Dr. Jacob Stoil is the Chair of Applied History at the Modern War Institute, Senior Fellow of the 40th ID Urban Warfare Center, and Trustee of the U.S. Commission on Military History. He has worked extensively in Israel and the Middle East including in support of Task Force Spartan. He has published multiple policy and academic articles which can be found in publication such as the International Journal of Military History, Wavell Room, and MWI. He can be followed on X as @JacobStoil.
The views expressed in this article represent the personal views of the author and are not necessarily the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, Army University, or the U.S. Military Academy.
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National Security Situation: Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack on Israel has caused a state of war between Israel and Hamas, which is ongoing as of this writing. The war has reached an inflection point and Israel has distinct options on how to proceed.
Date Originally Written: March 15, 2024.
Date Originally Published: March 25, 2024.
Author and / or Article Point of View: The author of the article is an academic with research specialties in Middle Eastern security and military history, irregular warfare, and military operations. He has an academic background in military history and experience working with multiple national militaries and government agencies. Since October 2023, he has researched the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas and taken part in discussion of tactics and operations. The author agrees with perspectives expressed by various senior U.S. Government officials that Hamas must be defeated.
Background: Following the Hamas attacks and atrocities of October 7, 2023, Israel began an offensive into Gaza. The purpose of Israel’s campaign was threefold: gain the return of the hostages; prevent Gaza from being the launch pad for future major attacks like those of the 7th; and degrade Hamas to the point where it could neither govern Gaza in the future nor operate in a large-scale organized capacity. This last objective is most often summarized as destroying Hamas. The initial phase of the war went well for Israel, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) destroyed two out of Hamas’s five regional brigades and began operating in Khan Yunis against the third, which they have largely defeated. Hamas has concentrated the majority of its remaining Gazan leadership, hostages, and capabilities in Rafah and an invasion of Rafah was the next phase in the IDF plan[1]. However, Egypt has closed its border to Gazan refugees[2]. As a result of the ongoing war and the closed border, the humanitarian situation in Gaza has worsened. This humanitarian situation, combined with domestic pressure, has led the U.S. to warn Israel away from major ground operations in Rafah and to tell Israel to consider other options[3].
Significance: With concentration of civilians in Rafah, the last remaining Hamas stronghold, and growing U.S. pressure, Israel’s ability to accomplish its goals is now under question. Failure to defeat of Hamas will potentially have far reaching consequences such as emboldening Hamas and other Iranian backed actors like Hezbollah to conduct further large-scale attacks.
Option #1: Israel invades Rafah.
The shortest way for Israel to achieve its objectives is through Rafah. To achieve this efficiently Israel will need to bring more forces back into Gaza, possibly recalling reservists. This option allows Israel to finish off Hamas’s governing organization within Gaza and fully occupy the territory. If Israel were to succeed in this operation, they would also overrun many of the areas where Hamas is holding its remaining hostages[4]. Based on Hamas’s previous behavior, a successful Israeli offensive has the potential to bring Hamas to the negotiating table and may motivate them to trade hostages in exchange for a delay to the offensive[5]. Israel’s operations to date have demonstrated the military capability to successfully conduct the incursion and such an operation has significant popular support in Israel[6].
Risk: A major incursion into Rafah risks significant civilian harm. With the Egyptian border closed, the civilians of Gaza who fled the fighting elsewhere in the strip are concentrated in and around Rafah. While Israel may take steps to evacuate them, a significant civilian population will likely remain in harm’s way. Beyond the all too real threat of civilian casualties, U.S. President Joseph R. Biden has indicated that such an operation might be a red line for him[7]. Thus, a major incursion into Gaza could risk Israel’s relationship with its most important strategic partner. This, in and of itself, constitutes a significant risk as the U.S. provides critical supplies to Israel and protects it from potential harm, up to and including sanctions, in the United Nations (UN).
