Civil Affairs Association and Divergent Options Writing Contest

EunomiaAdVER2

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The Civil Affairs Association and Divergent Options are sponsoring a writing contest to promote the launch of The Civil Affairs Association’s new journal Eunomia (Eunomia was the Greek goddess of law, governance, and good order.)

What:  A 1,000 word Options Paper or Assessment Paper examining the role of human factors in armed conflict and / or competition below levels of conflict within the world of 2035.  For the purposes of this competition, human factors are defined per Joint Publication 2-0 – Joint Intelligence as, “The physical, cultural, psychological, and behavioral attributes of an individual or group that influence perceptions, understanding, and interactions.”

When:  Submit your 1,000-word Options Paper or Assessment Paper between April 7, 2020 and July 7, 2020 to submissions@divergentoptions.org.

Why:  To help develop an understanding of the evolving role of population-centric operations in both conflict and competition, get your ideas published in Eunomia and Divergent Options, and have a chance to win $250 for 1st place, $150 for 2nd place, and $100 for 3rd place.

How:  Submissions will be judged by content, adherence to format, adherence to length, and grammar, spelling, and punctuation.  Contest winners will be announced once the judging is complete in late July.  The judging panel will consist of members of the Civil Affairs Association including an United States Agency for International Development Office Director, retired General Officers, Soldiers, Marines, Officers, Noncomissioned Officers, Reservists, and Active Duty personnel.

Other Comments:  For the purposes of this contest authors may examine and explore existing research and policy and how it will affect the future or they may choose to describe the environment of 2035 through the lens of alternative futures e.g. “An Assessment of U.S. Information Operations During the Sino-Tawanese Conflict of 2035” or “Options for Combating Virtual Terrorist Governance Structures.”  While the definition of human factors is derived from U.S. Joint Doctrine, we greatly encourage participation from all who are interested in this topic and understand that different nations have different definitions of population-centric operations.

Civil Affairs Association Contest

Options to Penetrate Adversary Anti Access / Area Denial (A2/AD) Systems

Major Jeffrey Day is a Royal Canadian Engineer officer currently attending the United States Army School of Advanced Military Studies. He can be found on Twitter @JeffDay27. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


National Security Situation:  U.S. military Multi Domain Operations (MDO) to Penetrate adversary Anti Access / Area Denial (A2/AD) Systems.

Date Originally Written:  February 27, 2020.

Date Originally Published:  March 20, 2020.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article is written from the point of view of the United States military.

Background:  U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations warns of the potential for near-peer or great power conflict against adversaries who can compete and oppose the United States in all domains and achieve relative advantage either regionally or worldwide[1].  On the other hand, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 The United States Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 implies that if competition and deterrence fail, the Joint Force quickly penetrates and disintegrates (A2/AD) systems and exploits the resulting freedom in order to win[2]. The MDO concept at this time does not include a shaping phase. Field Manual 3-0 describes how “Global Operations to Shape” continue through the joint phases of conflict, but the tasks listed are passive[3].

Significance:  There is a contradiction between these two U.S. Army concepts. If an enemy can compete and oppose the United States across all domains, quickly penetrating and disintegrating the enemy’s A2/AD would be at best extremely costly in resources, effort, and lives, and at worst impossible. The U.S. military relies on having a position of relative advantage in an area which it can exploit to create the conditions to be able to penetrate and disintegrate enemy A2/AD. Achieving that position is essential to the successful application of the MDO concept, but the enemy A2/AD systems can post a threat to U.S. forces and maneuver hundreds of miles from their borders.

Option #1:  The U.S. military conducts shaping operations in the peripheries, exploiting the enemy’s vulnerabilities throughout the global maneuver space, to indirectly weaken A2/AD systems.

The Second World War has several examples of the belligerents exercising this option. Prior to D-Day, the Allies limited German access to weather information through the Greenland campaign. Weather intelligence from Greenland was extremely useful to accurately predict European weather[4]. Rear-Admiral E.H. Smith of the United States Coast Guard organized the Northeast Greenland Sledge Patrol in the fall of 1941. It consisted of Danish and Norwegian trappers and Inuit hired to regularly patrol the East coast of Greenland and report any signs of enemy activity[5]. Through their operations, and other missions, Germany access to quality weather information, and thus their ability to forecast European weather was greatly reduced. U.S. President Eisenhower highlighted the importance of the weather data secured by the Allies and denied to the Axis many years after the war. When President Kennedy asked President Eisenhower why the invasion of Normandy had been successful, Eisenhower’s response was, “Because we had better meteorologists than the Germans![6]” What Eisenhower really meant was that the Allies had better weather data than the Germans, a position of relative advantage which largely came from shaping operations prior to attempting to defeat the Atlantic Wall, which is an historic example of an early A2/AD system. Throughout the history of global war there are campaigns in the peripheries with similar objectives. Examples include Germany attempts to deny British access to middle eastern oil in the Second World War, and the British campaign to secure eastern Indian Ocean sea lines of communication by capturing Madagascar during the Second World War.

Risk:  It took the Allies until 1944 before they set the conditions to attack into northern mainland Europe. U.S. shaping efforts today will also take time, during which the enemy will be able to further prepare their defense or also exploit opportunities in the global maneuver space. Due to their lack of mass, the smaller U.S. forces committed to the peripheries will be vulnerable to an enemy set on retaining their position of advantage.

Gain:  Shaping operations in the peripheries can be useful by:

  • Securing, seizing, or denying access to critical resources
  • Securing, seizing, or denying access to intelligence
  • Defending access to or denying enemy access to strategic lines of communication

By retaining critical capabilities and degrading the enemy’s critical requirements, the United States may be able to force the enemy to rely solely on resources, information, and lines of communication within the enemy’s area of control. If this area of control is continually diminished through the continued execution of peripheral campaigns, the United States will be able to attack in the primary theaters at a time of their choosing and from a position of relative advantage or perhaps even absolute advantage. By weakening the enemy’s A2/AD systems peripherally over a longer period of time, there will be better assessments of their residual capabilities and duration of the weaknesses.

Option #2:  The U.S. military commits resources to ensure technological dominance within specific aspects of domains to permit the Joint Force to quickly penetrates and disintegrates A2/AD.

Through extensive scientific and technical research and development, as well as reliance on technical intelligence to understand the enemies’ capabilities, the United States can ensure that it maintains a position of relative advantage along critical segments of all domains. Option #2 will enable the exploitation of vulnerabilities in enemy A2/AD systems, permitting disruption at key times and locations. Secrecy and operational security will be essential to ensure the enemy is not aware of the U.S. overmatch until it is too late to react.

Risk:  If the enemy is able to counter and minimize the calculated U.S. overmatch through intelligence, superior science, or luck, joint force entry and MDO will fail. It also will be more difficult to assess the impact of actions made to degrade enemy A2/AD systems or the enemy may repair systems before the joint force is able to permanently disintegrate them.

Gain:  This option exploits and does not cede the current technological advantage the United States holds over its competitors. Additionally, it permits the United States to conduct short and decisive operations. Potential enemies will waste resources developing resilient A2/AD systems, with expensive defensive measures protecting all perceived vulnerabilities. To counter these measures, the United States military only has to develop specific specialized capabilities, to penetrate A2/AD at points of their choosing, therefore retaining the initiative.

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendation:  None.


Endnotes:

[1] U.S. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Operations. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 13.

[2] TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 – The United States Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, December 6, 2018.

[3] The tasks listed in Field Manual 3-0 are: Promoting and protecting U.S. national interests and influence, building partner capacity and partnerships, recognizing and countering adversary attempts to gain positions of relative advantage, and setting the conditions to win future conflicts

[4] C.L Godske and Bjerknes, V, Dynamic Meteorology and Weather Forecasting (Boston: American Meteorological Society, 1957), 536

[5] David Howarth, The Sledge Patrol (New York, NY: The MacMillan Company, 1960), 13.

[6] “Forecasting D-Day,” NASA Earth Observatory, last modified June 5, 2019, accessed October 27, 2019, https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/145143/forecasting-d-day.

A2AD (Anti Access and Area Denial) Jeffrey Day Option Papers United States

Assessing U.S. Relative Decline

Adam A. Azim is a writer and entrepreneur based in Northern Virginia. His areas of interest include U.S. foreign policy and strategy, as well as political philosophy and theory. He can be found on Twitter @adamazim1988.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessing U.S. Relative Decline

Date Originally Written:  March 7, 2020.

Date Originally Published:  March 23, 2020.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article is written from an American point of view, in regards to U.S. relative decline vis-à-vis Russia and China.

Summary:  American policy since World War II imposed “world order,” which is fraught with the inability to enforce as well as aspirations exceeding capabilities. As a result, America is entangled in futile Middle Eastern conflicts, plagued with populism and President Trump, faced with the rise of Russia and China, debt, polarization, and public health issues. This situation prompts a paradigm shift from excess militarization to the elevation of national spirit.

Text:  In the early 20th century, a British historian named E.H. Carr made an odd proclamation: “Only the West is in decline.” The author sought to explore this idea by writing a book titled “Is The West in Decline? A Study of World Order and U.S. Relative Decline” published January 2018. This article seeks to summarize the findings of this book by making a few key points.

The United States, as the linchpin of Western civilization after Europe’s collapse in the 20th century, is not going through absolute decline. Rather, the United States is experiencing what Joseph Nye of Harvard University calls “relative decline,” which means other countries are rising as a result of America’s slowdown which can turn around. But the slowdown is yet to be a cause for severe concern. In a short book titled “Is the American Century Over?” Nye conducts an assessment and concludes that the United States is at least fifty years ahead of its nearest competitors in terms of military and economic capabilities.

But there are clear symptoms of American relative decline vis-à-vis other countries. In a number of public lectures, Professor John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago argues that there are three evident symptoms of American decline: entanglement in Middle Eastern conflicts, the rise of Russia and China, and the emergence of President Donald Trump. In addition to this are three internal symptoms that result from Mearsheimer’s list of external symptoms: the growing national debt, polarization, and a downturn in public health. One can argue that the national debt is the biggest threat to national security. As a result of debt, the United States barely has the capacity to stem the rise of polarization as evinced by problems such as domestic terrorism and health problems such as the recent opioid crisis and the mental health epidemic. When combining these six symptoms, the resulting decline in American power is evident. For example, one of America’s key tasks during the post-World War II period was to keep Europe united within political institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. These institutions are presently fraying as a result of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union and Britain’s faltering relationship with Germany.

From a big picture perspective, American foreign policy boils down to the fulfillment of one task after it emerged as the world’s foremost power subsequent to World War II, which was the maintenance of what is known as “world order.” During Sir Winston Churchill’s 1946 “Iron Curtain” Speech in Fulton, Missouri, Britain passed the responsibility of managing world affairs to the United States after its empire had severely contracted during the 1940’s. Now, the United States no longer seeks to shoulder the entire burden of maintaining world order. President Donald Trump has made “America First” the main priority of his political agenda. World Order has always been fraught with two permanent conditions. For one, aspirations always exceed capabilities, as noted by Pankaj Mishra in a book titled “The Age of Anger.” Second is the issue of enforcement, as noted by Henry Kissinger in his last book titled “World Order.” It is simply impossible for one nation, despite their capabilities, to enforce law and order on the entire world.

These conditions have led to the failure of liberal democracy as a system that can be imposed on the world.  The result is the United States incurring ongoing costs by defaulting to a realpolitik approach towards Russia and China, and in turn the costs have led to polarization and populism domestically. America is now faced with the option of experimenting with a constructivist foreign policy and a paradigm shift from a militaristic and costly realpolitik approach to a diplomatic approach that brings multiple parties together in the way of a burden-sharing approach to world order. Combined, Europe and East Asia have a higher GDP than America; it would be remiss to not ask these two regions to increase their share of defense spending. America will eventually be forced to advance its security and economic interests to contribute its fair share to world order, while considering a shift from an offensive approach to a defensive approach to national security. Overreach and America’s unnecessary entanglement in Afghanistan, which is considered “The Graveyard of Empires”, has led to the neglect of America’s first ever foreign policy proclamation, namely, “The Monroe Doctrine.” Because of Afghanistan, which Andrew Bacevich has called “a flight of fancy,” Russia and China have found apparent holes in American defense and have penetrated Africa and Latin America to the detriment of America’s hemispheric security.

For a long time, America has traded off a truly free market system, education, and health care for militarization and the imposition of world order. International relations theorists call this “the security dilemma.” John Herz, an international relations theorist, has called it “the absolute predicament and irreducible dilemma,” which is the inability to allocate resources to social welfare due to security concerns. As a result, radical leaders like President Donald Trump and Senator Bernie Sanders who appeal to American pathos are gaining momentum. Europe, Arab Gulf Countries, and East Asia have long prospered from the U.S. security umbrella by enjoying U.S. defense subsidies that enable these regions to invest in human development instead of defense, to the detriment of American citizens. To resolve this “security dilemma,” one must evaluate the main threat, which is not a physical one; rather, the threat is a moral and spiritual one. Baudelaire wrote of the “baseness of men’s hearts” that will lead to what Kierkegaard called “the common plight of man.” From a realist perspective, this threat is relevant. Hans Morgenthau, in “The Politics of Nations,” identified six dimensions of power: military, economic, population, territory, natural resources, and spirit. As long as there is a disproportionate amount of focus on militarization at the expense of national spirit, the United States will not be able to reverse what is known as “relative decline” vis-à-vis Russia and China.


Endnotes:

[1] Azim, A. A. (2018). Is The West In Decline? A Study of World Order and U.S. Relative Decline. Brandylane Publishing. / https://www.amazon.com/Decline-Study-World-Order-Relative/dp/0692967168

Adam A. Azim Assessment Papers Budgets and Resources Competition United States

An Assessment of the Concept of Competition as a Foundation to Military Planning

Jeffrey Alston is a member of the United States Army National Guard and a graduate of the United States Army War College.  He can be found on Twitter @jeffreymalston.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  An Assessment of the Concept of Competition as a Foundation to Military Planning

Date Originally Written:  February 23, 2020.

Date Originally Published:  March 26, 2020.

Author and / Article Point of View:  The author is a field-grade, maneuver officer with nearly 30 years of commissioned service. The article is written from the point of view of an American strategic analyst viewing the developments in the national security space since the release of the 2017 National Security Strategy.

Summary:  The U.S. Military is overextending its intellectual resources regarding great power competition and is losing its focus on core warfighting concepts. Recent national security documents have codified the great power security environment. The absence of any coherent foreign policy and subsequent strategy, coupled with over reliance on the military as the single foreign policy tool, puts U.S. military planning at a critical juncture.

Text:  Dutifully, the U.S. Armed Services (Services) seized upon the competition task following publication of the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and has-especially at the Joint Staff level-expended considerable effort framing[1] the military aspects of competition. At the same time, the Services are attempting to realize fundamental concepts which embrace the new challenges of a multi-domain environment with the vocabulary of competition seeping into its foundational documents. Without question, a nation’s military makes up part of its power and in the case of the U.S., holds the charge that they fight and persecute the nation’s wars securing victory through its unique capabilities. Logically, it follows then, the expansive idea of competition-at heart an international relations framework- should not be the sole conceptual focus of its military planning.

Seizing upon competition as a framework for structure and employment of the Services is understandable given recent history. The genesis of today’s U.S.’s strategic atrophy coincides with the end of the Cold War. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union left America with a sense of winning-if not hubris. The spectacular victory in Desert Shield/Desert Storm clinched this idea of a unipolar moment for the U.S. The promise of the “fog-lifting” Revolution in Military Affairs, the lack of an ideological or near peer competitor and selective military engagements (Bosnia, Somalia, Desert Fox in Iraq / Kuwait, et al) did not place demands for any type of comprehensive national strategy thinking let alone theory development. Operationally, the military was unsurpassed in its capability.

Then the 9/11 attacks occurred and the nation entered the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The opening phases of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, initially about regime change, were successful. However, lack of a meaningful goals for the successive phases of the GWOT, a lack of sustained, whole of nation effort to conduct the GWOT saw counterinsurgency and counter terrorism tactics elevate to take the place of actual strategy[2]. Simultaneously, debates about the utility of military force in such environments became more frequent in political and scholarship spheres. Frustration with quantifiable or sustainable goals in either campaign began to center on simple timelines and troop levels. Two decades of GWOT was exacerbating this period of strategic atrophy.

The military was not going to give up the initiative as it sought to make lasting impacts in the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. The military design movement began to find leverage in the Services as formations struggled to achieve sustainable outcomes in their areas of operations. Design “how-to’s” began to fill the pages of military journals, institutional curricula and be integrated into exercises. Tactical formations were left to seek the best way to leverage their capabilities in the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan[3].  Attempting to leverage design was further evidence of an absence of strategy. Design was an awkward and uncomfortable translation into formations which normally are assigned an objective set of mission essential tasks to master and execute.

Enter the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy and the corresponding concept of great power competition (GPC). Correctly identifying today’s national security realities, strategic competition is-in the context of the current environment-a concept requiring more thought and analysis for it to be a useful national security construct[4]. “Competition,” as a government wide framework, is not encouraging. The U.S. Department of State strategic plan for 2018-2022 mentions the term “competition” three times; the Treasury Department’s equivalent, once. While not an exhaustive review of interdepartmental policy coordination, it stands witness to the lack of whole of nation integration, if not linkage of competition at the national level. In the absence of a definitive “competition” strategy at the national level, the Joint Staff and Services must resist the temptation to unnecessarily militarize GPC.

The NSS and NDS provide the Services a framework to begin their realignment within an environment of GPC. However, as documents such as the Joint Staff’s Competition Continuum[1] frame the role of the Services as a function of competition. This is a mistake. Strategic competition is an environment for the military and is best if it informs broad decisions in the Services’ role of man, train and equip, but not its warfighting approaches. The Continuum document reflects a tremendous amount of intellectual capacity devoted to and carefully considering the aspects of competition: it is thought provoking, but misplaced. The American military would do well to resist, once again, elevating its capabilities to fulfill a strategic gap at the national levels and instead focus on core warfighting abilities and tasks.

The Services are at a crucial stage in the planning and programming for the out years; all with fresh eyes towards their obligations in an era of GPC. The U.S. Army has initiated a well-intentioned intellectual renaissance on large scale combat operations. The U.S. Army and Air Force (and the others) are collaborating and struggling with realizing Multidomain Operations[5]. In reviving and focusing on these ideas, the Services can appropriately complement national power as an element of GPC vice being its foundation. Until workable GPC foreign policy goals are established, acceptable political risks are identified and corresponding national strategies are in place, best would be for the Services to carefully navigate the contours of GPC.

The Joint Doctrine notes mentioned earlier and related documents (ie. Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning) are not helping in this cognitive framework. Their prominent use of a continuum of conflict[6] as a foundational model conflates national strategy formulation with military campaigning. While these sample documents speak to the role of interagency contributions to competition, recent campaigns make such whole of government intentions suspect. Most notably, the continuum of completion-conflict-competition is fertile ground for obscuring definitive political objectives. A lack of political objectives upends strategy formulation. Combined, this is not the space to expand military planning efforts. Competition is without a doubt, part of the global security environment, but it is a condition of that environment, not a principle of warfighting planning.


Endnotes:

[1] U.S. Department of Defense. (2019). Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum. Washington, DC. From https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_19.pdf?ver=2019-06-10-113311-233

[2] Stachan, H. (2013). The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective. Cambridge University Press.

[3] Keller, J. (2018, January 22). The 1st SFAB’s Afghan Deployment Is A Moment Of Truth For The Global War On Terror. Retrieved December 12, 2019, from https://taskandpurpose.com/analysis/sfab-train-advise-assist-afghanistan

[4] Wyne, A. (2019, February 11). America’s Blind Ambition Could Make It a Victim of Global Competition. Retrieved February 13, 2020, from https://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-blind-ambition-could-make-it-victim-global-competition-44227

[5] Air Force, Army Developing Multidomain Doctrine. (2018, January 25). Retrieved January 7, 2020, from https://www.jcs.mil/Media/News/News-Display/Article/1425475/air-force-army-developing-multidomain-doctrine/

[6] U.S. Department of Defense. (2018). Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning. Washington, DC. p. 8 From https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joint_concept_integrated_campaign.pdf?ver=2018-03-28-102833-257

Assessment Papers Competition Defense and Military Reform Great Powers United States

Assessing U.S. Use of Coercive Diplomacy

Assad Raza is an Active Component U.S. Army Civil Affairs Officer with deployment experience throughout the Middle East.  He holds a M.A. in Diplomacy with a concentration in International Conflict Management from Norwich University, and is a graduate of The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation Command and General Staff Officer Course at Fort Benning, Georgia.  He can be found on Twitter @assadraza12.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessing U.S. Use of Coercive Diplomacy

Date Originally Written:  February 23, 2020.

Date Originally Published:  March 9, 2020.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes the U.S. should only use coercive diplomacy if the situation is vital to U.S. interests, and the U.S. is prepared to go to war if necessary.

Summary:  U.S. use of coercive diplomacy has conflicting results. The 2018 missile strikes to compel the Syrian regime to stop using chemical weapons on civilians succeeded. The 2020 killing of an Iranian general to compel Iran to stop its aggression in the Middle East failed. To date, North Korea has not abandoned its nuclear program despite U.S. military threats, sanctions, and diplomatic talks.  Coercive diplomacy’s success isn’t guaranteed and it risks escalation.

Text:  Throughout history, the United States has used coercive diplomacy as a diplomatic strategy to influence adversaries’ behaviors. However, the U.S. success rate on the use of this strategy has mixed results. One example is the failed U.S. attempts to persuade the government of Iraq to cease their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program before the 2003 invasion[3]. A more recent example is the January 2020 U.S. drone strike that killed Iranian General Qassim Soleimani that failed to compel Iran to stop its aggression in the Middle East and provoked their retaliation, which could have quickly escalated to conflict[2]. These two examples highlight the importance of understanding the motives and perceptions of the adversary that can limit the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy.

Coercive diplomacy is the use of military and non-military threats to primarily persuade an adversary to cease a specific action. Former Stanford University political professor, Alexander L. George, defined coercive diplomacy as a “defensive strategy that is employed to deal with the efforts of an adversary to change a status quo situation in his own favor, by persuading the adversary to stop what it is doing or to undo what it had done[3].” A successful example of coercive diplomacy is the 2018 U.S. missile strikes against the Syrian regime to compel them to stop chemical attacks on civilians[4].

When employing coercive diplomacy, the coercing power must have a credible threat for non-compliance. According to Alexander George, “…the military weaker side may be strongly motivated by what is at stake and refuse to back down, in effect calling the bluff of the coercing power[5].” An excellent example of this “calling of bluff” is U.S. President Barack Obama’s threats to use military action on the Syrian regime if they crossed the “red line” by using chemical weapons on civilians. Once Syria crossed this red line, in August 2013, President Obama did not follow through on his threat, thus hurting U.S. credibility[6]. Failing to respond to non-compliance can cause the coercing power to lose credibility and negatively impact how it is perceived internationally as it did not follow through on its military promises.

Additionally, coercive diplomacy can include a mixture of military and non-military threats to influence an adversary’s behavior[7]. Yet, depending on what is at stake, not every actor will respond to these combinations of threats the same. For example, to date, North Korea has not abandoned its nuclear program and ballistic missile testing from the combination of U.S. military threats, sanctions, and diplomatic talks[8]. However, North Korea’s non-compliance may be due to their perceptions of the U.S. views on their nuclear program and the low risk of U.S. military actions based on U.S history towards them over the past 25 years.

One major risk of coercive diplomacy is the difficulty in calculating the adversary’s response. As Robert Art and Patrick Cronin wrote, “… mistakes are easy to make in situations where resolve is hard to estimate. …the coercer often underestimates the targets will to resist. Consequently, the coercer has to apply larger amounts of force, but then it entered the realm of war[9].” Two examples of this type of escalation are the 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s air campaign due to Serbian non-compliance to stop their persecution of Kosovo Albanians and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq to halt their WMD program. Hence, there are no guarantees that the use of coercive diplomacy will persuade the adversary to stop an action or, worse, the adversary’s miscalculations could escalate the situation.

As mentioned earlier, before employing coercive diplomacy, it is crucial to understand the adversary’s motivations and what is at stake for them. The January 2020 drone strike that killed the Iranian general is an example of the need for understanding motivational factors to calculate an adversary’s response. Iran’s potential loss of credibility within their own country and the region may have driven their retaliatory missile attacks at the two bases in Iraq[10]. Although there were no U.S. fatalities, with the right miscalculations, this retaliation could have escalated past coercive diplomacy to full-on war. This example reveals the risk of employing coercive diplomacy and the difficulties with calculating adversaries’ countermeasures.

In summary, the recent use of U.S. coercive diplomacy has conflicting results. For example, the 2018 missile strikes to compel the Syrian regime to stop using chemical weapons civilians achieved its objectives, but the 2020 drone strike of the Iranian general to compel Iran to stop its aggression in the Middle East did not. Iran’s retaliation demonstrates that weaker states will respond back if they believe their credibility is at stake. Also, the use of coercive diplomacy against North Korea shows the difficulty of changing an adversary’s behavior when their most vital program for survival is at stake. Moreover, coercive diplomacy is only of value if the threat is credible, and the nation is prepared to go to war if necessary. Lastly, coercive diplomacy is a risky strategy as it depends on the adversary’s motivations, and any wrong calculation can escalate the situation to full-on war, as seen with the 2003 invasion of Iraq.


Endnotes:

[1] Jervis, R. (2013). Getting to Yes with Iran: The Challenges of Coercive Diplomacy. Foreign Affairs, 92(1), 105-115. Retrieved February 17, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/41721008

[2] Missy Ryan, J. D. (2020, January 4). How Trump decided to kill a top Iranian general. Retrieved February 23, 2020, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/how-trump-decided-to-kill-a-top-iranian-general/2020/01/03/77ce3cc4-2e62-11ea-bcd4-24597950008f_story.html

[3] Levy, J. (2008). Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George. Political Psychology, 29(4), 537-552. Retrieved February 17, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/20447143

[4] Anne Gearan, M. R. (2018, April 14). U.S. and allies warn Syria of more missile strikes if chemical attacks used again. Retrieved February 2020, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-launches-missile-strikes-in-syria/2018/04/13/c68e89d0-3f4a-11e8-974f-aacd97698cef_story.html

[5] George, A. L. (1991). Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

[6] Chollet, D., Glover, J., Greenfield, J., & Glorioso, A. (2016, July 19). Obama’s Red Line, Revisited. Retrieved February 23, 2020, from https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/obama-syria-foreign-policy-red-line-revisited-214059

[7] George, A. L. (1991). Forceful persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

[8] North Korea. (2019, August). Retrieved February 23, 2020, from https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea

[9] Cronin, P. M., & Art, R. J. (2003). United States and Coercive Diplomacy. Washington, D.C.: United States Inst. of Peace Press.

[10] Bender, B., Zanona, M., Ferris, S., O’Brien, C., Starks, T., & Forgery, Q. (2020, January 7). Iran retaliates with missile attacks on U.S. troop locations in Iraq. Retrieved February 2020, from https://www.politico.com/news/2020/01/07/iran-retaliation-iraq-base-095869

 

Assad Raza Assessment Papers Coercive Diplomacy Diplomacy

An Assessment of Nationalism’s Impact on Security and Stability in Switzerland

Editor’s Note:  This article is the result of a partnership between Divergent Options and a course on nationalism at the George Washington University.


Gracie Jamison is a sophomore at The George Washington University and studies political science and history.  She can be found on Twitter at @grjamison13 and writes for the GW Hatchet, an independent student-run newspaper.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  An Assessment of Nationalism’s Impact on Security and Stability in Switzerland

Date Originally Written:  August 6, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  March 2, 2020.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author was an exchange student in Switzerland in 2015. The author supports multicultural policies, but believes nationalism is useful in promoting Swiss national unity. The article is written from the point of view of an American observing trends in Switzerland.

Summary:  Swiss citizens feel safer and more secure due to Switzerland’s nationalist policies of mandatory military service and stringent naturalization requirements[1]. The Swiss overcome ethnolinguistic tensions that threaten to divide them through a sense of security allowed by mass military military mobilization and local participation in the naturalization process which supports a key part of Switzerland’s national identity.

