allegiance and receiving protection from political contestants[24]. However, as a group that derives legitimacy from the conduct of elections, it is hoped that politicians will not allow violent events to disrupt actual election days.

Apart from dealing with security issues, society must identify and deal with the real issues underwriting them. Punishing bad actors, protecting communities, strengthening early warning systems, providing economic opportunities, and investing in physical, social and human infrastructure will go a long way in calming the polity and bringing an end to this current era of open conflict in Nigeria.

Endnotes:

[1] SBM Intelligence. (2021, December 16). Chart of the Week: Nigeria at War. Retrieved December 28, 2021 from https://www.sbmintel.com/2021/12/chart-of-the-week-nigeria-at-war/

[2] Campbell J. Nigeria Security Tracker. Retrieved January 7, 2022 from https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483 

[3] Adebanjo, K. (2022, January 4). Insecurity: Nearly 10,400 Killed In Nigeria In 2021, Worst Toll In 6 Years. Retrieved January 7, 2022 from https://humanglemedia.com/insecurity-nearly-10400-killed-in-nigeria-in-2021-worst-toll-in-6-years/ 

[4] Channel TV. (2018, November 27). ICYMI: All Over The World, The Military Rarely Discloses Figures Of Its Casualties – Adesina. Retrieved January 2, 2022 from https://www.channelstv.com/2018/11/27/all-over-the-world-the-military-rarely-discloses-figures-of-its-casualties-adesina/  

[5] Africanews. (2016, September 6). Nigeria Army Arrest Journalist with links to Boko Haram. Retrieved January 4, 2022 from https://www.africanews.com/2016/09/06/nigerian-army-arrests-journalist-with-links-to-boko-haram//

[6] Haruna, A. (2020, January 31). Nigerian soldiers arrest journalist ‘over Boko Haram report’. Retrieved January 4, 2022 from https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/375256-nigerian-soldiers-arrest-journalist-over-boko-haram-report.htmlz

[7] Fatunmole, M (2021, April 3). Insurgency: Nigerian Army punishes journalist for asking questions on arms procurement. Retrieved January 4, 2022 from https://www.icirnigeria.org/insurgency-nigerian-army-punishes-journalist-for-asking-questions-on-arms-procurement/

[8] Onyedika-Ugoeze, M. (2021, October 26). Editors, security agencies, others chart ways to resolving rising spate of insecurity. Retrieved January 4, 2022 from https://guardian.ng/features/media/editors-security-agencies-others-chart-ways-to-resolving-rising-spate-of-insecurity/

[9] Akinpelu, Y. (2021, November 26). Nigerian journalist assaulted by Lagos task force for filming harassment of motorists. Retrieved January 7, 2022 from https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/497543-nigerian-journalist-assaulted-by-lagos-task-force-for-filming-harassment-of-motorists.html 

[10] Adediran, I. (2020, September 10). How Nigeria police attacked, arrested journalists for covering protest. Retrieved January 7, 2022 from https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/413685-how-nigeria-police-attacked-arrested-journalists-for-covering-protest.html 

[11] Okeoma, C. (2021, December, 7). NSCDC operatives brutalise PUNCH reporter, tag him ESN spy. Retrieved January 7, 2022 from https://punchng.com/nscdc-operatives-brutalise-punch-reporter-tag-him-esn-spy/ 

[12] Ekeanyanwu, O. (2016, February 23). Court to hear suit on ‘assault’ of journalist by customs. Retrieved January 7, 2022 from https://www.thecable.ng/suit-assault-journalist-customs-gets-hearing-date 

[13] Amnesty International (2019, October 14). Nigeria: Endangered voices: Attack on freedom of expression in Nigeria. Retrieved January 7, 2022 from https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/9504/2019/en/ 

[14] International Press Center. Baseline Audit On State Of Safety Of Journalists In Nigeria. Retrieved January 7, 2022 from https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/jsi_report_for_nigeria_ipdc_project_0.pdf 

[15] SBM Intelligence. (2021, February 22). Small arms, mass atrocities and migration in Nigeria. Retrieved January 7, 2022 from https://www.sbmintel.com/2021/02/small-arms-mass-atrocities-and-migration-in-nigeria/ 

[16] Ayeni, D. (2021, August 7).  EXCLUSIVE: Egbunike, Head of Abba Kyari Probe Panel, Joined Others to Approve N1bn for Fake Police Camp Projects. Retrieved January 7, 2022 from https://fij.ng/article/exclusive-egbunike-head-of-abba-kyari-probe-panel-joined-others-to-approve-n1bn-for-fake-police-camp-projects/ 

[17] Orizu, U (2022, January 3). 2019 Audit Report: 178,459 Firearms, Ammunition Missing from Police Armoury. Retrieved January 7, 2022 from https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2022/01/03/2019-audit-report-178459-firearms-ammunition-missing-from-police-armoury/ 

[18] Campbell, J. (2019, April 4). Former Director General of Nigeria’s National Intelligence Agency Arrested. Retrieved January 7, 2022 from https://www.cfr.org/blog/former-director-general-nigerias-national-intelligence-agency-arrested 

[19] Adepegba, A. (2021, December 24). Ex-NSCDC commandant forfeits 60 buildings, land to FG over corruption. Retrieved January 7, 2022 from https://punchng.com/ex-nscdc-commandant-forfeits-60-buildings-land-to-fg-over-corruption/ 

[20] News Agency of Nigeria. (2021, October 11). NSCDC boss dismisses fraud, corruption allegations. Retrieved January 7, 2022 from https://guardian.ng/news/nscdc-boss-dismisses-fraud-corruption-allegations/ 

[21] National Mail Online. Released Captives Reveal: Bandits Reeling Under Military Airstrike, Logistic Blockade. Retrieved January 7, 2022 from https://nationalmailonline.com/released-captives-reveal-bandits-reeling-under-military-airstrikelogistic-blockade/ 

[22] Adepegba, A. (2021, May 20). 127 South-South, South-East cops killed, 25 stations razed – Report. Retrieved January 7, 2022 from https://punchng.com/127-ssouth-seast-cops-killed-25-stations-razed-report/ 

[23] Ogundele, B. and Mordi, R. (2022, January 6). Insecurity: Buhari rejects state police. Retrieved January 7, 2022 from https://thenationonlineng.net/insecurity-buhari-rejects-state-police/ 

[24] Ibok, A.K. and Ogar, O.A. (2019, October 16). Political Violence in Nigeria and Its Implication for National Development. Retrieved January 8, 2022 from https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3491888 

Assessment Papers Damimola Olawuyi Insurgency & Counteinsurgency Nigeria
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Assessing the Cognitive Threat Posed by Technology Discourses Intended to Address Adversary Grey Zone Activities

Zac Rogers is an academic from Adelaide, South Australia. Zac has published in journals including International Affairs, The Cyber Defense Review, Joint Force Quarterly, and Australian Quarterly, and communicates with a wider audience across various multimedia platforms regularly. Parasitoid is his first book.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing the Cognitive Threat Posed by Technology Discourses Intended to Address Adversary Grey Zone Activities

Date Originally Written:  January 3, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  January 17, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is an Australia-based academic whose research combines a traditional grounding in national security, intelligence, and defence with emerging fields of social cybersecurity, digital anthropology, and democratic resilience.  The author works closely with industry and government partners across multiple projects. 

Summary:  Military investment in war-gaming, table-top exercises, scenario planning, and future force design is increasing.  Some of this investment focuses on adversary activities in the “cognitive domain.” While this investment is necessary, it may fail due to it anchoring to data-driven machine-learning and automation for both offensive and defensive purposes, without a clear understanding of their appropriateness. 

