Lewis R. Grant holds a Master of Science in Biodefense from George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government. His research focused on the Russian Federation’s biosecurity and biodefense modernization activities. He was recently published in the Journal of Science Policy and Governance and has an accepted manuscript with Health Security pending publication. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.
National Security Situation: Due to U.S. inaction, Russia continues to wage an informational war to erode democratic institutions, ideologies, and norms.
Date Originally Written: February 10, 2024.
Date Originally Published: February 26, 2024.
Author and / or Article Point of View: The author believes Russia’s disinformation campaigns and other malign influence operations pose a significant threat to U.S. national security. The article is written from the point of view of providing written options to the U.S. President to address Russian disinformation campaigns.
Background: Aktivnyye meropriyatiya – or “active measures” – have long been one of the Kremlin’s most essential, far-reaching weapons in its fight against Western democracies[1]. Disinformation is a pillar of this strategy. The Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns follow five overarching themes: 1) Russia is a victim, 2) historical revisionism, 3) western civilization will collapse imminently, 4) popular movements are U.S.-sponsored, and 5) Flooding the information space with differing narratives to confuse the facts[2].
Significance: Russia’s active measures threaten multiple national and global security aspects. Moscow’s disinformation campaigns interfere with U.S. elections, inflame domestic and global political tensions, adversely affect U.S. efforts to increase international biosecurity, biosafety, and global health, weaken global nonproliferation norms, and undermine the authority and legitimacy of international treaties and legal bodies[3][4][5].
Option #1: The U.S. establishes a Public Information Agency (PIA) to develop and coordinate Public-Private Partnerships to counter Russian disinformation.
Risk: U.S. government partnerships with private media may be interpreted as an infringement on free speech. This interpretation becomes especially concerning when U.S. citizens are sharing or posting disinformation content[6]. Political controversy could embroil the PIA, adversely impacting its legitimacy, funding, and efficacy. In addition, public skepticism combined with the prevalence of misinformation and disinformation on social media may render Option #1 less effective. A new agency will also require Congressional approval and significant new and continued funding.
Gain: Partners of the PIA will be better able to identify, counter, and remove disinformation from their platforms. Joint educational efforts of the PIA and private partners will increase informational literacy among consumers, promoting resilience against disinformation operations[6][7]. Option #1 gives private sector partners access to regular and timely analysis and information regarding foreign malign influence operations, including disinformation. The PIA will also represent a single point of contact for private partners to engage with, increasing the efficiency of communications and ensuring that information is disseminated clearly and concisely.
Option #2: The U.S. reestablishes an expanded Active Measures Working Group within the Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC) at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Risk: The Active Measures Working Group’s (AMWG) influence and legitimacy will likely fluctuate with election cycles, depending on the political legitimacy the President awards to it and the FMIC[8]. Changes in leadership at interagency partners and their influence and legitimacy may result in inconsistent operations, compromising the efficacy of the AMWG. Agency leaders and their respective agencies could lose their reputation for objectivity and independence from partisan politics in the public eye[9]. Option #2 may also stretch resources for the newly created FMIC too thin, too quickly. This option will also require the declassification and publication approvals of information necessary to the AWMG’s efforts. This declassification and prepublication requirement could result in bottlenecks at agency partners and delay AMWG efforts to be proactive and swiftly reactive to new disinformation campaigns.
Additionally, portions of the public may interpret a U.S. government effort to identify and remove Russian disinformation as an effort to infringe on free speech and backfire[8].
Gain: A critical element that made the AMWG effective was its narrow focus[8]. The AWMG’s reestablishment would build on the success of the 1980s AMWG, which successfully countered Russian disinformation about the origins of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Option #2 gives the U.S. a specialized team to combat Moscow’s efforts via intelligence analysis, advance warnings, and disruption of covert and overt disinformation operations. Early exposure and communication of Russia’s disinformation operations would help disrupt its spread throughout the media. The AMWG would coordinate all interagency activities to publicly expose and refute Russian disinformation between the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.
Option #3: The U.S. responds in kind to Russian disinformation activities.
Risk: U.S. covert and overt measures to disrupt Russian malign influence operations could escalate high tensions between Moscow and Washington. The Russian government’s internet supervision service, Roskomnadzor, also presents a formidable obstacle to disseminating disinformation within Russia’s “RuNet.” Roskomnadzor closely monitors the RuNet for “anti-government” activities[10]. Roskomnadzor can surveil and reveal those behind anti-government accounts and pass the information to Russian security services[10]. This identification presents significant challenges to running covert operations and assets to support opposition movements.
Offensive cyber operations aimed at Russian cyber and intelligence agencies would likely prompt counter-cyberattacks. U.S. offensive cyber operations will likely add fuel to the “Russia is a victim” disinformation theme. Option #3 will also require a reevaluation of U.S. cyber policy – an issue policymakers have been reluctant to address – and U.S. policy towards nation-states harboring parties contributing to malign influence operations[11][12].