Text:  Given Switzerland’s cultural heterogeneity, as exemplified by its four national languages and the diversity of ethnic groups, it would be well to ask how a strong Swiss identity is possible. And yet, not only does a strong Swiss identity exist, with “a common national identity as Swiss over and above their separate linguistic, religious, and cantonal identities,” but evidence shows that Swiss nationalist policies help exert a stabilizing force on the country as a whole and provide an opportunity to realize national strength and unity amidst the variety of ethnicities and cultures[2].

Swiss nationalism consists of several different factors, a particularly dominant one being a strong political culture, as Switzerland is rooted in shared political spirit and belief in common ideals rather than cultural similarities. While a country based upon political will and a desire to achieve a common civic vision may seem fragile, it has united a remarkable number of diverse language, cultural, and ethnic groups throughout Swiss history and provides a helpful model of civic nationalism for other diverse nations.

Nationalist policies in Switzerland have pursued this common vision and balanced the conflicting identities through several mechanisms, but mandatory military service, starting around age 20 for men as well as women who choose to join, is perhaps the most successful. While the forced requirement to join an institution could very easily lead to resentment and protest, a staggeringly high percentage of Swiss citizens support the continuation of mandatory service[3]. Perhaps even more revealing is the amount of young people, the very demographic required to join the institution itself, who support the military–nearly eight in ten respondents reported positive feelings toward the military, and the number is climbing[4]. According to scholar Stephen Van Evera, perceived security of borders and faith in institutions are two of the most important factors for predicting nationalist violence. Swiss support for the military, nationalism in a civic sense, buries ethnolinguistic divisions and prevents the nationalist violence that could arise when such groups may otherwise feel ignored or threatened by such institutions instead of relying on them for external security[5]. Fundamentally, where borders are secure and there is intrinsic faith in institutions, nationalist violence is much less likely to occur.

This burying of ethnolinguistic divisions is particularly evident in a statistic that shows a majority of citizens feel that Switzerland’s famous neutrality is linked to their national identity[6]. Switzerland’s role as mediator in major wars throughout history has given Swiss citizens a sense of pride and security in their global standing- critically, without the potential for violence that has accompanied other countries involved in conflicts. The concept of neutrality has become so tied to the image of the nation itself that to desire one’s security often requires one to support the nation and its institutions[7]. It is this sense of security then, as well as the faith in institutions like the military, that showcases the link between nationalism and the stabilizing force it exerts in Swiss life.

Although the ways in which nationalism helps promote external security are important, internal stability is another vital aspect of the Swiss national identity and is supported by stringent naturalization policies. The restrictions surrounding who can live in the country and become a citizen involves an incredible amount of local participation compared to most countries, as applications for citizenship are not considered on a federal level “but rather by the country’s cantons and municipalities—and the applicants’ peers have a say in whether naturalization gets granted.”[8] Residents in local villages vote on whether they feel their neighbor should receive citizenship or not, and communal assemblies allow citizens to voice their concerns, procedures that would seem strange to many Americans but one that would perhaps give them more faith in their institutions and a sense of value that may be lacking. Being able to decide who comes in and why within the populace leads to a deep sense of security about borders, and also upholds the common Swiss belief in political participation and pride in their direct democracy, with 65 percent of Swiss citizens saying they are satisfied with their government[9]. This naturalization practice also helps to explain Switzerland’s success at what many Swiss consider to be at the heart of their national identity: “the idea that several linguistic communities [coexisting] within a single nation based on a degree of shared political culture while preserving and developing their cultural distinctiveness in other spheres.”[10] Switzerland’s economy is also relevant to this particular point, as, given the dependence on sectors like banking that require massive amounts of coordination and precise understanding, it is not only reassuring to Swiss citizens that immigrants assimilate but necessary for the strength of the economy[11].

Switzerland is rooted in civic nationalism that goes back to the writing of the Swiss constitution, a document “whose explicit goal was to consolidate the Swiss national unity and national sentiment through policy centralisation,” and has contributed to a national identity that is based upon shared political culture and the concept of neutrality[12]. Furthermore, nationalistic policies and programs in Switzerland ensure that tensions or divisions that might otherwise threaten a sense of a united Swiss nation are superseded by faith in institutions and the desire for the security that they provide, as well as a strong belief and participation in the political culture. While all of the preceding works well for Switzerland, it remains to be seen if Swiss-like civic nationalism can be successfully adopted by other countries who also have multi-ethnic populations.


Endnotes:

[1] Swissinfo.ch. (2018, May 25). Swiss feel safe and trust security forces, says report. Retrieved August 8, 2019, from
https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-security-study_swiss-feel-safe-and-trust-security-forces–says-report/4414477

[2] Miller, D. 1995. On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[3] Davis, M. (2019, March 23). What makes Switzerland different. Retrieved August 8, 2019, from https://bigthink.com/politics-current-affairs/switzerland-high-gun-ownership

[4] Swissinfo.ch. (2018, May 25). Swiss feel safe and trust security forces, says report. Retrieved August 8, 2019, from
https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-security-study_swiss-feel-safe-and-trust-security-forces–says-report/4414477

[5] Evera, S. V. (1994). Hypotheses on Nationalism and War. International Security, 18(4), 5-39. doi:10.2307/2539176

[6] Kużelewska, Elżbieta. (2016). Language Policy in Switzerland. Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric. 45. 10.1515/slgr-2016-0020.

[7] Swissinfo.ch. (2018, May 25). Swiss feel safe and trust security forces, says report. Retrieved August 8, 2019, from https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-security-study_swiss-feel-safe-and-trust-security-forces–says-report/44144770

[8] Garber, M. (2017, January 14). In Switzerland, You Can Be Denied Citizenship for Being Too Annoying. Retrieved August 8, 2019, from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/01/switzerland-citizenship-nancy-holten/513212

[9] Lucchi, M., Swiss Public Affairs, & World Economic Forum. (2017, July 31). This is how Switzerland’s direct democracy works. Retrieved August 8, 2019, from https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/07/switzerland-direct-democracy-explained

[10] Helbling, M., & Stojanović, N. (2011). Switzerland: Challenging the big theories of nationalism1. Nations and Nationalism, 17(4), 712-717. doi:10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00516.x

[11] Morris, D. (2018, October 25). Swiss Model of Positive Nationalism. Retrieved August 8, 2019, from https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1991-09-01-1991244083-story.html

[12] Helbling, M., & Stojanović, N. (2011). Switzerland: Challenging the big theories of nationalism1. Nations and Nationalism, 17(4), 712-717. doi:10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00516.x

Assessment Papers Gracie Jamison Nationalism Switzerland

Call for Papers: Emerging Technologies and Emerging Concepts

Background:

Divergent Options is a non-politically aligned non-revenue generating national security website that, in 1,000 words or less, provides unbiased, dispassionate, candid articles that assess a national security situation, present multiple options to address the situation, and articulate the risk and gain of each option.  Please note that while we assess a national security situation and may provide options, we never recommend a specific option.

Call for Papers:

Divergent Options is calling for papers assessing situations or discussing options related to Emerging Technologies and Emerging Concepts.  For the purposes of this Call for Papers we define Emerging Technologies and Emerging Concepts as technologies and concepts whose development, practical application, or both, are unrealized in national security.

Please limit your article to 1,000 words and write using our Options Paper or Assessment Paper templates which are designed for ease of use by both writers and readers alike.

Please send your article to submissions@divergentoptions.org by April 12, 2020.

If you are not interested in writing on this topic, we always welcome individual articles on virtually any national security situation an author is passionate about.  Please do not let our call for papers cause you to hesitate to send us your idea. We look forward to hearing from you!

Call For Papers

Writing Contest — Below Threshold Competition: China

China, controlled and claimed regions, map

It is a new year and Divergent Options has enlisted Kori Schake of the American Enterprise Institute, Wayne Hugar of the National Intelligence University, and Ali Wyne of the RAND Corporation to be the judges for our Below Threshold Competition: China writing contest.

What:  A 1,000 word Options Paper or Assessment Paper examining how countries can compete more effectively with China below the threshold of armed conflict.  We are also interested in writers examining how China will continue to compete and evolve their tactics below the threshold of armed conflict.

When:  Submit your 1,000 word Options Paper or Assessment Paper between May 1, 2020 and July 31, 2020 to submissions@divergentoptions.org.

Why:  To refine your thoughts on China, which, depending upon your point of view, could be an important trading partner, a complex competitor, or a sworn enemy.  Writers will have a chance to win $500 for 1st Place, $300 for 2nd Place, $100 for 3rd Place, or be one of three Honorable Mentions who receives $50.

How:  Submissions will be judged by strength of argument, relevance, uniqueness, adherence to format, adherence to length, and grammar, spelling, and punctuation.  Submissions will be published during and after the contest closes.  Contest winners will be announced once the judging is complete.

Other Comments:  For the purposes of this contest we encourage writers to think in an unconstrained manner and to not worry about what authority or what organization would be used to execute a given option.  From a U.S. point of view, some examples of unconstrained thinking could include:

A.  Since China has established Confucius Institutes in the United States, what is the risk and gain of the United States establishing “Thomas Jefferson Institutes” in China?

B.  The U.S. Government provides agricultural subsidies to agribusinesses to supplement their income, manage the supply of agricultural commodities, and influence the cost and supply of such commodities.  What is the risk and gain of U.S. colleges and universities adopting a version of this program?  In this option the U.S. Government would provide subsidies to U.S. colleges and universities that ban the enrollment of Chinese students thus protecting U.S. intellectual capital without affecting college or university financing.  These subsidies would continue until the U.S. college or university could find students from countries that aid the U.S. in its competition with China to take the enrollment slots previously reserved for the Chinese students.

China (People's Republic of China) Contest

Options for a Consistent U.S. Approach to Humanitarian Intervention

Michael D. Purzycki is a researcher, analyst and writer based in Arlington, Virginia.  He is a former communications and media analyst for the United States Marine Corps.  He writes regularly for Charged Affairs (the journal of Young Professionals in Foreign Policy) and Better Angels, and has also been published in Merion West, the Washington Monthly, the Truman National Security Project, and France 24.  He can be found on Twitter at @MDPurzycki and on Medium at https://medium.com/@mdpurzycki.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


National Security Situation:  Genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other forms of mass violence lead to destabilizing refugee flows and constitute humanitarian catastrophes.

Date Originally Written:  February 15, 2020.

Date Originally Published:  February 24, 2020.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article is written from the point of view of the United States government.

Background:  The United States’ responses to episodes of mass killing in recent decades have been inconsistent. The U.S. has intervened militarily in Bosnia, Kosovo and Libya. It has declined to intervene in Rwanda, Darfur and Syria (prior to the conflict against the Islamic State). This inconsistency calls into question American moral and geopolitical leadership, and creates an opening for rivals, especially China and Russia, to fill. America’s decision not to respond with military force when Syrian President Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons against his own people arguably emboldened Assad’s ally Russia.  Following this U.S. non-response Russia sent forces to Syria in 2015 that have committed multiple atrocities, including intentional bombing of hospitals[1]. Meanwhile, massive flows of refugees from Syria, as well as from other Middle Eastern and African countries, have destabilized Europe politically, empowering demagogues and weakening European cohesion. Climate change is likely to exacerbate existing conflicts, and make massacres and refugee flows more common[2].

Significance:  From a strategic perspective, sudden massive inflows of refugees destabilize allies and weaken host country populations’ confidence in international institutions. From a moral perspective, the refusal of the U.S. to stop mass killing when it is capable of doing so threatens American moral credibility, and afflicts the consciences of those who could have intervened but did not, as in Rwanda[3]. From a perspective that is both strategic and moral, non-intervention in cases where U.S. and allied force can plausibly halt massacres, as in Bosnia before August 1995, makes the U.S. and its allies look weak, undermining the credibility of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other security institutions[4].

Option #1:  The U.S. adopts a policy of humanitarian intervention during mass violence.

The U.S. government could adopt a de facto policy of intervening in humanitarian crises when it is capable of doing so, and when intervention can plausibly halt mass violence. The policy need not be formalized, stated or written down, but need only be inferred from the actions of the U.S. The U.S. could adopt the following criteria for intervention:

“1. The actual or anticipated loss of life substantially exceeds the lives lost to violence in the United States.
2. The military operation to stop the massive loss of life would not put at risk anything close to the number of lives it would save.
3. The United States is able to secure the participation of other countries in the military intervention[5].”

Risk:  Even with military units prepared for and devoted to humanitarian intervention, it is possible a successful intervention will require a larger force than the U.S. is able to commit, thus possibly weakening the credibility of U.S. power in humanitarian crises. Commitment of too many units to intervention could harm America’s ability to defend allies or project power elsewhere in the world. An unsuccessful intervention, especially one with a large number of American casualties, could easily sour the American public on intervention, and produce a backlash against foreign commitments in general.

Gain:  Intervention can halt or reduce destabilizing refugee flows by ending mass killing. It can also help guarantee American moral leadership on the world stage, as the great power that cares about humanity especially if contrasted with such atrocities as Chinese abuse of Uighurs or Russian bombing of Syrian hospitals. The saving of lives in a humanitarian intervention adds a moral benefit to the strategic benefits of action.

Option #2:  The U.S. adopts a policy of non-intervention during mass violence.

The U.S. could refuse to intervene to halt atrocities, even in cases where intervention is widely believed to be able to stop mass violence. Rather than intervening in some cases but not others, as has been the case in the last three decades, or intervening whenever possible, the U.S. could be consistent in its refusal to use force to halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other atrocities. Absent a formal declaration of atrocity prevention as a vital national security interest, it would not intervene in such conflicts.

Risk:  A policy of non-intervention risks bringing moral condemnation upon the United States, from the international community and from portions of the U.S. population. The U.S. risks surrendering its moral position as the world’s most powerful defender of liberal values and human rights. Furthermore, refugee flows from ongoing conflicts threaten to further destabilize societies and reduce populations’ trust in liberal democracy and international institutions.

Gain:  Non-intervention lowers the risk of U.S. military power being weakened before a potential conflict with China, Russia, Iran or North Korea. This option helps the U.S. avoid charges of inconsistency that result from intervention in some humanitarian crises but not others. The U.S. could choose to ignore the world’s condemnation, and concern itself purely with its own interests. Finally, non-intervention allows other countries to bear the burden of global stability in an increasingly multi-polar age, an age in which U.S. power is in relative decline.

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendation:  None.


Endnotes:

[1] Hill, Evan and Christiaan Triebert. “12 Hours. 4 Syrian Hospitals Bombed. One Culprit: Russia.” New York Times, October 13, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/13/world/middleeast/russia-bombing-syrian-hospitals.html

[2] “Climate Change Could Force Over 140 Million to Migrate Within Countries by 2050: World Bank Report.” World Bank, March 19, 2018. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/03/19/climate-change-could-force-over-140-million-to-migrate-within-countries-by-2050-world-bank-report

[3] Power, Samantha. “Bystanders to Genocide.” Atlantic, September 2001. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571

[4] Daalder, Ivo H. “Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended.” Brookings Institution, December 1, 1998. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/decision-to-intervene-how-the-war-in-bosnia-ended

[5] Solarz, Stephen J. “When to Go in.” Blueprint Magazine, January 1, 2000. https://web.archive.org/web/20070311054019/http://www.dlc.org/ndol_ci.cfm?contentid=1126&kaid=124&subid=158

Mass Killings Michael D. Purzycki Option Papers United States

U.S. Options to Combat Chinese Technological Hegemony

Ilyar Dulat, Kayla Ibrahim, Morgan Rose, Madison Sargeant, and Tyler Wilkins are Interns at the College of Information and Cyberspace at the National Defense UniversityDivergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


National Security Situation:  China’s technological rise threatens U.S. interests both on and off the battlefield.

Date Originally Written:  July 22, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  February 10, 2020.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article is written from the point of view of the United States Government.

Background:  Xi Jinping, the Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission. affirmed in 2012 that China is acting to redefine the international world order through revisionist policies[1]. These policies foster an environment open to authoritarianism thus undermining Western liberal values. The Chinese Community Party (CCP) utilizes emerging technologies to restrict individual freedoms of Chinese citizens, in and out of cyberspace. Subsequently, Chinese companies have exported this freedom-restricting technology to other countries, such as Ethiopia and Iran, for little cost. These technologies, which include Artificial Intelligence-based surveillance systems and nationalized Internet services, allow authoritarian governments to effectively suppress political dissent and discourse within their states. Essentially monopolizing the tech industry through low prices, China hopes to gain the loyalty of these states to obtain the political clout necessary to overcome the United States as the global hegemon.

Significance:  Among the technologies China is pursuing, 5G is of particular interest to the U.S.  If China becomes the leader of 5G network technologies and artificial intelligence, this will allow for opportunities to disrupt the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data. China has been able to aid regimes and fragmented democracies in repressing freedom of speech and restricting human rights using “digital tools of surveillance and control[2].” Furthermore, China’s National Security Law of 2015 requires all Chinese tech companies’ compliance with the CCP. These Chinese tech companies are legally bound to share data and information housed on Chinese technology, both in-state and abroad. They are also required to remain silent about their disclosure of private data to the CCP. As such, information about private citizens and governments around the world is provided to the Chinese government without transparency. By deploying hardware and software for countries seeking to expand their networks, the CCP could use its authority over domestic tech companies to gain access to information transferred over Chinese built networks, posing a significant threat to the national security interests of the U.S. and its Allies and Partners. With China leading 5G, the military forces of the U.S. and its Allies and Partners would be restricted in their ability to rely on indigenous telecoms abroad, which could cripple operations critical to U.S. interests [3]. This risk becomes even greater with the threat of U.S. Allies and Partners adopting Chinese 5G infrastructure, despite the harm this move would do to information sharing with the United States.

If China continues its current trajectory, the U.S. and its advocacy for personal freedoms will grow increasingly marginal in the discussion of human rights in the digital age. In light of the increasing importance of the cyber domain, the United States cannot afford to assume that its global leadership will seamlessly transfer to, and maintain itself within, cyberspace. The United States’ position as a leader in cyber technology is under threat unless it vigilantly pursues leadership in advancing and regulating the exchange of digital information.

Option #1:  Domestic Investment.

The U.S. government could facilitate a favorable environment for the development of 5G infrastructure through domestic telecom providers. Thus far, Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE have been able to outbid major European companies for 5G contracts. American companies that are developing 5G infrastructure are not large enough to compete at this time. By investing in 5G development domestically, the U.S. and its Allies and Partners would have 5G options other than Huawei and ZTE available to them. This option provides American companies with a playing field equal to their Chinese counterparts.

Risk:  Congressional approval to fund 5G infrastructure development will prove to be a major obstacle. Funding a development project can quickly become a bipartisan issue. Fiscal conservatives might argue that markets should drive development, while those who believe in strong government oversight might argue that the government should spearhead 5G development. Additionally, government subsidized projects have previously failed. As such, there is no guarantee 5G will be different.

Gain:  By investing in domestic telecommunication companies, the United States can remain independent from Chinese infrastructure by mitigating further Chinese expansion. With the U.S. investing domestically and giving subsidies to companies such as Qualcomm and Verizon, American companies can develop their technology faster in an attempt to compete with Huawei and ZTE.

Option #2:  Foreign Subsidization.

The U.S. supports European competitors Nokia and Ericsson, through loans and subsidies, against Huawei and ZTE. In doing so, the United States could offer a conduit for these companies to produce 5G technology at a more competitive price. By providing loans and subsidies to these European companies, the United States delivers a means for these companies to offer more competitive prices and possibly outbid Huawei and ZTE.

Risk:  The American people may be hostile towards a policy that provides U.S. tax dollars to foreign entities. While the U.S. can provide stipulations that come with the funding provided, the U.S. ultimately sacrifices much of the control over the development and implementation of 5G infrastructure.

Gain:  Supporting European tech companies such as Nokia and Ericsson would help deter allied nations from investing in Chinese 5G infrastructure. This option would reinforce the U.S.’s commitment to its European allies, and serve as a reminder that the United States maintains its position as the leader of the liberal international order. Most importantly, this option makes friendlier telecommunications companies more competitive in international markets.

Other Comments:  Both options above would also include the U.S. defining regulations and enforcement mechanisms to promote the fair usage of cyberspace. This fair use would be a significant deviation from a history of loosely defined principles. In pursuit of this fair use, the United States could join the Cyber Operations Resilience Alliance, and encourage legislation within the alliance that invests in democratic states’ cyber capabilities and administers clearly defined principles of digital freedom and the cyber domain.

Recommendation:  None.


Endnotes:

[1] Economy, Elizabeth C. “China’s New Revolution.” Foreign Affairs. June 10, 2019. Accessed July 31, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-04-17/chinas-new-revolution.

[2] Chhabra, Tarun. “The China Challenge, Democracy, and U.S. Grand Strategy.” Democracy & Disorder, February 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-china-challenge-democracy-and-u-s-grand-strategy/.

[3] “The Overlooked Military Implications of the 5G Debate.” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed August 01, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/blog/overlooked-military-implications-5g-debate.

Artificial Intelligence & Human-Machine Teaming China (People's Republic of China) Cyberspace Emerging Technology Ilyar Dulat Kayla Ibrahim Madison Sargeant Morgan Rose Option Papers Tyler Wilkins United States

Options for a Joint Support Service

Lieutenant Colonel Jason Hughes has served in roles from Platoon Leader to the Joint Staff with multiple combat deployments to Iraq and operational deployments to Africa and Haiti.  He is presently the Commander of 10th Field Hospital, a 148 bed deployable hospital.  He can be found on Twitter @medical_leader, manages the Medical Service Corps Leader Development Facebook page, and writes for The Medical Leader.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


National Security Situation:  “The Department of Defense will reform its business practices to gain the full benefit of every dollar spent, and to gain and hold the trust of the American people. We must be good stewards of the tax dollars allocated to us. Results and accountability matter[1].” – Former Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis

Date Originally Written:  December 24, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  February 3, 2020.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that without dynamic modernization solutions the DoD will be unable to sharpen the American Military’s competitive edge and realize the National Defense Strategy’s vision of a more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force. While DoD’s strategic guidance has evolved, its force structure has not.

Background:  Common support roles across the military create redundant overhead, separate doctrines, equipment and force designs, development and acquisition processes, and education and recruiting programs. Resources are scarce, yet organizations within DoD compete against each other developing three of everything when the DoD only requires one joint capability to support the operational requirement.

The Department’s sloth-like system and redundant capabilities across services create an opportunity for change. Reform and efficiencies realized in manpower, resources, and overhead cost directly support Lines of Effort One and Three of the National Defense Strategy[2]. Consolidation efforts could realize a 20-40% overhead[3], training, and equipment savings while providing the Joint Force access to low density, high demand capabilities.  Each Armed Service recruits, trains, and educates; develops policy, doctrine, and equipment; and manages careers separately for similar requirements. A review of similar capabilities across the services illustrates 16 commodities that could possibly be consolidated:

  • Human Resources
  • Logistics
  • Engineering
  • Communications
  • Intelligence
  • Medical
  • Cyber
  • Public Affairs
  • Religious
  • Finance
  • Contracting
  • Legal
  • Military Police / Criminal Investigation Forces
  • Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
  • Operations Research/Systems Analysis
  • Modeling and Simulations

Significance:  Similar reform efforts – health care transition from the services to the Defense Health Agency – have or will produce significant savings and efficiencies. Dollars saved focus scarce resources on combat readiness and lethality at the tip of the spear.

Option #1:  The DoD establishes a separate Armed Service focused on Joint Support.

The commodities listed above are consolidated into a separate Joint Support Service with Title 10 authorities commensurate with line requirements. The line (other Services) provides the requirement and “buys” what they need. This system is similar to the United States Marine Corps (USMC) relationship with the U.S. Navy (USN) regarding medical support. In this relationship the USMC defines their requirement and “buys” the commodity from the USN.

Risk:  Armed Service requirements documents are esoteric and do not allow the Joint Support Service to plan for force structure and requirements to meet those concepts.

Gain:  Option #1 ensures commonality and interoperability for the Joint Force (e.g., one scalable Damage Control Surgery set versus 8-10 service sets; fuel distribution systems that can support all forces; management of low density, high demand assets (Trauma Surgeons, Chaplains etc)).

Option #2:  The DoD pursues “Pockets of Excellence.”

The commodities listed above are centralized into a single existing Armed Service. The Secretary of Defense would redesign or select an Armed Service to manage a commodity, removing it from the other Armed Services. The lead Armed Service for a specific commodity then produces capacity that meets other Armed Service’s operational demands while building capability, doctrine, equipment, education and recruiting center of excellence for that commodity.

Risk:  The Armed Services, with resident expertise in specific commodities may impose their doctrine on other services instead of building a true joint capability that supports line operations across multiple Armed Services.

Gain:  The Armed Services are more likely to support this effort if they receive the manpower and appropriations increasing their bottom line.

Option #3:  Hybrid.

Each Armed Service develops commodity talent at the junior officer / Non-Commissioned Officer level much like today. This talent transfers into the Joint Support Service, providing support at “Echelons above Brigade,” later in their career.

Risk:  This option increases overhead in the Department by building a Joint Support Force without eliminating existing Armed Service requirements.

Gain:  This option would create a Joint Support Force that brings understanding of Armed Service systems, culture, and requirements.

Other Comments:  Lethality requires a support force organized for innovation that delivers performance at the speed of relevance, commensurate with line operational requirements, using a global operating model. The Armed Services hurt themselves by competing within the DoD. This competing leaves the overall DoD unable to produce a streamlined force using rapid, iterative approaches from development to fielding, that directly supporting the defeat of U.S. enemies, while protecting the American people and their vital interests at a sustainable cost to the taxpayer.

Recommendation:  None.


Endnotes:

[1] Mattis, J. N. (2018, January 19). Remarks by Secretary Mattis on the National Defense Strategy. Retrieved from https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1420042/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-on-the-national-defense-strategy/

[2] LOE 1: Rebuilding Military Readiness as we build a more lethal Joint Force; LOE 2: Reform the Department’s business practices for greater performance and affordability.

[3] German military reform forecasted a reduced total force by 18% while tripling the readiness force availability to support crisis management deployments. Larger cost savings should be expected in a force that is much larger than the German military. https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/30/opinion/30thu2.html

 

 

Budgets and Resources Capacity / Capability Enhancement Defense and Military Reform Jason Hughes Option Papers United States

Assessing a U.S. Policy of Détente with China

Assad Raza is an Active Component U.S. Army Civil Affairs Officer with deployment experience throughout the Middle East.  He holds a M.A. in Diplomacy with a concentration in International Conflict Management from Norwich University, and is a graduate of The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation Command and General Staff Officer Course at Fort Benning, Georgia.  He can be found on Twitter @assadraza12.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessing a U.S. Policy of Détente with China

Date Originally Written:  December 23, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  January 27, 2020.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes a policy of Détente, easing tension, with China would benefit the U.S. to avoid a military confrontation and increase economic opportunities between major powers.

Summary:  Any U.S. confrontation with China, which is the world’s second-largest economy and an emerging major power, would impact the global economy. The U.S. and its allies and partners cannot sever ties with China due to economic interdependencies. For these reasons, a policy of Détente with China that balances cooperation and deterrence to avoid a military confrontation would not only benefit the U.S. but the entire world.

Text:  In 1971 the United States set the conditions to integrate China into the international community. That year U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Beijing twice, and the United States voted for China’s permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council[1]. Now, 48 years later, U.S. Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo is saying that “China is the greatest threat the U.S. faces[2].” As an emerging major power, China’s foreign policy and competitive economy can threaten U.S. interests in the long-term.

To secure U.S. interests, a U.S. policy of Détente would ease U.S. tensions with China thus avoiding a military confrontation that could expand on a global scale. According to author Fareed Zakaria, “The U.S. risks squandering the hard-won gains from four decades of engagement with China, encouraging Beijing to adopt confrontational policies of its own, and leading the world’s two largest economies into a treacherous conflict of unknown scale and scope that will inevitably cause decades of instability and insecurity[3].” In a globalized world, the U.S. and several allies are economically interdependent, and any confrontation with China would have a drastic effect on the global economy. For this reason, improved U.S. relations with China would increase economic opportunities and reduce the risk of confrontation.

China is the second-largest economy and the largest trading partner in the world. As a result of this, any confrontation, either economically or militarily, will drastically impact the entire world. China’s recent economic decline and current U.S. trade disputes demonstrate China’s impact on the global economy. For example, Japan, China’s second-largest trading partner, blames China’s economic downturn for its first global trade deficit (1.2 trillion yen) since 2015[4]. Understanding China’s economic ties will likely drive U.S. policy development towards China. A China policy taking into account economic cooperation in areas of mutual interest will reduce the risk of a global market crash.