Text:  In 2019 the author wrote a short piece for the U.S. Army’s MadSci website titled  “In the Cognitive War, the Weapon is You![1]” This article attempted to spur self-reflection by the national security, intelligence, and defence communities in Australia, the United States and Canada, Europe, and the United Kingdom.  At the time these communities were beginning to incorporate discussion of “cognitive” security/insecurity in their near future threat assessments and future force design discourses. The article is cited in in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Cognitive Warfare document of 2020[2]. Either in ways that demonstrate the misunderstanding directly, or as part of the wider context in which the point of that particular title is thoroughly misinterpreted, the author’s desired self-reflection has not been forthcoming. Instead, and not unexpectedly, the discourse on the cognitive aspects of contemporary conflict have consumed and regurgitated a familiar sequence of errors which will continue to perpetuate rather than mitigate the problem if not addressed head-on.  

What the cognitive threat is

The primary cognitive threat is us[3]. The threat is driven by a combination of, firstly, techno-futurist hubris which exists as a permanently recycling feature of late-modern military thought.  The threat includes a precipitous slide into scientism which military thinkers and the organisations they populate have not avoided[4].  Further contributing to the threat is the commercial and financial rent-seeking which overhangs military affairs as a by-product of private-sector led R&D activities and government dependence on and cultivation of those activities increasingly since the 1990s[5].  Lastly, adversary awareness of these dynamics and an increasing willingness and capacity to manipulate and exacerbate them via the multitude of vulnerabilities ushered in by digital hyper-connectivity[6]. In other words, before the cognitive threat is an operational and tactical menace to be addressed and countered by the joint force, it is a central feature of the deteriorating epistemic condition of the late modern societies in which said forces operate and from which its personnel, funding, R&D pathways, doctrine and operating concepts, epistemic communities and strategic leadership emerge. 

What the cognitive threat is not   

The cognitive threat is not what adversary military organisations and their patrons are doing in and to the information environment with regard to activities other than kinetic military operations. Terms for adversarial activities occurring outside of conventional lethal/kinetic combat operations – such as the “grey-zone” and “below-the-threshold” – describe time-honoured tactics by which interlocutors engage in methods aimed at weakening and sowing dysfunction in the social and political fabric of competitor or enemy societies.  These tactics are used to gain advantage in areas not directly including military conflict, or in areas likely to be critical to military preparedness and mobilization in times of war[7]. A key stumbling block here is obvious: its often difficult to know which intentions such tactics express. This is not cognitive warfare. It is merely typical of contending across and between cross-cultural communities, and the permanent unwillingness of contending societies to accord with the other’s rules. Information warfare – particularly influence operations traversing the Internet and exploiting the dominant commercial operations found there – is part of this mix of activities which belong under the normal paradigm of competition between states for strategic advantage. Active measures – influence operations designed to self-perpetuate – have found fertile new ground on the Internet but are not new to the arsenals of intelligence services and, as Thomas Rid has warned, while they proliferate, are more unpredictable and difficult to control than they were in the pre-Internet era[8]. None of this is cognitive warfare either. Unfortunately, current and recent discourse has lapsed into the error of treating it as such[9], leading to all manner of self-inflicted confusion[10]. 

Why the distinction matters

Two trends emerge from the abovementioned confusion which represent the most immediate threat to the military enterprise[11]. Firstly, private-sector vendors and the consulting and lobbying industry they employ are busily pitching technological solutions based on machine-learning and automation which have been developed in commercial business settings in which sensitivity to error is not high[12]. While militaries experiment with this raft of technologies, eager to be seen at the vanguard of emerging tech; to justify R&D budgets and stave off defunding; or simply out of habit, they incur opportunity cost.  This cost is best described as stultifying investment in the human potential which strategic thinkers have long identified as the real key to actualizing new technologies[13], and entering into path dependencies with behemoth corporate actors whose strategic goal is the cultivation of rentier-relations not excluding the ever-lucrative military sector[14]. 

Secondly, to the extent that automation and machine learning technologies enter the operational picture, cognitive debt is accrued as the military enterprise becomes increasingly dependent on fallible tech solutions[15]. Under battle conditions, the first assumption is the contestation of the electromagnetic spectrum on which all digital information technologies depend for basic functionality. Automated data gathering and analysis tools suffer from heavy reliance on data availability and integrity.  When these tools are unavailable any joint multinational force will require multiple redundancies, not only in terms of technology, but more importantly, in terms of leadership and personnel competencies. It is evidently unclear where the military enterprise draws the line in terms of the likely cost-benefit ratio when it comes to experimenting with automated machine learning tools and the contexts in which they ought to be applied[16]. Unfortunately, experimentation is never cost-free. When civilian / military boundaries are blurred to the extent they are now as a result of the digital transformation of society, such experimentation requires consideration  in light of all of its implications, including to the integrity and functionality of open democracy as the entity being defended[17]. 

The first error of misinterpreting the meaning and bounds of cognitive insecurity is compounded by a second mistake: what the military enterprise chooses to invest time, attention, and resources into tomorrow[18]. Path dependency, technological lock-in, and opportunity cost all loom large if  digital information age threats are misinterpreted. This is the solipsistic nature of the cognitive threat at work – the weapon really is you! Putting one’s feet in the shoes of the adversary, nothing could be more pleasing than seeing that threat self-perpetuate. As a first step, militaries could organise and invest immediately in a strategic technology assessment capacity[19] free from the biases of rent-seeking vendors and lobbyists who, by definition, will not only not pay the costs of mission failure, but stand to benefit from rentier-like dependencies that emerge as the military enterprise pays the corporate sector to play in the digital age. 

Endnotes:

[1] Zac Rogers, “158. In the Cognitive War – The Weapon Is You!,” Mad Scientist Laboratory (blog), July 1, 2019, https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/158-in-the-cognitive-war-the-weapon-is-you/.

[2] Francois du Cluzel, “Cognitive Warfare” (Innovation Hub, 2020), https://www.innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/20210122_CW%20Final.pdf.

[3] “us” refers primarily but not exclusively to the national security, intelligence, and defence communities taking up discourse on cognitive security and its threats including Australia, the U.S., U.K., Europe, and other liberal democratic nations. 

[4] Henry Bauer, “Science in the 21st Century: Knowledge Monopolies and Research Cartels,” Journal of Scientific Exploration 18 (December 1, 2004); Matthew B. Crawford, “How Science Has Been Corrupted,” UnHerd, December 21, 2021, https://unherd.com/2021/12/how-science-has-been-corrupted-2/; William A. Wilson, “Scientific Regress,” First Things, May 2016, https://www.firstthings.com/article/2016/05/scientific-regress; Philip Mirowski, Science-Mart (Harvard University Press, 2011).

[5] Dima P Adamsky, “Through the Looking Glass: The Soviet Military-Technical Revolution and the American Revolution in Military Affairs,” Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 2 (2008): 257–94, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390801940443; Linda Weiss, America Inc.?: Innovation and Enterprise in the National Security State (Cornell University Press, 2014); Mariana Mazzucato, The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths (Penguin UK, 2018).

[6] Timothy L. Thomas, “Russian Forecasts of Future War,” Military Review, June 2019, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MJ-19/Thomas-Russian-Forecast.pdf; Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “Cognitive Domain Operations: The PLA’s New Holistic Concept for Influence Operations,” China Brief, The Jamestown Foundation 19, no. 16 (September 2019), https://jamestown.org/program/cognitive-domain-operations-the-plas-new-holistic-concept-for-influence-operations/.

[7] See Peter Layton, “Social Mobilisation in a Contested Environment,” The Strategist, August 5, 2019, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/social-mobilisation-in-a-contested-environment/; Peter Layton, “Mobilisation in the Information Technology Era,” The Forge (blog), N/A, https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/mobilisation-information-technology-era.

[8] Thomas Rid, Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare, Illustrated edition (New York: MACMILLAN USA, 2020).

