2LT Ben Phocas is an active-duty Armor Officer in the US Army. He is a 2024 graduate of the United States Military Academy with a Bachelor of Science in Defense and Strategic Studies. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature, nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation: Russian Policy Choices in Europe Following the Special Military Operation in Ukraine.

Date Originally Written: March 27, 2025

Date Originally Published: April 10, 2025

Article Point of View:  This article is written from the position of senior Kremlin officials who are considering how Russia might proceed following dramatic changes in U.S. policy.

Background: The return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency has ushered in a major shift in U.S. policy towards the ongoing Special Military Operation in Ukraine, and towards NATO and Europe as a whole. The U.S. president has placed significant pressure on the Ukrainian government to reach a peace deal with the Russian government, on terms that largely favor the latter. This push for an immediate peace deal from the U.S. is motivated by an isolationist desire to become uninvolved in the conflict and to largely decouple from its historic European allies, to force European states to take ownership of their national defense and allow the U.S. to focus on other priorities.

Significance: A favorable peace deal and subsequent U.S. disengagement will provide Russia with an opportunity to continue to use military force to achieve its political aims in Europe and Asia. European nations, particularly those that were once part of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, will posture in response to what Russia decides to do after a Ukraine peace deal is achieved.

Option 1: Russia Exploits the Deal & Continues the Special Military Operation

With the U.S. seemingly poised to withdraw support from Europe and NATO over the coming years, and European nations years away from fielding sufficient military capabilities, a closing window of opportunity exists for the Russian government to leverage the benefits of wartime mobilization and continue its strategy of securing territory. Despite the high cost in lives incurred in Ukraine, a seemingly successful end to the fighting could inspire Russian leaders to focus on other states within Russia’s sphere of influence, such as Moldova or the Caucuses.

Risks: Russia’s stockpiles of advanced weaponry have been exhausted in Ukraine, and a continued campaign in other regions would certainly be less effective without some pause to replenish depleted stocks and to rebuild what is mostly a poorly trained army. Additionally, European states may decide to strike out, despite worrying states of readiness, due to heightened concerns over the prospect of war. Kremlin elite, often shielded from disparaging reports and studies, could drastically overestimate their own capabilities and embark on a doomed campaign. Lastly, the Russian people may decide to pull their support for a subsequent campaign after the conclusion of the special military operation in Ukraine. The continuation of hostilities in new theatres could spark domestic unrest of an intensity that becomes a real threat to the state.

Gains: The European nations have just begun to rearm, and at the current pace, their rearmament will not be complete for many years. Additionally, the European nations are divided and face a weakened NATO in the wake of U.S. disengagement. Some European states, such as Hungary and Slovakia, would likely refuse to participate in a European conflict with Russia, further degrading the effectiveness of a response. This lackluster response would certainly be exacerbated should Russia deliberately target nations that have no connection to NATO such as Moldova or Georgia. Lastly, the driving force behind much of Russia’s efforts over the past decades, President Vladimir Putin, likely feels pressure to achieve his goals for a stronger Russia during his time as the head of state.

Option 2: Consolidate and Rebuild After a Deal

Risk: The transition from wartime mobilization to peacetime will drastically reduce Russia’s military capabilities. Thousands will leave the military and Russian society will return to a peacetime status quo followed by a serious economic decline as state expenditures drop and veterans seek jobs in stunted industries. Growing the economy, rebuilding the military, and strengthening the state will involve a deliberate process of post-conflict policies requiring years to complete.

Gain: Russia will be able to capitalize on its gains in the Donbas, Zaporizhia, and Kherson. Reconstruction investments along with the costs associated with rebuilding the military will dampen economic shocks associated with demobilization. Despite the loss of many experienced troops due to demilitarization, battlefield lessons can be studied to develop an even more effective future force. Additionally, a period of peace would allow the military to pursue technological and tactical improvements designed specifically to defeat the Western supplied NATO equipment that Russian troops faced in Ukraine. Seeking a means to boost domestic manufacturing, Europe could potentially seek to return to the status quo ante bellum and re-establish economic ties with Russia. The lack of an acute threat from Russia would further mollify European efforts to rearm and prepare for conflict. This, in turn, would set conditions for Russia to focus its efforts and resources elsewhere—such as Africa and the Middle East. Lastly, with a significant population of Russian men in Ukraine, an end to the fighting would allow a new generation of Russians to come into being and provide for a stronger defense.

Recommendations: None.

Endnotes:

Alexandra Prokopenko, “Russia’s Economic Gamble: The Hidden Costs of War-Driven Growth” The Carnegie Endowment, 20 December 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/12/russia-economy-difficulties?lang=en

Phillip Payson O’Brien, Eliot A. Cohen, “Russia is Losing the War of Attrition” The Atlantic, 7 March 2025. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2025/03/russia-ukraine-war-status/681963/

Haelim Anderson, Jin-Wook Chang, “Labor Market Tightness during WWI and the Postwar Recession of 1920-1921” US Federal Reserve Board, 2022. https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2022049pap.pdf