Beyond economic concerns, a U.S. policy towards China could include an arms agreement to limit a potential arms race and identify areas of cooperative research between the two countries. A good example is the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) that was part of the 1972 Nixon-Kissinger strategy of Détente with the Soviet Union[5]. Although negotiations over various strategic delivery systems (nuclear) continued through several administrations, this treaty did establish the necessary groundwork to prevent an accidental escalation of a nuclear war. A similar model to SALT with China would avoid the risk of confrontation and promote peace between major powers. A treaty between both countries does not imply that deterrence is not an option to manage any military ambitions China may have, for example, with Taiwan and the South China Sea.

In addition to economic and arms concerns, a policy of cooperation in technology and space with China would benefit the U.S. diplomatically and economically. During the Cold War, the U.S. pursued cooperative space research with the former Soviet Union. Although tensions at the time limited the extent of the cooperation, Russia’s technological contributions, pre- and post-Cold War, did benefit with establishing the International Space Station[6]. Additionally, cooperation in space also promoted U.S. foreign policy objectives in areas such as nonproliferation and arms control with Russia. Involving China in selected areas of cooperation in technology and space can ease tensions and increase diplomatic engagements in areas of mutual interests for both countries. Moreover, this space involvement can provide opportunities for the U.S. to engage with China on their nuclear program as they continue to build out their military capabilities.

The U.S. cannot sever ties with China due to the economic interdependence between China, the U.S., and its allies and partners. Additionally, several U.S. based companies want access to the growing market in China. According to the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), William Reinsch, “With 1.2 billion people, you can’t be a multinational company or a global company without some kind of presence there one way or the other[7].” Hence, U.S. companies would benefit from a U.S. policy that eases tension and increases economic ties with China. However, the topic of human rights abuses, censorship, and mass surveillance in China will continue to be debated between U.S. businesses, the U.S. government, and China.

China’s domestic behavior and foreign policy do threaten the liberal international order, for example, with human rights. However, severing ties with China would empower them to continue those repressive behaviors and influence other developing countries to follow suit. A U.S. policy that increases relations with China can provide the necessary leverage in the future to reinforce their commitment to human rights and promote peace within their borders.

For the U.S., a multi-faceted policy of Détente, compared to severing ties with from China, would better benefit the nation in the long-term. According to the chief economist at Enodo Economics, Diana Choyleva, severing ties with from China “…would mean cost-push inflation, it would mean the slowing down of innovation and technological progress, it would mean that each economy trying to solve the issues of increased inequality will find it that much harder to do so[8].” For this reason, a policy of Détente with China that balances cooperation and deterrence to avoid a military confrontation would not only benefit the U.S. but the entire world.


Endnotes:

[1] United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute (n.d.). Rapprochement with China, 1972. Retrieved December 23, 2019, from https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/rapprochement-china

[2] Schwartz, I. (2018). Pompeo: China Is The Greatest Threat U.S. Faces. Retrieved December 23, 2019, from https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2018/12/10/pompeo_china_is_the_greatest_threat_us_faces.html

[3] Zakaria, F. (2019). The New China Scare. Foreign Affairs, 99(1), 52–69. DOI: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-12-06/new-china-scare

[4] Johnston, M. (2019). China’s Top Trading Partners. Retrieved December 23, 2019, from https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/092815/chinas-top-trading-partners.asp 

[5] United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute (n.d.). Strategic Arms Limitations Talks/Treaty (SALT) I and II. Retrieved December 23, 2019, from https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/salt 

[6] U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (1995). U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Space, OTA-ISS-618. Retrieved December 23, 2019, from https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1995/9546/9546.PDF 

[7] Disis, J. (2019). American companies are taking enormous risks to do business in China. Retrieved December 23, 2019, from https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/11/business/us-china-trade-war-business/index.html 

[8] Mistreanu, S. (2019). Beyond ‘Decoupling’: How China Will Reshape Global Trade In 2020 . Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/siminamistreanu/2019/12/03/beyond-decoupling-how-china-will-reshape-global-trade-in-2020/#44bda74065b7 

 

Assad Raza Assessment Papers China (People's Republic of China) Détente / Detente

An Assessment of the Global War on Terror via Deterrence Theory

James P. Micciche is an Active Component U.S. Army Civil Affairs Officer with deployment and service experience in the Middle East, Africa, Afghanistan, Europe, and Indo-Pacific. He is currently a Master’s candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.  He can be found on Twitter @james_miccicheDivergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  An Assessment of the Global War on Terror via Deterrence Theory

Date Originally Written:  December 27, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  January 20, 2020.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that the 2017 National Security Strategy marked an end to the Global War on Terrorism.  Based upon this belief, it is important to start assessing U.S. policy during the Global War on Terrorism era through multiple theoretical lenses and practical frameworks to understand its successes and failures.

Summary:  The Global War on Terrorism’s goal was deterrence based — preventing terror attacks against the U.S. and extending that deterrence to other nations through a policy of denial and punishment. While the U.S. element of this goal was successful, the extension part was not as both terrorism deaths and the number of attacks from 2015-2019 still exceed pre-Global War on Terrorism levels, raising questions about the validity of deterring terror.

Text:  On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda conducted a series of coordinated attacks on the United States marking an emergence of a new era of American foreign policy. Nine days later before a joint session of Congress, President George W. Bush declared, “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated[1].” Bush’s speech ushered in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), a construct that would define the lens and transactional medium through which U.S. policy makers would shape foreign policy for the next 16 years.

The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) codified Bush’s charge by clearly defining that to achieve its strategic interests the United States will: “strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends[2].” In addition to the overarching principles within the NSS, two additional policy documents guided the initial operationalizing of the GWOT, the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. The former focused on preventing terrorist attacks within and against the United States while the ladder established a strategy to “Identify and defuse threats before they reach our borders[3].” These two documents outlined the GWOT’s foundational objectives that endured throughout the Bush and Obama administrations, a narrow goal of protecting the America and Americans and a comprehensive objective of averting international terrorist attacks by both defeating named terrorist organizations and preventing new ones to form.

Despite the 2006 NSS’s declaration that “terrorists cannot be deterred[4],” the foundational documents above clearly establish objectives based on deterrence. At its core, the GWOT sought to prevent a specific behavior, terrorism, against the United States and partners by means of both core tenets of deterrence, denial and punishment. Deterrence, simply put, is an agent preventing another agent from undertaking unwanted action or behaviors. The vast majority of deterrence theories identify two primary methods through which nations can deter others from taking undesirable actions — denial and punishment. The former increases the cost of conducting unwanted behaviors and decreases the chance of their success while the ladder threatens punitive action against agents who engage in such behaviors. Furthermore, it is important to analyze the scope of a nation’s deterrence efforts by defining if they are direct and concentrated only on preventing action against the nation itself or extended beyond national borders to other agents[5].

The GWOT utilized a bifurcated approach of denial by first directly hardening the United States homeland from terrorist attack by establishing new government agencies and implementing laws and structures that denied terrorists the opportunity to attack the United States. Secondly, the United States extended the GWOT to third parties by proactively attempting to deny terrorists the economic, social, and cultural conditions needed to thrive and form through development and democracy building efforts. Concurrently, the United States waged an aggressive punitive based deterrent policy against those that engaged and supported terror, including state actors, attempting to extend deterrence globally. If one is to examine the amount of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding that Congress authorized as part of the aforementioned efforts, it becomes clear that DoD-led punitive deterrence was the emphasized and preferred method throughout the GWOT. Of the nearly $2 Trillion spent on the GWOT-related OCO funding from 2001 to 2019 the U.S. Government allocated 92% towards DoD efforts, 8% for the U.S. Agency for International Development and Department of State development programs, and less than 1% on Department of Homeland Security and Coast Guard operations[6]. Punitive deterrence presents unique challenges against non-state actors who have no territorial sovereignty and often coexist with neutral civilian populations making preemptive and disciplinary action a calculated risk as it has the potential to support recruitment and propaganda narratives and counter ongoing denial efforts. Furthermore, punitive and preemptive actions against state actors also present the prospective of creating instability and under governed spaces conditions in which terrorist organizations form and thrive.

If one is to assess at the goal of extended global deterrence then the GWOT failed to achieve its objective as global terrorism related deaths were almost three and half times higher in 2017 (26,445) than in 2001 (7729) with numbers of attacks following similar growth rates[7]. Additionally, the GWOT period saw the rise of new violent extremist organizations such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State, despite ongoing extended denial efforts and punitive strikes and raids. Furthermore, two nations at the center of U.S. GWOT efforts, Afghanistan and Iraq, have remained the most impacted by terror despite nearly two decades of U.S. efforts[8]. Even longstanding U.S. treaty allies such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries have had their terror rates increase during the GWOT period. Despite the overall increase in global terror rates throughout the GWOT period, the past four years (2015-2019) have witnessed a decline in both deaths and number of attacks but still exceeds pre-GWOT levels.

The GWOT goal of direct deterrence has been far more successful than its extended counterpart as there have been no attacks on U.S soil that are comparable to the scale of 9/11. Moreover, from 2002 to 2018, North America experienced 431 terrorist attacks and 317 related deaths, only Central America and the Caribbean saw lower rates with 212 and 164 respectively; for comparison, Europe experienced 4290 attacks and 2496 deaths during the same period[9]. Despite the relative success of preventing terrorism compared to other regions, the United States still experienced deadly terrorist attacks from across the spectrum of ideologies such as the Boston Marathon bombing of 2013 and El Paso shooting of 2017.

In closing, assessing the GWOT through the lens of deterrence presents mixed results based on the scope of efforts; direct deterrence achieved far greater outcomes than extended efforts with less allocated funding. Furthermore, the GWOT raises questions about the validity of deterring non-state actors through punitive measures, the prospects of waging war against a tactic, and if a given level of terrorism is a constant risk within the modern world. U.S. Africa Command’s 2019 strategic priority of reducing terror threats to a “level manageable by internal security forces[10]” highlights a strategic shift in thinking and the acceptance of inherent levels of global terrorist activity.


Endnotes:

[1] Gregg, Gary L. “George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs.” The Miller Center. https://millercenter.org/president/gwbush/foreign-affairs. (retrieved 29Nov19)

[2] Bush, George W. , National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Executive Officer of the President, Washington DC, Washington United States 2002

[3] Bush, George W., National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Executive Officer of the President, Washington DC, Washington United States 2006

[4] Bush, George W., National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Executive Officer of the President, Washington DC, Washington United States 2006

[5] Mazarr, Michael J. Understanding Deterrence. RAND 2018

[6] Mazarr, Michael J. Understanding Deterrence. RAND 2018 McGarry, Brendan W. and Morgenstern, Emily M. “Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status.” Library of Congress. Washington D 2019

[7] McGarry, Brendan W. and Morgenstern, Emily M. “Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status.” Library of Congress. Washington D 2019 Global Terrorism Database https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=&sa.x=54&sa.y=3

[8] Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2019: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, Sydney, November 2019. Available from: http://visionofhumanity.org/reports (accessed 20 Dec 2019).

[9] Ibid

[10] Waldhauser, Thomas. United States Africa Command Posture Statement. Washington DC: DoD, 2019.

Assessment Papers Deterrence James P. Micciche Violent Extremism

An Assessment of the Forest Brothers’ Response to Invasion of the Baltics

Adam Paul Hunt is a freelance writer with a background in political science.  Adam wide-ranging writing has been featured in Library Journal, Premier Guitar, and Dirt Rag.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  An Assessment of the Forest Brothers’ Response to Invasion of the Baltics

Date Originally Written:  November 22, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  January 13, 2020.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that in today’s security environment many lessons can be learned from how the Baltic nations historically defended themselves against a militarily superior foe.

Summary:  According to the Rand Corporation, Russia could invade the Baltic nations and reach the capitols of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania within 60 hours[1].  The Baltic nations are not strangers to defending themselves against invasion.  History shows that Baltic-based resistance groups, though their actions may be complicated or undesired, can penalize a militarily superior foe.

Text:  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the election of Vladimir Putin as President of Russia in 1999, the Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have felt uneasy concerning their larger and more powerful Russian neighbor. The Baltic States have a long history of resisting Russian aggression, but as with most histories, the relationship between the Baltic States and Russia is complex and sometimes the line between hero and villain is indistinct.

During the Russian Revolution of 1905, small groups of Baltic peasants and teachers sought refuge from Tsarist forces and hid in the forests. These groups become known as The Forest Brothers[2]. After the chaos of World War I and the 1918 Bolshevik revolution, the Baltic States were able to break away from Russia. In 1940 that independence would come to a halt, with the Soviets seizing control of the Baltic States. As in 1905, small groups fled into the forests and attempted to resist the Soviets and the German Nazis. Some of The Forest Brother groups were hopeful that they could depend on the 1941 Atlantic Charter signatories, the United Kingdom and the United States, to come to their aid. The lack of action of the Atlantic Charter nations, among other factors, would eventually doom the resistance group efforts to failure[3].

In 1941, the first resistance group in Lithuania called the Lithuanian Activist Front, was formed to fight the Soviets[4]. A year later, The Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania was set up to resist Nazi occupation. Curiously, partisan resistance did not start in earnest until 1944, even though the resistance would last until 1953 and the last Lithuanian partisan, Benediktas Mikulis, would be arrested in 1971[5]. While the exact numbers of those that took up arms against the Soviets are unknown, it’s estimated that between 30,000 – 50,000 did and another 50,000 people were active helpers; which means 1-20 Lithuanians were active in the struggle for independence[6]. The pinnacle of partisan efforts in 1945 clearly represents a culminating point that forced the Lithuanian resistance movement to shift their operations drastically. Ultimately, based on the totality of evidence, this 1945 culminating point split the resistance into two stages: 1) 1944-1945 – conventional war operations, a period of traditional offensive warfare by an organized partisan movement; and 2) 1946-1953 – irregular warfare operations, a period of unremitting decline by a significantly diminished resistance, relegated to a more defensive posture and small scale offensive operations.

Two men, Povilas Plechavičius[7][8] and Adolfas Ramanauskas[9][10] (“Vanagas”)would emerge as during World War II as symbols of Lithuanian independence. Plechavičius had been involved in the 1918 war of independence and the 1926 Lithuanian coup d’état that overthrew Lithuanian President Kazys Grinius. Ramanauskas was an American of Lithuanian dissent who became a platoon commander to the chairman of the Union of Lithuanian Freedom Fighters.

By 1944, the tide had started to turn against Germany. Nazi occupation forces had begun conscripting members of the German minority in Estonia and Latvia into the Waffen-SS. In keeping with blurring the line between hero and villain, Povilas Plechavičius cooperated with SS Obergruppenführer, and police general Friedrich Jackeln and Chief-of-Staff of the Northern Front Field Marshal Walther Model[11]. However, Plechavičius refused Jackeln’s demand for a Lithuanian SS division[12] and formed a local group called the Lithuanian Territorial Defense Force instead[13][14].

One of the most famous of the Lithuanian anti-Soviet partisans was Adolfas Ramanauskas[15]. Ramanauskas was born 1918 in Connecticut, United States of America, but in 1921 he and his family moved to Lithuania. While in Lithuania he would eventually study at the Kanus War School, join the reserve forces, rise to the rank of second lieutenant, and participate in the anti-Soviet uprising in 1941.

Ramanauskas organized a sizable resistance group called the Lithuanian Freedom Fighters Union (LLKS) and directly engaged the Soviet Ministry of Interior’s forces, the NKVD. The group’s most daring assault was an effort to free prisoners located in Merkinė and destroy Soviet records. The attack was only partly successful, ending in the destruction of the records[16]. Merkinė was also the site of the extinction of 854 Jews by fellow Lithuanians. Their bodies were deposited in a mass grave near the Jewish cemetery[17].

One of the controversies surrounding Ramanauskas is the event of July 19, 1941. Along with German forces, the LLKS partisans held partial control of the Lithuanian town of Druskininkai and participated in the roundup of communists and Jews, and the disarming of Poles. Those detained were then transported to the Treblinka death camp[18].

At the end of World War II, The Forest Brothers would continue to defy Soviet occupation and hope that the United States and Great Britain would support their resistance[19]. Plechavičius ordered his men to disband and organize resistance groups to fight Soviet occupation. Plechavičius would eventually be arrested by the Soviets and deported to Latvia. In 1949, Plechavičius moved to the United States and would die in 1973[20].

Ramanauskas would continue to resist Soviet occupation, but due to a series of defeats and lack of outside support, he would eventually suspend armed resistance in favor of passive resistance and publish newspapers in Russian and Lithuanian. He would continue to evade Soviet authorities until his arrest in 1956. Ramanauskas would be tortured by the Soviet Committee for State Security, the KGB, and was eventually executed in 1957[21].

The occupation of Lithuania by the Third Reich and the Soviet Union was brutal. Between extermination campaigns by the Wehrmacht and Einsatzgruppen, mass deportations (notably operations Vesna, Priboli, and Osen), and “Sovietization” campaign, it’s estimated that between 60-70,000 Lithuanians were forced into exile[22]. Between 1940 and 1944, 460,000 civilians and military personnel were killed (out of a population of 2,442,000). Also, in 1953 nearly 120,000 people, (about 5% of the population) would be deported. Lastly, the Germans exterminated between 143,000-195,000 Litvaks (Lithuanian Jews).

The lessons that can be learned from Lithuania are many, and range from: history is messy, the distinction between hero and villain isn’t always clear, commitments like Atlantic Charter are not always honored, and changing tactics as circumstances change is necessary, especially against superior forces.


Endnotes:

[1] Kyle, J. (2019, January 16), “Contextualizing Russia and the Baltic States,” Retrieved December 15, 2013, from https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/01/contextualizing-russia-and-the-baltic-states/.

[2] Woods, Alan. “Bolshevism: The Road to Revolution Archived 2012-12-10,” Wellred Publications, London, 1999.

[3] Leskys, Major Vylius M. United States Army. “‘Forest Brothers,’ 1945: The culmination of the Lithuanian Partisan movement” Submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Master of Military Studies. United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, 2009.

[4] Piotrowski,Tadeusz, “Poland’s Holocaust”, McFarland & Company, 1997

[5] Buttar, Prit, “Between Giants: The Battle for the Baltics in World War II” Osprey Publishing, 2015.

[6] Ruin, Pahl, “The forest brothers – heroes & villains of the partisan war in Lithuania” Baltic Worlds http://balticworlds.com/the-forest-brothers-heroes-villains/, 2016.

[7] Povilas Plechavičius, http://partizanai.org/gen-povilas-plechavicius

[8] Roszkowski,Wojciech and Kofman, Jan, “Biographical Dictionary of Central and Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century” Routledge, 2008.

[9] Adolfas Ramanauskas, http://www.draugas.org/news/adolfas-ramanauskas-the-hawk-vs-the-ussr/

[10] “Ceremony of Adolfas Ramanauskas-Vanagas state funeral,” Ministry of National Defence Republic of Lithuania, https://kam.lt/en/ceremony_of_adolfas_ramanauskas-vanagas_state_funeral.html 

[11] Povilas Plechavičius, http://partizanai.org/gen-povilas-plechavicius

[12] Villani, Gerry and Georg, Jennifer, “Soldiers of Germania – The European volunteers of the Waffen SS”. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016.

[13] “Karys Nr. 2 (2018) 2014 m.” (PDF). Karys: 46–52. 2014, https://kam.lt/download/39937/maketas%20visas.pdf, Retrieved 2 October 2019.

[14] Eidintas, Alfonsas et al., “The History of Lithuania. 2nd rev. ed”. Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2015.

[15] Adolfas Ramanauskas, https://www.baltictimes.com/lithuania_pays_tribute_to_partisan_commander_ramanauskas-vanagas_in_state_funeral/

[16] Adolfas Ramanauskas, https://peoplepill.com/people/adolfas-ramanauskas/

[17] Balčiūnas, Evaldas, “Footprints of Adolfas Ramanauskas-Vanagas in the Mass Murder of the Jews of Druskininkai” http://defendinghistory.com/footprints-adolfas-ramanauskas-vanagas-mass-murder-jews-druskininkai/65177, 2014.

[18] Balčiūnas, Evaldas, “Footprints of Adolfas Ramanauskas-Vanagas in the Mass Murder of the Jews of Druskininkai” http://defendinghistory.com/footprints-adolfas-ramanauskas-vanagas-mass-murder-jews-druskininkai/65177, 2014.

[19] Leskys, Major Vylius M. United States Army. “‘Forest Brothers,’ 1945: The culmination of the Lithuanian Partisan movement” Submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Master of Military Studies. United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, 2009.

[20] Povilas Plechavičius, http://partizanai.org/gen-povilas-plechavicius

[21] Adolfas Ramanauskas, http://www.draugas.org/news/adolfas-ramanauskas-the-hawk-vs-the-ussr/

[22] “The Genocidal Temptation: Auschwitz, Hiroshima, Rwanda, and Beyond,” edited by Robert S. Frey, 2004, https://books.google.com/books?id=NkE1LGCxiR0C&lpg=PA79&dq=Soviet%20deportations%20from%20Lithuania&lr&pg=PA79#v=onepage&q=Soviet%20deportations%20from%20Lithuania&f=false

Assessment Papers Baltics Estonia Germany Irregular Forces Latvia Lithuania Russia

An Assessment of the National Security Impact of Digital Sovereignty

Kathleen Cassedy is an independent contractor and open source specialist. She spent the last three years identifying, cataloging, and analyzing modern Russian and Chinese political and economic warfare efforts; the role of foreign influence operations in gray zone problem sets; global influence of multi-national entities, non-state actors, and super-empowered individuals; and virtual sovereignty, digital agency, and decentralized finance/cryptocurrency. She tweets @Katnip95352013.

Ian Conway manages Helios Global, Inc., a risk analysis consultancy that specializes in applied research and analysis of asymmetric threats. Prior to conducting a multi-year study of political warfare operations and economic subversion, he supported DoD and homeland security programs focused on counterterrorism, counterproliferation, hard and deeply buried targets, and critical infrastructure protection.

Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  An Assessment of the National Security Impact of Digital Sovereignty

Date Originally Written:  December 6, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  January 6, 2020.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The authors believe that traditional notions of citizenship and sovereignty are rapidly changing and that the U.S. could gain competitive advantage by embracing a tiered citizenship model, including e-residency.

Summary:  Money, people, and companies drove globalization’s disruption of centuries of power domination by nation-states, while increasing the agency and autonomy of corporations and individuals. The balance of power has shifted, and if governments do not learn how to adapt, they will be relegated to the back seat in influence and decision making for this century. One opportunity for adaptation lies in embracing, not rejecting, digital sovereignty.

Text:  In the past 25 years, the globalization of the world’s economic systems and the introduction of Internet ubiquity have had profound effects on humankind and centuries-old governance structures. Electronic commerce has transformed international supply chain dynamics and business finance. Physical borders have become less meaningful in the face of digital connectedness and supranational economic zones. The largest multinational corporations have market caps which challenge or exceed the gross domestic product of most of the countries in the world. These changes have made international transactions – and investments – executable with the click of a button, transactions that once required weeks or months of travel to finalize.

Facilitating and empowering the citizens of the world to engage in the global marketplace has created a new dynamic. This dynamic involves the provision of safety and security of the people being increasingly transferred to the private sector thus forcing governments to outsource their most basic sovereign responsibility and reserving the most complete and effective solutions for those who can afford them. This outsourcing includes fiscal security (or social welfare), especially in free market economies where the responsibility for savings and investment is on the individual, not the government. As safety and security – personal and fiscal – becomes further privatized, individuals are taking steps to wrest control of themselves – their identities, their businesses, and their freedom of movement – from the state. Individuals want to exercise self-determination and attain individual sovereignty in the globalized world. This desire leaves the nation state, particularly in western democracies, in a challenging position. How does a government encourage self-sufficiency (often because states can no longer afford the associated costs) and democracy when globalized citizens are redefining what it means to be a citizen?

The first war of the 21st century, the Global War on Terrorism, was one of individuals disenfranchised from the state developing subnational, virtual organizations to employ terror and insurgent tactics to fight the nation states’ monopoly on power. The second war – already well underway but one that governments have been slow to recognize and engage – is great power competition short of kinetic action, to remake the geopolitical balance of power into multi-polar spheres of influence. The third war this century may likely be over amassing talent and capital, which in turn drives economic power. America’s near-peer adversaries, particularly China[1], are already moving aggressively to increase their global hegemony for this century, using all means of state power available. How can America counter its near-peers? The U.S. could position itself to exert superiority in the expanding competition for wealth by proactively embracing self-determination and individual autonomy as expressed by the digital sovereignty movement.

Digital sovereignty is the ultimate expression of free market capitalism. If global citizens have freedom of movement – and of capital, access to markets, encouragement to start businesses – they will choose the market and the society with the fewest barriers to entry. Digital sovereignty gives the advantage to countries who operate on free market capitalism and self-determination. Digital sovereignty is also an unexpected counter to China’s and Russia’s authoritarian models, thus disrupting the momentum that both those competitors have gained during the great power competition. In addition to acting as a disrupter in global geopolitics, proactive acceptance and adoption of digital sovereignty opens new potential tax and economic boosts to the U.S. Further, digital sovereignty could serve as an opportunity to break down barriers between Silicon Valley (particularly its techno-libertarians) and the U.S. government, by leveraging one of the tech elite’s most progressive socio-cultural concepts.

What might digital sovereignty look like in the U.S.? One approach is Estonia’s forward-looking experiments with e-residency[2] for business purposes but with the U.S. extending these ideas further to a tiered citizenship structure that includes U.S.-issued identity and travel benefits. One can be a citizen and contribute to the U.S. economy with or without living there. People can incorporate their business and conduct banking in the U.S., all using secure digital transactions. Stateless (by choice or by circumstance) entrepreneurs can receive travel documents in exchange for tax revenue. This is virtual citizenship.

The U.S. government could opt to act now to throw its weight behind digital sovereignty. This is a democratic ideal for the 21st century, and the U.S. has an opportunity to shape and influence the concept. This policy approach would pay homage to the Reagan-Bush model of free movement of labor. In this model, people don’t get full citizenship straight away, but they can legally work and pay taxes in the U.S. economy, while living where they like.

The U.S. government could create two tiers of citizenship. Full conventional citizenship – with voting privileges and other constitutionally guaranteed rights – could remain the domain of natural born and naturalized citizens. A second level of citizenship for the e-citizen could avoid the provision of entitlements but allow full access to the economy: free movement across borders, the ability to work, to start a business, to open a bank account. E-citizenship could be a path to earning full citizenship if that’s what the individual wants. If not, they can remain a virtual citizen, with some but not all privileges of full citizenship. Those who do wish to pursue full legal citizenship might begin contributing to the American economy and gain some benefits of association with the U.S., but they could do so from wherever they are currently located. This approach might also encourage entrepreneurship, innovation, and hard work – the foundations of the American dream.

Both historically and at present – irrespective of what party is in office – the U.S. has always desired to attract immigrants that want the opportunity to pursue a better life for themselves and their children through hard work. Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness: the foundational concept of the United States. Accordingly, if the U.S. is the first great power to embrace and encourage digital sovereignty, acting in accordance with core American values, then the U.S. also shapes the future battlespace for the war for talent and capital by exerting first-mover advantage.


Endnotes:

[1] Shi, T. (2017, October 17). “Xi Plans to Turn China Into a Leading Global Power by 2050”. Retrieved December 2, 2019, from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-17/xi-to-put-his-stamp-on-chinese-history-at-congress-party-opening.

[2] Republic of Estonia. “The new digital nation: What is E-Residency?” Retrieved December 2, 2019, from https://e-resident.gov.ee/.

Assessment Papers Cyberspace Economic Factors Estonia United States

Call for Papers: Ethics in National Security

Background:

Divergent Options is a non-politically aligned non-revenue generating national security website that, in 1,000 words or less, provides unbiased, dispassionate, candid articles that assess a national security situation, present multiple options to address the situation, and articulate the risk and gain of each option.  Please note that while we assess a national security situation and may provide options, we never recommend a specific option.

Call for Papers:

Divergent Options is calling for national security papers assessing situations or discussing options related to Ethics in National Security.

Please limit your article to 1,000 words and write using our Options Paper or Assessment Paper templates which are designed for ease of use by both writers and readers alike.

Please send your article to submissions@divergentoptions.org by February 15, 2020.