[9] For example see Jake Harrington and Riley McCabe, “Detect and Understand: Modernizing Intelligence for the Gray Zone,” CSIS Briefs (Center for Strategic & International Studies, December 2021), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/211207_Harrington_Detect_Understand.pdf?CXBQPSNhUjec_inYLB7SFAaO_8kBnKrQ; du Cluzel, “Cognitive Warfare”; Kimberly Underwood, “Cognitive Warfare Will Be Deciding Factor in Battle,” SIGNAL Magazine, August 15, 2017, https://www.afcea.org/content/cognitive-warfare-will-be-deciding-factor-battle; Nicholas D. Wright, “Cognitive Defense of the Joint Force in a Digitizing World” (Pentagon Joint Staff Strategic Multilayer Assessment Group, July 2021), https://nsiteam.com/cognitive-defense-of-the-joint-force-in-a-digitizing-world/.

[10] Zac Rogers and Jason Logue, “Truth as Fiction: The Dangers of Hubris in the Information Environment,” The Strategist, February 14, 2020, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/truth-as-fiction-the-dangers-of-hubris-in-the-information-environment/.

[11] For more on this see Zac Rogers, “The Promise of Strategic Gain in the Information Age: What Happened?,” Cyber Defense Review 6, no. 1 (Winter 2021): 81–105.

[12] Rodney Brooks, “An Inconvenient Truth About AI,” IEEE Spectrum, September 29, 2021, https://spectrum.ieee.org/rodney-brooks-ai.

[13] Michael Horowitz and Casey Mahoney, “Artificial Intelligence and the Military: Technology Is Only Half the Battle,” War on the Rocks, December 25, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/12/artificial-intelligence-and-the-military-technology-is-only-half-the-battle/.

[14] Jathan Sadowski, “The Internet of Landlords: Digital Platforms and New Mechanisms of Rentier Capitalism,” Antipode 52, no. 2 (2020): 562–80, https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12595.

[15] For problematic example see Ben Collier and Lydia Wilson, “Governments Try to Fight Crime via Google Ads,” New Lines Magazine (blog), January 4, 2022, https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/governments-try-to-fight-crime-via-google-ads/.

[16] Zac Rogers, “Discrete, Specified, Assigned, and Bounded Problems: The Appropriate Areas for AI Contributions to National Security,” SMA Invited Perspectives (NSI Inc., December 31, 2019), https://nsiteam.com/discrete-specified-assigned-and-bounded-problems-the-appropriate-areas-for-ai-contributions-to-national-security/.

[17] Emily Bienvenue and Zac Rogers, “Strategic Army: Developing Trust in the Shifting Strategic Landscape,” Joint Force Quarterly 95 (November 2019): 4–14.

[18] Zac Rogers, “Goodhart’s Law: Why the Future of Conflict Will Not Be Data-Driven,” Grounded Curiosity (blog), February 13, 2021, https://groundedcuriosity.com/goodharts-law-why-the-future-of-conflict-will-not-be-data-driven/.

[19] For expansion see Zac Rogers and Emily Bienvenue, “Combined Information Overlay for Situational Awareness in the Digital Anthropological Terrain: Reclaiming Information for the Warfighter,” The Cyber Defense Review, no. Summer Edition (2021), https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/Portals/6/Documents/2021_summer_cdr/06_Rogers_Bienvenue_CDR_V6N3_2021.pdf?ver=6qlw1l02DXt1A_1n5KrL4g%3d%3d.

Artificial Intelligence / Machine Learning / Human-Machine Teaming Assessment Papers Below Established Threshold Activities (BETA) Cyberspace Influence Operations Information Systems Zac Rogers
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Options to Counter Foreign Influence Operations Targeting Servicemember and Veterans

Marcus Laird has served in the United States Air Force. He presently works at Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command as a Strategic Plans and Programs Officer. He can be found on Twitter @USLairdForce.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.  Divergent Options’ does not contain official information nor is it affiliated with the Department of Defense or the U. S. Air Force. The following opinion is of the author only, and is not official Air Force or Department of Defense policy. This publication was reviewed by AFRC/PA, and is cleared for public release and unlimited distribution.

National Security Situation:  Foreign Actors are using Social Media to influence Servicemember and Veteran communities. 

Date Originally Written:  December 2, 2021.

Date Originally Published:  January 3, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is a military member who has previously researched the impact of social media on US military internal dialogue for professional military education and graduate courses. 

Background:  During the lead up to the 2016 election, members of the U.S. Army Reserve were specifically targeted by advertisements on Facebook purchased by Russia’s Internet Research Agency at least ten times[1]. In 2017, the Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA) also detected social media profiles which were sophisticated mimics of their official web pages. These web pages were created for several reasons to include identity theft, fraud, and disseminating disinformation favorable to Russia. Further investigation revealed a network of fake personas attempting to make inroads within online military and veteran communities for the purpose of bolstering persona credibility to spread disinformation. Because these mimics used VVA logos, VVA was able to have these web pages deplatformed after two months due to trademark infringement[2].  

Alternatively, military influencers, after building a substantial following, have chosen to sell their personas as a means of monetizing their social media brands. While foreign adversary networks have not incorporated this technique for building an audience, the purchase of a persona is essentially an opportunity to purchase a turnkey information operation platform. 

Significance:  Servicemembers and veterans are trusted voices within their communities on matters of national security. The special trust society places on these communities makes them a particularly lucrative target for an adversary seeking to influence public opinion and shape policy debates[3]. Social media is optimized for advertising, allowing specific demographics to be targeted with unprecedented precision. Unchecked, adversaries can use this capability to sow mistrust, degrade unit cohesion, and spread disinformation through advertisements, mimicking legitimate organizations, or purchasing a trusted persona. 

Option #1:  Closing Legislative Loopholes 

Currently, foreign entities are prohibited from directly contributing to campaigns. However, there is no legal prohibition on purchasing advertising by foreign entities for the purpose of influencing elections. Using legislative means to close this loophole would deny adversaries’ abuse of platforms’ microtargeting capabilities for the purpose of political influence[4].

Risk:  Enforcement – As evidenced during inquiries into election interference, enforcement could prove difficult. Enforcement relies on good faith efforts by platforms to conduct internal assessments of sophisticated actors’ affiliations and intentions and report them. Additionally, government agencies have neither backend system access nor adequate resources to forensically investigate every potential instance of foreign advertising.

Gain:  Such a solution would protect society as a whole, to include the military and veteran communities. Legislation would include reporting and data retention requirements for platforms, allowing for earlier detection of potential information operations. Ideally, regulation would prompt platforms to tailor their content moderation standards around political advertising to create additional barriers for foreign entities.  

Option #2:  Deplatforming on the Grounds of Trademark Infringement

Should a foreign adversary attempt to use sophisticated mimicry of official accounts to achieve a veneer of credibility, then the government may elect to request a platform remove a user or network of users on the basis of trademark infringement. This technique was successfully employed by the VVA in 2017. Military services have trademark offices, which license the use of their official logos and can serve as focal points for removing unauthorized materials[5].

Risk:  Resources – since trademark offices are self-funded and rely on royalties for operations, they may not be adequately resourced to challenge large-scale trademark infringement by foreign actors.

Personnel – personnel in trademark offices may not have adequate training to determine whether or not a U.S. person or a foreign entity is using the organization’s trademarked materials. Failure to adequately delineate between U.S. persons and foreign actors when requesting to deplatform a user potentially infringes upon civil liberties. 

Gain:  Developing agency response protocols using existing intellectual property laws ensures responses are coordinated between the government and platforms as opposed to a pickup game during an ongoing operation. Regular deplatforming can also help develop signatures for sophisticated mimicry, allowing for more rapid detection and mitigation by the platforms. 

Option #3:  Subject the Sale of Influence Networks to Review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) 

Inform platform owners of the intent of CFIUS to review the sale of all influence networks and credentials which specifically market to military and veteran communities. CFIUS review has been used to prevent the acquisition of applications by foreign entities. Specifically, in 2019 CFIUS retroactively reviewed the purchase of Grindr, an LGBTQ+ dating application, due to national security concerns about the potential for the Chinese firm Kunlun to pass sensitive data to the Chinese government.  Data associated with veteran and servicemember social networks could be similarly protected[6]. 