Gain: An invasion of Rafah is the quickest way to end the war while achieving Israel’s objectives. It would allow Israel’s internally displaced persons to return to their homes in the south with a renewed feeling of safety. Paradoxically by shortening the war, this option could also minimize the suffering of the Palestinian population by allowing Gaza to transition to a post-war phase and reconstruction to begin. There are few other options that guarantee the destruction of Hamas as a robust and capable organization. Israel has previously eliminated Hamas leaders, but its organized military structure means that Hamas can replace its leadership[8]. Hamas’s capabilities reside in its formations. Destroying them is the surest path to achieving Israel’s objectives. No other option can guarantee this. A successful operation would also aid Israel in reestablishing deterrence. Dismantling Hamas in Gaza, regardless of the risk, would send a powerful message to other regional threats such as Hezbollah. This option would also change the risk calculus for any Iranian proxies interested in threatening the country.
Option #2: Israel transitions to ‘Counterterrorism’ Operations.
This option has two variants. In the first, the IDF more or less maintains the status quo in Gaza, while creating room for some changes to improve the humanitarian situation. This keeps pressure on Hamas, provides more security to the southern Israeli communities, and gives Israel bargaining leverage. In the second variant Israel withdraws in whole or in part from part of Gaza, either unilaterally or as part of a temporary ceasefire, while maintaining a buffer zone on the Gaza border. In either case, whether without a ceasefire or following its expiration, Israel would continue to pursue dismantling Hamas through targeted strikes against its leadership, logistics, and critical operational nodes, while, at the same time, seeking the release or rescue of hostages. The IDF would do this by continuing raids throughout Gaza and limited operations in Rafah. Such operations would have a distinct benefit over larger operations in the international arena. There have been recent suggestions that the U.S. would accept the IDF conducting limited operations in Rafah to pursue high value targets and rescue hostages[9]. Eliminating Hamas leadership in Rafah alone, however, would be insufficient. Israel would have to continue to target Hamas’s critical infrastructure and command nodes, which would involve raids and airstrikes over a prolonged period of time – similar to the U.S. campaigns against Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State that have stretched over years. The population of Gaza would remain under threat as operations continued. In addition, much of the key leadership of Hamas lives abroad[10]. If Israel seeks to dismantle the organization, they will have to engage those targets as well. This option is further complicated by the fact that several Hamas leaders are resident in U.S. partners and allies such as Turkey and Qatar[11]. In past campaigns against terror organizations, Israel showed a willingness to conduct operations in such countries[12].
Risk: The risk of failure is high in this option. Israel has removed significant numbers of Hamas senior leaders in the past and the organization has maintained itself due to its robust structure[13]. A failure in this case would allow Hamas to achieve its strategic goal of recovering and conducting further October 7th like attacks[14]. Additionally, the need to continue raids into Rafah and other areas of Gaza would effectively extend the war indefinitely. As demonstrated by the hostage rescue operation in Rafah in February 2024, these raids necessarily involve significant forces and potential for loss of life. As the war drags on, and Gazans continue to suffer, international pressure and domestic pressure in the U.S. could continue to build which could end even this reduced tempo of operations. Additionally, if the war is seen as inconclusive it could easily lose Israeli support as well. Finally, the need to expand operations to involve strikes in U.S. partners and allies conveys significant risk. Turkey, which shelters much of the Hamas leadership, is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization member. Carrying out operations in their sovereign territory could cause significant blowback.
Gain: A ‘counterterrorism’ operation would allow Israel to continue to pursue Hamas in a manner that the U.S. has said is acceptable[15]. This option would help shore up a critical strategic partnership for Israel. In the past when Israel has successfully all but destroyed a terrorist group it has done so through this method. The example of the campaign against the Black September Organization is particularly relevant[16]. The global and indefinite nature of this option provides the most potential to completely destroy Hamas as an organization not just as the governing entity of Gaza. Knowing that hosting Hamas assets may put their countries at risk could also change the stance towards Hamas of countries like Qatar. In short, this option has the potential to achieve Israel’s objective while lowering the amount of forces Israel has to employ, lowering the human and logistical cost to Israel, and potentially sparing the Palestinian people in Gaza from the destruction and loss of life caused by a renewed ground offensive into Rafah.
