Angelos Giakoumis is an officer in the Hellenic Air Force. He has commanded at the squadron level and held command staff assignments related to training (T-2C/E & T-6A) and transport aircraft (C-130B/H). In 2022, he graduated from U.S. Air Force’s Air Command Staff College distance learning course (DL). In 2023, he earned his MA in International Relations and Strategic Studies, from Panteion University of Social & Political Sciences in Athens, Greece. His academic research focuses on security, grand strategy, airpower, nuclear deterrence, and space. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.
Title: Assessment of the Impact of Geography in Modern Air Campaigns.
Date Originally Written: January 4, 2026
Date Originally Published: January 18, 2026
Author Point of View: The author argues that despite technological advances, geography remains a challenge for modern airpower. Depending on the terrain and distances involved, geography may limit the effectiveness of air power or act as a force multiplier. The author will support the argument with case studies from recent conflicts over the past 25 years.
Summary: Technological advances in aerodynamics, engineering and propulsion systems have pushed the boundaries of airpower. Yet, geography and terrain remain decisive variables in military operations. The question that arises is whether modern air campaigns are similarly affected. Case studies from recent wars show that terrain can constrain air power effects or act as a force multiplier.
Text: The tactical, operational, and strategic evolution of modern air power is closely related to technological progress. Advances in materials and aerodynamic design and manufacturing, combined with more powerful and more efficient engines have enabled aircraft to fly higher and faster. Progress in sensors, electronics, and guidance systems has produced air launched precision-guided munitions that can adjust their flight trajectory in real time and correct for targeting errors, weather, and other issues to increase the munition`s probability of striking a target [1]. Yet, despite the technological breakthroughs of our era, the distances and scale of operational theaters, the landscape, and the terrain all present challenges to modern airpower. Depending on the terrain and distances involved, geography may limit the effectiveness of air power or act as a force multiplier.
The mountains of Afghanistan for example, significantly limited the effectiveness of kinetic air operations. After the capture of Kandahar in December 2001, surviving Taliban fighters fled to the tribal areas of neighboring Pakistan via the Tora Bora Mountain range. The mountains of Tora Bora provided shelter against the bombings of the U.S. Air Force [2]. In March 2002, American soldiers and their Afghan allies launched Operation Anaconda. The objective of the operation was to clear the Shah-i-Kot Valley of the remaining pockets of the Taliban. Enemy fighters fully exploited the complex geography of the Shah-i-Kot Valley and the rugged terrain of the Arma mountains to hide and remain out of sight, to the point that only 50% of the enemy positions were identified by the sophisticated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities of the U.S. military prior to the operation [3] [4].
During the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Iraqi military stood little chance against the technologically superior weapons systems of the U.S. military. Iraqi forces fought most of the battles in open areas or in the desert, where the U.S. and their allies held the advantage. They could hit the enemy from a distance with precision strikes of increased lethality, while keeping friendly and civilian casualties relatively low. Not deploying troops inside urban areas was a strategic mistake for the Iraqi leadership, as this decision could have significantly influenced the course of the fighting. The dense urban fabric of the Iraqi cities could have minimized the precision and the lethality of U.S. precision strikes. Additionally, advancing U.S. ground forces would have been forced to fight in close-quarters engagements, thereby suffering greater losses [5] [6].
Actors, both large and small, observed the American application of air power—along with its limitations—and took note. During the second Lebanon War in 2006, Hezbollah fully exploited the terrain of southern Lebanon to camouflage missile launchers, equipment, and weapons, making them nearly invisible to Israeli Air Force’s airborne ISR platforms and patrolling fighter aircraft [7] [8]. After the first two days of Russia’s war with Georgia in 2008, as the fighting moved from South Ossetia to central Georgia, the tide turned against the Georgian army. Central Georgia is mainly an open plain with scattered hills. This was good terrain for tank advances of the Russian army and offered little cover for Georgian soldiers to protect themselves from Russian airstrikes [9]. Similarly, Libya’s desert landscape provided little shelter and left Muammar Gaddafi’s troops exposed to NATO airstrikes during the 2011 international military operation [10].
Throughout “Opération Serval” in January 2013, the desert environment of Mali provided little cover to the jihadists during their advance to Bamako and left them exposed to French airstrikes. When the fighting shifted to the mountainous region of the Adrar des Ifoghas, air power supported the counteroffensive of the French military and its allies (Operation Panther). The objective of the operation was to eliminate the remaining jihadists. Evidence suggests that French strategists realized that standoff weapons must be used in conjunction with “old-fashioned” dismounted infantry, the latter used to expose the enemy. So, soldiers moved from rock to rock, from cave to cave, and from foxhole to foxhole, often engaging in close combat, to force the enemy to break their cover and become vulnerable to artillery strikes or close air support. The French way of fighting in Adrar des Ifoghas proved effective despite the mountainous landscape, because the ground troops had artillery and aviation support [11] [12].
Rugged, rocky terrain and vast operational theaters highlight the strategic impact of airlift and air-to-air refueling (AAR) to modern air campaigns. The so-called tyranny of distance imposed operational challenges and limitations for NATO in Libya (2011), for the U.S. military in Afghanistan (2001-2021) and for the French military in Mali (2013). NATO faced logistical challenges because fighter aircraft were operating from air bases in southern Europe, several hundred kilometers away from the front line. As a result, an increased number of tanker aircraft were necessary to maintain the desired operational tempo. The U.S. dispatched a total of 25 tanker aircraft to the operation; NATO allies provided 12 more [13] [14]. Airlift was a critical means of moving troop and supplies in Afghanistan. The mountainous terrain, the lack of modern transportation infrastructure, and casualties from ambushes and IEDs drove a constant preference for airlifting (or airdropping) troops and equipment, rather than relying on transportation via the existing road network [15].
