Major Benjamin Franzosa is a Military Police officer and holds an MA in Advanced Military Studies from the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies and an MA in Business and Organizational Security Management from Webster University. He served as a maneuver planner for the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) at the time of writing this article, and he currently serves as the executive officer for the 91st Military Police Battalion.
Major Kaman Lykins is a Civil Affairs officer and holds an MA in Military Art and Science in contemporary Chinese strategy from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He served as the deputy G9 and SOF planner for the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) at the time of writing this article and currently serves as the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) current operations officer.
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National Security Situation: The U.S. Army’s doctrinal links between Unconventional Warfare (UW) and conventional force-led follow-on stability operations are insufficient for Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO).
Date Originally Written: March 5, 2024.
Date Originally Published: April 1, 2024.
Author and/or Article Point of View: The authors believe a doctrine gap exists between Special Operations Forces (SOF) UW and stability operations in a LSCO context. This article provides options for U.S. Army doctrine developers to close this gap.
Background: How SOF UW operations support 21st-century LSCO are largely theoretical[1][2]. However, we can assume that SOF will conduct UW in conjunction with LSCO and in the proximity of conventional combat operations, rather than so deep as to be disconnected from conventional operations[3][4]. Given these two assumptions, conventional forces are likely to eventually overtake previously enemy-controlled areas where SOF has initiated, organized, and trained guerrilla forces. The presence of these guerrillas creates fundamental challenges for follow-on stability operations. Organized, armed groups operating outside of state control are anathema to restoring civil order and control. These challenges can be mitigated through a deliberate reintegration process, making guerrillas a force multiplier for stability operations[5].
Significance: UW has the potential to create challenges for follow-on stability operations. Disaffected guerrillas, armed and trained by U.S. SOF elements, operating uncontrolled in a rear area, is a nightmare scenario for any conventional force. The factors that make guerrillas dangerous to an occupying enemy force (local knowledge, community ties, social/political cache, etc.) are the same qualities that make them valuable to friendly forces attempting to reestablish civil security/order[6]. If executed correctly, guerrilla forces can be tremendously effective both in enemy and friendly rear areas[7]. UW is a Special Forces (SF) proponent task, but its impact on stability operations requires updates to both SOF and conventional forces policy and doctrine[8].
Option #1: SOF units control irregular forces from establishment through reintegration.
SOF units in enemy rear areas establish, organize, train, equip, and employ local guerrilla forces. As the main battle area approaches the SOF element and their partnered force, both elements go dormant, attempt to avoid detection, and allow the close fight to overtake them. The SOF element initiates a link-up with friendly conventional forces and supervises integrating their partnered guerrilla forces into stability operations. SOF units are then reinserted into the enemy rear area to continue deep shaping operations.
Risk: If SOF units remain with their indigenous partners as conventional forces overtake them, this poses a risk to both mission and force. It is a risk to mission because the SOF element loses its utility as it suspends operations and allows the conventional fight to pass them. SOF elements and their partnered guerrilla forces are lightly armed compared to mechanized/armored units, tied to their local area, and will, by necessity, avoid direct engagement during large-scale combat operations[9]. Therefore, the SOF element can only be utilized once conventional forces arrive and will then require a risky reinsertion. This is a risk to force because the speed and lethality of LSCO make the reinsertion of SOF assets into the enemy rear area exceedingly risky[10]. In a LSCO context, these risks make remaining with indigenous partners and waiting on conventional forces unattractive.
Gain: UW is based on trust[11]. This option maintains a chain of trust from establishing the irregular force to integration into stability operations through the embedded SOF element. The guerrillas and conventional forces both trust those SOF elements. This has several practical benefits: First, it significantly reduces the risk of fratricide or misidentification of guerrilla forces when they link up with friendly conventional forces. Second, during their rear area utilization, the SOF can mediate between the guerrillas and conventional forces. Additionally, based on the time spent with the indigenous guerrillas, the SOF element will have a greater appreciation for the specific abilities and limitations of the partnered force[12]. Finally, SOF leaders, having been embedded with the irregular force, are better postured than conventional forces to assess which guerrilla leaders do or do not have a temperament consistent with integration into a state’s security services.
Option #2: SOF units transition control of irregular forces to conventional units.
As the main battle area approaches the SOF unit and partnered guerrillas, the SOF trains the guerrillas to go dormant and avoid detection, as well as procedures for their eventual link-up with conventional forces. The SOF element displaces deeper into the enemy rear area and continues operations. Once conventional forces overtake the hidden guerrillas, both entities conduct a link-up following an established procedure, and the guerrillas fall under the control of the division or corps conducting stability operations in their local area, oriented on reintegrating the guerrillas into post-conflict society.