If you are not interested in writing on this topic, we always welcome individual articles on virtually any national security situation an author is passionate about.  Please do not let our call for papers cause you to hesitate to send us your idea. We look forward to hearing from you!

Call For Papers

Assessment of the U.S. Presence in Afghanistan

Adam A. Azim is a writer and entrepreneur based in Northern Virginia.  He holds a Master’s Degree in U.S. Foreign Policy at American University’s School of International Service in Washington, DC.  His areas of interest include U.S. foreign policy and strategy, as well as political philosophy.  He can be found on Twitter @adamazim1988.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessment of the U.S. Presence in Afghanistan

Date Originally Written:  December 5, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  December 30, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article is written from an American point of view, in regards to the U.S. presence in Afghanistan.

Summary:  Afghanistan is part of an American effort to create a world system based on liberal-democratic principles. This effort began in post-World War II reconstruction projects, the success of which rested on abstention from extending the project into countries like Russia and China and accommodating their security and military interests.

Text:  The rationale for the U.S. presence in Afghanistan can vary depending on whether one views the presence through a realist or liberal lens. On one hand, there is sufficient cause to suggest that the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is based on realpolitik, where the U.S. is pursuing security and economic interests by thwarting the possibility of Afghanistan again becoming a transnational terrorist safe haven all while tapping into natural resources such as uranium, lithium, rare earth materials, and opium that are vital for the sustenance of modern high-tech industries and the pharmaceutical industry. On the other hand, an idealist would justify the U.S. presence in Afghanistan as part of an overall pursuit of what John Mearsheimer calls “liberal hegemony” where the U.S. is seeking to establish a world system based on the principles of liberal democracy, such as global peace and security, free-market economics, as well as rule of law and the adjudication of conflicts.

In reality, U.S. foreign policy is a balance of both approaches, where the pursuit of military and economic power is combined with principle to shape the nature of foreign policy. Unlike China, whose foreign policy is based purely on the concept of realpolitik and the pursuit of its own security and economic interests, the U.S. is one of the few superpowers in world history to have combined the realpolitik approach of foreign policy with one that is based on the promotion of liberal-democratic principles. Much of America’s efforts on the global stage since World War II have been focused on institution building on a global level in various areas of concern to all nations, such as security with the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and economics through the creation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and international law through the creation of the United Nations. The United States has applied both realpolitik and liberal hegemony as approaches to its involvement in Afghanistan. There is both a moral justification to America’s presence in Afghanistan and a military and economic justification.

The question remains whether the U.S. presence in Afghanistan will persist and possess the lifespan of the U.S. presence in other places such as Germany and the Korean Peninsula. The American public has put immense pressure on its politicians to withdraw American forces and personnel from the Middle East and Afghanistan. From a legal standpoint, the U.S. government has the legal justification for its involvement in the Middle East and Afghanistan through laws that were passed in the post-9/11 era such as the Patriot Act as well as an “Authorization to Use Military Force.” The United Nations and the European Union have also pledged support for the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. The U.S. government may decide to announce a withdrawal of a significant number of troops and personnel from Afghanistan to placate its public, but it is highly unlikely that the United States will initiate a full withdrawal from Afghanistan after all the investments that it has made there over the past eighteen years.

As mentioned before, the mission in Afghanistan is part of an overall effort to organize the world and create a world system based on liberal-democratic principles while maintaining the pursuit of American military and economic power to sustain the liberal hegemonic effort. This liberal hegemonic effort has its roots in America’s post-World War II reconstruction of Europe and Asia, and this effort has now extended in scope by covering areas that are novel to the United States such as the Middle East and Afghanistan. However, it is a fact that the focus of the United States has been lopsided towards countries where America has vested security and economic interests. Furthermore, there has not been a significant push on the part of the United States to implement international law in places like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan who are allied to the United States but are in violation of liberal-democratic principles. Nevertheless, the global strategy for the United States is in place with clear objectives, and the implementation of such a strategy will inevitably face challenges and roadblocks imposed by authoritarian powers such as Russia and China who like the United States have regional and possibly global ambitions.

One component of America’s global strategy will also include a “live and let die” component by using all the levers of power at its disposal to place pressure as well as sanctions on countries that will resist America’s liberal hegemonic project such as Iran and Russia. However, it is unlikely that Russia and China will seek to thwart America’s global strategy simply because the capabilities are not there to mount such an effort. Instead, the Russians and the Chinese will seek to find opportunities to negotiate and engage in dialogue with the United States to preserve their respective security and economic interests. As far as Afghanistan is concerned, the Russians and the Chinese initially had no objections to America’s involvement in Afghanistan, and the Russians even encouraged Uzbekistan to allow the United States to stage its Afghan-related operations there in 2001.

While America’s liberal hegemonic effort has staying power in Afghanistan and possibly the Middle East, it may run into a dead end if America seeks to extend the effort inside of Russia and China. It is highly unlikely that Russia and China will seek to dislodge the United States from Afghanistan via proxy as long as America engages in sustainable diplomacy with Russia and China and find ways to accommodate Russian and Chinese security and economic interests. Short of Russia joining the European Union and America engaging with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization for the purpose of economic and infrastructural development in Asia, American efforts in Afghanistan regarding Russia and China will continue to be one-offs and not be underpinned by a formal structure.


Endnotes:

None.

Adam A. Azim Afghanistan Assessment Papers Taliban (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) United States

Options for Deterrence Below Armed Conflict

James P. Micciche is an Active Component U.S. Army Civil Affairs Officer with deployment and service experience in the Middle East, Africa, Afghanistan, Europe, and Indo-Pacific. He is currently a Master’s candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.  He can be found on Twitter @james_miccicheDivergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


National Security Situation:  As military competition below armed conflict once again becomes the norm, the U.S. requires deterrence options.

Date Originally Written:  November 17, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  December 23, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that traditional nuclear deterrence will not suffice in the current national security paradigm as it is focused on mainly deterring nuclear war or major conflict, which are the least-likely situations to occur.

Background:  In June 2019, the United States Military’s Joint Staff published Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-19 “The Competition Continuum.”  The JDN further developed and refined the non-linear/non-binary continuum that defines the perpetual state of competition that exists between nations .  This perpetual state of competition was originally proposed in the “Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC)[1].” Within the JDN continuum the Joint Force, in conjunction with other elements of national power (diplomacy, economic, information, etc.), simultaneously campaigns through a combination of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict to achieve desired strategic objectives including deterring actions and goals of rival states. The continuum represents a shift in U.S. military doctrine from a counterterrorism-centric security strategy to one focused on competing with a spectrum of international agents and actors.

Significance:  While not an authoritative document, JDNs generate and facilitate the creation and revision of joint and service specific doctrine. Therefore, the continuum proposed by the JDN will be integrated and operationalized by planners and doctrine writers across the Department of Defense (DoD). Within the JDN’s continuum, competition below armed conflict is not only the aspect that most regularly occurs, but also the most challenging for the DoD to operationalize. The JDN further refines the JCIC language by describing campaigning through competition below armed conflict as a protracted, constrained, often imbalanced, and diverse construct predicated upon a deep understanding of the operating environment where the joint force seeks to execute three newly codified tactical tasks: Enhance, Manage, and Delay.  Despite clarifying the language of competition below armed conflict, the JDN fails to provide concrete examples of the concepts implementation to include the Joint Force’s role in deterrence which is vaguely described “Deterrence in competition below armed conflict is similarly nuanced [to deterrence by armed conflict} and perhaps harder to judge[2].”  This paper will provide three options for planners and doctrine writers to employ deterring rivals through competition below armed conflict per the guidance outlined in the JDN and JCIC.

Option #1:  Persistent Presence.

The United States, at the behest of partner nations, overtly deploys conventional ground forces to key strategic regions / locations to prevent aggressive incursions from rival states in fear of causing U.S. casualties and invoking a potential kinetic response. This same principle is applied to the regular exercise of freedom of navigation though global commons that are considered vital to U.S. interests.

Risk:  Conventional U.S. force presence adjacent to competitor nations potentially escalates tensions and greatly increases the risk of armed conflict where U.S. personnel forward potentially face overwhelming force from a near peer competitor. The logistical and personnel requirements to deploy conventional forces forward are high and can lead partner nations to become overly dependent on U.S. forces thus creating enduring U.S. expenditures. The presence of a large U.S. footprint can facilitate competitor information operations focusing on delegitimizing the efficacy of host nation government / military possibly creating domestic instability, and prompting anti-U.S. sentiment amongst the population.

Gain:  There have been successful historic and contemporary applications of deterrence by presence from a proportionally smaller U.S. force compared to rivals. Examples include U.S. / North Atlantic Treaty Organization forward presence in Europe during the Cold War as part of a successful deterrence strategy against larger Eastern bloc forces and the recent expansion of Turkish, Syrian, and Russian forces into Northern Syria upon the departure of a small footprint of U.S. forces in October of 2019. Presence can also facilitate collaboration and interoperability between U.S. and regional partners supporting the two other elements of the competition continuum cooperation and armed conflict.

Option #2:  Civil Resiliency and Civil Engagement.

Many of the United States’ principal competitors attempt to advance their interests and achieve their objectives through various forms of population-centric warfare that seeks to instigate and capitalize on domestic instability. To deny access to, and mitigate the ability to influence populations needed to advance such a strategy, the Joint Force utilizes Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations capabilities to identify populations tied to key terrain and in conjunction with other elements of national power fosters civil resiliency to malign influence.

Risk:  Fostering civil resiliency in populations vulnerable to or targeted by malign influence operations is a long-term undertaking requiring enduring programming funds and command support to be effective. Assessments of population-centric operations are difficult to quantify making the establishment of measures of performance and effectiveness exceptionally difficult and impeding the understanding of effects of enemy, friendly, and partner actions within the complex system of the human domain.

Gain:  A population-centric engagement strategy facilitates interagency coordination enabling the utilization of multiple elements of national power to counter malign efforts by adversaries and simultaneously propagates U.S. soft power. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations elements have exceptionally small personnel footprints and low logistical costs and can promote cooperation with host nation counterparts. Military-civil engagement programs and projects often permit personnel to operate in regions and nations where competitors have an established advantage.

Option #3:  Proxies and Regime Fragility.

Today, the United States’ chief competitors and their allies are regimes that are authoritarian in nature[3] and therefore all share the primacy of maintaining regime power as their supreme interest. The Joint Force can exploit this distinctive feature of authoritarianism and utilize clandestinely-supported proxies and / or focused information operations to threaten the domestic stability of autocrats taking actions against U.S. interests.

Risk:  Creating instability comes with many unknown variables and has the potential to produce unwanted secondary effects including expanding conflicts beyond a single nation and engulfing an entire region in war. There remains a long history of the United States equipping and training proxies that later become adversaries. If direct U.S involvement in a proxy conflict becomes publicly known, there could be irreversible damage to the United States’ international reputation degrading comparative advantages in soft power and the information domain.

Gain:  Operating through either a proxy or the information domain provides managed attribution to the Joint Force and increases freedom of maneuver within a normally constrained competition environment to threaten rival leadership in their most vulnerable areas. Working with proxies provides both an easy exit strategy with very few formal commitments and leads to little risk to U.S. personnel.

Other Comments:  The above listed options are not mutually exclusive and can be utilized in conjunction not only with each other but also together with other elements of the competition continuum to achieve an objective of deterring unwanted competitor actions while concurrently promoting U.S interests. The U.S. cannot compete in an omnipresent manner and ts planners would do well to pragmatically choose where and how to compete based on national interests, competitor action/inaction, available resources, and conditions within a competitive environment.

Recommendation:  None.


Endnotes:

[1] Joint Chiefs of Staff (2018) Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning. Retrieved from https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joint_concept_integrated_campaign.pdf?ver=2018-03-28-102833-257

[2] Joint Chiefs of Staff (2019) Competition Continuum (Joint Doctrine Note 1-19). Retrieved from https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_19.pdf?ver=2019-06-10-113311-233

[3] The Economist Intelligence Unit (2018). 2018 Democracy Index, The Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index

 

 

 

Below Established Threshold Activities (BETA) Deterrence James P. Micciche Option Papers

Assessing the Deterrence Value of the F-35 in Syria

Humayun Hassan is an undergraduate student at National University of Sciences and Technology, Pakistan. His areas of research interests include 5th and 6th generation warfare and geopolitics of the Levant. He can be found on Twitter @Humayun_17. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessing the Deterrence Value of the F-35 in Syria

Date Originally Written:  October 30, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  December 16, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article is written from the U.S perspective, with regards to the significance of the F-35 aircraft, in terms of protecting U.S assets in Syria and the Levant amidst various local and foreign hostile forces.

Summary:  In 2019 the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter was used for the first time in the Middle East. As major world players further their national interests in Syria, the United States is forced to be more active in the region. The Turkish offensive against the Kurds, the Islamic State, and Russian influence are the major concerns for the U.S. The F-35 could be used effectively to not only protect the U.S ground forces but also to deter its enemies from attacking the American assets.

Text:  Amidst the fickle and intricate geopolitics of Syria, perhaps the only constant in this melting pot, is the United States’ lack of strategic clarity. After over eight years of the ongoing Syrian civil war, the average American might not pay much heed to this seemingly incessant conflict, other than when this issue involves their fellow countrymen and tax money. Regardless, the geo-strategic significance of Syria, coupled with the kind of major players involved in this conflict, calls for proactivity and sometimes, grudging, yet necessary entailment on the part of the United States.

The emergence and the consequential establishment of the Islamic State’s (IS) caliphate, amongst the ashes of burning Levant, is perhaps the most pertinent issue of concern, not only for United States but for most of the Western powers. Since the civil war broke out in 2011, the scale of the conflict has only exacerbated[1], to the point where almost all global powers are somehow involved in the Syrian crisis. Whether this involvement is due to a lack of U.S. long-term vision for Syria and the greater Levant, or the reluctance to be proactive and protect its national interests in the region, the fact remains that rival powers, Iran and Russia, have more strategic depth and the leverage to protect their interests in the region than any time in recent years[2].

Since 2011, there have been many turns and changes with regards to the U.S objectives in Syria. However, containment and impairment of the IS caliphate, opposition of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and halting increasing Iranian influence in the region have continued to be the among the main priorities of the United States in Syria. With a limited number of boots on ground the U.S also relies on its allies to such as Syrian Democratic Force (SDF), to protect its interests in the region. The SDF, which are commonly regarded as “rebel forces,” are primarily comprised of Kurdish fighters, who have actively fighting against the Syrian army and IS simultaneously[3]. With three main local factions fighting each other for the control of territory and resources of the country, each foreign power is supporting their side. For the United States, the prevailing objective is to not only undermine the threat of IS, but also to deny the unholy trinity of Assad, Iran, and Russia sole dominion over the geopolitical landscape.

With limited amount of manpower, unfamiliar terrain, presence of multiple hostile fronts, and a threat of inadvertent clash with the Iranian or Russian forces, how does the United States protect its assets, while keeping the hostile forces at bay? Regardless of where the U.S ground forces might be, their competitive advantage, in many instances, is the fact that they are supported by arguably the best, in terms of operational capacity and technological prowess. To this end, the recently developed F-35 fighter jet[4] is likely to play a vital role in maintaining a buffer between the American/coalition forces and the local hostile factions.

As the only other credible air force present in the region, the Russian air force, has maintained a safe distance with the American forces. Disregarding an unlikely scenario, at least in the near future, of a direct confrontation between the American and the Russian forces, the only remaining airpower against the F-35 is the Syrian Arab Air force[5]. With its fighter fleet mainly comprised of MiG-23s, Su-17 and the Fencer (Su-24), theoretically there is no threat to the F-35’s air superiority in the region.

In April 2019, the first U.S combat use of the F-35 was observed in the Middle East, when an IS munitions cache was targeted, to thwart the group’s possible resurgence[6]. To compensate for its numerical disadvantage and to protect strategically vital oilfields, the F-35’s role against the hostile local groups is likely to increase overtime. With its initiation into combat, it seems as if the Unites States envisions a key role for the F-35 in the region’s future. The only criticism is on the jet’s lack of energy maneuverability, due to its lower thrust to weight ratio compared to its rivals, which makes the jet less nimble in a dogfight[7]. However, the recent footage released by the U.S. Air Force depicts the F-35 making significant strides in this aspect, which has halted many of the objections on its close combat capabilities[8]. Despite its dogfight nimbleness, the competitive advantage of the F-35 is its computational capacity. The F-35, as a 5th-generation fighter, is unmatched at intelligence gathering, reconnaissance, and targeting aircraft from a distance beyond visual range, significantly far away from the range of any of its possible competitors. Furthermore, the F-35’s stealth capability makes it difficult to detect, early and accurately[9].

As the United States sends its largest contingent of troops in Syria thus far, there is new threat looming over which might challenge the U.S interests in the area. As the Turkish forces target the Kurdish fighters, the threat of IS reprisal looms over, and Russia justifies its military presence in the area, as a “balancing act” between the Turkish and Syrian forces, the coming days for the United States will be precarious. As evident by the combat testing against IS earlier this year, the F-35 will play an ever-increasing role in Syria and greater Levant, where its stealth may be used to venture inside hostile territory to preemptively target terror networks. The F-35’s superior recon may be used to provide a bird’s eye to the American forces in Northeast Syria, and perhaps, most importantly, to deter the Russian forces and their proxies as they attempt to use their numerical advantage against the American land forces to control the lucrative energy fields of Northeastern Syria.


Endnotes:

[1] Bernard A and Saad H. (2018, February 8). It’s Hard to Believe but Syria’s Wat is Getting Even Worse. Retrieved October 31, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/08/world/middleeast/syria-war-idlib.html

[2] Neely B, Smith S. (2019, October 15). As the U.S. withdraws, Assad and Putin are emerging as the winners in Syria. Retrieved October 31, 2019, from https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-withdraws-assad-putin-are-emerging-winners-syria-n1066231

[3] Shapiro A. (2019, October 10). A Look At The History Of The U.S. Alliance With The Kurds. Retrieved October 31, 2019, from https://www.npr.org/2019/10/10/769044811/a-look-at-the-history-of-the-u-s-alliance-with-the-kurds

[4] Staff. (2019, October 29). Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II. Retrieved October 31, 2019, from https://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=23

[5] Majumdar D. (2017, April 17). The Syrian Air Force: What Is Left? Retrieved October 31, 2019, from https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-syrian-air-force-what-left-20135

[6] Insinna V. (2019, April 30). US Air Force conducts airstrikes with F-35 for first time ever. Retrieved October 31, 2019, from https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/04/30/us-air-force-conducts-airstrikes-with-f-35-for-first-time-ever/

[7] Robinson T. (2015, July 10). Does the F-35 really suck in air combat? Retrieved October 31, 2019, from https://www.aerosociety.com/news/does-the-f-35-really-suck-in-air-combat/

[8] Lockie A. (2017, April 19). Here’s why the F-35 once lost to F-16s, and how it made a stunning comeback. Retrieved October 31, 2019, from https://www.businessinsider.com/f-35-vs-f-16-15-18-lost-beaten-flatley-comeback-2017-4

[9] Thompson L. (2019, May 13). The F-35 Isn’t Just ‘Stealthy’: Here’s How Its Electronic Warfare System Gives It An Edge. Retrieved October 31, 2019, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2019/05/13/how-a-super-agile-electronic-warfare-system-makes-f-35-the-most-invincible-combat-aircraft-ever

 

Assessment Papers Deterrence F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter) Humayun Hassan Syria United States

Divergent Options at the 2019 #NatSecGirlSquad Conference

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d_o-short

Phil Walter, Founder of Divergent Options, attended the 2019 #NatSecGirlSquad Conference where he spoke at a breakout session called How to Brief Well.  At this breakout session Phil discussed how he prepares to brief others and his experiences building and executing briefs.  If you could not attend, Phil’s one page reference that he spoke to during this breakout session can be found here.

#NatSecGirlSquad

Assessing the Relationship of Sikh-Canadians with Canada and India

Editor’s Note:  This article is the result of a partnership between Divergent Options and a course on nationalism at the George Washington University.


Nikita Khurana is an undergraduate student at the George Washington University in Washington, D.C. She is pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Economics and minoring in International Affairs.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessing the Relationship of Sikh-Canadians with Canada and India

Date Originally Written:  October 19, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  December 9, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author of this piece identifies as a first-generation Indian-American. This article is written in the point of view of Sikhs living in Canada that have a strong religious identity.

Summary:  Canada is home to nearly half a million Sikhs, thus becoming one of the largest Sikh diaspora populations in the world. While most diaspora populations have difficulty settling into their new home countries, political tensions with the Indian state was a driving force in Sikh-Canadian integration. Even though Sikh-Canadians faced discrimination from white Canadians, the Khalistan movement (a Sikh separatist movement) helped create a strong Sikh community within Canada.

Text:  Canada is home to one of the largest Sikh diaspora communities in the world. As of 2011, Sikhs accounted for 1.4% of the Canadian population with over 400,000 residents[1]. Legal immigration from the Indian province of Punjab is the root cause for the prominence of the Sikh religion in Canada. Sikh immigration into Canada can be separated into two waves: the early twentieth century and the 1960s. Due to political differences in their homeland, Sikhs in Canada have been able to integrate into Canadian society and even gain political power, despite the initial unwelcoming actions of white Canadians.

South Asia has been home to numerous religious movements including the creation of Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism. In the late fifteenth century, Guru Nanak established the Sikh religion. Sikhism is a prominent ideology with over 27 million followers, thus making it the fifth largest religion in the world. Followers of Skihism believe that there is a total of ten gurus, including Guru Nanak, and upon the death of the final spiritual leader, the essence of the eternal Guru transferred itself into the sacred Sikh scripture[2].

From their initial migration to Canada, Sikhs were met with profound racial discrimination[3]. This discrimination took the international stage in April of 1914 when the Komagata Maru, a Japanese steamship ship carrying Sikh passengers, was refused entry into Canada[4]. Nonetheless, Sikhs established strong religious institutions through gurudwaras or Sikh temples. South Asian immigration was completely halted until 1920, when wives and children of Sikh-Canadians were finally allowed to enter the country.

In contrast to the American society depicted as a ‘melting pot,’ Canada is seen as a ‘mixed salad’ of cultural differences today, where all faiths, ethnicities, and traditions are accommodated instead of assimilated. However, throughout the twentieth century, white Canadians were resistant to non-white immigrants. From the 1920s to the 1960s, Sikhs in Canada experienced a religious revision. Instead of maintaining traditional practices, children of immigrants adopted Sahajdhari practices. Being a Sahajdhari meant that men were able to break from practices that prevented them from cutting their hair and adopting Canadian dress codes[5].

The second wave of immigration coincided with the birth of the Sikh separatist movement in India. Even though Sikhs and Hindus lived peacefully amongst each other for centuries, tensions arose in the late 1960s when the Sikh population in Punjab gained economic prosperity following the Green Revolution in India. With growing wealth and a flourishing agricultural industry, Punjabi society slowly became increasingly more detached from mainstream Indian culture. In an effort to relieve political stress, Indian Prime Minister Indra Gandhi attempted to transfer the city of Chandigarh to the Punjab province. However, with no success, this olive branch was never fully executed, further strengthening distrust of the Prime Minister amongst the Sikh population. By the 1980s, the Sikh Khalistan movement was in full force.

The Khalistan movement is a separatist movement that calls for an autonomous Sikh nation-state. As scholar Stephen Van Evera suggests that nationalist movements are inherently violent, the Khalistan movement quickly turned violent against the Indian state[6]. In 1984, the Indian army staged a siege of the Golden Temple, a sacred Sikh shrine, in an effort to take down Sikh extremists. After the altercation, more than 1,000 people died, and the temple was nearly destroyed. This results of the siege ignited support from the Sikh diaspora in Canada, both financially and socially. Sikhs in Canada began to fund the separatist movement in India, which resulted in the deterioration of the relationship between Canadian Sikhs and their Indian homeland[7]. Additionally, the sudden violence of the Khalistan movement caused a mass migration of Sikhs to western countries, most prominently in Canada.

The growing Sikh population in Canada has recently become a concern to India. Within the last year, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has become wary of Canada and their foreign policies. Indian officials worry that western governments have become sympathetic to the Sikh separatists and will act in their interests when considering foreign policy[8]. In 2017, the Canadian Parliament declared the siege on the Golden Temple in Punjab a genocide committed by the Indian state against the Sikh religious minority. This genocide declaration has further strained the relationship between Sikh-Canadians and the Indian State. Being a stateless nation, the Sikh population in Canada has essentially become a political organization where they have gained the agency to influence politics in Canada[9]. Thus, the Canadian government has been an active participant in accommodating Sikh-Canadians and Sikh immigrants. On March 2, 2006, the Canadian Supreme court notably struck down a ban on allowing Sikh students to carry a kirpan, ceremonial dagger, in school[10].

Pop culture is another important indicator of the relationship between white Canadians and Sikhs. Within the past century, major pop culture figures of Sikh roots have gained popularity among all Canadians. Most famously, Lilly Singh, also known as iiSuperwomanii, was the highest paid female on the video hosting website YouTube in 2016. She is a vocal Sikh who was born and brought up in the Ontario province of Canada[11].

Sikh immigrants were not initially welcomed with open arms into Canada. Due to racial discrimination by white Canadians, South Asians had a slow assimilation into Canadian society. However, political tensions with the Indian state weakened the connection Sikh immigrants had with their homeland. Hence, integration and assimilation into a new national identity was possible. Sikhs in Canada have risen to political power with nearly twenty Sikh Members of Parliament. While Sikh-Canadians’ connection to India may have been weakened, Sikh identity in Canada was strengthened due to support for the Khalistan movement and Sikh nation, instead of the actual Indian state.


Endnotes:

[1] “History.” Canadian Sikh Heritage. Accessed August 11, 2019. http://canadiansikhheritage.ca/history/.

[2] McLeod, William Hewat. “Sikhism.” Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., June 21, 2019. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sikhism

[3] “Sikhism in Canada.” Sikhism in Canada | The Canadian Encyclopedia. Accessed August 9, 2019. https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/sikhism.

[4] “History.” Canadian Sikh Heritage. Accessed August 11, 2019. http://canadiansikhheritage.ca/history/.

[5] “Who Is a ‘Sehajdhari’?: India News – Times of India.” The Times of India. Accessed August 11, 2019. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Who-is-a-sehajdhari/articleshow/9830416.cms.

[6] Evera, Stephen Van. “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War.” International Security18, no. 4 (1994): 5. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539176.

[7] “Sinews of the Nation: Constructing Irish and Zionist Bonds in the United States” 51, no. 03 (2013). https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.51-1737.

[8] Sunny Hundal @sunny_hundal. “India’s Indifference to the Sikh Diaspora Is Damaging Western Foreign Policy towards the Country.” The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, February 25, 2018. https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/india-sikh-justin-trudeau-separatism-canada-foreign-policy-a8223641.html.

[9] Harris Mylonas & Nadav G. Shelef (2014) Which Land Is Our Land? Domestic Politics and Change in the Territorial Claims of Stateless Nationalist Movements,Security Studies, 23:4, 754-786, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2014.964996

[10] CBC News, “Ban on Sikh kirpan overturned by Supreme Court,” March 2, 2006. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ban-on-sikh-kirpan-overturned-by-supreme-court-1.618238.

[11] Maya Oppenheim @mayaoppenheim. “The Highest-Paid Female YouTuber, and the Astonishing Amount She Earns.” The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, March 6, 2017. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/lilly-singh-youtube-highest-paid-richest-forbes-list-2016-a7458441.html.

 

Assessment Papers Canada India Nikita Khurana

Assessment of Increased Chinese Strategic Presence in Afghanistan

Humayun Hassan is an undergraduate student at National University of Sciences and technology, Pakistan.  His areas of research interests include 5th and 6th generation warfare and geopolitics of the Levant.  He can be found on Twitter @Humayun_17. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessment of Increased Chinese Strategic Presence in Afghanistan

Date Originally Written:  September 15, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  December 2, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article is written from the Chinese standpoint, with regards to U.S and North Atlantic Treaty Organization member country (NATO) presence in Afghanistan and the pursuit of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Summary:  Afghanistan is important to Chinese strategic interests. To ensure stability in its autonomous region of Xinjiang, expansion of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, and counter a perceived “encirclement of China” strategy, Afghanistan holds the key for China. Therefore, China is consolidating its interests in Afghanistan through “economic diplomacy”, facilitation of peace talks, and working with other regional players.