Gain: Moscow’s authoritarianism and control of information make it vulnerable to U.S. information campaigns[13][14]. Most Russians receive their news from state-run media sources via television, but the share of those using social media and news sites is rapidly increasing[15]. This shift to social media presents an opportunity for the U.S. to introduce information that would otherwise be restricted from the RuNet. A CIA covert action codenamed QRHELPFUL successfully aided democratic opposition movements in Poland by creating an underground media enterprise[14]. Today’s Russian government is weaker than its Soviet predecessor, and the Russian public’s trust in their government is low, indicating similar campaigns could be highly effective[13][16]. Compelling exposition and dissemination of the Kremlin’s domestic malign practices within the RuNet could increase domestic support for opposition movements, forcing Moscow to reexamine its priorities[13].
Moscow’s use of non-state parties for deniability also presents a weakness that offensive cyber operations can exploit. Since these parties are not officially Russian government entities, using offensive operations against them comes with a lower risk of escalation. Effective cyber operations will increase U.S. cyber deterrence, discouraging future disinformation campaigns and other malign interference operations[12].
Other Comments: None.
Recommendation: None.
Endnotes:
[1] Disarming Disinformation: Our Shared Responsibility. (n.d.). United States Department of State. Retrieved February 1, 2024, from https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/
[2] Russia’s Top Five Persistent Disinformation Narratives. (n.d.). United States Department of State. Retrieved February 8, 2024, from https://www.state.gov/russias-top-five-persistent-disinformation-narratives/
[3] Leitenberg, M. (2022, March 10). Russian nuclear and biological disinformation undermines treaties on weapons of mass destruction. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/russian-nuclear-and-biological-disinformation-undermines-treaties-on-weapons-of-mass-destruction/
[4] Filippa Lentzos. (2018, November 19). The Russian disinformation attack that poses a biological danger. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/the-russian-disinformation-attack-that-poses-a-biological-danger/
[5] Stowe-Thurston, A. (2022, March 22). Russia’s non-proliferation disinformation campaign. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/russias-non-proliferation-disinformation-campaign/
[6] McGeehan, T. (2018). Countering Russian Disinformation. The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, 48(1). https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.2850
[7] Levis, J. M., Casi Gentzel, Adela. (2021, May 10). Toward a Whole-of-Society Framework for Countering Disinformation. Modern War Institute. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/toward-a-whole-of-society-framework-for-countering-disinformation/
[8] Dhunjishah, M. (2017, July 7). COUNTERING PROPAGANDA AND DISINFORMATION: BRING BACK THE ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP? War Room – U.S. Army War College. https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/countering-propaganda-disinformation-bring-back-active-measures-working-group/
[9] David M. Tillman. (2020). Combatting Russian Active Measures. Small Wars Journal. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/combatting-russian-active-measures
[10] Mozur, P., Satariano, A., Krolik, A., & Aufrichtig, A. (2022, September 22). ‘They Are Watching’: Inside Russia’s Vast Surveillance State. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/09/22/technology/russia-putin-surveillance-spying.html
[11] Joseph S. Nye. (2021, July 8). Will Biden’s red lines change Russia’s behaviour in cyberspace? Australian Strategic Policy Institute | The Strategist. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/will-bidens-red-lines-change-russias-behaviour-in-cyberspace/
[12] LCDR Stephanie Pendino, MAJ Robert K. Jahn, Sr., & Kirk Pedersen. (2022, September 7). U.S. Cyber Deterrence: Bringing Offensive Capabilities into the Light. Joint Forces Staff College. https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Media/Campaigning-Journals/Academic-Journals-View/Article/3149856/us-cyber-deterrence-bringing-offensive-capabilities-into-the-light/https%3A%2F%2Fjfsc.ndu.edu%2FMedia%2FCampaigning-Journals%2FAcademic-Journals-View%2FArticle%2F3149856%2Fus-cyber-deterrence-bringing-offensive-capabilities-into-the-light%2F
[13] Jones, S. G. (2021). Three Dangerous Men: Russia, China, Iran and the Rise of Irregular Warfare. W. W. Norton & Company.
[14] Jones, S. G., Reagan, A. from A. C. A., Cia, T., & Jones, and the C. W. S. in P. by S. G. (2018). Going on the Offensive: A U.S. Strategy to Combat Russian Information Warfare. https://www.csis.org/analysis/going-offensive-us-strategy-combat-russian-information-warfare
[15] Parsons, L. (2022, March 14). How Russians see Russia. Harvard Gazette. https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2022/03/how-russians-see-russia/
[16] Рейтинги января 2024 года: Оценка положения дел в стране, одобрение институтов, доверие политикам и рейтинги партий. (2024, February 1). https://www.levada.ru/2024/02/01/rejtingi-yanvarya-2024-goda-otsenka-polozheniya-del-v-strane-odobrenie-institutov-doverie-politikam-i-rejtingi-partij/