Risk:  Enforcement – Due to the large number of influencers and the lack of knowledge of the scope of the problem, enforcement may be difficult in real time. In the event a sale happens, then ex post facto CFIUS review would provide a remedy.  

Gain:  Such a notification should prompt platforms to craft governance policies around the sale and transfer of personas to allow for more transparency and reporting.

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] Goldsmith, K. (2020). An Investigation Into Foreign Entities Who Are Targeting Servicemembers and Veterans Online. Vietnam Veterans of America. Retrieved September 17, 2019, from https://vva.org/trollreport/, 108.

[2] Ibid, 6-7.

[3] Gallacher, J. D., Barash, V., Howard, P. N., & Kelly, J. (2018). Junk news on military affairs and national security: Social media disinformation campaigns against us military personnel and veterans. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.03572.

[4] Wertheimer, F. (2019, May 28). Loopholes allow foreign adversaries to legally interfere in U.S. elections. Just Security. Retrieved December 10, 2021, from https://www.justsecurity.org/64324/loopholes-allow-foreign-adversaries-to-legally-interfere-in-u-s-elections/.

[5] Air Force Trademark Office. (n.d.). Retrieved December 3, 2021, from https://www.trademark.af.mil/Licensing/Applications.aspx.

[6] Kara-Pabani, K., & Sherman, J. (2021, May 11). How a Norwegian government report shows the limits of Cfius Data Reviews. Lawfare. Retrieved December 10, 2021, from https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-norwegian-government-report-shows-limits-cfius-data-reviews.

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Call for Papers: Cognitive Threats

Background:

Divergent Options is a non-politically aligned non-revenue generating national security website that, in 1,000 words or less, provides unbiased, dispassionate, candid articles that assess a national security situation, present multiple options to address the situation, and articulate the risk and gain of each option.  Please note that while we assess a national security situation and may provide options, we never recommend a specific option.

Below you will see a Call for Papers.  If you are not interested in writing on this topic, we always welcome individual articles on virtually any national security situation an author is passionate about.  Please do not let our call for papers cause you to hesitate to send us your idea. We look forward to hearing from you!

Call for Papers:

Divergent Options is calling for national security papers assessing situations or discussing options related to Cognitive Threats.

For the purpose of this Call for Papers a “Cognitive Threat” is defined as efforts undertaken to manipulate an adversary’s perceptions in order to achieve a national security objective.

Please limit your article to 1,000 words and write using our Options Paper or Assessment Paper templates which are designed for ease of use by both writers and readers alike.

Please send your article to submissions@divergentoptions.org by February 12, 2022.

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Analyzing Social Media as a Means to Undermine the United States

Michael Martinez is a consultant who specializes in data analysis, project management and community engagement. has a M.S. of Intelligence Management from University of Maryland University College. He can be found on Twitter @MichaelMartinez. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group. 

Title:  Analyzing Social Media as a Means to Undermine the United States

Date Originally Written:  November 30, 2021.

Date Originally Published:  December 27, 2021.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that social media is not inherently good nor bad, but a tool to enhance discussion. Unless the national security apparatus understands how to best utilize Open Source Intelligence to achieve its stated goals, i.e. engaging the public on social media and public forums, it will lag behind its adversaries in this space.

Summary:  Stopping online radicalization of all varieties is complex and includes the individual, the government, social media companies, and Internet Service Providers. Artificial intelligence reviewing information online and flagging potential threats may not be adequate. Only through public-private partnerships can an effective system by created to support anti-radicalization endeavors.

Text:  The adage, “If you’re not paying for the product, you are the product[1],” cannot be further from the truth in the age of social media. Every user’s click and purchase are recorded by private entities such as Facebook and Twitter. These records can be utilized by other nations to gather information on the United States economy, intellectual property, as well as information on government personnel and agencies. This collation of data can be packaged together and be used to inform operations to prey on U.S. personnel.  Examples include extortion through ransomware, an adversary intelligence service probing an employee for specific national information by appealing to their subject matter expertise, and online influence / radicalization.

It is crucial to accept that the United States and its citizens are more heavily reliant on social media than ever before. Social media entities such as Meta (formerly Facebook) have new and yet to be released products for children (i.e., the “Instagram for Kids” product) enabling adversaries to prey upon any age a potential. Terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda utilize cartoons on outlets like YouTube and Instagram to entice vulnerable youth to carry out attacks or help radicalize potential suicide bombers[2]. 

While Facebook and YouTube are the most common among most age groups, Tik-Tok and Snapchat have undergone a meteoric arise among youth under thirty[3]. Intelligence services and terrorist organizations have vastly improved their online recruiting techniques including video and media as the platforms have become just as sophisticated. Unless federal, state, and local governments strengthen their public-private partnerships to stay ahead of growth in next generation social media platforms this adversary behavior will continue.  The national security community has tools at its disposal to help protect Americans from being turned into cybercriminals through coercion, or radicalizing individuals from overseas entities such as the Islamic State to potentially carry out domestic attacks.

To counter such trends within social media radicalization, the National Institutes of Justice (NIJ) worked with the National Academies to identify traits and agendas to facilitate disruption of these efforts. Some of the things identified include functional databases, considering links between terrorism and lesser crimes, and exploring the culture of terrorism, including structure and goals[4]. While a solid federal infrastructure and deterrence mechanism is vital, it is also important for the social media platform themselves to eliminate radical media that may influence at-risk individuals. 

According to the NIJ, there are several characteristics that contribute to social media radicalization: being unemployed, a loner, having a criminal history, a history of mental illness, and having prior military experience[5]. These are only potential factors that do not apply to all who are radicalized[6]. However, these factors do provide a base to begin investigation and mitigation strategies. 

As a long-term solution, the Bipartisan Policy Center recommends enacting and teaching media literacy to understand and spot internet radicalization[7]. Social media algorithms are not fool proof. These algorithms require the cyberspace equivalent of “see something, say something” and for users to report any suspicious activity to the platforms. The risks of these companies not acting is also vital as their main goal is to monetize. Acting in this manner does not help companies make more money. This inaction is when the government steps in to ensure that private enterprise is not impeding national security. 

Creating a system that works will balance the rights of the individual with the national security of the United States. It will also respect the rights of private enterprise and the pipelines that carry the information to homes, the Internet Service Providers. Until this system can be created, the radicalization of Americans will be a pitfall for the entire National Security apparatus. 

Endnotes:

[1] Oremus, W. (2018, April 27). Are You Really the Product? Retrieved on November 15, 2021, from https://slate.com/technology/2018/04/are-you-really-facebooks-product-the-history-of-a-dangerous-idea.html. 

[2] Thompson, R. (2011). Radicalization and the Use of Social Media. Journal of Strategic Security, 4(4), 167–190. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26463917 

[3] Pew Research Center. (2021, April 7). Social Media Use in 2021. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/04/07/social-media-use-in-2021/ 

[4] Aisha Javed Qureshi, “Understanding Domestic Radicalization and Terrorism,” August 14, 2020, nij.ojp.gov: https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/understanding-domestic-radicalization-and-terrorism.

[5] The National Counterintelligence and Security Center. Intelligence Threats & Social Media Deception. Retrieved November 15, 2021, from https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-features/2780-ncsc-intelligence-threats-social-media-deception. 

[6] Schleffer, G., & Miller, B. (2021). The Political Effects of Social Media Platforms on Different Regime Types. Austin, TX. Retrieved November 29, 2021, from http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/13987. 