In 2013 the “armée de l’air” had to operate in Mali, 4,000 km away from its main bases and main logistics hubs, in a country roughly twice the size of France. Despite the pre-deployed assets in the neighboring countries, the French had to deploy additional fighter aircraft and ship additional supplies for the combat units. The French engaged most of their available C-135FRs to the operation, but this was not enough. The U.S. Airlift Military Command provided 3 KC-135s, which performed 2 sorties per day (this represented 50% of the AAR capability—Germany also offered an A-310MRTT aircraft). The commitment of U.S. tankers allowed French fighters to perform the two-hour flight from N`djamena to Mali and fly back. These missions required 3 to 4 in flight refuelings to allow for station time over the designated target area. The French Air Force also committed the bulk of its available fleet to airlift troops into the theater and support front-line operations. Nearly all the remaining equipment and logistical support were airlifted to Mali by allies (U.S. and Canadian C-17s) and private contractors (Antonov cargo planes) [16] [17].
Despite major technological advances in avionics and munitions, geography and terrain remain decisive variables in modern air warfare. Mountainous and complex environments can offer hideouts and sanctuaries that reduce the lethality of air launched weapons. Proper camouflage and cover can also degrade ISR from airborne platforms. Conversely, open plains and deserts usually increase vulnerability to airstrikes. At the same time, vast distances and austere theaters highlight the strategic value of airlift and air-to-air refueling. These capabilities are essential to maintaining an air campaign’s operational tempo and to sustaining forces. In short, air power’s outcomes are still significantly shaped by a conflict’s operational environment and geography, despite the 21st century’s technological advances.
Endnotes:
[1] Congressional Research Service (updated 2025, July 3, 2025). Defense Primer: U.S. Precision-Guided Munitions. Retrieved January 4, 2026, from https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF11353/IF11353.18.pdf
[2] Lambeth, B. (2006, Nov 7). Air Power Against Terror. America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom. RAND, p. 144-154. Retrieved January 4, 2026, from https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG166-1.html
[3] Bolger, D. (2014). Why we lost. A General`s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, p. 85-94.
[4] Lambeth, B. (2006, Nov 7). Air Power Against Terror. America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom. RAND, p. 165-186.
[5] Biddle, S. (2007). Iraq, Afghanistan, and American Military Transformation, p. 287-290. In Baylis, J., Wirtz, J., Gray, C. and Cohen, E. (editors). Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies. Oxford University Press, 2nd edition; Dale, C. (2008).
[6] Congressional Research Service. Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress. CRS Report for Congress, p. CRS-38–CRS-40. Retrieved January 4, 2026, from https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA490069.pdf
[7] Cordesman A., with Sullivan, G. & Sullivan, W. (2007). Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), p. 42-44. Retrieved January 4, 2026, from https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/120720_Cordesman_LessonsIsraeliHezbollah.pdf
[8] Johnson, D. E. (2011). Hard Fighting. Israel in Lebanon and Gaza. RAND, p. 44-54. Retrieved January 4, 2026, from https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1085.html
[9] Felgenauer, P. (2009). After August 7: The Escalation of the Russia-Georgia War. In Svante E. Cornell & S. Frederick Starr (editors). The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia (p. 162-180). M. E. Sharp Inc., p. 174-178.
[10] Woodward, M. & Morrison, P. (2013). The Responsibility to Protect. The Libya Test Case. Joint Forces Quarterly (JFQ). Issue 71, 4th Quarter, p. 24. Retrieved January 4, 2026, from https://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-71.pdf
[11] Byford, Al. (2013). Operation SERVAL: The Air Power Lessons of France`s Intervention in Mali. Royal Air Force Airpower Review, Volume 16, number 3, p. 77-78. Retrieved January 4, 2026, from https://www.raf.mod.uk/what-we-do/centre-for-air-and-space-power-studies/aspr/apr-vol16-iss3-4-pdf/
[12] Shurkin M. (2014). France’s War in Mali. Lessons for an Expeditionary Army. RAND, p. 22-23. Retrieved January 4, 2026, from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR770.html
[13] Bell, A. & Witter, D. (2011). The Libyan Revolution – Part 2 Escalation & Intervention. Institute for the Study of War (ISW), p. 27-30. Retrieved January 4, 2026, from https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Libya_Part2_0.pdf
[14] Quintana, E. (2012). The War from the Air. In Adrian Johnson & Saqeb Mueen (editors), Short War Long Shadow. The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign. Whitehall Report 1-12 (p. 31-38). Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), p. 36. Retrieved January 4, 2026, from https://static.rusi.org/201203_whr_short_war_long_shadow_0.pdf
[15] Cordesman, A. (2008). Air Combat Trends in the Afghan and Iraq Wars. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), p. 12-15.
[16] Starosta, G. (2013). Mission to Mali. Air Force Magazine, November, p. 46-50. Retrieved January 4, 2026, from https://www.airandspaceforces.com/PDF/MagazineArchive/Documents/2013/November%202013/1113mali.pdf
[17] Gros P. (2014). Libya and Mali Operations. Transatlantic Lessons Learned. The German Marshall Fund of the United States. Foreign Policy Papers, p. 7-12. Retrieved January 4, 2026, from https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/autres/2014/2014-gros-gmf-libya-mali.pdf