Text:  As a part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China is establishing multiple economic passages, across Eurasia, Africa, and Southeast Asia. A total of six economic[1] corridors are designed to connect China with most of the major markets of the world. To consolidate her direct access to these markets, it is pivotal for China to maintain regional and political stability, especially in areas that directly pertain to these economic corridors. Two of these six corridors, namely CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) and China-Central Asia and West Asia economic corridors pass through the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang. This network of railroads, energy projects, and infrastructure is meant to connect Beijing with Central and Western Asia, along with the Middle East. Xinjiang is not only one of the most impoverished and underdeveloped regions of China, but is also home to almost 10-12 million Uighurs Muslims. In the past few years, Muslims in Xinjiang have caught significant media spotlight[2], due to growing sense of discontent among the local population with the Chinese administration. While the official Chinese narrative depicts a few Uighurs groups to be supportive of terrorist activities, the opposing viewpoint highlights internment camps[3] and over-representation of police force in the region. Nevertheless, the geo-economic importance of Xinjiang is paramount, which is why China is willing to use aggressive measures to restore stability in the area.

The militant factions of the Uighur community are supported by various group operating from Afghanistan. The Turkestan Islamic Movement, which was formerly known as East Turkestan Islamic Movement, is considered to be the primary organization undermining the Chinese sovereignty in Western China. In the past, this group has primarily operated from Afghanistan, with alliances with the Afghan Taliban (Taliban) and Al-Qaeda. However, since 2015, China has another reason to be cautious of protecting its economic[4] interests in the region. The Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) chapter of the violent extremist organization the Islamic State was established that year, with an aim to create its terror network in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Apart from tacitly supporting the Uighurs militant factions, IS-K has openly threatened to attack the ongoing CPEC projects, not only inside Pakistan but also in Western China[5].

The encirclement of China strategy advocates for constant U.S military and political presence in Chinese proximity[6]. With forces in Afghanistan the United States and NATO have opened up a new pressure point for China, a country that is already coping with the U.S forces in South China Sea and Japan, on the eastern front. After almost 18-years of non-conclusive war in Afghanistan, the U.S and Afghan forces have failed subdue the Taliban[7]. As the Kabul administration is facing financial and political turmoil, the U.S is considering reducing military presence in the country, and leaving a friendly government in Afghanistan. China seems to be aware of the political vacuum that awaits Afghanistan, which is why it presents an opportunity for it to find new allies in the country and work with other stakeholders to bring in a friendly government. This government vacuum-filling may not only allow China to neutralize U.S encirclement from Afghanistan, but will also help suppress terrorist organizations operating from Afghanistan. The latest developments in lieu of U.S-Taliban talks in Doha, Qatar indicate that China is enhancing ties with the Taliban. A Taliban government in Afghanistan may be suitable for China, at least in consideration of the available options. Not only have the Taliban declared war against IS-K[8], an entity that has openly threatened to disparage Chinese interests in the region and support militants in Western China, but also remained silent on the alleged persecution of the Uighurs in Xinjiang. This war declaration may be regarded as a major milestone in the China-Taliban relations, since the late 1990s when the Taliban government in the country allowed militant groups, such as Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

For the first few years of the Afghan war, China passively supported it. However, as the United States, under the Obama administration started to hint a military withdrawal from Afghanistan, China assumed a more active role in the country. Since the initiation of BRI, Chinese exports to Afghanistan have increased significantly[9]. For the first time in modern China-Afghanistan relations, China has offered military aid to the Afghanistan. The Chinese foreign minister also expressed a desire to expand the ongoing CPEC into Afghanistan as well[10]. Another aspect that is often discredited is the natural resource potential in the country. Afghanistan incorporates some of the largest Lithium reserves, which are particularly essential for the manufacturing of most electronic products. As per the American Geological Survey, Afghanistan holds approximately $3 trillion worth of natural resources[11]. This alone makes Afghanistan an area of interest for major world powers.

In conclusion, China’s approach towards Afghanistan may be best deciphered by a paradigm shift. From a strategic limited involvement to active leadership, China has now become one of the key stakeholders in the Afghan peace process. With an apparent failure of the Afghan peace talks between the Taliban and U.S, the situation is deteriorating quickly. The Taliban, since then, have vowed to double down on militancy. From a Chinese standpoint, continuation of U.S presence in Afghanistan and the anticipated increase in violence would be the least desired outcome. China, over the years, has strategically played a balancing act between all the internal stakeholders of Afghanistan, from offering aid to the national government to hosting a Taliban delegation in Beijing. Therefore, any political settlement in the country, whether it is the creation of a new “national government” with the Taliban or a truce between the fighting forces within the country may suit the Chinese in the long-run. As the BRI initiative enters the next stage, and threats of terror activities in the Xinjiang loom, and the race to tap into Afghanistan’s natural resources intensifies, China is now in unchartered waters, where any significant development in Afghanistan will directly effects its regional political and economic interests. It seems that, in coming times, China may assume the central role in organizing new peace initiatives, ensuring that whoever comes to power in Afghanistan may not thwart China’s ambitions in the country.


Endnotes:

[1]1 Hillman, J. (2019, September 4). China’s Belt and Road Is Full Of Holes. Retrieved October 10, 2019, from https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-belt-and-road-full-holes

[2] Sudworth, J. (2019, July 4). China Muslims: Xinjiang schools used to separate children from families. Retrieved October 10, 2019, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48825090

[3] Shams, S. (2015, July 24). Why China’s Uighurs are joining jihadists in Afghanistan. Retrieved October 10, 2019, from https://www.dw.com/en/why-chinas-uighurs-are-joining-jihadists-in-afghanistan/a-18605630

[4] Pandey, S. (2018, September 22). China’s Surreptitious Advance in Afghanistan. Retrieved October 10, 2019, from https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/chinas-surreptitious-advance-in-afghanistan/

[5] Aamir, A. (2018, August 17). ISIS Threatens China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Retrieved October 10, 2019, from https://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/isis-threatens-china-pakistan-economic-corridor

[6] Gunner, U. (2018, January 18). Continuity of Agenda: US Encirclement of China Continues Under Trump. Retrieved October 10, 2019, from https://www.globalresearch.ca/continuity-of-agenda-us-encirclement-of-china-continues-under-trump/5626694

[7] Wolfgang, B. Taliban now stronger than when Afghanistan war started in 2001, military experts say. Retrieved October 10, 2019, from, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/sep/9/taliban-strongest-afghanistan-war-started-2001/

[8] Burke, J. (2019, August 19). With Kabul wedding attack, Isis aims to erode Taliban supremacy. Retrieved October 10, 2019, from, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/19/with-kabul-wedding-attack-isis-aims-to-erode-taliban-supremacy

[9] Zia, H. (2019, February 14). A surge in China-Afghan trade. Retrieved October 10, 2019, from, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201902/14/WS5c65346ba3106c65c34e9606.html

[10] Gul, A. (2018, November 1). China, Pakistan Seeking CPEC Extension to Afghanistan. Retrieved October 10, 2019, from, https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/china-pakistan-seeking-cpec-extension-afghanistan

[11] Farmer, B. (2010, June 17). Afghanistan claims mineral wealth is worth $3trillion. Retrieved October 10, 2019, from, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7835657/Afghanistan-claims-mineral-wealth-is-worth-3trillion.html

 

Afghanistan Assessment Papers China (People's Republic of China) Great Powers Humayun Hassan

Assessing North Korea’s Cyber Evolution

Ali Crawford has an M.A. from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce where she focused on diplomacy, intelligence, cyber policy, and cyber warfare.  She tweets at @ali_craw.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessing North Korea’s Cyber Evolution

Date Originally Written:  September 17, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  November 25, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that the international community’s focus on addressing North Korea’s nuclear capability sets the conditions whereby their cyber capabilities can evolve unchecked.

Summary:  Despite displaying a growing and capable cadre of cyber warriors, North Korean cyber prowess has been overshadowed by threats of nuclear proliferation. While North Korea remains extremely isolated from the global community, it has conducted increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks over a short span of time. In a relatively short period of time, North Korea has cultivated a cyber acumen worth recognizing as threatening as its nuclear program.

Text:  As the internet quickly expanded across the globe and changed the nature of business and communication, Western nations capitalized on its capabilities. Authoritarian regimes felt threatened by the internet’s potential for damaging the regime’s power structure. In the 1990s, Kim Jong-il, father of current North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, restricted internet access, usage, and technology in his country[1]. Eventually, Kim Jong-il’s attitude shifted after recognizing the potential benefits of the internet. The North likely received assistance from China and the Soviet Union to begin training a rudimentary cyber corps during the 80s and 90s[2]. Cyber was and still is reserved explicitly for military or state leadership use.

The expansion of North Korea’s cyber program continued under Kim Jong-un, who today seeks to project military might by displays of a capable nuclear program. But Kim Jong-un, who possesses a degree in computer science, also understood the potential for cultivating cyber power. For North Korea, cyber is not just an asymmetrical medium of warfare, but also a method of surveillance, intelligence-gathering, and circumventing sanctions[3]. Within the last decade, North Korea has demonstrated an impressive understanding and application of offensive cyber competence. Several experts and reports estimate North Korean cyber forces range from 1,800 to upwards of 6,000 professionals[4]. Internet access is reportedly routed through China, which lends added difficulty to attribution but provides a measure of defense[5]. North Korea is largely disconnected from the rest of the world and maintains a rudimentary internet infrastructure[6]. The disconnect between the state and the internet leaves a significantly small and less vulnerable attack surface for other nations to exploit. 

Little information is available regarding the internal structure of North Korea’s cyber forces. What is thought to be known suggests an organizational hierarchy that operates with some autonomy to achieve designated mission priorities. Bureau 121, No. 91 Office, and Lab 110 report to North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB)[7]. Each reportedly operate internally and externally from Pyongyang. Bureau 121’s main activities include intelligence gathering and coordinating offensive cyber operations. Lab 110 engages in technical reconnaissance, such as network infiltration and malware implantation. No. 91 Office is believed to orchestrate hacking operations. Other offices situated under Bureau 121 or the RGB likely exist and are devoted entirely to information warfare and propaganda campaigns[8]. 

In the spring of 2013, a wave of cyber attacks struck South Korea. A new group called Dark Seoul emerged from North Korea armed with sophisticated code and procedures. South Korean banks and broadcasting companies were among the first institutions to endure the attacks beginning in March. In May, the South Korean financial sector was paralyzed by sophisticated malware. Later in June, marking the 63rd anniversary of the beginning of the Korean War, various South Korean government websites were taken offline by Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Although Dark Seoul had been working discreetly since 2009, its successful attacks against major South Korean institutions prompted security researchers to more seriously consider the North Koreans as perpetrators[9]. The various attacks against financial institutions would be a prequel to the massive cyber financial heists the North would eventually manage, possibly making South Korea a testing ground for North Korea’s code and malware vehicles.

North Korea’s breach of Sony Pictures in 2014 catapulted the reclusive regime to international cyber infamy. Members of an organization calling themselves the Guardians of Peace stole nearly 40 gigabytes of sensitive data from Sony Pictures, uploaded damaging information online, and left behind a bizarre image of a red skeleton on employees’ desktop computers[10]. This was the first major occurrence of a nation-state attacking a United States corporation in retribution for something seemingly innocuous. While the Sony hack was an example of how vague rules for conducting cyber war and crime differ between nations, the attack  was more importantly North Korea’s first true display of cyber power. Sony executives felt compelled to respond and sought counsel from the U.S. government. The government was hesitant to let a private company respond to an attack led by the military apparatus of a foreign adversary. Instead, President Barack Obama publicly named North Korea as the perpetrator and vaguely hinted at a potential U.S. response, becoming the first U.S. president to do so.

Cyber crime also provides alternative financing for the regime’s agenda. In February 2016, employees at the Bank of Bangladesh were struggling to recover a large sum of money that had been transferred to accounts in the Philippines and Sri Lanka. The fraudulent transactions totaled $81 million USD[11]. Using Bangladesh Bank employee credentials, the attackers targeted the bank’s SWIFT account. SWIFT is an international money transfer system used by financial institutions to transfer large sums of money. After-action analysis revealed the malware had been implanted a month prior and shared similarities with the malware used to infiltrate and exploit Sony in 2014[12]. The Bangladesh Bank heist was intensively planned and researched, which lent credence to the North’s growing cyber acumen. As of 2019, North Korea has accumulated an estimated $2 billion USD exclusively from cyber crime[13]. Security assessments indicate the Sony attack, the Bangladesh Bank hack, and the WannaCry attacks are related which lends some understanding to how North Korean cyber groups operate. In 2018, the United States filed criminal charges against a North Korean man for all three cyber crimes as part of a grander strategy for deterrence[14].

Finally, it is important to consider how North Korea’s cyber warfare tactics and strategies will evolve. North Korea has already proven to be a capable financial cyber crime actor, but how would its agencies perform in full-scale warfare? In terms of numbers, the North Korean military is one of the largest conventional forces in the world despite operating with rudimentary technology[15]. Studies suggest that while the North may confidently rely on its nuclear program to win a conventional war, it is unlikely that North Korea would be able to sustain its forces in long-term war[16]. North Korea would need to promptly engage in asymmetric warfare to disorient enemy forces to gain a technological advantage while continuously attempting to attack enemy systems to disrupt crucial communications. The regime could conduct several cyber operations against its adversaries, deny responsibility, then use the wrongful attribution as grounds for a kinetic response. North Korea has threatened military action in the past after being hit with additional sanctions[17]. 

Despite North Korea’s display of a growing and expansive cyber warfare infrastructure coupled with a sophisticated history of cyber attacks, the international community remains largely concerned with the regime’s often unpredictable approach to nuclear and missile testing. With the international community focused elsewhere, North Korea’s cyber program continues to grow unchecked. It remains to be seen if someday the international community will diplomatically engage North Korea regarding their cyber program with the same intensity as their nuclear program.


Endnotes:

[1] David E. Sanger, The Perfect Weapon, Crown Publishing, 2018, p. 127

[2] The Perfect Weapon, p.127-128; and Eleanor Albert, Council on Foreign Relations: North Korea’s Military Capabilities, 25 July 2019, retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-military-capabilities

[3] David Sanger, David Kirkpatrick, Nicole Perloth, New York Times: The World Once Laughed at North Korean Cyberpower. No more, 15 October 2017, retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/15/world/asia/north-korea-hacking-cyber-sony.html

[4] Ibid; and 1st Lt. Scott J. Tosi, Military Review: North Korean Cyber Support to Combat Operations, July/August 2017, retrieved from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20170831_TOSI_North_Korean_Cyber.pdf

[5] 1st Lt. Scott J. Tosi

[6] David Sanger, David Kirkpatrick, Nicole Perloth

[7] 1st Lt. Scott J. Tosi; and Kong Ji Young, Lim Jong In, and Kim Kyoung Gon, NATO CCDCOE:The All-Purpose Sword: North Korea’s Cyber Operations and Strategies, 2019, retrieved from https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_08_The-All-Purpose-Sword.pdf

[8] Ibid.

[9] Symantec Security Response, Four Years of DarkSeoul Cyberattacks Against South Korea Continue on Anniversary of Korean War, 26 June 2013, retrieved from https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war; and Kong Ji Young, Lim Jong In, and Kim Kyoung Gon, NATO CCDCOE Publications, The All-Purpose Sword: North Korea’s Cyber Operations and Strategy, 2019, retrieved from https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_08_The-All-Purpose-Sword.pdf

[10] Kim Zetter, Wired: Sony Got Hacked Hard: What We Know and Don’t Know So Far, 3 December 2014, retrieved from https://www.wired.com/2014/12/sony-hack-what-we-know/

[11] Kim Zetter, Wired: That Insane, $81M Bangladesh Bank Heist? Here’s What We Know, 17 May 2016, retrieved from https://www.wired.com/2016/05/insane-81m-bangladesh-bank-heist-heres-know/

[12] Ibid.

[13] Michelle Nichols, Reuters: North Korea took $2 billion in cyberattacks to fund weapons program: U.N. report, 5 August 2019, retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-cyber-un/north-korea-took-2-billion-in-cyberattacks-to-fund-weapons-program-u-n-report-idUSKCN1UV1ZX

[14] Christopher Bing and Sarah Lynch, Reuters: U.S. charges North Korean hacker in Sony, WannaCry cyberattacks, 6 September 2018, retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-northkorea-sony/u-s-charges-north-korean-hacker-in-sony-wannacry-cyberattacks-idUSKCN1LM20W

[15] Eleanor Albert, Council on Foreign Relations, What Are North Korea’s Military Capabilities?, 25 July 2019, retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-military-capabilities

[16] 1st Lt. Scott J. Tosi, Military Review: North Korean Cyber Support to Combat Operations, July/August 2017, retrieved from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20170831_TOSI_North_Korean_Cyber.pdf

[17] Jack Kim and Ju-min Park, Reuters:Cyber-attack on South Korea may not have come from China after all, 22 March 2013, retrieved from  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-korea/cyber-attack-on-south-korea-may-not-have-come-from-china-after-all-regulator-idUSBRE92L07120130322

 

 

Assessment Papers Cyberspace North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea)

Assessment of Militia Forces as a Model for Recruitment and Retention in Cyber Security Forces

Franklin Holcomb is a graduate student from the U.S. at the University of Tartu, Estonia and a former research analyst on Eastern European security issues in Washington, D.C. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessment of Militia Forces as a Model for Recruitment and Retention in Cyber Security Forces

Date Originally Written:  September 25, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  November 18, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is a graduate student from the U.S. at the University of Tartu, Estonia and a former research analyst on Eastern European security issues in Washington, D.C. He is a strong believer in the Euro-American relationship and the increasing relevance of innovation in security and governance.

Summary:  U.S. and Western Armed Forces are struggling with recruitment and retention in their cyber units, which leaves their countries vulnerable to hostile cyber actors. As society becomes increasingly digitalized in coming years, the severity of these vulnerabilities will increase. The militia model adopted by the Baltic states provides a format to attract civilian experts and decrease vulnerabilities.

Text:  The U.S. Armed Forces are facing difficulties recruiting and retaining cyber-security talent. To meet this challenge the U.S. Marine Corps announced in April 2019 that it would establish a volunteer cyber-auxiliary force (Cyber Aux) consisting of a “small cadre of highly-talented cyber experts who train, educate, advise, and mentor Marines to keep pace with constantly-evolving cyber challenges[1].” The Cyber Aux will face many of the issues that other branches, and countries, have in attracting and retaining cyber-security professionals. Cyber Aux takes notably important steps towards increasing the appeal of participation in the U.S. armed forces for cyber-security experts, such as relaxing grooming and fitness standards. But Cyber Aux will struggle to attract enough professionals due to factors such as its role as a mentorship organization, rather than one that conducts operations, and the wide military-civilian pay gap in the cyber-security field[2]. These factors will ensure U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military forces will have suboptimal and likely understaffed cyber components; increasing their vulnerabilities on and off the battlefield.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been on the geographic and virtual frontlines of many challenges faced by NATO. The severity of threats facing them has made security innovation a necessity rather than a goal. While not all innovations have succeeded, these countries have created a dynamic multi-layered defense ecosystem which combines the skillsets of civil society and their armed forces to multiply their defense capabilities and increase national resilience. There are numerous organizations that play a role in these innovations including civilian groups as well as the militias of each state[3]. The militias, non-professional military forces who gain legitimacy and legality from state authorization, play a key role in increasing the effective strength of forces in the region. The Estonian Defense League, the Latvian National Guard, and the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Association all draw on civilian talent to form militias. These organizations are integrated, to different extents, with military structures and play supporting roles in a time of crisis that would free regular forces to conduct operations or support their operations directly.

These militias have established cyber units which are models for integrating civilian cyber-security professionals into military structures. The Baltic cyber-militias engage directly in practical cyber-security concerns, rather than being restricted to academic pursuit or mentoring like Cyber Aux. In peacetime, these organizations conduct training for servicemen and civilians with the goal of raising awareness of the risks posed by hostile cyber actors, increasing civilian-military collaboration in cyber-security, and improving cyber-security practices for critical systems and infrastructure[4]. In crisis, these units mobilize to supplement state capabilities. The Estonian Defense League and Latvian National Guard have both established cyber-defense units, and Lithuania intends to complete a framework through which its militia could play a role in supporting cyber-defense capabilities by January 2020[5]. 

The idea of a cyber-militia is not new, yet the role these organizations play in the Baltic states as a talent bridge between the armed forces and civil society provides a very useful policy framework for many Western states. Currently cyber-auxiliaries are used by many states such as Russia and China who rely on them to supplement offensive cyber capacities[6]. This situational, and often unofficial use of auxiliaries in cyber operations has advantages, prominently including deniability, but these should not overshadow the value of having official structures that are integrated into both civil society and national cyber-defense. By creating a reserve of motivated civilian professionals that can be called on to supplement military cyber units during a time of crisis, the Baltic states are also effectively increasing not only their resilience to a major cyber incident while it is underway, but raising the up-front cost of conducting such an attack in the first place.

As NATO and European policymakers consider the best courses available to improve their Armed Forces’ cyber capacities, the models being adopted in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are likely of value. Estonia pioneered the concept in the region[7], but as the model spreads to other states Western states could learn from the effectiveness of the model. Cyber-militias, which play a supportive role in cyber operations, will strengthen the cyber forces of militaries in other NATO states which are undermined by low recruitment and retention.


Endnotes:

[1] (2019, May 13). Marine Corps Establishes Volunteer Cyber Auxiliary to Increase Cyberspace Readiness. Marines.mil. Retrieved September 25, 2019. https://www.marines.mil/News/Press-Releases/Press-Release-Display/Article/1845538/marine-corps-establishes-volunteer-cyber-auxiliary-to-increase-cyberspace-readi

[2] Moore E., Kollars N. (2019, August 21). Every Marine a Blue-Haired Quasi-Rifleperson? War on the Rocks. Retrieved on September 25, 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/every-marine-a-blue-haired-quasi-rifleperson/; Cancian M., (2019, September 05) Marine Cyber Auxiliaries Aren’t Marines, and Cyber “Warriors” aren’t Warriors. War on the Rocks. Retrieved September 25, 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/marine-cyber-auxiliaries-arent-marines-and-cyber-warriors-arent-warriors/

[3] Thompson T. (2019, January 9) Countering Russian Disinformation the Baltic nations’ way. The Conversation. Retrieved September 25, 2019. http://theconversation.com/countering-russian-disinformation-the-baltic-nations-way-109366

[4] (2019, September 24). Estonian Defense League’s Cyber Unit. Estonian Defense League. Retrieved on September 25, 2019. http://www.kaitseliit.ee/en/cyber-unit; (2013). National Armed Forces Cyber Defense Unit (CDU) Concept. Latvian Ministry of Defense. Retrieved September 25, 2019. https://www.mod.gov.lv/sites/mod/files/document/cyberzs_April_2013_EN_final.pdf; (2015, January 15). National Guard opens cyber-defense center. Public Broadcasting of Latvia. Retrieved September 25, 2019. https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/society/national-guard-opens-cyber-defense-center.a113832/; Kaska K, Osula A., Stinnissen J. (2013) The Cyber Defence Unit of the Estonian Defense League NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence. Tallinn, Estonia. Retrieved September 25, 2019. https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/CDU_Analysis.pdf; Pernik P. (2018, December). Preparing for Cyber Conflict: Case Studies of Cyber Command. International Centre for Defense and Security. Retrieved on September 25, 2019. https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/ICDS_Report_Preparing_for_Cyber_Conflict_Piret_Pernik_December_2018-1.pdf

[5] (2019, July 03) The Government of the Republic of Lithuania: Ruling on the Approval of the Interinstitutional Action Plan for the Implementation of National Cybernet Security Strategy. Lithuanian Parliament. Retrieved September 25, 2019. https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/faeb5eb4a6c811e9aab6d8dd69c6da66?jfwid=dg8d31595

[6] Applegate S. (2011, September/October) Cybermilitias and Political Hackers- Use of Irregular Forces in Cyberwarfare. IEEE Security and Privacy. Retrieved on September 25, 2019. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/220497000_Cybermilitias_and_Political_Hackers_Use_of_Irregular_Forces_in_Cyberwarfare

[7] Ruiz M. (2018.January 9) Is Estonia’s Approach to Cyber Defense Feasible in the United States? War on the Rocks. Accessed: September 25, 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/estonias-approach-cyber-defense-feasible-united-states/; Drozdiak N. (2019, February 11) One of Russia’s Neighbors Has Security Lessons for the Rest of Us. Bloomberg. Retrieved on September 25, 2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-11/a-russian-neighbor-has-cybersecurity-lessons-for-the-rest-of-us

Assessment Papers Baltics Cyberspace Estonia Franklin Holcomb Latvia Lithuania Non-Full-Time Military Forces (Guard, Reserve, Territorial Forces, Militias, etc)

2020 Call for Papers Topics

Background:

Divergent Options is a non-revenue generating non-politically aligned national security website that, in 1,000 words or less, provides unbiased, dispassionate, candid Option Papers, Assessment Papers, and also records Podcasts.  Please note that while we assess a national security situation and may provide options, we never recommend a specific option.

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Please note that a national security situation can be one that is externally focused e.g. what is Country X going to do about County Y or internally focused e.g. Country X should invest more in Y capability.

2020 Call for Papers Topics:

Topic:  Ethics in National Security

Call for Papers Begins:  January 2020

Call for Papers Ends:  Mid-February 2020

Publish Date:  Late-February 2020

Topic:  Emerging Technologies and Emerging Concepts

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Call for Papers Begins:  November 2020

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Call For Papers

An Assessment of the Current State of U.S. Cyber Civil Defense

Lee Clark is a cyber intelligence analyst currently working on cyber defense strategy in the Middle East.  He holds an MA in intelligence and international security from the University of Kentucky’s Patterson School. He can be found on Twitter at @InktNerd.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  An Assessment of the Current State of U.S. Cyber Civil Defense

Date Originally Written:  September 11, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  November 22, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is an early-career cybersecurity analyst with experience advising private and public sector organizations on cyber threats and building cyber threat intelligence programs.

Summary:  Local civic organizations in the U.S. are experiencing a wave of costly and disruptive low-sophistication cyberattacks on a large scale, indicating widespread vulnerabilities in networks. In light of past and ongoing threats to U.S. cyber systems, especially election systems, this weak cybersecurity posture represents a serious national security concern.

Text:  The state of cyber defenses among public sector entities in the United States is less than ideal. This is especially true among smaller civic entities such as city utility companies, local government offices (including local election authorities), and court systems. There is currently an ongoing wave of cyberattacks against government systems in cities across the U.S. In 2019, more than 40 local government organizations experienced successful ransomware attacks[1]. These widespread attacks indicate an attractive attack surface and vulnerable profile to potential cyber aggressors, which has broad implications for the security of U.S. cyber systems, including election systems.

Ransomware is a vector of cyberattack in which malicious actors compromise a victim’s computer and encrypt all available files, while offering the victim an encryption key to decrypt files in exchange for a ransom payment, typically in the form of a cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin. If victims refuse to pay or cannot pay, the files are left encrypted and the infected computer(s) are rendered useless. In some cases, files can be decrypted by specialists without paying the ransom. In other cases, even if victims pay, there is in reality no decryption key and files are permanently locked. 

Ransomware is among the most common and least sophisticated forms of cyberattack in the field today. Attacks of this type have grown exponentially in recent years, and one study found that in 2019, 18% of all cyber-related insurance claims internationally were linked to ransomware incidents, second only to business email compromises[2]. In some cases, insurance companies were found encouraging clients to pay ransoms because it saved money and promoted the criminal practice, enhancing the market for cyber insurance services[3]. 

Ransomware attacks are relatively easy to execute on the part of attackers, and often target computers can be infected by tricking a victim into clicking on a malicious link through a phishing email disguised as a legitimate business communication. For example, in 2018, city computer networks in Allentown, Pennsylvania were offline for weeks after ransomware infected the system through an employee’s email after the employee failed to install security updates and clicked on a phishing email. The attack cost the city around USD 1 million to resolve and ongoing security improvements are costing approximately USD 420,000 per year[4].

Local city systems make for attractive targets for cyber attackers for several reasons: 

1) Such organizations often carry cyber insurance, indicating an ability to pay and a higher likelihood of attackers being paid quickly without difficulty.

2) Local government offices have a reputation for being soft targets, often with lax and/or outdated security software and practices.

