Jerritt A. Lynn is an Army veteran with over 20 years of distinguished service and more than five years of deployment tours throughout the Middle East, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. He earned a Master of Arts in Strategic Security Studies from National Defense University and is pursuing a PhD in Public Policy with a concentration in Foreign Policy from Liberty University. He can be found on Instagram @jerritt_lynn. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation: Deposal of Former Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

Date Originally Written: January 7, 2025

Date Originally Published: January 17, 2025

Author and/or Article Point of View: The author believes that the deposal of former Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad in late 2024 provides the U.S. an opportunity to improve U.S. national security through clarified policies and maintenance of regional partnerships to counter malign influence.

Background: The U.S. has been involved in the Syrian conflict since its onset during the Arab Spring in 2011—with its role evolving in response to shifting dynamics and priorities. Initially, in 2013, U.S. efforts focused on supporting Syrian rebels against the Assad regime through non-lethal support[1]. Over time, priorities shifted towards combating ISIS, which in turn lead to the deployment of U.S. forces throughout North-East Syria in support of Kurdish fighters, particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Beyond military operations, the U.S. has played a significant role in addressing the conflict’s humanitarian impact by providing financial and material support to regional allies, such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Türkiye, which have shouldered the burden of hosting the majority of more than 5.5 million Syrian refugees[2]. These efforts highlight the complex nature of U.S. engagement in the region, encompassing military, political, and humanitarian dimensions.

Significance: The U.S. relies on strategic regional partnerships in the Middle East to achieve its objectives. Strategic foresight and a balanced approach may allow the U.S. to protect its regional interests while contributing to greater stability. The new Syrian government provides a significant opportunity for the U.S. to recalibrate its current policies, enhancing its ability to project power, strengthen regional alliances, and promote national security interests. Reduction of involvement or complete abandonment of Syria risks ceding any potential advantage and may alienate partners, further reducing the ability of the U.S. to achieve its objectives in the region.

Option #1: The U.S. recognizes the government installed by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and works toward including SDF and Kurdish representation in the new Syrian government.

The shortest path to restoring stability within Syria and the greater region is for the newly installed Syrian government to begin providing Syrians with adequate governance. U.S. recognition could legitimize this process. Although not inherent in recognition, this option also demonstrates that the U.S. supports its Kurdish partners in northeast Syria and acts as a mediator between the Syrian government and Türkiye to find an amicable solution toward the Kurdish political disposition in the newly formed government.

Risk:

• Currently, HTS and the leader of the newly formed Syrian government, Abu Muhammad Al-Jawlani, is designated as a terrorist by the U.S. and other allies [3]. The U.S. would have to remove the designation and acknowledge their acceptance of a formerly designated terrorist as a legitimate foreign government official. This about-face has the potential to signify a path from terrorism to legitimacy and presents numerous legal hurdles.
• The U.S. risks supporting a newly installed government that has already begun to make unilateral education curriculum changes. These changes quickly drew scrutiny for replacing previous norms of secularism with an Islamic slant [4]. If the new Syrian government continues down a path similar to the Taliban, the U.S. risks having legitimized a theocratic government built upon anti-western ideals.
• Türkiye is a NATO partner but is also an active combatant against the same Kurdish forces that the U.S. has supported in Syria. This has already created strife between the two NATO partners, with Türkiye identifying various Kurdish entities (both within its territory and within Syria) as terrorist organizations and fighting them for over three decades. The U.S.-Türkiye relationship could be eroded by any attempt by the U.S. to support the Kurds in Syria.[5]

Gain:

• A thirteen-year civil war has ended. Reduction in fighting should mean a reduction in the loss of life and the ability of the Syrian people to rebuild. The end of the civil war eventually allows refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and Türkiye to return home. This reduces the decades-long strain put upon these partners to provide for millions of Syrian refugees. To date, the direct cost of Syrian refugees on Jordan since 2011 is calculated to be approximately USD $11,032 billion [6].
• A Syrian government whose disposition ranges from neutral to friendly to the U.S. provides the opportunity to counter Iranian malign influence in the region. Reduced Iranian influence in the region is a U.S. national security objective. Additionally, Iran’s reduced ability to openly utilize overland routes through Syria can reduce the overland traffic of illicit material to groups such as Hamas or Hezbollah, reducing their combat effectiveness against Israel.
• S. military force reduction could be possible given a political agreement between the new Kurdish-inclusive Syrian government and Türkiye.
• The U.S. could work with the new Syrian government towards rejecting Russian usage of Syrian ports. This would be a setback for Russia—removing a key logistic point and reducing its operational capability in the Mediterranean[7].