Risk: If SOF elements displace forward, there is a risk to follow-on stability operations as SOF-trained guerrilla forces are left uncontrolled on the battlefield[13]. As the SOF element displaces forward, the guerrillas lose their connection to U.S. forces, which must be reestablished once conventional units arrive. This reintegration is extremely risky for both groups. Conventional forces are rightly suspicious of organized armed groups operating in their close or rear areas; enemy-aligned guerrillas can pose as friendly-raised guerrilla forces, and even neutrally aligned guerrillas can cause problems during stability operations if their goals are not consistent with U.S. Army goals 14]. From guerrillas’ perspective, they are in the middle of a state collapse, and were disaffected by the conditions under their previous government. Having control over an armed force gave them the power to have their grievances addressed, or at least not be ignored[15]. Guerrilla leaders could be understandably reticent to give up this power, especially to an invading conventional force they have never worked with and have no reason to trust.
Gain: This option has benefits for both conventional and SOF units. SOF units can stay deep of maneuvering units’ close fight and continue to conduct deep shaping operations with significantly less interruption. The guerrillas do not have to be repeatedly reinserted into the enemy’s rear area, avoiding multiple risky infiltrations. For conventional divisions and corps tasked with restoring civil order and civil control in their rear areas, having control of friendly-raised guerrilla forces enables unity of command for the stability operations[16]. Divisions and corps can leverage this linkage to reintegrate guerrillas into the state security apparatus long term[17].
Other Comments: None.
Recommendation: None.
Endnotes:
[1] Long, J. E. (2019, February 8). Green Berets: Rebuilding the Guerrilla Leader Identity. Small Wars Journal. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/green-berets-rebuilding-guerrilla-leader-identity
[2] Robinson, L. (November/December 2012). The Future of Special Operations: Beyond Kill and Capture. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91 (No 6), 110–122.
[3] Maxwell, D. (2023, May 29). An Unconventional Warfare Mindset: The Philosophy of Special Forces Must be Sustained. Small Wars Journal. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/unconventional-warfare-mindset-philosophy-special-forces-must-be-sustained
[4] Moir, N. L. (2023, January 1). The Overlooked Irregular Warfare Expert the Pentagon Should Study Today. Modern Warfare Institute. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-overlooked-irregular-warfare-expert-the-pentagon-should-study-today
[5] Headquarters, Department of the Army. (2019, March 21). Army Techniques Publication 3-18.1: Special Forces Unconventional Warfare.
[6] McDonough, D. S. (2008). From Guerrillas to Government: Post-conflict Stability in Liberia, Uganda, and Rwanda. Third World Quarterly, 29(2), 357–374.
[7] Headquarters, Department of the Army. (2021). Army Techniques Publication 3-05.1: Unconventional Warfare at the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Level.
[8] Toguchi, R. M., & Krivdo, M. E. (Eds.). (2019). The Competitive Advantage: Special Operations Forces in Large-Scale Combat Operations. Army University Press.
[9] Headquarters, Department of the Army. (2019, March 21). Army Techniques Publication 3-18.1: Special Forces Unconventional Warfare.
[10] Headquarters, Department of the Army. (2019, March 21). Army Techniques Publication 3-18.1: Special Forces Unconventional Warfare.
[11] Long, Joseph E. (2019, February 8). Green Berets: Rebuilding the Guerrilla Leader Identity. Small Wars Journal. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/green-berets-rebuilding-guerrilla-leader-identity
[12] Maxwell, David. (2023, May 29). An Unconventional Warfare Mindset: The Philosophy of Special Forces Must be Sustained. Small Wars Journal. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/unconventional-warfare-mindset-philosophy-special-forces-must-be-sustained
[13] McDonough, D. S. (2008). From Guerrillas to Government: Post-conflict Stability in Liberia, Uganda, and Rwanda. Third World Quarterly, 29(2), 357–374.
[14] Headquarters, Department of the Army. (2014, June 2). Field Manual 3-24: Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies.
[15] United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Zawels, E. A., Stedman, S. J., Daniel, D. C. F., Cox, D., Boulden, J., Tanner, F., Potgieter, J., & Gamba, V., 96 Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues (1996). New York, New York; United Nations.
[16] Headquarters, Department of the Army. (2014, June 2). Field Manual 3-07: Stability.
[17] McDonough, D. S. (2008). From Guerrillas to Government: Post-conflict Stability in Liberia, Uganda, and Rwanda. Third World Quarterly, 29(2), 357–374.