Captain Robert N. Hein (U.S. Navy, Retired) was a career Surface Warfare Officer in the U.S. Navy. He previously commanded the USS Gettysburg (CG-64) and the USS Nitze (DDG-94). He can be found on Twitter @the_sailor_dog. Claude Berube teaches at the United States Naval Academy, was a 2004 Brookings Institution LEGIS Congressional Fellow and a 2010 Maritime Security Studies Fellow at The Heritage Foundation. He can be found on Twitter @cgberube. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.
National Security Situation: After lying dormant for a few years, following a large international response, piracy off the Horn of Africa is again threatening the free flow of global commerce.
Date Originally Written: May 29, 2017.
Date Originally Published: June 19, 2017.
Author and / or Article Point of View: Claude Berube has operated off the Horn of Africa, and has written extensively on piracy and private maritime security companies. Bob Hein has hunted pirates off Somalia. Bob’s final assignment was the Deputy Director of Strategy on the U.S. Navy Staff.
Background: Somali piracy threatens major trade routes. Over 30,000 ships transit the Gulf of Aden annually. At its peak in 2007, the cost of Somali pirate attacks to the shipping industry was $7B. The cost decreased to $1.3B in 2015, and climbed to $1.7B in 2016. In May 2017, the Commander of U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Marine Corps General Thomas Walderhauser, indicated as many as six piracy attacks occurred in the last month. Given the expanse of unpatrolled waters in the region and opportunities for criminal and pirate networks to exploit maritime security gaps, there will inevitably be more attacks.
Significance: Since the Romans and Carthaginians raised their Navies against each other in the Punic Wars, the purpose of Navies has been to protect the coast, and protect maritime commerce. Prior to that, Thucydides mentions piracy in History of the Peloponnesian War. The actions of pirates in Africa led to the establishment and deployment of the U.S. Navy in the early 19th century. A resurgence in Somali piracy represents a renewed threat to global trade, and the stability of Somalia.
Option #1: The U.S. cedes the constabulary role for counter-piracy activities to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) People’s Liberation Army (Navy) (PLA(N)). In April 2017 the PRC deployed its 26th anti-piracy flotilla to the Horn of Africa. In that time, the PRC escorted 5,900 ships in the region, and established a base in nearby Djibouti to maintain a mission to not only protects the PRC’s “One Belt” initiative, but give PRC Naval Commanders experience operating far from home.
Risk: Taking over this mission allows the PRC to gain experience in operating far from home, a key attribute for an historic land power seeking increased influence abroad. Prior to its first anti-piracy flotilla in 2008, the PLA(N) had been largely absent in international waters for five centuries. The PRC may also give a false sense of security to those areas where it does not have a direct interest. By ceding additional maritime security missions to the PLA(N), the U.S. and its partners empower PLA(N) overseas capabilities and the possibility that regional powers will become more reliant on the PRC. For example, in 2015 the PRC was able to evacuate its citizens from the growing crisis in Yemen due, in part, to their enhanced capabilities from long-range operations in the region and newer platforms.
Gain: The PRC does provide a short-term solution with a modern navy. It has the motivation to prove itself as a guarantor of maritime security, not just a consumer. The PRC has the capability and the desire to contain and curtail piracy in the Horn of Africa if not to simply secure shipping then for longer-range operational and strategic goals.
Option #2: The U.S. builds capacity in the Somali maritime forces, and trains nascent Somali governments with the tools required to ensure domestic maritime security. Local Somali governments have had some recent success in counter-piracy activity, rescuing eight Indian mariners captured by Somali pirates. Introducing counter-piracy training, maritime domain awareness and intelligence sharing would go far in allowing regions of Somalia to work together to stop what should be a Somali law enforcement issue.
Risk: The threat of corruption is a major concern; also the responsibility for building maritime law enforcement capacity would be a political minefield for any host nation.
Gain: Using the dictum of “Teach a man to fish,” places Somalia in a position to police its waterways will provide a permanent solution to the piracy problem. It will also ensure illegal fishing or overfishing by other states does not further deplete local fishing grounds. Piracy in Somalia was born of frustrated fisherman who had no recourse against foreign fishing boats poaching their grounds. Giving Somalia the ability to not only deter piracy, but also police their waters against illegal fishing should provide a complete long-term solution.
Option #3: The U.S. continues to enable Private Maritime Security Companies, (PMSCs), to provide on-board armed guards at the shipping companies’ discretion. To date, no ship with an armed team aboard has been successfully taken by Somali pirates.
Risk: PMSCs are subject to market fluctuations. As piracy rose in 2006-2008, PMSCs proliferated providing a wide spectrum of cost, capabilities, and legitimacy. Ceding full maritime security control to unregulated PMSCs or to PMSCs from non-partnered nations could have other consequences as well, such as future military operations employing a trained, unaligned and unregulated force. Additionally, many of the smaller shipping companies, favored by pirates, cannot afford PMSCs thus potentially identifying the smaller shipping companies as soft targets.
Gain: Working with shipping companies and PMSCs would ensure the U.S. and its partners contribute to regulation of legitimate and capable PMSCs and would deny the PLA(N) an opportunity to enhance its capabilities through gaining experience in counter-piracy operations.
Option #4: Coalition operations in the region continue. In addition to independent operations, Somali piracy resulted in the creation of several key partnerships including Combined Task Force 151, the European Union’s Operation ATALANTA, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Operation OCEAN SHIELD.
Risk: Coalition investment of time, money, staff, and platforms for any operation takes away from other missions. If other missions such as North Korea, Iran, and threats in the Mediterranean Sea have a higher immediate priority, then coalition ships might not be available if the pirate threat level is assessed as low. In November 2016, for example, NATO concluded Operation OCEAN SHIELD as it shifted resources to the Baltic and Black Seas.
Gain: Coalition operations enhance interoperability between traditional and new partners. The larger the coalition, the fewer resources each nation has to contribute. In most maritime operations, few countries can go it alone.
Other Comments: While the options are limitless, the options presented here are those the authors assess as being the most feasible and acceptable.
 CNBC Int’l, Luke Graham, “Somali Pirates are Back,” 03 May 2017
 The Trumpet, Anthony Chibarirwe, “Somali Pirates are Back,” 19 May 2017
 The Diplomat, Ankit Panda, “As Somali Pirates Return, Chinese Navy Boasts of Anti-Piracy Operations,” 16 April 2017
 The Diplomat, Kevin Wang, “Yemen Evacuation a Strategic Step Forward for China,” 10 April 2015
 The New York Times, Hussein Mohamed, “8 Indians rescued from Somali Pirates, Officials say,” 12 April 2017
 Asia Today, Hong Soon-Do, “Chinese Illegal Fishing Threatens World Waters,” May 2017
 Reuters, Robin Emmott, “NATO Ends Counter-Piracy Mission as Focus Shifts to Mediterranean,” 23 November 2016