Option #2: The U.S. enacts a neutral stance towards the new Syrian government and conducts redeployment of U.S. troops from Syria.

In this option, the U.S. decides it is advantageous to remove itself from the situation altogether and let regional partners take the lead, reducing costs to the U.S. while removing the U.S. military from potential conflict. This path allows allies, such as Israel, Türkiye, and Jordan, to provide the economic, material, and military support required to re-establish a “status quo” in the region.

Risk:

• Israel and Türkiye are already at odds concerning Israeli troop deployments within Syrian borders. Disengagement by the U.S. could increase tensions between two allies and devolve into open conflict[8].
• Since the fall of the Assad regime, Türkiye has increased military strikes against Kurdish forces in Northeast Syria. U.S. departure from this region of Syria provides Türkiye the opportunity to conduct uncontested unilateral military operations against Kurdish forces[9]. This could further delegitimize the U.S. as a trustworthy and reliable partner globally, which could be costly, as the U.S. already suffered reputational damage after its hasty departure from Afghanistan.
• Although diminished in capability, Iran can take advantage of the continued discord within Syria to exacerbate regional tensions and continue malign activities.
• Regional partners such as Jordan may also feel abandoned as they contend with the relocation of refugees and increased security threats caused by less-than-secure borders.

Gain:

• The U.S. can militarily extricate itself from Syria, reducing the opportunity for armed conflict with adversaries and reallocate military resources as required. Currently, 2000+ U.S. servicemembers are in Syria[10].
• The U.S. isn’t held politically or economically liable for the future of the Syrian people. Since Fiscal Year 2021, the U.S. has provided more than USD $19.1 billion in humanitarian and stabilization assistance within Syria and neighboring states[11].
• Removal of support to the Kurdish population in Syria could strengthen U.S. ties with Türkiye.

Recommendation: None.

Endnotes:

[1] Humud, C. E., Blanchard, C. M., & Nikitin, M. B. D. (n.d.). Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response.

[2] United Nations Refugee Agency. (2024, December 23). Syria Refugee Crisis Explained. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unrefugees.org/news/syria-refugee-crisis-explained/

[3] National Counterterrorism Center. (2022, October). Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). U.S. Department of National Intelligence. https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/hts_fto.html

[4] Usher, S. (2025, January 2). New Syrian government’s school curriculum changes spark concern. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1ln12056ppo

[5] Çitlioğlu, E. (2020). A Turkish Perspective on Syria. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

[6] Khawaldah, H., & Alzboun, N. (2022). Socio-economic and environmental impacts of Syrian Refugees in Jordan: A Jordanians’ perspective. Heliyon, 8(8), e10005. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2022.e10005

[7] Gorenburg, D. (2019). Russia’s Naval Strategy in the Mediterranean. Marshall Center Security Insight, 35. https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/russias-naval-strategy-mediterranean-0

 [8] Setton, K. (2025, January 6). Erdogan’s policies in Syria bring Turkey and Israel closer to confrontation. The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/international/article-836211

 [9] Abido, H., & Martany, S. (2025, January 9). Conflict between Turkey and Kurdish groups rises around key dam in northern Syria. ABC News. https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/conflict-turkey-kurdish-groups-rises-key-dam-northern-117516343

[10] Olay, M. (2024, December 19). DOD Announces 2,000 Troops in Syria, Department Prepared for Government Shutdown. U.S. Department of Defense News. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4013726/dod-announces-2000-troops-in-syria-department-prepared-for-government-shutdown/

 [11] Blanchard, C. M. (2024). Syria and U.S. Policy. U.S. Congressional Research Center.