Other Comments: None.
Recommendation: None.
Endnotes:
[1] Jacob Stoil and John Spencer. “The Road to Ceasefire Leads Through the Refah Offensive.” Newsweek, Mar 11, 2024 https://www.newsweek.com/road-ceasefire-leads-through-rafah-offensive-opinion-1878137
[2] Myre, G., & Batrawy, A. (2024, February 26). Why Egypt won’t allow vulnerable Palestinians across its border. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2024/02/26/1232826942/rafah-gaza-palestinians-egypt-border
[3] “Biden Warns Netanyahu an Assault on Rafah would Cross a Red Line.” Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/biden-warns-netanyahu-an-assault-on-rafah-would-cross-red-line-c78677ba
[4] Bob, Y. J. (n.d.). IDF finds no hostages in Khan Yunis: Where is Hamas Hiding Them?. The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com. https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-788164
[5] Jacob Stoil and John Spencer. “The Road to Ceasefire Leads Through the Refah Offensive.” Newsweek, Mar 11, 2024 https://www.newsweek.com/road-ceasefire-leads-through-rafah-offensive-opinion-1878137
[6] Times of Israel. (n.d.-b). Poll: 75% of Jewish Israelis back Rafah Operation | the times of … https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/poll-75-of-jewish-israelis-back-rafah-operation/
[7] “Biden Warns Netanyahu an Assault on Rafah would Cross a Red Line.” Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/biden-warns-netanyahu-an-assault-on-rafah-would-cross-red-line-c78677ba
[8] Ahmed Jabari: The Ruthless Terror Chief whose Bloody End was Only … (n.d.-a). https://www.timesofisrael.com/ahmad-jabari-1960-2012/; Bennet, J. (2004, March 22). Leader of Hamas killed by missile in Israeli strike. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/22/world/leader-of-hamas-killed-by-missile-in-israeli-strike.html; Guardian News and Media. (2004, April 18). Israeli missile attack kills new Hamas chief. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/18/israel
[9] US would support limited, pinpoint IDF op against high-value targets … (n.d.-d). https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-would-support-limited-pinpoint-idf-op-against-high-value-targets-in-rafah-report/
[10] 8 Hamas, “Islamic Jihad” leaders leave Gaza to live abroad. Awsat. (n.d.). https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3414056/8-hamas-islamic-jihad-leaders-leave-gaza-live-abroad
[11] Robbins, E. (2024, January 13). While Gazans suffer, Hamas leaders live in luxury . FDD. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/01/13/while-gazans-suffer-hamas-leaders-live-in-luxury/
[12] France 24. (2022, September 2). “Wrath of God”: Israel’s Response to 1972 Munich Massacre. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220902-wrath-of-god-israel-s-response-to-1972-munich-massacre
[13] NBC Universal News Group. (n.d.). Israel has a long track record of assassinating its enemies. Will it work against Hamas?. NBCNews.com. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israel-mossad-assassinates-enemies-munich-olympics-hamas-rcna132908
[14] Middle East Media Research Institute. (2023, November 1). Hamas official Ghazi Hamad: We will repeat the October 7 attack, Time and again, until Israel is annihilated; we are victims – everything we do is justified. MEMRI. https://www.memri.org/reports/hamas-official-ghazi-hamad-we-will-repeat-october-7-attack-time-and-again-until-israel
[15] The US privately told Israel the kind of Rafah campaign it … (n.d.-c). https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/13/us-would-back-a-limited-military-campaign-in-rafah-00146827
[16] France 24. (2022, September 2). “Wrath of God”: Israel’s Response to 1972 Munich Massacre. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220902-wrath-of-god-israel-s-response-to-1972-munich-massacre