[7] Bipartisan Policy Center. (2012, December). Countering Online Radicalization in America. Retrieved November 29, 2021, from https://bipartisanpolicy.org/download/?file=/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BPC-_Online-Radicalization-Report.pdf 

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2022 Call for Papers Topics

Background:

Divergent Options is a non-revenue generating non-politically aligned national security website that does not conduct political activities.  In 1,000 words or less, we provide unbiased, dispassionate, candid articles that assess a national security situation, present multiple options to address the situation, and articulate the risk and gain of each option.  Please note that while we assess a national security situation and may provide options, we never recommend a specific option.

Below you will see a 2022 Call for Papers Schedule.  Our Call for Papers process is meant to motivate, not exclude.  If you are not interested in writing on these topics, we always welcome individual articles on virtually any national security situation an author is passionate about.  Please do not let our call for papers cause you to hesitate to send us your idea. We look forward to hearing from you!

Writing for Divergent Options:

We are very excited that you are interested in writing for Divergent Options!

Please send us your original, unpublished, un-submitted-elsewhere article, or participate in one of our Call for Papers below, by emailing us at:  submissions@divergentoptions.org

At Divergent Options we write using a specified format.  Are you interested in assessing a national security situation and providing options to address it?  Then our Options Paper format is for you.  Are you interested in assessing a national security situation only?  Then our Assessment Paper is for you.  Are you a bit anxious?  Then check out our Writer Testimonial page.

Please note that a national security situation can be one that is externally focused e.g. what is Country X going to do about County Y or internally focused e.g. Country X should invest more in Y capability.

2022 Call for Papers Topics:

Topic:  Cognitive Threats

Call for Papers Begins:  January 2022

Call for Papers Ends:  Mid-February 2022

Publish Date:  Late-February 2022

Topic:  The Cost:  Societal, Organizational, and Personal Impacts of 2001-2021 National Security Decisions

Call for Papers Begins:  March 2022

Call for Papers Ends:  Mid-April 2022

Publish Date:  Late-April 2022

Topic:  The Next Superpower

Call for Papers Begins:  May 2022

Call for Papers Ends:  Mid-June 2022

Publish Date:  Late-June 2022

Topic:  COVID19 and National Security

Call for Papers Begins:  July 2022

Call for Papers Ends:  Mid-August 2022

Publish Date:  Late-August 2022

Topic:  Coordinating All The Things

Call for Papers Begins:  September 2022

Call for Papers Ends:  Mid-October 2022

Publish Date:  Late-October 2022

Topic:  Threats and Opportunities in 2050

Call for Papers Begins:  November 2022

Call for Papers Ends:  Mid-December 2022

Publish Date:  Late-December 2022

Call For Papers
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McMaster, Afghanistan, and the Praetorian Mindset

Lieutenant Colonel John Bolton, U.S. Army, is a doctoral candidate at Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies.  He previously commanded Bravo Company, 209th Aviation Support Battalion, served as the Executive Officer for 2-25 Assault Helicopter Battalion, and the Brigade Aviation Officer for 4/25 IBCT (Airborne). He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College’s Art of War Scholars Program and holds degrees in military history and mechanical engineering. An AH-64D/E Aviator, he has deployed multiple times with Engineer, Aviation, and Infantry units. 

Title:  McMaster, Afghanistan, and the Praetorian Mindset

Date Originally Written:  November 20, 2021.

Date Originally Published:  December 20, 2021.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes some national security professionals are taking the wrong lessons from Afghanistan, blaming a non-existent lack of public support for the failure of the American campaign.

Summary:  Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, USA(ret) recently blamed the U.S. public for a “lack of support” in Afghanistan.  McMaster’s claim evokes the legacy of dangerous “stabbed in the back” mentalities that emerged after Germany’s defeat in WWI and the U.S. Army’s withdrawal from Vietnam. Instead of blaming others, the U.S. military would benefit from a far-reaching study to discover the institutional lapses and shortcomings that precipitated failure. 

Text:  Retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), has rightfully lambasted the U.S. withdrawl from Afghanistan as embarrassing. However, McMaster goes too far in calling the withdrawl a “defeat” with severe implications for American credibility[1]. More troubling, in a recent column, McMaster blamed the U.S. public and unnamed leaders who allegedly failed to back the American military[2]. According to McMaster, “There are a lot of people in senior positions in government who have never led anything… they’ve never done anything except maybe in academic environments or write policy papers[3].”

McMaster is wrong about Afghanistan and his narrative endorses a praetorian mindset – one dangerously close to the “stab in the back” dogmas that took hold in Weimar Germany after World War I and among the American Military Officer Corps after Vietnam[4]. Leaving Afghanistan will have few, if any, long-term effects on American security but the war’s impact on civil-military relations portends pernicious tensions, especially if military leaders adopt McMaster’s mentality. 

McMaster says America was fighting “one-year wars” in Afghanistan for two decades, obscuring the reality that the U.S. military chose this rotational model and often failed to adapt to local conditions[5]. But the 2017 Afghanistan “surge” engineered by McMaster while he was APNSA was more of the same. The McMaster Surge did not quell violence, deter the Taliban, nor generate effective (or loyal) Afghan Defense Forces[6]. From 2017-2020 Americans did more of the same: hunting the Taliban and training and foisting expensive equipment on poorly trained and often barely literate Afghan forces[7]. Americans were also dying. During the author’s 2017-18 tour, six Soldiers died during a time when Afghans were supposedly in the lead. “Bureaucratic capture” is the only way to explain how otherwise intelligent professionals can endorse logically inconsistent, sunk-cost arguments about a strategically unimportant place.

Rather than explain why Central Asia has relevancy at home, McMaster and others have made expansive credibility arguments – we must stay there because we are there. In doing so, McMaster bastardizes historian Zachary Shore’s “strategic empathy[8].” But instead of understanding the domestic and cultural sources of U.S. adversaries’ actions, McMaster’s “strategic empathy” justifies expansive American action by equating all challenges as likewise threatening. Better to employ a rational consideration of interests and achievable ends, especially amid a public justifiably skeptical of employing force[9]. Moreover, American credibility has shades – eschewing a non-vital commitment in Afghanistan is hardly relevant to the enduring North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance, for example. Tellingly, according to McMaster, violating the 2019 U.S.-Taliban agreement and staying in Afghanistan would not have affected American credibility.

Despite the folly of throwing good Soldiers after bad policy, McMaster and the praetorians see no systemic failure in American national security institutions. Instead, McMaster blames the “defeatist” U.S. public for a lack of support – as if 20 years and trillions of dollars materialized without public consent and Congressional support[10]. If anything, the public and Congress were far too lenient with oversight of the Afghan efforts, largely bequeathing whatever national security leaders wanted. 

The irony of a former APNSA decrying “policy paper writers” is palpable but McMaster certainly knows better. An accomplished soldier-scholar, his doctoral thesis (later turned in the book Dereliction of Duty) savaged senior officers who allowed President Lyndon Johnson to lurch America toward tragedy in Vietnam. Once U.S. forces began fighting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did little to question U.S. Army General William Westmoreland’s fundamentally flawed strategy. Consequently, Johnson felt boxed in by his own military advisors. Unfortunately, in an unnerving reprisal, American strategy in Afghanistan developed little beyond asking for “more time,” “more money,” “more troops,” while leaders proclaimed “great progress” or “being on the right azimuth[11].” To paraphrase the Afghanistan Special Investigator General John Sopko, “so many corners were turned, we were spinning[12].” When Americans did speak out, as in the case of a U.S. Army Special Forces officer who grew tired of his Afghan partner’s pederasty or an officer who described rampant false reporting in 2012, they were ignored[13].  