3) Infecting systems requires very little investment of resources on the attacker’s part, such as time, technical skill, focus, and labor, since phishing emails are often sufficient to gain access to targeted networks.

4) Executing successful attacks against such organizations often results in widespread media attention and tangible damages, including monetary cost to the organization, disruption to services, and public backlash, all of which enhance the attacker’s reputation in criminal communities.

Because of the ongoing prevalence of ransomware attacks, U.S. officials recently voiced public concern about the plausibility of ransomware attacks against election systems during the 2020 elections[5]. A chief concern is that if attackers have enough systems access to lock the files, the attackers very likely also have the ability to alter and/or steal files from an infected system. This concern is compounded by recent revelations by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Russian-linked threat actors targeted election systems in all 50 states in 2016, most successfully in Illinois and Arizona[6]. 

It should be noted that U.S. federal agencies and private consulting firms have engaged in a large-scale effort to increase security measures of election systems since 2016 in preparation for the 2020 election, including hiring specialists and acquiring new voting machines[7]. The specifics, technical details, and effectiveness of these efforts are difficult to properly measure from open source materials, but have drawn criticism for their limited scope[8].

In the U.S., election security is among the most complex and difficult challenges facing the cybersecurity field. Elections involve countless competing and interacting stakeholders, intricate federal and local regulations, numerous technologies of varying complexity, as well as legal and ethical norms and expectations. These nuances combine to present a unique challenge to U.S. national security concerns, especially from a cyber-viewpoint. It is a matter of public record that U.S. election systems are subject to ongoing cyber threats from various actors. Some known threats operate with advanced tactics, techniques, procedures, and resources supported by technologically-sophisticated nation states. 

The recent wave of ransomware attacks on local governments compounds election security concerns because the U.S. election system relies heavily on local government organizations like county clerk and poll offices. Currently, local systems are demonstrably vulnerable to common and low-effort attacks, and will remain so without significant national-level efforts. If local defenses are not developed enough to resist a ransomware attack delivered in a phishing email, it is difficult to imagine a county clerk’s office in Ohio or Kentucky having sufficient cyber defenses to repel a sophisticated attack by a Russian or Chinese-backed advanced persistent threat group. 

After the beginning of the nuclear arms race in the second half of the 20th century, the U.S. government developed a national civil defense program by which to prepare local jurisdictions for nuclear attacks. This effort was prominent in the public mind and expensive to execute. Lessons from this national civil defense program may be of value to adequately prepare U.S. civic cyber systems to effectively resist both low and high-sophistication cyber intrusions.

Unlike nuclear civil defense, which has been criticized for achieving questionable results in terms of effective defense, cyber civil defense effectiveness could be benchmarked and measured in tangible ways. While no computer system can be entirely secure, strong indicators of an effective cybersecurity posture include up-to-date software, regular automatic security updates, periodic security audits and vulnerability scans, established standard operating procedures and best practices (including employee cyber awareness training), and a well-trained and adequately-staffed cybersecurity team in-house.


Endnotes:

[1] Fernandez, M., Sanger, D. E., & Martinez, M. T. (2019, August 22). Ransomware Attacks Are Testing Resolve of Cities Across America. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/us/ransomware-attacks-hacking.html

[2] Cimpanu, C. (2019, September 2). BEC overtakes ransomware and data breaches in cyber-insurance claims. Retrieved from https://www.zdnet.com/article/bec-overtakes-ransomware-and-data-breaches-in-cyber-insurance-claims/

[3] Dudley, R. (2019, August 27). The Extortion Economy: How Insurance Companies Are Fueling a Rise in Ransomware Attacks. Retrieved from https://www.propublica.org/article/the-extortion-economy-how-insurance-companies-are-fueling-a-rise-in-ransomware-attacks

[4] Fernandez, M., Sanger, D. E., & Martinez, M. T. (2019, August 22). Ransomware Attacks Are Testing Resolve of Cities Across America. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/us/ransomware-attacks-hacking.html

[5] Bing, C. (2019, August 27). Exclusive: U.S. officials fear ransomware attack against 2020 election. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-election-exclusive/exclusive-us-officials-fear-ransomware-attack-against-2020-election-idUSKCN1VG222

[6] Sanger, D. E., & Edmondson, C. (2019, July 25). Russia Targeted Election Systems in All 50 States, Report Finds. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/us/politics/russian-hacking-elections.html

[7] Pearson, R. (2019, August 5). 3 years after Russian hackers tapped Illinois voter database, officials spending millions to safeguard 2020 election. Retrieved from https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-illinois-election-security-russian-hackers-20190805-qtoku33szjdrhknwc7pxbu6pvq-story.html 

[8] Anderson, S. R., Lostri, E., Jurecic, Q., & Taylor, M. (2019, July 28). Bipartisan Agreement on Election Security-And a Partisan Fight Anyway. Retrieved from https://www.lawfareblog.com/bipartisan-agreement-election-security-and-partisan-fight-anyway

Assessment Papers Civil Defense Cyberspace Lee Clark United States

Assessing Black Swans and their Pre-Incident Indicators

Charles Cameron, is a poet first and foremost, managing editor of the Zenpundit blog, and one-time Senior Analyst with The Arlington Institute and Principal Researcher with The Center for Millennial Studies at Boston University. He holds an MA Oxon, having studied theology at Christ Church, Oxford, under AE Harvey. He is the designer of the HipBone family of creative and analytic games, based on Hermann Hesse’s Nobel-winning novel, The Glass Bead Game. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessing Black Swans and their Pre-Incident Indicators

Date Originally Written:  August 21, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  November 4, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author, who earned a living as a professional futurist during the 1999/2000 rollover, believes Black Swan Events will disrupt our best efforts to predict future threats.  However, with cognitive humility firmly in place national security analysts can observe the cross-disciplinary impacts of trends and can at least begin to think better about where these trends may lead.

Summary:  Black Swan Events come as a surprise, have a major effect, and are often inappropriately rationalized after the fact with the benefit of hindsight.  Rather than watching the Black Swan take off from the lake, identifying its initial wing flaps, as warning of the impending event, and where other events intersect, is valuable.  

Text:  Watching a black swan take off is instructive.  It starts, invisibly, on the lake of time, skeeting with wing-flaps to gain speed, achieves lift-off, after quite a while, and whang, whang, whang, ups itself to optimal speed and altitude – at which point we, in our hide in the marshes, recognize “Hey, there’s a black swan here,” and note where on the lake of time the occurrence occurred.  National security analysts often opine on Black Swan Events, which are events that comes as a surprise, has a major effect, and are often inappropriately rationalized after the fact with the benefit of hindsight.  Equally if not more important than the Black Swan Event are the pre-incident indicators of the event, the flaps of the swan’s wings if you will, that enabled the Black Swan to take flight. 

A first flap might have been Ramon Llull’s devices for calculating all possible knowledge by means of wheels and tables.  As History-Computer.com suggests, “One can ask ‘What exactly is Ramon Llull’s place in the history of computers and computing?’ The answer is Llull is one of the first people who tried to make logical deductions in a mechanical, rather than a mental way.”  On the lake of time, that preliminary wing-flap occurs around 1275 CE.  Llull, a Franciscan, was called Doctor Illuminatus, and beatified by the Church in 1514 CE.

Skipping a few possible Renaissance wing-flaps from the general type of magus on which Shakespeare based his Prospero, and oh, Pascal and Leibniz, we can reach Charles Babbage.  Babbage attained lift-off but not optimal speed or flight altitude with his Difference and Analytical mechanical computing engines.  While Llull’s were wing-flaps with the swan’s orange webbed feet still tracing ripples in the waters of time, Babbage’s definitively cleared the lake, it’s reflection, however, still allowing us to date it to the reign of Queen Victoria and Lewis Carroll’s river-boating tales with Alice – circa 1833 to 1871.  Insufficient funding prevented the construction of Babbage’s engine – an indication that general awareness of a black swan in flight was still lacking.  Even the powerful flap of Vannevar Bush’s memex machine, described in his 1945 Atlantic piece “As We May Think” wasn’t enough.

Next are the wing-flaps of Johnny von Neumann, or International Business Machines aka IBM mainframes at a time when Thomas Watson said no more than six computers would suffice for world-wide supply.  Even the first personal computers (PC), or the portable Osbornes and KayPros made a few flaps, but it’s Steve Jobs’ Macintosh that hits speed and altitude, popularity and elegance.  In 1984 the Macintosh dragged the reluctant PC world into Windows behind it.  Black Swan, we cry, as ARPANET, an internet precursor, becomes the World Wide Web which sets the conditions for Facebook and QAnon.  “We didn’t see it coming” analyst cry, turning to Nicholas Nassim Taleb’s book, “Black Swan,” for an excuse.  Taleb, meanwhile, has moved on, writing more books and a stream of articles – and thinking as yet unwritten thoughts.

The lake of time by now has become, for all practical purposes, the timeline of computing, but the flight plan of the Black Swan has still not been announced.  Black Swans in general don’t issue flight plans and – here’s the catch – are generally recognized only in retrospect.  So the future can be intuited to some degree by assessing the black swans already in flight such as social media and climate change, and tracking them to their national security implications such as weakening of the nation state, the rise of nationalist movements, protest movements, and massive migrations / movements.  But beyond that, and in terms of Black Swans just now achieving lift-off – the future is black, blank, invisible, unseen, and unguessable.  This un-guessability is you will is partly because the future lies where the paths of Black Swans such as mass migration and climate change intersect and cross-pollinate.

Pollination is from a different discourse than swan lift-off, of course – it’s mixing metaphors.  But then by now, interdisciplinarity and perhaps intersectionality intersect, too.  “Only connect” wrote English novelist EM Forster, flapping his dark wings back before the First World War in 1910: “Only connect!” that was the whole of her sermon.  “Only connect the prose and the passion, and both will be exalted, and human love will be seen at its height.  Live in fragments no longer.”

Cognitive humility is valuable to not only surviving Black Swans but identifying the early flap of their wings.  While best assessments of future threats can be made, exploring the cross-over impacts of these assessments can be of value.  So too can considering outside influences and whether possible events will unfold in a sequence or lack thereof.  As national security threats are driven by the needs of people and their actions, returning frequently to climate change and cross-border mass migration threats can be of value.  Finally, one’s depth of historical knowledge will greatly one’s reach of futuristic thinking.  And, despite all this, the future Black Swan Event may still come at us from behind.  

Endnotes:

None.

Assessment Papers Charles Cameron Major Events / Unforeseen Events / Black Swans

Call for Papers: Deterrence and Détente

Background:

Divergent Options is a non-politically aligned non-revenue generating national security website that, in 1,000 words or less, provides unbiased, dispassionate, candid articles that assess a national security situation, present multiple options to address the situation, and articulate the risk and gain of each option.  Please note that while we assess a national security situation and may provide options, we never recommend a specific option.

Call for Papers:

Divergent Options is calling for national security papers assessing situations or discussing options related to Deterrence and Détente.

For the purpose of this Call for Papers we define Deterrence as the maintenance of military power for the purpose of discouraging attack.

For the purpose of this Call for Papers we define Détente as as the relaxation of strained relations or tensions (as between nations).

Please limit your article to 1,000 words and write using our Options Paper or Assessment Paper templates which are designed for ease of use by both writers and readers alike.

Please send your article to submissions@divergentoptions.org by December 13, 2019.

If you are not interested in writing on this topic, we always welcome individual articles on virtually any national security situation an author is passionate about.  Please do not let our call for papers cause you to hesitate to send us your idea. We look forward to hearing from you!

Call For Papers

Alternative History: An Assessment of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy Azhdar Unmanned Undersea Vehicle

David R. Strachan is a naval analyst and founder of Strikepod Systems (strikepod.com), a provider of current and strategic fiction intelligence (FICINT) on global naval affairs, with an emphasis on unmanned maritime systems.  He can be found on Twitter @Strikepod.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Alternative History: An Assessment of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy Azhdar Unmanned Undersea Vehicle

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article presumes that the anonymous tanker attacks of May 12, 2019, were carried out by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) using an indigenously-developed unmanned undersea vehicle (UUV), and that the United States subsequently uncovered evidence of an Iranian offensive UUV, the Azhdar. It is written from the perspective of the U.S. Intelligence Community for an audience of national security policymakers.

Date Originally Written:  August 10, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  October 28, 2019.

Summary:  U.S. intelligence has uncovered evidence that Iran has repurposed its e-Ghavasi swimmer delivery vehicle (SDV) as an offensive UUV.  This repurposing is a potentially game-changing capability for Iranian naval forces with grave implications for regional stability.

Text:  On the morning of May 12, 2019, four oil tankers anchored off the coast of the Port of Fujairah, United Arab Emirates (UAE), sustained damage from what was alleged to be limpet mines placed by Iranian divers or fast boat operatives. However, scientific intelligence obtained from a clandestine source working alongside UAE investigators suggests that the blast damage was in fact inconsistent with the use of limpet mines. The source also reports that UAE investigators reached conclusions similar to those of an unnamed Norwegian insurance company (as reported by Reuters on May 17, 2019), namely that the IRGCN was behind the attacks, that these attacks were likely carried out using “underwater drones carrying 30-50 kg (65-110 lb.) of high-grade explosives,” and that the release of such information would cause significant alarm and exacerbate regional instability[1]. Additional supporting evidence was not provided, but if confirmed, this type of attack would represent a deeply concerning development for the United States, its  allies, and a potentially game-changing breakthrough for the IRGCN. 

Despite years of crippling economic sanctions, Iran has managed to acquire a potent undersea warfare capability, including three Russian-made Kilo-class submarines, nearly two dozen Ghadir-class midget submarines, two domestically produced classes of attack submarine (Fateh and Besat), and an assortment of special operations vehicles and mines[2]. Given the IRGCN’s experience with undersea operations, including offensive mining, and the fact that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and IRGCN have historically been skilled early adopters of unmanned technologies, we anticipated that Iran would seek to acquire an unmanned undersea capability, either through illicit acquisition or indigenous manufacture. Even a crude UUV would provide a considerable asymmetric advantage to Iran and its nonstate proxies operating in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb Strait. As such, U.S. collection efforts expanded in 2010 to include monitoring for indications of Iranian procurement of UUV-related technologies. 

In 2012, a report surfaced that Iran had managed to domestically produce a UUV, dubbed the Phoenix, that was capable of 18 knots while submerged[3]. Given Tehran’s history of exaggerating or outright fabricating military capabilities, the veracity of this report was questionable. We were aware, however, that Iran had been attempting to acquire commercially available UUVs by tapping into the global defense marketplace via a complex web of front companies and smuggling operations. Iran was also attempting to acquire commercial off-the-shelf components, such as accelerometers and gyroscopes (used in inertial guidance systems), marine magnetometers, electro-hydraulic pressure sensors, and undersea modems. In the months leading up to May 12, 2019, we were well aware of Iranian materiel gains, but believed that the technical and operational challenges involved in deploying an offensive UUV were too great for Iran to overcome. However, given the UAE investigation, and intelligence recently provided by a highly placed source within the Iranian naval establishment, we no longer believe this to be the case.

We are now certain that Iran has repurposed its e-Ghavasi SDV as a weaponized UUV, and that four of these vehicles were in fact used to carry out the May 12, 2019 attacks. With its ready-made hullform and operational propulsion system, Iranian engineers successfully retrofitted a crude but effective onboard inertial guidance system. Coupled with its capacity to accommodate a large multi-influence mine, the weaponized, unmanned e-Ghavasi, dubbed the Azhdar, is now a highly mobile, stealthy, and lethal mine platform.

The weaponized UUV Azhdar is 533mm in diameter, which makes it compatible with standard heavyweight torpedo tubes. In order to fit, the vehicle’s forward diving planes and rear stabilizer have been recessed into the hull and are spring loaded to deploy upon launch. The vehicle’s cargo bay is large enough to carry a 480kg seabed mine, and it is likely, given the scale of the damage, that only a fraction of its ordnance capacity was utilized in the May 12, 2019 attacks[4]. Approximately twelve units are currently in the IRGCN inventory.  Assuming current Iranian defense industrial capacity and an uninterrupted connection to illicit supply lines, we believe Iran is capable of producing two to three weaponized UUVs per month.

The Azhdar is essentially a mobile mine that can be programmed to detonate at a particular time or place, or when influenced by specific sensory inputs. It can be deployed from surface or subsurface platforms, and is extremely hard to detect and neutralize. Although relatively slow and lumbering when compared to a torpedo or encapsulated torpedo mine, it is extremely quiet and stealthy, and, given its mobility, is largely immune to mine countermeasures. Azhdar undersea deployments would be far more covert than indiscriminate mining, which would take several days of highly visible surface activity. Also, the psychological effect of targeted Azhdar attacks could enable the Iranians to effectively close the Strait of Hormuz while enjoying deniability and maintaining a vital economic lifeline for oil exports.

The Azhdar poses a unique and significant tactical challenge for the U.S. Navy, as it would likely render traditional mine countermeasures and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) tactics ineffective. In a manner consistent with Iranian torpedo tactics, we believe that Azhdars would be deployed from Ghadir-class midget submarines operating on the seabed in shallow, cluttered coastal areas where they would be effectively masked from sonar detection. But unlike a torpedo launch, which would expose the Ghadir to near-immediate counter-detection and counterattack by U.S. ASW assets, an Azhdar deployment would be extremely difficult if not impossible to detect. Once deployed, the Azhdars would proceed slowly and quietly, approaching their targets without warning and detonating on contact or from magnetic influence. The Ghadir could then rearm while surfaced or submerged using divers from an IRGCN surface vessel to facilitate the reloading process[5]. 

The Azhdar UUV is a force multiplier for the IRGCN, combining the sea denial capability of conventional offensive mine warfare with the stealth, mobility, and plausible deniability of unmanned undersea operations. It is a game-changer for Iranian seapower, with far-reaching implications for the United States and its regional interests.


Endnotes:

[1] Reuters, (2019, May 17) Exclusive: Insurer says Iran’s Guards likely to have organized tanker attacks https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-oil-tankers-exclusive/exclusive-insurer-says-irans-guards-likely-to-have-organized-tanker-attacks-idUSKCN1SN1P7

[2] See Covert Shores, (2017, December 29) Iranian e-Ghavasi Human Torpedo http://www.hisutton.com/Iran_Chariot.html; Covert Shores, (2015, October 10) Demystified – new low profile Iranian SDV http://www.hisutton.com/Demystified%20-%20new%20low-profile%20Iranian%20SDV.html; Covert Shores, (2016, August 28) Nahang Class http://www.hisutton.com/Nahang%20Class.html; Office of Naval Intelligence, (2017, February) Iranian Naval Forces: A Tale of Two Navies https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/iran/Iran%20022217SP.pdf

[3] Navy Recognition, (2012, January 24) Iran reportedly designed an unmanned undersea vehicle (UUV) https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/year-2012-news/january-2012-navy-world-naval-forces-maritime-industry-technology-news/294-iran-reportedly-designed-an-unmanned-underwater-vehicle-uuv.html

[4] Covert Shores, (2017, December 29) Iranian e-Ghavasi Human Torpedo http://www.hisutton.com/Iran_Chariot.html

[5] Tasnim News Agency, (2016, January 30) Iranian Navy Forces Practice Off-Dock Torpedo Loading in Drills https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2016/01/30/985644/iranian-navy-forces-practice-off-dock-torpedo-loading-in-drills

Alternative Futures / Alternative Histories / Counterfactuals Assessment Papers David R. Strachan Iran Underwater Capabilities

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ Options to Counter the 1941 German Invasion

Timothy Heck is a free-lance editor focusing on military history and national security topics.  An artillery officer by trade, he is working on several projects related to the Red Army during and after the Great Patriotic War.  He can be found on Twitter @tgheck1 Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


National Security Situation:  On June 22, 1941 Germany invaded the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

Date Originally Written:  August 13, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  October 24, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article is written from the point of view of the Soviet High Command’s (Stavka) options for handling the German invasion of the USSR which began on June 22, 1941.

Background:  On June 22, 1941 German troops in significant strength (at least Army-sized) attacked the border of the Soviet Union in all military districts.  The attacks came as a surprise to the Soviets, in spite of the presence of several operational indicators[1].  At the strategic level, intelligence failed to detect obvious signals of an imminent invasion[2].  Despite intelligence shortcomings, the Soviet Red Army repelled these attacks and defended the Motherland at heavy cost.

On June 23 positional fighting continued with Soviet defenses holding firm in most sectors and making small gains in others.  Today, the Germans are expected to continue attacks in local settings in division-level or below strength.  The Red Army has several options to respond.  Options 1a and 1b are manpower-based decisions while Options 2a and 2b involve combat deployment.  

Significance:  Massed German forces pose an existential threat to the Soviet Union’s security.  German military capability and capacity remain high.  While the German campaign model is of short, aggressive thrusts, a long war would likely involve the destruction of recent Soviet significant economic and social progress made during recent five-year plans. Conversely, failure to destroy the Hitlerites presents a threat to the long-term stability of the USSR.

Option #1a:  The USSR initiates a full military mobilization. 

While reservists in the Kiev and the Western Special Military Districts remain mobilized until autumn 1941, complete mobilization is required for full war.  Mobilization Plan 41 (MP-41) would activate approximately 8.7 million men and women, arrayed in over 300 divisions, which outweighs estimated German strength of approximately 200 available divisions[3].  

Risk: 

Economic:  Full mobilization would result in significant disruption to the Soviet economic base. First, mobilized manpower would be removed from the labor pool, tightening all sectors’ resources. Second, the necessary industrial retooling from peacetime to war material is a long-term detriment of the Soviet economy.  Third, mobilized manpower would be unavailable for the upcoming harvest.  Fourth, as the majority of Soviet economic assets travel via rail lines, their use for mobilized forces will impact delivery of necessary civilian goods, including agricultural products and raw materials.  

Equipment:  Current industrial capacity and military stores are unable to fully equip the mobilized force in the near term.  Furthermore, a full-scale mobilization risks adding excessive use to all items not specifically needed to address the German threat, requiring accelerated replacement and procurement plans. 

Gain: 

Strategic flexibility:  A fully mobilized Red Army provides flexibility without concerns about manpower restrictions should further combat operations become necessary.  MP-41 gives commanders strategic and operational reserves needed for mobile warfare, regardless of whether Option 2a or 2b is selected.

Readiness:  A full-scale mobilization brings all reserve formations to table of organization and equipment strength, allowing commanders to improve individual and collective training levels, and improving combat readiness.

Option #1b:  The USSR initiates a partial military mobilization.

A limited mobilization could be used to replenish losses in forward units, recall specialists to duty, and / or reinforce against potential Japanese aggression in the East.  A limited mobilization would focus on current operational and strategic needs. 

Risk: 

Excessive scope/scale:  Any level of mobilization creates excess manpower to train, administer, and equip.  Given current Red Army shortages, excess personnel risk being underused.  Furthermore, an excessive mobilization shortens service life for items used by excess personnel.  

Inadequate scope/scale:  Inadequate mobilization fails to give the Red Army the manpower needed for either Option 2a or 2b.  Likely, subsequent mobilizations would be required, increasing the complexity of operational-level planning by adding phasing requirements.

Gain:

Planned preparedness:  Recalling selected personnel / units tailors the mobilization to meet current or anticipated needs without creating waste.

Minimized disruption:  The impact on the Soviet economy would be reduced, allowing for continued progress on the Third Five Year Plan and its focus on consumer goods.  Excessive disruption would adversely impact the Soviet citizens’ quality of life.

Option #2a:  The Red Army counterattacks against the German forces.

With the forces currently or soon to be available, launch an immediate counterattack along the East Prussia-Berlin or Prague-Vienna axes[4].  

Risk: 

Material readiness:  While the Red Army possesses approximately 13,000 tanks along the German-Soviet border, many units have limited mobility needed for offensive operations[5].  Many airfields are overcrowded and squadrons displaced as a result of recent re-alignment in the Red Air Force[6].

Japanese involvement:  Given the Japanese-German-Italian alliance, the possibility exists that Japan will declare war against the USSR.  This would necessitate dividing forces to deal with both enemies, a risk compounded if forces are relocated from Siberian and Manchurian districts.

Gain: 

Operational initiative:  Choosing when and where to attack gives the Red Army the operational initiative in support of strategic objectives.

Potential alliance with Western Allies:  An immediate counterattack would align with Western interests and possibly set the conditions for an alliance.  Such an alliance would gain access to Western technologies, intelligence, and equipment while further dividing German attention and strength.  While capitalist states cannot fully be trusted, there exist mutually aligned interests in countering Germany that could be exploited.

Option #2b:  The Red Army maintains current defensive posture along the western border.  

Risk:

Continuing threat:  Without internal political collapse in Germany, the German military threat cannot be removed by a defensive Red Army.  In any war, the most one can hope for when playing defense is a tie.

Unprepared defenses:  Soviet defenses, especially in recently liberated territories, remain vulnerable.  Assuming continued German aggression and nationalist remnants, these territories are at risk of capture by German forces.

Gain:

Flexibility:  Remaining on the strategic defense now does not preclude going onto the offensive at a later date.  Furthermore, the Red Army can rebuild on its chosen timeline and to its desired end state (Option 1a or 1b).  

International support:  By remaining on the defensive rather than waging war on the German forces, including their civilians, the Soviet Union retains moral superiority, furthering the cause of Socialism worldwide.  Given recent Capitalist propaganda during and after the Finnish War, appealing to the League of Nations would advance Soviet interests in the long-term by showing a respect for the organization and giving the appeal a perceived moral grounding.  

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendation:  None. 


Endnotes:

[1] Alexander Hill, The Red Army and the Second World War.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, p. 206.  For more on available indications and warnings, see David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Revised and Expanded Edition. (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2015), pp. 48-51.  See also Amnon Sella, “‘Barbarossa’: Surprise Attack and Communication.’” Journal of Contemporary History 13, No. 3 (July, 1978).

[2] Viktor Suvorov, Icebreaker: Who Started World War II? (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990), pp. 320-321.

 [3] Hill, 198 and 192-3.

 [4] Hill, 196.

 [5] Hill, 199.

[6] See Mikhail Timin and Kevin Bridge, trans. Air Battles Over the Baltic: The Air War on 22 June 1941—The Battle for Stalin’s Baltic Region. Solihull, UK: Helion, 2018.

Germany Option Papers Timothy Heck Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

U.S. Options to Respond to North Vietnam’s 1973 Violations of the Paris Peace Accords

Timothy Heck is a free-lance editor focusing on military history and national security topics.  An artillery officer by trade, he lived and worked in Southeast Asia for four years.  He can be found on Twitter @tgheck1.  Josh Taylor is a U.S. Navy Foreign Area Officer and a 2018 Federal Executive Fellow at the Center for Strategic & International Studies.  He is presently Head of International Plans & Policy at Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, HI.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group. 


National Security Situation:  In 1973 North Vietnam violated the Paris Peace Accords.

Date Originally Written:  August 12, 2019. 

Date Originally Published:  October 21, 2019.

Article and / or Article Point of View:  This article summarizes some of the options presented by U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and his Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), to U.S. President Richard Nixon to address North Vietnamese violations of the Paris Peace Accords in the spring of 1973.  These options are based on realities as they existed on April 18, 1973, the day before the U.S. agreed to another round of talks with North Vietnam in Paris and U.S. Congress Representative Elizabeth Holtzman sued Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to stop the “secret” bombing of Cambodia. Nixon addressed the nation on Watergate on April 30, 1973, effectively closing the door on military options to coerce North Vietnamese compliance.  Included in this article are several errors in judgment common in WSAG or with Kissinger at the time.

Background:  On January 28, 1973, the ceasefire in Vietnam began in accordance with the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, also known as the Paris Peace Accords.  Since the ceasefire began, repeated violations of the Accords, specifically Articles 7 and 20, have occurred as a result of North Vietnamese action[1].  At the recent WSAG meetings on April 16-17, 1973, National Security Advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger asked for options on how to address North Vietnamese violations. The WSAG presents the below two options to meet Dr. Kissinger’s desired end state of securing North Vietnamese compliance with the Accords.  

Significance:  The collapsing security in Southeast Asia presents several concerns for American national security.  First, failure to forcefully respond to gross North Vietnamese violations of the Accords makes the U.S. seem impotent, undermines U.S. credibility, and endangers the President’s Peace with Honor goal. Second, unimpeded infiltration of men and equipment into South Vietnam place it at risk in the event of another North Vietnamese general offensive. Third, given the weak governments in Laos and Cambodia, further violations by North Vietnam risk destabilizing those nations with spillover effects on South Vietnam and Thailand. Fourth, any recalcitrance on behalf of North Vietnam risks damaging ongoing U.S. negotiations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), long known to be their primary patron. 

