Shawn Moore is a Fulbright Scholar, a member of the United States Coast Guard Auxiliary, and attended The United States Army War College National Security Seminar in 2025. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature, nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.
Title: Options for Venezuela to Counter United States Actions in the Caribbean
Date Originally Written: January 3, 2026
Date Originally Published: January 6, 2026
Author and / or Article Point of View: The article approaches the situation in the Caribbean from the perspective of Venezuelan leaders attempting to employ asymmetric means to retain power following the capture of President Maduro.
Background: On December 17, 2025, U.S. naval and air forces established dominance over the northern coast of South America, effectively isolating Venezuela [1]. U.S. president Donald Trump announced a “total and complete” blockade of all sanctioned oil tankers going in and out of Venezuela [2]. The seizure of the oil tanker Skipper on December 10 marked an escalation of operations under Operation Southern Spear, unveiled on November 13, 2025 [3]. According to U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), the objectives of this operation include disrupting illicit drug trafficking and protecting the homeland from threats originating from Venezuela [4]. President Maduro’s tight grip on Venezuela ended on January 3, 2026 in spectacular fashion. Explosions reverberated across Caracas as U.S. aircraft struck targets while military and law enforcement officials arrested President Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. President Maduro’s reign seems to have ended as he remains detained in New York City. However, Venezuela’s Vice President, Delcy Rodriguez, and allied narcotraffickers retain significant influence and no doubt prepared for the possible end of Maduro’s leadership. Plans may have included going underground in the case of political leaders and going abroad for narcotraffickers. Through diplomatic pressure, and kinetic operations paired with cognitive influence operations, these actors can create a narrative portraying Maduro’s capture as an act of aggression by the U.S. to expropriate Venezuela’s natural resources. Creating and amplifying this narrative might allow Rodriguez to retain her hold on power and frame the U.S. raid as a violation of state sovereignty and international law.
Significance: The Caribbean Sea is a vital maritime corridor for global trade. Regime change operations and continued counter-narcotics actions by the U.S. risk escalating into a broader regional conflict. The U.S. Southern Command’s area of responsibility encompasses 31 countries and 12 dependencies, including Latin America south of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea [5]. Cuba remains Venezuela’s closest regional ally, while China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey provide support from abroad.
Option #1: Venezuela pursues a diplomatic strategy, framing the conflict as resistance to U.S. imperialism. The U.S. operation that captured Nicolas Maduro was followed by President Trump’s statement that the U.S. will be running Venezuela and controlling its oil resources [6]. Venezuela could argue that U.S. military action is a violation of international law including Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter which states that: “all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” [7]. Highlighting the raid as a blatant violation of international norms and heedless destabilizing action by the U.S. could be used to rally allies across Latin America and beyond.
Risk: Minimal, as diplomatic engagement would unlikely provoke more aggressive U.S. actions. Additional U.S. escalation would be viewed as a further breakdown of the rules-based international order and direct violation of national sovereignty.
Gain: By leveraging Cuba, Russia and China, Venezuela could develop a collective diplomatic front, reducing U.S. operational freedom and potentially stymieing U.S. governance efforts. This strategy allows the United Socialist Party of Venezuela to retain its ability to govern and avoid capitulation.
Option #2: Narco-terrorist groups, which span across several continents, could launch an insurgency either in Venezuela or around the globe. Outside of any military benefit, this insurgency would have a more insidious strategic goal of spreading propaganda and disinformation. In 2023, 903,153 hispanics of Venezuelan origin resided in the United States [8]. This diaspora, through coercion by narco-terrorist groups could become a frontline in weakening public support for Operation Southern Spear. Social media influencers offer another avenue for shaping public opinion. Mobilizing anti-war sentiment among Latino youth—the fastest growing U.S. demographic—could undermine political support. Highlighting civilian suffering could sow distrust and erode confidence in U.S. leadership. Historical parallels, such as Jane Fonda’s activism during the Vietnam War, underscore the potential impact of this type of influence operation on public sentiment.
Risk: Increased narco-terrorist activities will likely yield corresponding losses of personnel and resources due to elevated responses by U.S. military and law enforcement. However, U.S. laws protecting free speech limit America’s ability to counter narratives amplified by private citizens on platforms like TikTok or YouTube.
Gain: Influence operations could halt U.S. actions without further kinetic operations, erode trust in U.S. leadership, and create civil-military rifts in the U.S. The Tet Offensive of 1968 was a military failure for the North Vietnamese but ultimately served as a propaganda success. Maduro’s successors in Venezuela, like North Vietnam, might prevail against the U.S by manipulating Americans’ opinions and overwhelmingly swaying public opinion.
Other comments: U.S. forces demonstrated overwhelming conventional superiority; Venezuela and its allies can leverage asymmetric means to hold American objectives at risk. Diplomatic pressure and social media campaigns could serve as an effective counter to U.S. operations.
Recommendation: None.
Endnotes:
[1] Roy, D. (2025, December 17). Operation Southern Spear: The U.S. Military Campaign Targeting Venezuela. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/article/operation-southern-spear-us-military-campaign-targeting-venezuela
[2] Folk, Z. (2025, December 16). Trump announces ‘Total and Complete Blockade’ of sanctioned oil tankers entering or leaving Venezuela. https://www.forbes.com/sites/zacharyfolk/2025/12/16/trump-announces-total-and-complete-blockade-of-sanctioned-oil-tankers-entering-or-leaving-venezuela/
[3] Roy, Diana. (2025, December 17). Operation Southern Spear: The U.S. Military Campaign Targeting Venezuela. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/article/operation-southern-spear-us-military-campaign-targeting-venezuela
[4] USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) Public Affairs. (2025, November 16). “Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group Enters Caribbean Sea.” U.S. Southern Command. https://www.southcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/4332637/gerald-r-ford-carrier-strike-group-enters-caribbean-sea/
[5] U.S. Southern Command. “Area of Responsibility.” U.S. Southern Command. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.southcom.mil/About/Area-of-Responsibility/
[6] PBS News. (2026, January 3). “Watch: Trump says U.S. is ‘going to run’ Venezuela until transition of power after capturing Maduro.’ https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-trump-says-u-s-is-going-to-run-venezuela-until-transition-of-power-after-capturing-maduro
[7] United Nations Security Council, “Purposes and Principles of the UN (Chapter I of UN Charter),” United Nations Security Council, accessed January 3, 2026. https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/purposes-and-principles-un-chapter-i-un-charter
[8] U.S. Census Bureau. 2023. “Selected Population Profile in the United States: Venezuelan.” American Community Survey, 1-Year Estimates: Table S0201. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://data.census.gov/table/ACSSPP1Y2023.S0201?q=Venezuelan