As documented by the Washington Post’s “Afghanistan Papers,” false hopes and false reporting were mainstays of Afghanistan strategy across multiple administrations[14]. A 2014 Army report demonstrated the war’s toll on the ethics of Army Officers, finding lying and false reporting had become “common place[15].” Officers, the report said, were often “lying to themselves.” Civil-military distrust arising from Afghanistan needs to be analyzed in this context. If the public shares blame, it is for being too credulous – treating soldiers like saints and senior leaders as anointed heroes, too pious to be questioned, let alone contradicted. Blaming the public is insipid at best and dangerous at worst. Here McMaster espouses a praetorian view of civil-military relations grossly out of step with the American tradition. 

Leaving Afghanistan is exactly the exactly the type of prioritization McMaster called for in his 2017 National Security Strategy. While the Afghanistan withdrawal was embarrassing[16], leaving demonstrates that United States can make unpleasant distinctions between what is long-standing and what is vital. A perpetual counter-terrorism mission in Afghanistan would (and did) distract from other regions. Rather than abandon a failed project, McMaster continues to advocate for doubling down on efforts that were often corrupt and ineffective[17]. It is foolhardy to adopt a national security paradigm predicated on long-term occupations and defense posture anathema to the American public and much of Congress. 

McMaster is an American hero, not only on the battlefield but in the war for the intellectual soul of the U.S. Army. His views on warfare helped shape a generation of officers, including the author. But his correct view of war’s nature has not translated into feasible policy. By failing to distinguish concerns from vital interests this worldview lacks the wherewithal to make difficult strategic decisions. 

America is and will remain the world’s sole superpower. But even massive reserves of power are finite, requiring an adept strategy based on a healthy understanding of the world as it is. Good strategy also requires an engaged but not overly deferential public. U.S. policy will succeed when it prioritizes threats and interests and aligns them with the resources available, not assuming it can do as it wishes abroad with no consequences to the nation’s budget, civil-military relationship, or moral standing. 

Endnotes:

[1] McMaster quoted in Hal Boyd, “Gen. H.R. McMaster on America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan,” Deseret News, October 27, 2021, https://www.deseret.com/2021/10/27/22747222/general-hr-mcmaster-on-americas-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-trump-national-security-adviser-biden.

[2] H.R. McMaster, “Honor Veterans by Having the Will to Win,” Wall Street Journal, November 10, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/honor-vets-the-will-to-win-war-military-service-veterans-day-afghanistan-taliban-mcmaster-11636576955

[3] McMaster quoted at the 4th Great Power Competition Conference, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dvx1rmU-QAU&t=2093s

[4] See Summers, On Strategy and Evans, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich for discussion of the “stabbed in the back” narratives.

[5] McMaster interviewed by Chuck Todd, Meet the Press, August 29, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/video/mcmaster-afghanistan-a-one-year-war-fought-20-times-over-119712325910

[6] See Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Events of 2018,” https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/afghanistan; Craig Whitlock, “Afghan Security Forces’ Wholesale Collapse Was Years in the Making,” The Washington Post, August 16, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/afghan-security-forces-capabilities/2021/08/15/052a45e2-fdc7-11eb-a664-4f6de3e17ff0_story.html

[7] See Alexandra Kuimova and Siemon T. Wezeman, “Transfers of major arms to Afghanistan between 2001 and 2020,” SIPRI, September 3, 2021, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2021/transfers-major-arms-afghanistan-between-2001-and-2020.

[8] McMaster, lecture to George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs, March 2021, https://gwtoday.gwu.edu/hr-mcmaster-stresses-strategic-empathy-effective-foreign-policy

[9] Anna Shortridge, “The U.S. War in Afghanistan Twenty Years On: Public Opinion Then and Now,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 7, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-war-afghanistan-twenty-years-public-opinion-then-and-now

[10] Kyle Rempfer, “Trump’s former national security adviser says the public is fed ‘defeatist narrative’ that hurts the US in Afghanistan,” Military Times, May 9, 2019, https://www.businessinsider.com/hr-mcmaster-defeatist-narrative-hurting-us-afghanistan-strategy-2019-5

[11] See “Afghan ISAF commander John Allen sees ‘road to winning’,” BBC News, February 10, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-21399805; Sara Almukhtar, “What Did the U.S. Get for $2 Trillion in Afghanistan?,” The New York Times, December 9, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/09/world/middleeast/afghanistan-war-cost.html; Chris Good, “Petraeus: Gains in Afghanistan ‘Fragile and Reversible’; Afghans Will Take Over in Select Province,” The Atlantic, March 15, 2011, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/03/petraeus-gains-in-afghanistan-fragile-and-reversible-afghans-will-take-over-in-select-provinces/72507.

[12] Dan Grazier, “Afghanistan Proved Eisenhower Correct,” Project on Government Oversight, November 1, 2021, https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2021/11/afghanistan-proved-eisenhower-correct/

[13] See Joseph Goldstein, “U.S. Soldiers Told to Ignore Sexual Abuse of Boys by Afghan Allies,” The New York Times, September 20, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/world/asia/us-soldiers-told-to-ignore-afghan-allies-abuse-of-boys.html; Dan Davis, “Truth, Lies, and Afghanistan,” Armed Forces Journal, February 1, 2012, http://armedforcesjournal.com/truth-lies-and-afghanistan

[14]Craig Whitlock, “The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War,” The Washington Post, December 9, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-confidential-documents/

[15] Leonard Wong and Stephen Gerras, “Lying to Ourselves,” Strategic Studies Institute, February 2015, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/466

[16] The White House, “National Security Strategy,” https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf

[17] SIGAR, “Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan,” September 2016, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/sigar-16-58-ll.pdf

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Assessing Russian Use of Social Media as a Means to Influence U.S. Policy

Alex Buck is a currently serving officer in the Canadian Armed Forces. He has deployed twice to Afghanistan, once to Ukraine, and is now working towards an MA in National Security.  Alex can be found on Twitter @RCRbuck.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group. 

Title:  Assessing Russian Use of Social Media as a Means to Influence U.S. Policy

Date Originally Written:  August 29, 2021.

Date Originally Published:  December 13, 2021.

Author and / or Article Point of View: The author believes that without appropriate action, the United States’ political climate will continue to be exploited by Russian influence campaigns. These campaigns will have broad impacts across the Western world, and potentially generate an increased competitive advantage for Russia.

Summary:  To achieve a competitive advantage over the United States, Russia uses social media-based influence campaigns to influence American foreign policy. Political polarization makes the United States an optimal target for such campaigns. 

Text:  Russia aspires to regain influence over the international system that they once had as the Soviet Union. To achieve this aim, Russia’s interest lies in building a stronger economy and expanding their regional influence over Eastern Europe[1]. Following the Cold War, Russia recognized that these national interests were at risk of being completely destroyed by Western influence. The Russian economy was threatened by the United States’ unipolar hegemony over the global economy[2]. A strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has threatened Russia’s regional influence in Eastern Europe. NATO’s collective security agreement was originally conceived to counter the Soviet threat following World War II and has continued to do so to this day. Through the late 1990s and early 2000s, NATO expanded their membership to include former Soviet states in Eastern Europe. This expansion was done in an effort to reduce Russian regional influence [1]. Russia perceives these actions as a threat to their survival as a state, and needs a method to regain competitive advantage.

Following the Cold War, Russia began to identify opportunities they could exploit to increase their competitive advantage in the international system. One of those opportunities began to develop in the early-2000s as social media emerged. During this time, social media began to impact American culture in such a significant way that it could not be ignored. Social media has two significant impacts on society. First, it causes people to create very dense clusters of social connections. Second, these clusters are populated by very similar types of people[3]. These two factors caused follow-on effects to American society in that they created a divided social structure and an extremely polarized political system. Russia viewed these as opportunities ripe for their exploitation. Russia sees U.S. social media as a cost-effective medium to exert influence on the United States. 