Option #1:  The U.S. conducts airstrikes against the Ho Chi Minh Trail (HCMT).

Recent North Vietnamese resupply efforts to their forces in South Vietnam offer numerous targets for the resumption of a massive aerial campaign lasting between three to seven days.  These airstrikes would be conducted by the Thailand-based U.S. Support Activities Group/7th Air Force against targets in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.  Targets along the HCMT in Laos will require strikes against surface-to-air missile sites located near Khe Sanh.

Risk: 

New U.S. Prisoners of War (POW):  With the repatriation of the last American POWs on March 29, 1973, the creation of new POWs resulting from military action would cause a domestic uproar. Such an uproar risks reinvigorating the Administration’s political enemies, jeopardizing other initiatives.

Domestic criticism:  Continued military actions in Indochina fuel growing concerns over continued involvement in Indochina post-Accord.  It is reported that Representative Holtzman (D-NY) will be filing a federal lawsuit over bombing in Cambodia in an effort to stop the President’s efforts there. 

International reprobation:  The Agreement did not specify how violations would be addressed. Though the North Vietnamese bear little political cost for blatant disregard of the Accords, it will damage U.S. international credibility if we do not scrupulously adhere to its articles as we would be seen as violating the ceasefire despite our efforts to enforce it.

United States Air Force (USAF) limitations:  Previous losses during the similar OPERATION LINEBACKER II were significant and wing metal fatigue limits the availability of B-52D bombers. Converting nuclear-capable B-52Gs to conventional B-52Ds is time prohibitive and would reduce strategic readiness[2]. Additionally, the USAF possesses limited stocks of the precision stand-off weapons needed to strike targets on the HCMT (40-55 nautical mile range).

Ceasefires in Laos and Cambodia:  Currently, bombing operations are being conducted in the vicinity of Tha Viang, Laos against a Pathet Lao assault.  While in violation of the ceasefire treaty, the measure is being taken to dissuade further Pathet Lao violations.  Larger bombing operations, however, risk the fragile ceasefires in place or being sought in Laos and Cambodia. 

Gain: 

Signals to North Vietnam:  As Dr. Kissinger stated in his meetings, North Vietnam only respects brutality.  Thus, massive bombing will increase their likelihood of compliance with the Accords.

Demonstrates American power and resolve:  By demonstrating the U.S. is willing to back up its words with force, we reinforce messaging of enduring support to our Allies and Partners.  Importantly in Indochina, bombing demonstrates U.S. commitment to our allies, Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam, Souvanna Phouma of Laos, and Lon Nol of Cambodia, that the U.S. is not cutting off their support after the Accords.  

Attrition of North Vietnamese Supplies & Equipment:  Bombing the HCMT significantly reduces North Vietnamese capacity to launch a general offensive in the short term.  Given the significant disruption the 1972 Easter Offensive created in South Vietnam, diminishing the North Vietnamese capacity for a repeat offensive is crucial to South Vietnamese survival.

Encourages PRC involvement:  The PRC only supports the U.S. when they feel we are unrestrained.  Any escalation of our actions will induce them to compel the North Vietnamese to comply with the terms of the Accords[3].

Option #2:  The U.S. continues negotiations with North Vietnam.

An insolent cable from North Vietnamese foreign minister Le Duc Tho to Dr. Kissinger offered to open another round of talks in Paris on May 15, 1973[4].  Any discussions about ceasefire violations should include all members of the Four Parties (U.S., Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (Viet Cong)) so that the diplomatic process is respected.  Significant headway was made during previous negotiations.

Risk:

North Vietnam stalling for time:  Given the recent surge in resupply, this meeting could begin too late given recent Central Intelligence Agency warnings of an imminent North Vietnamese offensive[5]. 

South Vietnamese intransigence:  While the U.S. remains South Vietnamese President Thieu’s staunchest ally and largest benefactor, Thieu may resist returning to negotiations as a means of holding out for additional financial and military aid and support. As he demonstrated in the fall of 1972, he has no qualms about scuttling negotiations that he feels are not in the best interest of his country. South Vietnam must participate if the negotiations are to have any credibility or effect.

Highlights diplomatic weakness:  There is no indication that North Vietnam will adhere to any new agreements any more than it has the original

Gain: 

Supports Peace with Honor:  The U.S. maintains international and domestic support by scrupulously adhering to the Agreement and avoiding additional bloodshed.

Preserves domestic political capital:  This option safeguards Congressional and public support for financial reconstruction assistance to South Vietnam and potentially North Vietnam as part of the Accords.

Military options remain open:  Option #2 discussions do not preclude a future employment of military options and allows time for the reconstitution of the USAF’s conventional bomber fleet.

Other Comments:  President Nixon is slated to address the nation on April 30, 1973 regarding recent developments in the Watergate incident[6].  

Recommendation:  None. 


Endnotes:

[1] Article 7: [T]he two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel including technical military personnel, armaments, munitions, and war material into South Vietnam.  Article 20: The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam undertake to refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and security of one another and of other countries. (b) Foreign countries shall put an end to all military activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing into these two countries troops, military advisers and military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material. Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam (Paris, 27 January 1973) https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/10/12/656ccc0d-31ef-42a6-a3e9-ce5ee7d4fc80/publishable_en.pdf

[2] “Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, April 11, 1973 in FRUS: X, VN, 1973, 188.

[3] “Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting,” Washington, April 16, 1973, 10:03–11:45 a.m. in FRUS: X, VN, 1973, 196.

[4] “Transcript of Telephone Conversation between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, April 21, 1973, 11:40 a.m. in FRUS: X, VN, 1973, 206-207.

[5] “Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, April 11, 1973 in FRUS: X, VN, 1973, 188.

[6] “Address to the Nation about the Watergate Investigations, April 30, 1973” in Public papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, containing the public messages, speeches, and statements of the President by United States and Richard M. Nixon. 1975. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 328-333.

Josh Taylor Option Papers Timothy Heck United States Vietnam

Alternative Future: Assessment of the Effects of the Loss of the American Lease on Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti

Travis Prendergast has served in the United States Army for eight years as a Rifle Platoon Leader, Staff Officer, and Rifle Company Commander.  He currently serves as a Company Commander in U.S. Army Recruiting Command.  He has just started tweeting as @strategy_boi, where he shares fiction and non-fiction content.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Alternative Future:  Assessment of the Effects of the Loss of the American Lease on Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti

Date Originally Written:  August 10th, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  October 17, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is a current military member who served at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti in 2018. The article is written from the point of view of a historian in the mid-2030s, examining shifts in great power competition in East Africa.

Summary:  After the United States lost its lease on Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti in 2024, a series of operational and strategic challenges arose in East Africa. The departure of certain operational assets degraded America’s capability to conduct crisis response. At a strategic level, the ability of the United States to stem Chinese foreign direct investment and influence in Africa also suffered.

Text:  Looking back, it is easy to pinpoint the shift in America’s strategic position in East Africa to the 2024 decision by Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Guelleh to not allow the United States to extend its lease on Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ). As a former commander of United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) had once said of the then $1.2 billion worth of Djiboutian debt to China, there did indeed come a time when that money would be collected[1]. The collection came at a steep price for Djibouti, as the country was forced to hand over control of the Doraleh Container Terminal to Beijing, an outcome many had feared would be the eventual result of the Chinese debt trap[2]. However, the United States paid the steepest price of all by losing its strategic position at CLDJ, which was at the time the United States’ longest enduring military base in Africa and headquarters of the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Whether the loss came as a result of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) influx of money and influence into the Djiboutian government, or as a result of American foreign policy changes, is still in debate even ten years later. It is clear though that the loss of CLDJ triggered strategic and operational effects that are still being felt today.

With the loss of CLDJ, the United States’ already tenuous grasp on Africa, best illustrated by the failure of USAFRICOM to establish its headquarters on the continent itself, slipped further. First used by America in 2001 and expanded in 2007, the camp had been a hub for a variety of United States operations not just in East Africa, but in Yemen as well[3]. As the base expanded, so did its mission set, resulting in the United States basing not just special operations forces and Marines there, but also conventional Army units[4]. This expansion of the base and the operational support that Camp Lemonnier provided to the operations in Yemen and East Africa only intensified the impact of the loss of the American lease on CLDJ.

The immediate scramble to plan for and then re-locate the 4,000 personnel on Camp Lemonnier and their attendant functions to other locations left little time to plan for contingency operations in the Horn of Africa. Just as the United States military was completing its phased transition out of Camp Lemonnier, riots in the South Sudanese capital of Juba in 2026 threated American embassy personnel and tested USAFRICOM’s ability to respond to crises on the continent from outside the continent. With the departure of the East Africa Response Force from Camp Lemonnier, the United States could no longer provide a rapid response force as outlined in the New Normal procedures that had been in put in place in reaction to the Benghazi consulate attacks in 2012[5][6]. Instead, USAFRICOM and the Department of State had to rely on another child of the Benghazi attacks: the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SP-MAGTF) located in Moron, Spain and Sigonella, Italy[7]. In the vast distances of the African continent, the time spent getting from Sigonella to Juba proved costly, and by the time the SP-MAGTF element secured the embassy, two American diplomats were dead. In the investigations in the months that followed, it was not lost on American legislators that a failure to maintain a foothold in East Africa had contributed to the loss of American lives and property in Juba.

Beyond the immediate operational costs of losing CLDJ, America faced a greater strategic loss in East Africa. As part of the BRI that China had been pursuing for over a decade prior to 2024, the Export-Import Bank of China had loaned Djibouti nearly $957 million as of 2018 in order to finance development projects[8]. Also under the BRI, China constructed the Djibouti International Free Trade Zone, a 3.5 billion dollar project[9]. After losing its foothold in Djibouti, the United States had little diplomatic clout to resist the continued investment of Chinese capital into East African states, furthering the debt trap situation beyond the borders of Djibouti. Furthermore, with the departure of the United States military from Djibouti, long-term American humanitarian projects in Djibouti, such as the 2019 opening of a medical clinic in the town of Ali Oune, no longer had a logistical base from which to draw support[10]. With America out of the way, any non-Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) was left in the hands of the French, Japanese, and other foreign powers present in Djibouti. America could no longer use its military to try to match, in some small way, the FDI provided by China.

Despite the American military departure from the region beginning in 2024, several of America’s allies remain to this day. Although the French Senate had previously expressed concern over Chinese influence overshadowing French influence in Djibouti, France’s defense clause remains in place and ensures that the French will remain in Djibouti even as China grows in power[11]. With piracy in the waters off the Horn of Africa no less prevalent than in the late 2010s, the Japanese anti-piracy base just outside the old Camp Lemonnier gate continues its operations. However, no amount of anti-piracy operations or promises of defense can match the sheer influx of money that China promised, and delivered, under their BRI. As the world moves toward the 2040s and the completion of the multi-decade BRI, the world is left wondering if the 21st century will be a Chinese century. With the departure of the American military from Djibouti, the answer seems to be that in Africa, it already is.


Endnotes:

[1] Browne, R. (2018, April 08). US military resumes air operations in Djibouti. Retrieved August 7, 2019, from https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/08/politics/us-air-operations-djibouti/index.html

[2] Belt and Road Initiative strikes again… Djibouti risks Chinese takeover with massive loans – US warns. (2018, September 02). Retrieved August 07, 2019, from https://www.kaieteurnewsonline.com/2018/09/02/belt-and-road-initiative-strikes-again-djibouti-risks-chinese-takeover-with-massive-loans-us-warns/

[3] Schmitt, E. (2014, May 06). U.S. Signs New Lease to Keep Strategic Military Installation in the Horn of Africa. Retrieved August 7, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/world/africa/us-signs-new-lease-to-keep-strategic-military-installation-in-the-horn-of-africa.html

[4] Ibid.

[5] Martin, P. (2019, March 20). East Africa Response Force deployed to Gabon. Retrieved August 07, 2019, from https://www.army.mil/article/218891/east_africa_response_force_deployed_to_gabon

[6] Schmitt, E. (2014, May 06). U.S. Signs New Lease to Keep Strategic Military Installation in the Horn of Africa. Retrieved August 07, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/world/africa/us-signs-new-lease-to-keep-strategic-military-installation-in-the-horn-of-africa.html

[7] Egnash, M. (2019, January 14). Legacy of Benghazi: Marine force stays ready for quick Africa deployment. Retrieved August 07, 2019, from https://www.stripes.com/news/legacy-of-benghazi-marine-force-stays-ready-for-quick-africa-deployment-1.564342

[8] Daly, J. C. (2018, April 11). Geostrategic position draws foreign powers to Djibouti. Retrieved August 07, 2019, from https://thearabweekly.com/geostrategic-position-draws-foreign-powers-djibouti

[9] Belt and Road Initiative strikes again… Djibouti risks Chinese takeover with massive loans – US warns. (2018, September 02). Retrieved August 07, 2019, from https://www.kaieteurnewsonline.com/2018/09/02/belt-and-road-initiative-strikes-again-djibouti-risks-chinese-takeover-with-massive-loans-us-warns/

[10] Nickel, S. (2019, January 31). U.S. Navy Seabees turn over Ali Oune Medical Clinic to Djiboutian officials. Retrieved August 07, 2019, from https://www.hoa.africom.mil/story/22489/u-s-navy-seabees-turn-over-ali-oune-medical-clinic-to-djiboutian-officials

[11] Griffin, C. (2018, October 28). Strategic Competition for Bases in Djibouti: TRENDS. Retrieved August 07, 2019, from http://trendsinstitution.org/strategic-competition-for-bases-in-djibouti/

Africa Alternative Futures / Alternative Histories / Counterfactuals Assessment Papers China (People's Republic of China) Djibouti Horn of Africa Travis Prendergast United States

Alternative Futures: An Assessment of the 2040 Security Environment absent Great Power Competition

Mike Sweeney is a former think tanker who lives and writes in New Jersey.  He is the author of the essays, “Could America Lose a War Well?” and “Could America Leave the Middle East by 2031?” He’s still not sure about the answer to either question.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Alternative Futures: An Assessment of the 2040 Security Environment absent Great Power Competition

Date Originally Written:  July 22, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  October 14, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article presupposes that the challenges the United States will face as it approaches the mid-century mark could be quite different from the great-power conflicts with China and Russia that are now being anticipated and planned for. This article attempts to jar thinking to promote consideration of an entirely different set of threats. 

Summary:  America is likely to be ill-prepared for the security threats circa 2040. The tasks the U.S. military may be asked to perform in the face of global political instability, mass migration, and environmental degradation are likely to be both unconventional and unwanted. 

Text:  By 2040, Russia and, to a lesser extent, China are twilight powers whose strategic influence and military strength are waning. The former is mainly pre-occupied with internal stability and reform in the post-Putin era[1]. The latter has solidified its influence over the South China Sea, but the extreme costs of maintaining internal control over its domestic population and territories inhibit China from translating its resources into true global power[2]. The great-power conflict many postulated in the early twenty-first century never comes to pass. Instead, the U.S. military is forced to confront diverse but persistent low-level threats spurred on by forced migration, environmental degradation, and growing global inequality.

Several regions begin to undergo major political and social change, notably the Middle East. The region’s traditional rentier system breaks down in the face of falling oil revenue as the world belatedly transforms to a post-hydrocarbon economy. The Arab monarchies and secular authoritarian regimes begin to crumble in a second, more wide-ranging “Arab Spring[3].” While increasing the personal freedom of the region’s citizens, this second Arab Spring also enhances instability and creates a loose security environment where weapons and terrorist safe-havens are plentiful. 

Globally, there is a growing antipathy towards the world’s “have’s” among its many “have not’s.” Part of this antipathy is due to the economic insecurity in regions affected by major social and political transformation. But just as significant is the impact of environmental degradation on the livability of areas home to millions of people. By mid-century, ecological decline provokes massive refugee movements, dwarfing those seen earlier in the century[4]. As the stateless population increases substantially, the ability of Western governments to cope is severely stressed, necessitating assignation of military forces to administer refugee settlements and to interdict migrant flows. 

The increased stateless population, coupled with the turmoil brought about by political change in the Middle East and other regions, provides ample recruits for revolutionary organizations. Conservative, religious extremist groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have been discredited due to their social backwardness and exploitative hierarchies. However, the cycle of violence swings back to new incarnations of the violent Marxism that dominated terrorism at various points during the twentieth century. In contrast to religious extremists, the Marxist revivalists embrace many nominally noble ideas like gender and racial equality, the existence of universal human rights, and place an emphasis on securing dignity for the oppressed individual. They also draw an explicit link between the existing health of the world’s stable, prosperous nations and past exploitation of both poorer regions and the world’s environment as a whole. 

These Marxist beliefs form the basis for their targeting of the United States and other mature industrial states like Japan and most European nations. Despite their ostensibly laudable goals, the new wave of Marxists are willing to employ extreme violence to achieve them. The lethality of these groups is enhanced by major advances in biotechology which create new opportunities for relatively small groups to initiate catastrophic terrorist strikes. Proliferation of directed energy weapons renders civilian aircraft of all types increasingly vulnerable from terrorist attack from the ground. 

After decades of largely ignoring the value of international organizations, U.S. efforts to resuscitate such bodies to deal with many of the transnational problems undergirding new terrorist threats are ineffective. The result is an ad hoc approach where the United States works bilaterally where it can with whomever it can to address regional migration and poverty. 

For the U.S. military, the consequences are severe. Most of the equipment purchased or developed for great-power conflict with Russia and China is ill-suited for the challenges it faces in 2040. The U.S. military’s heavy investment in robotics still yields some benefits in the realms of logistics and reconnaissance. However, the complexities of dealing with challenges like migration flows, globally distributed low-intensity conflicts, and Marxist terrorism places limits on the applicability of robotic systems to combat. 

Above all else, well-trained manpower remains at a premium. The nature of many tasks the military is asked to carry out – directly guarding American borders, providing security and humanitarian aid to refugee camps, “humanely” interdicting migration flows, conducting counter-insurgency against impoverished, sometimes displaced populations – makes securing qualified personnel difficult. Some consideration is given to establishing a standing force of paid professionals drawn from outside the United States for particularly distasteful jobs, essentially “an American Foreign Legion.” 

The specific extent to which America should go abroad to address transnational threats is a source of intense domestic debate, with a wide disparity among political groups on the issue. One school of thought argues for developing and implementing truly imposing physical and technological barriers to seal the United States off completely from the outside world. These barriers are referred to as “the Fortress America” model. Another approach favors a robust and invasive effort to interdict the sources of Marxist terrorism through a range of humanitarian and nation-building initiatives. In this model, the U.S. military becomes something of a global gendarme mated with a strong civil engineering component. A third line of thinking argues for modestly increasing the physical barriers to entry into America while conducting specific interdiction missions against groups, leaders, and weapons facilities. These raids are initially referred to as “Abbottabad on steroids,” where small units deploy from the U.S. for short periods – up to a week – to secure and clear “zones of concern” around the world. 

The intense domestic debate over the military’s role in addressing transnational threats makes long-term procurement planning difficult. Many military members grow increasingly despondent with the thankless security tasks the challenges of 2040 require. The ubiquitous coverage of most U.S. military actions through everyday technology like cell phones increases civilian debate and military dissatisfaction. Force retention reaches a crisis, as does the mental health of military personnel. Most Americans agree that administering large migrant camps or attempting to address environmental degradation abroad aren’t what they want their military to do; most also concede that given the scope of these problems by mid-century, there are few other qualified options. 


Endnotes:

[1] For an excellent discussion of four scenarios for Russia’s future, see Lynch, A. (2018, October 25). What Will Russia Be. Retrieved July 21, 2019, from https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/10/25/what-russia-will-be/

[2] See the discussion of China’s future prospects in Beckley, M. (2018). Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower. Ithaca and London: Cornel University Press.

[3] For a discussion of the rentier system and its role in maintaining authoritarian governments in the Middle East, see Muasher, M. (2018, November/December). The Next Arab Uprising. Retrieved July 21, 2019, from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-10-15/next-arab-uprising 

[4] For another possible extrapolation of the security impacts of the climate-refugee link, see Ader, M. (2019, July 2). Climate Refugees: Our Problem from Hell. Retrieved July 21, 2019, from https://wavellroom.com/2019/07/02/climate-refugees-our-problem-from-hell/

Alternative Futures / Alternative Histories / Counterfactuals Assessment Papers Great Powers Mike Sweeney

Assessment of Right-Wing Militia Extremism in the United States

T.S. Whitman is a writer from St. Louis, Missouri.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessment of Right-Wing Militia Extremism in the United States

Date Originally Written:  July 5, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  October 7, 2019.

Summary:  Due to increased levels of militia activity and right-wing extremism, individuals radicalized on the far right-end of the political spectrum remain an awkward elephant in the room for policymakers. Despite a clear threat from right-wing extremists, an effective response is often limited by political posturing and pressure.

Text:  The rise of alt-right ideology, availability of firearms, and increased militia membership over the past decade creates a unique problem for policymakers. Setting aside the unlikely, worst-case scenario of whole-scale rebellion, even a single militia can pose a threat that exceeds the operational capacity of law enforcement personnel. There is no easy way to address this issue, as even openly discussing it probes sensitivities and fuels political resentment.

The ascent of militias has not occurred in a vacuum. It can be attributed to a sharp increase in political polarization over the past two decades, particularly after the election of President Barack Obama in 2008. This widening gap in ideology and values has led to rising animosity between Americans. Nearly 1-in-5 Americans believe that many members of the opposite party “lack the traits to be considered fully human”; and 13% of Republicans and 18% of Democrats believe that violence would be justified in response to an electoral loss in 2020[1]. Despite high-levels of animus from both sides of the political spectrum, right-wing violence represents an increasing share of terrorist activity. The slice of terrorist violence by right-wing extremists increased from 6% of attacks in 2010 to 35% by 2016, while left-wing terrorist violence during the same period dropped from 64% of attacks to just 12%[2]. Furthermore, right-wing violence quadrupled between 2016 and 2017[3]. As the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes, “Although violent left-wing groups and individuals also present a threat, far-right-networks appear to be better armed and larger[4].” Many acts or plots of right-wing violence have involved militia members[5].

Some militia groups are conducting so-called “operations.” One frequent spot for militia activity is the U.S.-Mexican border, where one militia recently detained several hundred immigrants illegally crossing the border[6]. Meanwhile, over the past decade, there have been a number of prominent incidents involving right-wing militia members. In 2014, following what had been two decades of legal disputes between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Cliven Bundy over grazing fees, the BLM moved to confiscate Bundy’s cattle. What followed was a tense standoff between Bundy’s armed supporters, many of whom had militia ties, and BLM agents. Out of fear of armed violence, the BLM caved and returned Bundy’s livestock[7]. In 2016, Ammon Bundy, son of Cliven Bundy, led a group of armed protestors affiliated with militias and the sovereign citizen movement to occupy the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge outside of Burns, Oregon, in response to federal charges against two farmers, Stephen and Dwight Hammond. By the time the standoff ended, one armed occupier was dead and 27 more were arrested and charged. In June, 2019, after eleven Oregon Republican state Senators refused to attend a legislative session for a cap-and-trade bill, Governor Kate Brown ordered state police to apprehend and bring them to the state capitol for a vote on the bill. All eleven Senators went on the run. During a television interview, Senator Brian Boquist (R) said, “Send bachelors and come heavily armed. I’m not going to be a political prisoner in the state of Oregon.” They received support from militia groups in Oregon and Idaho, the former of which was involved in the aforementioned Bundy Ranch and Malheur National Wildlife Reserve standoffs. According to Real Three Percenters Idaho militia leader Eric Parker, “We’re doing what we can to make sure that they’re safe and comfortable.” He added that his group was communicating with the Oregon Three Percenters militia about the Senators. One militiaman with the Oregon Three Percenters wrote on Facebook that his militia “vowed to provide security, transportation and refuge for those Senators in need[8].” The crisis ended after an agreement between Republican and Democratic leadership was reached to kill the cap-and-trade bill.

Attempted or fulfilled acts of political violence and terrorism by domestic extremists, though often bloody, have overwhelmingly been perpetrated by an individual or small cells. In almost every case, law enforcement officers have been able to preempt, apprehend, or kill the responsible parties. However, the size, organization, and armament of many right-wing militias gives the government cause for concern. Based upon the result of the 2014 Bundy standoff and the disastrous outcome of the 1993 Waco siege, it stands to reason that even a small militia of 100 armed personnel would require U.S. military capabilities to suppress[9]. However, the contemporary history of domestic military operations is fraught with confusion. For instance, during the L.A. Riots in 1992, Joint Task Force-Los Angeles lacked legal experts in Chapter 15, Title 10, Sections 331-334, and military lawyers were initially confused by the Posse Comitatus Act[10].

Discussing right-wing extremism requires delicacy and nuance, but will remain an inflammatory topic regardless of how it is addressed. In attempt to position itself to respond to right-wing domestic terrorism and political violence, the government has faced allegations of political bias. The earliest assessment of right-wing extremism under the Obama administration’s Department of Homeland Security (DHS) came under severe scrutiny for anti-conservatism and was subsequently retracted. According to Daryl Johnson, a career intelligence analyst and author of the report, the political fallout led to the end of “work related to violent right-wing extremism[11].” It was reported by The Daily Beast in April 2019 that the DHS had disbanded its domestic terrorism intelligence unit. Some officials have anonymously alleged that there has been a sharp reduction in the number of domestic terrorism assessments as a result[12].

Despite the challenge of addressing right-wing militia extremism, the average American is unlikely to ever be killed or injured by one. The chances of being killed in a terrorist attack, committed by a right-wing extremist or otherwise, are 1 in 3,269,897[13]. More concerning is the threat posed by insurrection, even if it is isolated and not widespread. Keith Mines, a veteran Special Forces officer and diplomat, estimated a 60% chance that America would experience “violence that requires the National Guard to deal with[14].” Ignoring this possibility will only place America at a disadvantage if an extreme militia group collectively turns to violence.


Endnotes:

[1] Kalmoe, N. P., & Mason, L. (2019, January). pp. 17-24. Lethal Mass Partisanship: Prevalence, Correlates, and Electoral Contingencies (pp. 1-41). Retrieved April 09, 2019, from https://www.dannyhayes.org/uploads/6/9/8/5/69858539/kalmoe___mason_ncapsa_2019_-_lethal_partisanship_-_final_lmedit.pdf

[2] Ideological Motivations of Terrorism in the United States, 1970-2016 (Rep.). (2017, November). Retrieved April 10, 2019, from University of Maryland website: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_IdeologicalMotivationsOfTerrorismInUS_Nov2017.pdf

[3] Clark, S. (2019, March 07). Confronting the Domestic Right-Wing Terror Threat. Center for American Progress. Retrieved April 10, 2019, from https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/03/07/467022/confronting-domestic-right-wing-terrorist-threat/

[4] Jones, S. G. (2018, November 07). The Rise of Far-Right Extremism in the United States. Retrieved July 08, 2019, from https://www.csis.org/analysis/rise-far-right-extremism-united-states

[5] Goldman, A. (2019, June 04). F.B.I., Pushing to Stop Domestic Terrorists, Grapples With Limits on Its Power. Retrieved July 08, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/us/politics/fbi-domestic-terrorism.html

[6] Hernandez, S. (2019, April 19). A Militia Group Detained Hundreds Of Migrants At Gunpoint At The Border. Retrieved July 05, 2019, from https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/salvadorhernandez/militia-group-border-migrants-detain-united-constitutional

[7] Prokop, A. (2015, May 14). The 2014 controversy over Nevada rancher Cliven Bundy, explained. Retrieved April 11, 2019, from https://www.vox.com/2014/8/14/18080508/nevada-rancher-cliven-bundy-explained

[8] Sommer, W. (2019, June 21). Armed Militias Pledge to Fight for Fugitive Oregon GOP Lawmakers ‘At Any Cost’. Retrieved from https://www.thedailybeast.com/armed-militias-pledge-to-fight-for-fugitive-oregon-gop-lawmakers-at-any-cost

[9] Matthews, M. (2012, February 07). Chapter 4: The 1992 Los Angeles Riots and the Posse Comitatus Act. In The Posse Comitatus Act and the United States Army: A Historical Perspective. Retrieved April 10, 2019, from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/matthews.pdf

[10] Matthews, M. (2012, February 07). Chapter 6: Conclusions. In The Posse Comitatus Act and the United States Army: A Historical Perspective. Retrieved April 10, 2019, from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/matthews.pdf

[11] Johnson, D. (2017, August 21). I Warned of Right-Wing Violence in 2009. Republicans Objected. I Was Right. Washington Post. Retrieved April 09, 2019, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/08/21/i-warned-of-right-wing-violence-in-2009-it-caused-an-uproar-i-was-right/

[12] Woodruff, B. (2019, April 02). Exclusive: Homeland Security Disbands Domestic Terror Intelligence Unit. The Daily Beast. Retrieved April 11, 2019, from https://www.thedailybeast.com/homeland-security-disbands-domestic-terror-intelligence-unit

[13] Nowrasteh, A. (2018, March 08). More Americans Die in Animal Attacks than in Terrorist Attacks. Retrieved April 10, 2019, from https://www.cato.org/blog/more-americans-die-animal-attacks-terrorist-attacks

[14] Ricks, T. E. (2017, March 10). Will we have a civil war? A SF officer turned diplomat estimates chances at 60 percent. Foreign Policy. Retrieved April 9, 2019, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/10/will-we-have-a-civil-war-a-sf-officer-turned-diplomat-estimates-chances-at-60-percent/

Assessment Papers T.S. Whitman United States Violent Extremism

Alternative Futures: Assessment of the 2027 Afghan Opium Trade

Chris Wozniak is an independent analyst. He holds a BA in Political Economy from the University of Washington. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Alternative Futures: Assessment of the 2027 Afghan Opium Trade

Date Originally Written:  July 3, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  October 3, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article is written from the point of view of a United Nations report outlining the rise Afghan heroin production and the consequences both within and beyond Afghan borders.

