Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, and United States Army. In addition to Divergent Options, he has been published in the Center for Maritime Strategy, the Center for International Maritime Security, the Washington Monthly, The Liberal Patriot, The Defense Post, Merion West, Wisdom of Crowds, Braver Angels, and more. He can be found on Twitter at @MDPurzycki, and on Substack at The Non-Progressive Democrat. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.
Title: Assessing the Benefits of Consolidating the U.S. Navy’s Fleets
Date Originally Written: June 29, 2024.
Date Originally Published: July 29, 2024.
Author and / or Article Point of View: The author believes if the U.S. Navy returned to the four regional fleets of the Cold War, this would improve integration of maritime and other national security operations.
Summary: The excessive number of regional fleets divides U.S. maritime strategy at a time when threats do not respect regional boundaries. Consolidating the fleets and aligning them with the Department of State’s regions (in tandem with the Department of Defense (DoD) doing the same as part of the Unified Command Plan), can help the U.S. Navy integrate its operations across geographic lines, and integrate maritime strategy with other aspects of national security.
Text: The U.S. Navy divides the world’s oceans between six numbered fleets (see image 1 below; an additional fleet, the Tenth, is the Naval component of United States Cyber Command)[1][2]. When a vessel is deployed to a region, it comes under the command of that region’s fleet. Fleets are generally commanded by vice admirals.
During the Cold War, however, there were four numbered fleets. A 1977 paper by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) listed them thusly[3]:
The late Cold War-era Navy peaked in 1987 at 594 ships[4]. Paradoxically, while the number of ships has since declined (293 as of April 1, 2024)[5], the number of fleets has risen. The Fifth Fleet was activated in 1995, and received responsibility for the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea[6]. The Fourth Fleet, activated in 2008, is responsible for the waters surrounding Central and South America[7].
This paradox could be ascribed to an increase in geopolitical complexity. U.S. efforts to contain Iraq after the First Gulf War provided a rationale for devoting a numbered fleet to the Gulf region. Without the Soviet threat to anchor American strategy, America’s focus became split between regions. Even though U.S. defense spending shrank during the 1990s[8], the DoD’s geographic combatant commanders grew in stature and influence. Between 1990 and 2000, the budgets of the geographic combatant commands doubled[9]. Journalists Dana Priest and Robert D. Kaplan compared the heads of the geographic combatant commands to Roman proconsuls[10][11].
However, the geopolitical complexity of the 2020s calls for more integration of regional strategies, not less. The threats to American interests from China, Russia, Iran, and other actors do not lend themselves to rigid geographic boundaries. These threats can be seen in the maritime realm – for example, China and Russia have conducted naval drills with Iran in the Middle East[12].
Consolidating fleets could be paired with aligning both the fleets and DoD’s geographic combatant commands with the Department of State’s (DOS) regions (see image 2). This alignment could provoke greater investment in civilian sources of American power, including DOS. Senior military officers have publicly called for more investment in civilian power[13]. Marine Corps General James Mattis, later Secretary of Defense, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2013, “If you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition, ultimately[14].”
If the U.S. reverted to four fleets, one possible step would be fairly straightforward: divide the Fourth Fleet between the Second and Third. The boundary between them could be the border between Argentina and Chile. While U.S. policy toward Latin America has distinct aspects, integrating its maritime aspect into other portions of the Navy’s activities could focus attention on the region’s role in great power competition, such as Chinese influence in the South Atlantic[15].
A more ambitious change would include dividing the Fifth Fleet between the Sixth and Seventh. If the U.S. moved Pakistan from United States Central Command to United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), the countries in DOS’ Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs would align with the DoD. A parallel change would be moving the waters directly south of Pakistan from the Fifth Fleet to the Seventh. The remaining waters of the Fifth Fleet could be moved to the Sixth, giving the Sixth Fleet responsibility for waters corresponding to the nations in three DOS regions.
There are certainly risks to this choice. USINDOPACOM and the Seventh Fleet are already geographically large, and adding Pakistan and corresponding waters may stretch their burdens too far. Nevertheless, given China’s historic ties to Pakistan, and their mutual rivalry with India, the benefits of placing these three nuclear-armed countries under one geographic combatant command during an age of great power competition may outweigh the downsides.
Meanwhile, the challenge the Sixth Fleet faces in confronting Russian aggression may make it extremely difficult for it to handle burdens currently borne by the Fifth Fleet, particularly Iranian aggression. However, there is a precedent for Europe and the Middle East being covered by the same naval command. The aforementioned 1977 CNA paper notes the presence of the Navy’s MidEast (sic) Force alongside the Sixth Fleet under Commander-in-Chief Naval Forces, Europe[16].
In a complex and unstable world, the fewer barriers exist between American approaches to various regions, the better. Threats to American security interests are not bound by lines on maps. Reducing the number of subdivisions of U.S. Naval power, and of American power generally, offers potentially significant integration of efforts to meet and overcome security challenges.
Endnotes:
[1] U.S. Department of Defense. “Navy.” https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Experience/Military-Units/Navy/#902.5937805175781
[2] U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet. “Command Description.” https://www.fcc.navy.mil/
[3] Powers, Bruce W. “The United States Navy.” Center for Naval Analyses, December 1977. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA049108.pdf
[4] Naval History and Heritage Command. “US Ship Force Levels, 1886-Present.” November 17, 2017. https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/us-ship-force-levels.html
[5] U.S. Naval Institute. “USNI News Fleet and Marine Tracker: April 1, 2024.” https://news.usni.org/2024/04/01/usni-news-fleet-and-marine-tracker-april-1-2024
[6] Naval Sea Systems Command. “Fifth Fleet.” https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Home/RMC/FDRMC/Bahrain/WhyBahrain/OurMission/5thFleet/
[7] U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/U.S. Fourth Fleet. “History of U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command.” https://www.fourthfleet.navy.mil/About-Us/History/
[8] Council on Foreign Relations, “Trends in U.S. Military Spending.” July 15, 2014. https://www.cfr.org/report/trends-us-military-spending
[9] Priest, Dana. “A Four-Star Foreign Policy?” Washington Post, September 27, 2000. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/09/28/a-four-star-foreign-policy/f9779938-7a88-449f-9f55-84ab020abbd7/
[10] Ibid
[11] Kaplan, Robert D. Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos. New York: Vintage, 2001, Page 117. https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/warrior-politics-robert-d-kaplan/1112272419
[12] Lendon, Brad. “China, Russia and Iran put on show of force with Mideast naval drills.” CNN, March 14, 2014. https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/13/middleeast/china-russia-iran-navy-drills-intl-hnk/index.html
[13] U.S. Global Leadership Coalition. “Over 120 Retired Generals, Admirals on State and USAID Budget: ‘Now is not the time to retreat.’” February 27, 2017. https://www.usglc.org/newsroom/over-120-retired-generals-admirals-on-state-and-usaid-budget-now-is-not-the-time-to-retreat/
[14] C-SPAN. “User Clip: Mattis Ammunition.” March 5, 2013. https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4658822/user-clip-mattis-ammunition
[15] Espach, Ralph. “A New Great Game Finds the South Atlantic.” War on the Rocks, March 22, 2021. https://warontherocks.com/2021/03/a-new-great-game-finds-the-south-atlantic/
[16] Powers, Bruce W. “The United States Navy.” Center for Naval Analyses, December 1977. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA049108.pdf