In the late 2000s, Russia began experimenting with their concept of exploiting the cyber domain as a means of exerting influence on other nation-states. After the successful use of cyber operations against Ukraine, Estonia, Georgia and again in Ukraine in 2004, 2007, 2008, and 2014 respectively, Russia was poised to attempt utilizing their concept against the United States and NATO[4]. In 2014, Russia slowly built a network of social media accounts that would eventually begin sowing disinformation amongst American social media users[3]. The significance of the Russian information campaign leading up to the 2016 U.S. presidential election can not be underestimated. The Russian Internet Research Agency propagated ~10.4 million tweets on Twitter, 76.5 million engagements on Facebook, and 187 million engagements on Instagram[5]. Although within the context of 200 billion tweets sent annually this may seem like a small-scale effort, the targeted nature of the tweets contributed to their effectiveness. This Russian social media campaign was estimated to expose between 110 and 130 million American social media users to misinformation aimed at skewing the results of the presidential election[3]. The 2000 presidential election was decided by 537 votes in the state of Florida. To change the results of an American election like that of 2000, a Russian information campaign could potentially sway electoral results with a campaign that is 0.00049% effective.

The bifurcated nature of the current American political arena has created the perfect target for Russian attacks via the cyber domain. Due to the persistently slim margins of electoral results, Russia will continue to exploit this opportunity until it achieves its national aims and gains a competitive advantage over the United States. Social media’s influence offers Russia a cost effective and highly impactful tool that has the potential to sway American policies in its favor. Without coherent strategies to protect national networks and decrease Russian social influence the United States, and the broader Western world, will continue to be subject to Russian influence. 

Endnotes:

[1] Arakelyan, L. A. (2017). Russian Foreign Policy in Eurasia: National Interests and Regional Integration (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315468372

[2] Blank, S. (2008). Threats to and from Russia: An Assessment. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 21(3), 491–526. https://doi.org/10.1080/13518040802313746

[3] Aral, S. (2020). The hype machine: How social media disrupts our elections, our economy, and our health–and how we must adapt (First edition). Currency.

[4] Geers, K. & NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. (2015). Cyber war in perspective: Russian aggression against Ukraine. https://www.ccdcoe.org/library/publications/cyber-war-in-perspective-russian-aggression-against-ukraine/

[5] DiResta, R., Shaffer, K., Ruppel, B., Sullivan, D., & Matney, R. (2019). The Tactics & Tropes of the Internet Research Agency. US Senate Documents.

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Assessing the Threat from Social Media Enabled Domestic Extremism in an Era of Stagnant Political Imagination


David Nwaeze is a freelance journalist and former political organizer based out of the U.S. Pacific Northwest, who has spent over two decades among the U.S. left.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group. 

Title:  Assessing the Threat from Social Media Enabled Domestic Extremism in an Era of Stagnant Political Imagination

Date Originally Written:  November 19, 2021.

Date Originally Published:  November 29, 2021.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author contends that despite efforts by legislators and social media platforms to reduce online mediated domestic extremism, America’s political stagnation is a chief contributor to the appeal of extremist movements to the domestic public at large.

Summary:  Social media is enabling domestic extremism. Where recruitment and incitement to action once took a great deal more effort for domestic extremists, they can now instantly attract much larger audiences through social media. While some may blame social media echo chambers for the growth of domestic extremism in recent years, equally culpable is stagnant political imagination within the U.S.

Text:  The threat of social media enabled domestic extremism in the U.S. is all too real today.  Below are some recent examples:

– An 18-year-old Army National Guardsman murders two of his housemates in Tampa, Florida[1]. A fourth is later arrested, tried, and convicted of possessing explosive material. All four are members of a Neo-Nazi organization that’s been built up in the preceding years through social media chatrooms.

– A drive-by shooting takes the life of a security guard on contract with the Federal Protective Service at the Ronald V. Dellums Federal Building in Oakland, California[2]. The following weekend, a suspect in the attack kills a Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Sergeant and injures a deputy seeking to arrest him in relation to the attack. This suspect – along with another man – is arrested. Both suspects were part of an online subculture organized mainly over social media, oriented around preparing for or inciting a second American Civil War, or “boogaloo.”

– A mob of rioters storms the United States Capitol building in Washington, D.C.[3]. In the conflagration, there were five deaths and an unknown number of injuries[4]. To date, 695 individuals have been charged with crimes associated with this event[5]. Inspired by a mix of social media-mediated conspiracy theories, the January 6th attack would go on to wake America up to the real-world threat imposed by online extremism.

As we enter 2022, Americans are witnessing an uneasy calm following a violent awakening to the threat of social media enabled domestic extremism. What got us here? It is easy to look at recent history as moments in the process of evolution for online radicalization and mobilization toward violence:

– Email list-servs are used in 1999 to organize the shutdown of the World Trade Organization’s conference in Seattle[6]

– Al Qa’ida uses early social media as a propaganda and recruitment tool[7]

– The Islamic State dramatically improves this technique[7]

To understand where we are, the fundamental character of the present American mediascape needs examination. Today’s mediascape is unlike anything in human history. The internet provides an immense capability for anyone with a connection to transmit ideas and information at nearly instantaneous speeds worldwide. With this opportunity, however, comes the deep risk of information bottlenecks. According to SEO marketing strategist Brian Dean[8], “93.33% of [the] 4.8 billion global internet users and 85% of [the] 5.27 billion mobile phone users are on social media.” This means that the most popular social media platforms (Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, Instagram, etc) substantially impact how internet users connect to news, information, and ideas.

Additionally, in late October 2021, Facebook whistleblower Frances Haugen leaked documents now known as The Facebook Papers[9]. In her testimony since the leak, she has identified the moral hazard faced by social media companies as their “engagement-based metrics” create “echo chambers that create social norms” which exacerbate the “normalization of hate, a normalization of dehumanizing others.” In her words, “that’s what leads to violent incidents[10].” In a threat-free environment, this would be worrying enough on its own. However, the American people face many ideological opponents – both at home and abroad – who seek to leverage this media space to violent ends. To understand U.S. vulnerability to these threats, let’s examine the underlying character of our political environment since “the end of history.”

In “The End of History and the Last Man[11],” Francis Fukuyama presents a case for liberal democracy as the apotheosis and conclusion of historical ideological struggle as viewed through the Hegelian lens. In his words, the end of the Cold War brought us to “the end-point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” Stemming from this, Fukuyama holds that humanity, once having achieved this “end-point,” would reach a condition in which “here would be no further progress in the development of underlying principles and institutions, because all of the really big questions had been settled.” In other words, he concludes that humanity is no longer capable of achieving far-reaching social change. This political theory – and the phenomenon it sought to characterize – found its expression during the 1990s in the rise of neoliberalism, and its attendant policy shifts, in the anglo-American political space away from the welfare state and toward finance capital mediated economic goals. Such subsequent ideas have come to define the limits of the American political space.

In “The Return of History and the End of Dreams[12],” Robert Kagan responded to Fukuyama by framing an international political struggle characterized by the rise of a new impulse toward autocracy, led by Russia and China. Kagan goes on to propose a “concert of world democracies” work together to challenge this new international autocratic threat. Kagan’s solution to “the end of dreams” is to awaken to the ideological struggle at hand and rise to its challenge of identifying and affirming our values and promoting the fulfillment of democratic political dreams abroad.

In the spirit of Kagan’s response to Fukuyama, America won’t rise to meet the dual challenges of social media’s capability to enable far-reaching social change and the inevitability of ideological struggle with domestic extremists until it accepts that history has not ended.  Unless America can assertively identify and affirm its underlying national values, the convergence of information echo chambers with stagnant political imagination will continue to motivate this threat to U.S. national security.  America has seen the warning signs in the headlines. History illustrates what this may portend if not abated. America’s enemies are many. Chief among them, however, is dreamless slumber.

Endnotes:

[1] Thompson, A.C., Winston, A. and Hanrahan, J., (2018, February 23). Inside Atomwaffen As It Celebrates a Member for Allegedly Killing a Gay Jewish College Student. Retrieved November 19, 2021 from: https://www.propublica.org/article/atomwaffen-division-inside-white-hate-group

[2] Winston, A., (2020, September 25). The Boogaloo Cop Killers. Retrieved November 19, 2021 from: https://www.popularfront.co/boogaloo-cop-killers

[3] Reeves, J., Mascaro, L., and Woodward, C., (2021, January 11). Capitol assault a more sinister attack than first appeared. Retrieved November 19, 2021 from: https://apnews.com/article/us-capitol-attack-14c73ee280c256ab4ec193ac0f49ad54

[4] McEvoy, J., (2021, January 8). Woman Possibly ‘Crushed To Death’: These Are The Five People Who Died Amid Pro-Trump Riots. Retrieved November 19, 2021 from: https://www.forbes.com/sites/jemimamcevoy/2021/01/08/woman-possibly-crushed-to-death-these-are-the-five-people-who-died-amid-pro-trump-riots/

[5] Hall, M., Gould, S., Harrington, R., Shamisian, J., Haroun, A., Ardrey, T., and Snodgrass, E., (2021, November 16). 695 people have been charged in the Capitol insurrection so far. This searchable table shows them all. Retrieved November 19, 2021 from: https://www.insider.com/all-the-us-capitol-pro-trump-riot-arrests-charges-names-2021-1

[6] Arquilla, J., & Ronfeldt, D. (2001). Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. RAND Corporation.

[7] Byman, D. L. (2015, April 29). Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different goals, different targets. Retrieved November 19, 2021 from: https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/comparing-al-qaeda-and-isis-different-goals-different-targets

[8] Dean, B. (2021, October 10). Social Network Usage & Growth Statistics: How Many People Use Social Media in 2021?. Retrieved November 19, 2021 from: https://backlinko.com/social-media-users

[9] Chappell, B. (2021, October 25). The Facebook Papers: What you need to know about the trove of insider documents. Retrieved November 19, 2021 from: https://www.npr.org/2021/10/25/1049015366/the-facebook-papers-what-you-need-to-know

[10] Sky News. (2021, October 25). Facebook groups push people to “extreme interests”, says whistleblower Frances Haugen. Retrieved November 19, 2021 from: https://news.sky.com/story/facebook-groups-push-people-to-extreme-interests-says-whistleblower-frances-haugen-12444405

[11] Fukuyama, F. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. Free Press.

[12] Kagan, R. (2009). The Return of History and the End of Dreams. Vintage.

Cyberspace David Nwaeze United States Violent Extremism
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Assessing Contemporary Deterrence Parallel to Netflix’s Squid Game

Dr. Brooke Mitchell is a George Washington University Nuclear Security Working Group Fellow. She works on Capitol Hill for a member of the United States Congress and leads appropriation portfolios for defense, energy and water, and military construction and veteran’s affairs. Dr. Mitchell also serves as manager for the Congressional Nuclear Working Group. In addition, she is the Chief Academic Officer for the Small Business Consulting Corporation and principal investigator for Air Force Global Strike Command’s (AFGSC) National Nuclear Strategy and Global Security Workshop for Practitioners. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group. 

Title:  Assessing Contemporary Deterrence Parallel to Netflix’s Squid Game

Date Originally Written:  November 17, 2021.

Date Originally Published:  November 22, 2021.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The United States Department of Defense (DoD) has placed an increased emphasis on the present era of strategic competition with Russia and China. The author uses the Netflix show Squid Game as a metaphor to draw attention to the value of understanding the players’ motivations as central to define the rules of the game in order to create clear focus around contemporary deterrence. 

Summary:  DoD’s view of deterrence is reminiscent of Netflix’s hit show, Squid Game[1]. Deterrence traditionally focuses on nation states implementing military actions which may deter adversary action[2]. Deterrence fails when the adversary proceeds anyway. Both deterrence and Squid Game involve players executing their free will to compete against the other players.  Deterrence becomes complicated today as players and game rules remain undiscovered.

Text:  It has historically been assumed that the strongest parties (i.e. individuals, groups, countries) have an advantage and can thus deter the weaker. Deterrence can be measured in terms of nuclear deterrence (including both weapons and weapons systems), along with conventional sources of warpower, and include additional forms of diplomatic, economic, or social variables that enhance one party’s ability to deny undesirable outcomes. 

The question remains though: how, in an era of strategic competition, do traditional deterrence theories or concepts hold true when many leaders, military strategists, and subject matter experts view the United States as facing near-peer competition with both Russia and China? If deterrence is still simply the ability to strategically maneuver strength, or capabilities, to the other parties than by this token the United States won this competition long ago. Yet, despite the present conundrum Russia and now China continues to grow their nuclear arsenals; are far outpacing the United States on the research, development, and fielding of hypersonic technologies; and exceed the United States in the militarization of space and other non-terrestrial warfighting domains[3]. 

In Squid Game players execute their free will to compete against the other players[4]. The idea is that these individuals have nothing to lose but their life and are gambling to both preserve their life and receive tangible gain. This idea pushes the competition to the brink. The game only ends if the majority agrees to stop playing. The psychological tug-of-war between the barbaric nature of the rules and then sentimental connection to the “fairness” of such a competitive (and lawless society made out to be equitable for all) by Squid Game leaders such as the Front Man, further exacerbates the rapidly shifting conclusions of the viewers. By the characters later chasing the money trail to the evil people funding the game, then pursuing the very master mind both controlling and holding the purse strings the viewer is left questioning, “How could I not see that coming?” or “Why did I miss that?” Only when there is crystal clear clarity around the rules and players of Squid Game can action in pursuit of strategically deterring the extreme nature of the game be confronted. 

The characters in Squid Game needing crystal clear clarity around the rules and players is very similar to the 21st century conditions surrounding deterrence. The United States and her allies are attempting to deter Russia and China in their respective activities that are nefarious to the well-being of the world. However, in this pursuit the convoluted, interwoven, sentiment to separate the motivations of how Russia and China are now playing the game from their priorities in how they are choosing to do so is vague and unclear. The money trail can certainly be traced and the United States’ ongoing efforts to modernize military capabilities and enhance its diplomacs capability with adversarial counterparts remains an option. Whether military and diplomatic modernization remain a viable, sustainable option against Russia and China in a contemporary context is a different question altogether. It is certainly feasible to continue building deterrence around existing frameworks but then again, if those frameworks were fool proof, then how on the United States watch did Russia and China gain both power and speed in their respective nuclear arsenals and in the contested domains of cyberspace and space? 

United States efforts to conduct thoughtful analysis and study the “game” within this era of strategic competition, will fail if it does not unpack the relationships and motivations of the players in order to effectively deter unwarranted outcomes on the homeland and abroad. While the conditions of strategic competition may appear intuitive, it is only by understanding the players, and their respective worldviews, that the rules can be effectively established and the turnabout path to maintaining a democratic, truly free, and just society preserved, as demonstrated in the Squid Game. 

Endnotes:

[1] Garamone, J. (2021, September 17) “DOD Policy Chief Kahl Discusses Strategic Competition with Baltic Allies,” https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Articles/Article/2780661/dod-policy-chief-kahl-discusses-strategic-competiton-with-baltic-allies. 

[2] Mazaar, M.J. (N.D.), “Understanding Deterrence,” RAND, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE295/RAND_PE295.pdf. 

[3] Congressional Research Service (19 October 2021), “Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress,” https://www.crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45811. 

[4] N Series, “Squid Game,” Netflix, https://www.netflix.com/title/81040344. 

Assessment Papers Competition Deterrence Dr. Brooke Mitchell
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Assessing the Impact of U.S. Forces on Pearl Harbor Heeding Multiple Warnings on December 7, 1941

Scott Martin is a career U.S. Air Force officer who has served in a multitude of globally-focused assignments.  He studied Russian and International Affairs at Trinity University and received his Masters of Science in International Relations from Troy University.  He is currently assigned within the National Capitol Region. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.