Summary:  A sudden exit of western troops from Afghanistan has fostered dramatic expansion of the already robust opium trade. Peace, profitability, and cynical policy calculations have led Afghan and regional players to embrace cultivation and trafficking at a cost to their licit economies, public health, and security. International players seem to think that Afghan peace on these terms is worth the corrosive influence that opium exports are carrying abroad.

Text:  In this 2027 30th anniversary edition of the World Drug Report, we have added an auxiliary booklet with an unprecedented singular focus on Afghanistan’s global impact on the drug supply chain and the threat it poses to security and development across multiple continents. This booklet covers the political landscape that allowed Afghanistan to become the world’s heroin epicenter and key players in the heroin trade. It also addresses the international response to the crisis and the global implications of the Afghan drug economy.

Five years after China’s 2022 acquisition of the port of Karachi through predatory One Belt One Road loans and a cooling in relations with Russia following the annexation of Belarus, major sea and air resupply routes to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) were closed or compromised, making sustained operations in Afghanistan logistically untenable. The subsequent departure of all ISAF troops removed a principal roadblock in peace talks with the Afghan Taliban (Taliban): withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. The resulting hastily negotiated peace deal formalized a power sharing agreement between the existing Afghan government and Taliban shadow government in exchange for renunciation of support and safe haven for transnational terrorists. In practice, a crude federalization has taken effect that leaves the Taliban politically represented in Kabul and in control of the majority of arable countryside used for poppy growth. The Western-supported government of Afghanistan largely retains control of urban centers and major highways needed for processing and export. This delicate equilibrium is largely sustained due to recognition that uninterrupted Afghan opium production is in the interest of both Afghans and international stakeholders and any violence would negatively impact profitability.

Within Afghanistan, an influential lobby shaping the political environment that has had a hand in the opium trade for decades is the transport mafia. Afghanistan has historically been a crossroads of trade and transport interests have long exploited opportunities for profit. The modern transport mafia became robust beginning in 1965 following the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA). The agreement allowed the duty free trade of goods from Pakistan into Afghanistan, leading to smuggling of the same goods back across the border for illicit profit. Soviet-Afghan war transport mafia activities included cross-border smuggling of arms to the mujahideen and smuggling of opium on the return journey. Post 9/11, theft of American supplies shipped via Karachi and destined for Afghanistan was another common scheme[1]. The influence of transport mafia interests in Afghanistan is profound in the political and developmental arenas as well. Popular support of the Taliban in the 1990s was largely attributable to the Taliban elimination of highway bandits, making transport much more predictable. Following the improvement in conditions, the profitability of opium smuggling by transport interests proved too popular for even the Taliban’s ban on poppy cultivation and opium. Following the 2001 arrival of American and ISAF personnel, transportation interests continued to grow alongside poppy cultivation, and in 2017 cultivation reached an all-time high of approximately 420,000 hectares – seventy-five percent of the global total[2]. Yields have continued to improve in the years since as Afghans have repaired irrigation infrastructure all over the south and east of the country. Reconstruction of qanats destroyed in the Soviet-Afghan war when they were utilized as tunnels for covert mujahideen movement has been especially important to year-over-year poppy yield increases. Many of the improvements were enabled by international donations until media coverage revealed poppy farmers to be the chief beneficiaries. Subsequent donor fatigue has depressed additional rounds of Afghan development funding, making improvements in health care and education unlikely. With few alternatives, most Afghans are now completely dependent on either poppy cultivation or the transport enterprise for their livelihoods.

Regional players surrounding Afghanistan all reap unique rewards by allowing opium trade to continue. Pakistan has doubled down on the idea of “strategic depth” in any conflict with India that is afforded to them by a friendly Afghan power structure. Allowing the proliferation of poppy farming in Taliban-controlled districts and refining labs throughout the Hindu Kush has benefited Pakistan by restoring a major proxy force that is now self-sustaining. Moreover, extraction of rents from producers and traffickers by Pakistani military and intelligence factions supports asymmetric operations against India in the disputed Kashmir region. Iran has been exploiting the European heroin epidemic by extracting concessions from European stakeholders in nuclear talks in exchange for closure of their border with Afghanistan, thereby closing a major trafficking highway to Europe. Iran’s border closure has had the unforeseen consequence of driving the flow of narcotics north into the Central Asian states and the Russian Federation. Subsequently, Russia has made heroin trafficking into Europe their latest asymmetric effort to disrupt European cohesion, with reports that tacit support of the Russian Mafia by the state has expanded the volume of the Moscow trafficking hub from one third of all heroin being trafficked to Europe to two thirds today[3]. As for the United States, the domestic political atmosphere continues to reward an exit from Afghan affairs despite the diplomatic and security costs incurred abroad. For all of these actors, inaction or an embrace of Afghan heroin is a devil’s bargain. In Pakistan, the drug economy has further hollowed out the licit economy, risking the stability of a nuclear state and calling into question the security of its nuclear materials. For Russia and Central Asian States, drug use has skyrocketed and Russia’s population has been particularly hard hit by a corresponding rise in HIV/AIDS, tripling from an estimated one million citizens in 2016 to just over three million in 2025[4].

Peace in Afghanistan has been achieved at the cost of the public health, security, and economies of nations across the Eurasian landmass. Moreover, it is a peace sustained by a tenuous illicit economy and cynical policy calculations that steadily erode the licit economies of neighboring nations and transit states. Without multinational cooperation to address the corrosive fallout of Afghan heroin exports, the international community will continue to feel the negative effects for years to come.


Endnotes:

[1] Looted U.S. Army Gear For Sale in Pakistan,
Chris Brummitt – http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39542359/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/t/looted-us-army-gear-sale-pakistan/#.XR0AcZNKgb0

[2] World Drug Report 2018 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.18.XI.9).

[3] Crimintern: How the Kremlin Uses Russia’s Criminal Networks in Europe,
Mark Galeotti – https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/crimintern_how_the_kremlin_uses_russias_criminal_networks_in_europe

[4] Russia At Aids Epidemic Tipping Point As Hiv Cases Pass 1 Million – Official,
Andrew Osborn – https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-aids/russia-at-aids-epidemic-tipping-point-as-hiv-cases-pass-1-million-official-idUSL2N1551S7

Afghanistan Alternative Futures / Alternative Histories / Counterfactuals Assessment Papers Chris Wozniak Drug Trade

Assessment of U.S. Counterinsurgency Efforts in Laos 1954-1962

Harrison Manlove is a Cadet in the U.S. Army’s Reserve Officer Training Corps at the University of Kansas and is currently studying History and Peace and Conflict Studies. Harrison has also written for The Strategy Bridge, where he examined Russia’s strategy in Syria and the Middle East. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessment of U.S. Counterinsurgency Efforts in Laos 1954-1962

Date Originally Written:  June 21, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  September 30, 2019.

Author and / or Author Point of View:  This article is written from the point of view of the U.S. National Security Council after the 1962 Geneva Accords to determine the effectiveness of programs in Laos and their use in future foreign policy actions.

Summary:  From 1954-1962 the deployment of U.S. Army Special Forces teams, Central Intelligence Agency officers, economic and military aid prevented a communist takeover of Laos, considered a strategically important country in Southeast Asia. A pro-West Laos was desired under Eisenhower, but the transition to a neutral coalition government was ultimately supported by the Kennedy administration to keep Laos from becoming a Communist foothold in Indochina.

Text:  Counterinsurgency (COIN) can be defined as government actions to counter the “organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region[1]”. U.S. COIN in Laos had a broad focus to include: building the capacity of the Forces Armées du Royaume (FAR) – the Lao Royal Armed Forces, training a thousands-strong Hmong paramilitary force, economic and military aid packages, and defeating insurgent threats within Laos. Despite little strategic value, the French war in Indochina had convinced the Eisenhower administration that Laos could be the first potential ‘domino’ to cause Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam to fall to communism[2]. 

In 1954, economic aid began flowing into Laos through a United States Operations Mission (USOM) based in Vientiane[3]. The 1954 Geneva Agreement brought the fighting to a (relative) end, established an independent and neutral Laos, and issued a withdrawal of French military units and Viet Minh elements, leaving only a small French force to train the FAR. The Pathet Lao, a communist political movement and organization in Laos, would move to the northeast for eventual demobilization[4]. 

The Programs Evaluation Office (PEO) was established in 1955 as an element of USOM to facilitate defense aid to the FAR, supporting the fight against the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) presence in northeastern Laos. Laotian neutrality meant the PEO was staffed and led by civilians who were almost all former military[5]. The Vientiane Agreements, signed in 1957, incorporated the Pathet Lao into the FAR. However, a 1959 coup conducted by Laotian General Phoumi Savanna signaled the continued tenuous situation in Laos[6]. 

In 1959 U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) personnel deployed to Laos as part of Project Hotfoot to train FAR personnel. Hotfoot was spread across the five military regions within Laos. Led by U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Arthur ‘Bull’ Simons of the 77th Special Forces Group, training responsibilities for Hotfoot were divided in two. “France would provide the tactical training to Laotian forces while non-uniformed U.S. SF would equip and provide technical training[Emphasis in original][7].” Hotfoot transitioned and expanded after Kennedy took office. 

In August 1960, Laotian Captain Kong Le led an FAR airborne battalion to Vientiane in a coup against the Royal Lao Government (RLG) to form a neutralist government. Lack of pay and the burden of continuous operations led to the coup[8]. While U.S. efforts under Hotfoot became Operation White Star in 1961, SF began Operation Pincushion, a training program for the Kha tribal areas with village defense units each up to 100 strong[9]. The PEO also became a Military Assistance Advisory Group with personnel donning uniforms, signaling the transition to an overt military presence[10]. During French rule the Auto Defense Choc (ADC), or self defense units, were established at the village level and filled by local populations. CIA began a covert operation, called Momentum, to build off the ADC program and establish a large paramilitary force of ethnic Hmong to fight the Pathet Lao insurgents and Kong Le’s forces[11].

Vang Pao was a Hmong officer in the FAR who had earlier received assistance from SF to create an irregular Hmong force. In 1961, CIA paramilitary officer James W. Lair approached Vang Pao to expand the operation which became Momentum. The second White Star rotation in the spring of 1961 became part of Momentum. The operation would equip and train nearly 10,000 recruits who proved extremely effective in the field[12].

CIA used its proprietary airline – Air America –  to support operations taking place throughout Laos. H-34 helicopters (replacing the weaker H-19), C-46, C-47, C-123 transport aircraft, and single-engine short take-off and landing aircraft provided airlift capabilities to CIA officers moving throughout the country, and FAR and Hmong units who received supplies through airdrops[13].

U.S. activities were critically challenged by Pathet Lao radio broadcasts (with Soviet support) which “were convincingly portraying the U.S. as obstructing peace and neutrality in Laos (while downplaying their own efforts to do so)[14].” The U.S. Information Agency field office in Laos “had two main objectives: improve the credibility of the Laotian government in the eyes of the population, and counter-Communist propaganda[15].” Small radios were distributed to provide pro-government messages in the Lao language, which was limited by the various local dialects around the country. In 1961 the U.S. Army deployed the 1st Psychological Warfare Battalion consisting of 12 men, whose “primary role was augmenting the U.S. Information Service (USIS).” and their under-resourced staff[16]. 

Under U.S. policy from 1954-1962, COIN efforts to support the RLG were a relative success. In 1962 a neutralist-majority coalition government was formed including rightists (from the RLG) and members of the Pathet Lao. The 1962 Geneva Accords again declared Laotian neutrality and barred any re-deployment of foreign forces to Laos. Fighting had slowed, but the Kennedy administration was disappointed with the political result. Neutrality was not a complete policy failure for the Kennedy administration, as a communist government would not be in place[17]. In accordance with the agreement SF teams withdrew from Laos, while Air America flights slowed[18]. However, future American operations would be covert, and conducted primarily by the CIA beginning after the coalition collapse in 1964 to the Pathet Lao defeat of the RLG in 1975. 

From a policy perspective, the American commitment to Laos was consistent with containment and halting the global spread of communism. The covert nature of U.S. operations reflected not only the declarations of neutrality by the RLG, but the larger possibility of U.S. embarrassment on the domestic and world stages if U.S. objectives did fail. Even with no discernible strategic interests in the region, particularly Laos, “National prestige was, as always, closely linked to its apparent success or failure in foreign policy[19].”


Endnotes:

[1] United States, Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2018). Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency (p. ix)

[2] Mcnamara, R. S. (1996). In retrospect. Random House Usa. (pp. 35-37)

[3] Leeker, J. F. (2006). Air America in Laos II – military aid (p. 1, Rep.). Part I

[4] Adams, N. S., & McCoy, A. W. (1970). Laos: War and revolution. New York: Harper & Row. (p. 128).; United Nations. (1954). Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos 20 July 1954.

[5] Castle, T. N. (1991). At war in the shadow of Vietnam: United States military aid to the Royal Lao government, 1955-75 (Doctoral dissertation).

[6] Adams, N. S., & McCoy, A. W. (1970). Laos: War and revolution. New York: Harper & Row. (p. 147).

[7] Tracy, J. M., PhD. (2018). Shoot & Salute: U.S. Army Special Warfare in Laos. Veritas, 14(1), (p. 2). Retrieved from https://www.soc.mil/ARSOF_History/articles/v14n1_shoot_and_salute_pt1_page_2.html. 

[8] Celeski, J. D. (2019). The Green Berets in the land of a million elephants: U.S. army special warfare and the secret war in Laos, 1959-74. Havertown: Casemate. (p. 80). 

[9] Celeski, J. D. (2019). The Green Berets in the land of a million elephants: U.S. army special warfare and the secret war in Laos, 1959-74. Havertown: Casemate. (p. 171). 

[10] Celeski, J. D. (2019). The Green Berets in the land of a million elephants: U.S. army special warfare and the secret war in Laos, 1959-74. Havertown: Casemate. (p. 87).

[11] Celeski, J. D. (2019). The Green Berets in the land of a million elephants: U.S. army special warfare and the secret war in Laos, 1959-74. Havertown: Casemate. (p. 121).

[12] Ahern, T. L., Jr. (2006). Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos 1961-1973. (p. 45).; Leary, W. M. (1999-2000). CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955-1974. Studies in Intelligence. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter99-00/art7.html.

[13] Leary, W. M. (1999-2000). CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955-1974. Studies in Intelligence. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter99-00/art7.html. 

[14] Tracy, J. M., PhD. (2018). Shoot & Salute: U.S. Army Special Warfare in Laos. Veritas, 14(1), (p. 2). Retrieved from https://www.soc.mil/ARSOF_History/articles/v14n1_shoot_and_salute_pt1_page_2.html.

[15] Tracy, J. M., PhD. (2018). Shoot & Salute: U.S. Army Special Warfare in Laos. Veritas, 14(1), (p. 2). Retrieved from https://www.soc.mil/ARSOF_History/articles/v14n1_shoot_and_salute_pt1_page_2.html.

[16] Tracy, James M., PhD. “More Than Shoot & Salute: U.S. Army Psywar in Laos.” Veritas 14, no. 2 (2018): 1. https://www.soc.mil/ARSOF_History/articles/v14n2_shoot_and_salute_pt2_page_1.html.

[17] Goldstein, M. E. (1973). American policy toward Laos. Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press. (pp. 263-267).; United Nations. (1962). No. 6564. DECLARATION 1 ON THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS. SIGNED AT GENEVA, ON 23 JULY 1962https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume 456/volume-456-I-6564-English.pdf.

[18] Celeski, J. D. (2019). The Green Berets in the land of a million elephants: U.S. army special warfare and the secret war in Laos, 1959-74. Havertown: Casemate. (p. 247).

[19] Koprowski, D. C. (2000). John F. Kennedy, the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and American intervention in Laos, 1961-1963 (Doctoral dissertation). University of Massachusetts Amherst. Masters Theses 1911 – February 2014. 1682 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/1682.

Assessment Papers Harrison Manlove Insurgency & Counteinsurgency Laos United States

Alternative Futures: Assessment of the Afghanistan Bureau 2001-2021

Michael Barr is a military historian and Director of Ronin Research, which specializes in high stress performance improvement.  He has 47 years’ experience in close quarter control and combat and is also the Director of the Jiki Ryu Aikijujutsu Association.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessment of the Afghanistan Bureau 2001-2021

Date Originally Written:  May 30, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  September 23, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This assessment paper provides an alternative history and therefore an alternative future to U.S. actions in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks.  This paper is written from the point of view of a staff officer providing an overview of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan from 2001-2021 to an incoming political appointee in the Department of Defense.

Summary:  Despite conventional force cries for large troop footprints in Afghanistan following the ousting of the Afghan Taliban in late 2001, the U.S. chose a different route.  The combined interagency efforts of U.S. Special Operations Forces, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State have enabled minimization (not defeat) of threats to U.S. interests in Afghanistan thus enabling the U.S. military to remain prepared for large scale threats posed by Russia and China.

Text:  The initial response to the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda elements in Afghanistan after 9/11 involved U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA restored old ties with Afghan tribal leaders in the Northern Alliance. Backed by U.S. air power, the operation toppled the Taliban within two months and leveled the playing field allowing for the aspirations of various tribal leaders. 

With these initial operations complete, conventional force proponents argued for a text book counterinsurgency operation using a series of forward operating bases to project force and prop up a weak central government in Kabul. Asymmetric proponents argued for a return to influence and shaping operations and a strategy of stabilization and deterrence. No matter how noble the objective or heroic the effort, the U.S. would not achieve a political victory through a massive intervention that would have a large foreign footprint that even our Afghan allies did not favor. In Afghanistan, the U.S. had something to lose but nothing to gain in the conventional sense. Stability was the objective and that would be better achieved by helping the Afghans fight their own war rather than U.S. troops fight it for them. The more the U.S. efforts were unseen, the better. Instead of fighting a pointless counterinsurgency, a pragmatic strategy of forging relationships necessary to keeping Islamists from developing any significant power base in Afghanistan was pursued. 

The Afghanistan Bureau (AFBU) was created as part of U.S. Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), to follow a strategy of realistic, attainable goals, and restricted rules of engagement, with operations calibrated to the Afghan political, cultural, physical, and mental landscapes. AFBU allowed strategy to be custom-tailored to the reality on the ground. As a result AFBU has created stability through an often tedious and contentious negotiation of tribal interests with a minimum use of force. AFBU is primarily an intelligence and influence / shaping organization that makes suggestions and entreaties to various tribal elements. Within AFBU is the Afghan Operations Group (AOG) which includes both FID (foreign internal defense) and UW (unconventional warfare) elements:

  • 100 long term advisors from CIA, SOF, and the Department of State are embedded at the tribal leadership level.
  • A fluctuating number of specialists rotate through AOG based on tribal requests and advisor observations. These specialists have included military trainers, civil affairs, engineers, teachers, medical and even civilian specialist in blacksmithing and agriculture.
  • Sufficient procurement and logistics elements to both support the AFBU and train their partners in the Afghan military.
  • AOG forces: A light, strong, mobile force of 2000 men that continually rotates its presence living and purchasing from the various tribes. This rotation creates a pragmatic symbiotic relationship. Various force components have been temporarily added. An active drone force is maintained. Support Force provides intelligence to AFBU, solidifies tribal relations, acts as a deterrent, and makes periodic strikes to reduce opposition build ups. Terrorists may never be eliminated but AOG keeps them minimized. In this way AOG imitates the Israeli response to terrorism threats. 
  • A clandestine force works from within tribal support areas to collect human intelligence and reduce the need for intervention.

Despite public claims, Afghanistan is not a nation state but a tribal society with tribal interests. Even the urban elite are really a tribe. Cash and other assets which can be measured and accounted for, are capable of accommodating many tribal needs. Limited cash and assets help solidify existing relations with tribal leaders. Refusal to provide assets, threats by other leaders, the presence of AOG forces, and loss of prestige has proven an effective mix in maintaining the peace. There is a constant battle among interested parties to supplant opium income, but the broad mix of assets available to AFBU has served as a greater inducement than illicit income. 

AFBU’s strategy leverages the fact that the parties do not like or get along with each other. AFBU’s small but effective presence and its outsider position allows it to orchestrate adversaries more as a referee. This relationship works to U.S. benefit and against U.S. enemies. AFBU is not creating Jeffersonian liberals but selectively supporting dependable leaders who can create stability and minimize Islamist capability. Sometime this means winning over factions of the Taliban. This winning over has been controversial, but a 51% reduction in extremism is sometimes better than nothing at all. Every tribal leader affiliated with AFBU is one less enemy and it allows us to monitor and influence their behavior.

AFBU has succeeded because of:

  • Sufficient funding and bipartisan Congressional support.
  • General public support or at least no vocal opposition.
  • Clear, pragmatic policy objectives.
  • Restraint imposed by the force size and the acceptance that there are limits to U.S. influence.
  • Emphasis on assembling tools in innovative ways which are applied with sufficient foresight and duration to achieve lasting effect while avoiding major combat operations.
  • High priority on intelligence.  

AFBU has converted some opposition tribes, neutralized others to ineffectiveness, and isolated most resistance to the Waziristan region. Pakistan’s ambiguous blind eye support of the Taliban, although still operative, has been muted by AFBU operations. AFBU has been able to provide long term stability for the past 20 years at a minimum investment of money, materiel, and manpower. AFBU has established a template for an overall influencing and shaping strategy which provides a structure for projecting power with a minimum of intrusion and risk. By calibrating to local concerns, similar strategies have been successful in Syria. Venezuela, Central America, Cuba, the Philippines, and even larger states like Ukraine. These small operations have allowed more resources to go to conventional near peer preparation while creating a matrix of support and influence in areas distant from the United States. 

In conclusion, AFBU has provided outsized results for its limited investment, while providing a first option for achieving U.S. objectives without large expenditures of personnel, material, and political support. The model has proven an excellent counter to gray zone conflicts related to Russia, China, and Iran.


Endnotes:

None.

Afghanistan Alternative Futures / Alternative Histories / Counterfactuals Assessment Papers Michael Barr United States

Writing Contest Winners!

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Small Wars Journal and Divergent Options ran a Writing Contest from March 1, 2019 to May 31, 2019 and as of this writing all of the entries we received have been published.  On behalf of the Divergent Options Team of myself (Phil Walter), Steve Leonard, and Bob Hein, and also on behalf of Dave Dilegge of Small Wars Journal, we want to thank all of our writers who entered the contest.  Not only was it a joy to read what you wrote, but for me personally, it is always an emotional event to see how Divergent Options has grown from a random idea scribbled in one of my notebooks to what it is today. Divergent Options would not be what it is without our writers, and for that I am eternally grateful.  All writings related to this contest can be found by clicking here, and the awards are as follows:

First Place $500:  Heather Venable – “Turning ‘Small’ Wars into ‘Big’ Wars: How Tacticians Endanger Us All

Second Place $300:  Ekene Lionel – “Assessment of the Existential Threat Posed by a United Biafran and Ambazonian Separatist Front in West Africa

Third Place $200:  Naiomi Gonzalez – “An Assessment of the Private Military Industry and its Role in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

Honorable Mention $100:  Scott Harr – “Assessment of the Impacts of Saudi Arabia’s Vision2030 on U.S. Efforts to Confront Iran

Honorable Mention $100:  Gregory Olsen – “Assessment of the Efficacy of the French Military Intervention in the Northern Mali Conflict

Honorable Mention $100:  Sam Canter – “An Assessment of Population Relocation in 21st Century Counterinsurgencies

Honorable Mention $100:  Samuel T. Lair – “Assessing the Jefferson Administration’s Actions During the First Barbary Wars and their Impact on U.S. Small War Policy

Honorable Mention $100:  Edwin Tran – “Assessment of U.S. Strategic Goals Through Peacekeeping Operations in the 1982 Intervention of Lebanon

 

Announcements Small Wars Journal Writing Contest

Germany’s Options in the First Moroccan Crisis

This article is published as part of the Small Wars Journal and Divergent Options Writing Contest which ran from March 1, 2019 to May 31, 2019.  More information about the writing contest can be found here.


Rafael Loss is a California-based defense analyst. He can be found on Twitter @_RafaelLoss. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


National Security Situation:  The German Empire was a latecomer to the “Scramble for Africa.” Looking for “a place under the sun,” the first Moroccan crisis in 1905-06 presented an opportunity for Germany to further its colonial ambitions and improve its position among Europe’s great powers.

Date Originally Written:  May 31, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  September 19, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The article is written from the point of view of the German Empire under Kaiser Wilhelm II[1]. While representative of the competing views within the German government, the two options presented are somewhat stylized to draw a starker contrast.

Background:  Following the Franco-Prussian war and its unification in 1871, the German Empire was a latecomer to the “Scramble for Africa.” Only in 1890 did it adopt Weltpolitik, seeking possessions abroad and equal status among the European imperial powers. On a visit to Tangier in March 1905, Kaiser Wilhelm II provoked a diplomatic spat by challenging France’s dominance in Morocco. As the crisis escalated, Germany called up reserve units and France moved troops to the German border. In early 1906, a conference in the southern Spanish town of Algeciras sought to resolve the dispute[2].

Significance:  The Entente Cordiale of 1904, a series of agreements between Great Britain and France which saw a significant improvement in their relations, marked a major setback for German efforts, perfected during the Bismarckian period, to manipulate the European balance of power in Berlin’s favor[3]. The Entente not only threatened Germany’s colonial ambitions, but also its predominant position on the European continent—a vital national security interest. The Algeciras conference presented an opportunity to fracture the Franco-British rapprochement. In hindsight, it arguably also offered the best off-ramp for Europe’s diplomats to avert locking in the alignment patterns that contributed to the unraveling of the European order only eight years later.

Option #1:  Germany weakens the Entente by seeking closer relations with France (and Britain). This option required a constructive and conciliatory stance of Germany at Algeciras. (This option is associated with Hugo von Radolin, Germany’s Ambassador to France.)

Risk:  Rebuffing French bilateral overtures, Germany had insisted that a conference settle the Moroccan issue from the beginning of the crisis. Appearing too compromising at Algeciras risked undermining German credibility and status as a great power determined to pursue legitimate colonial interests. Alignment with France (and Britain) also jeopardized Germany’s relations with the Russian and Austro-Hungarian monarchies and could further increase domestic pressure for democratic reform.

Gain:  A successful pursuit of this option promised to alleviate Germany’s security dilemma, located between France to the west and Russia to the east, with the British navy threatening its sea lines of communication. This option would also reduce dependence on Austria-Hungary and Italy, who were seen by some as rather unreliable allies, and could eventually facilitate the emergence of a continental block—with France and Russia—against Britain’s maritime primacy. Moreover, this option could improve relations with the United States, a rising great power and increasingly important player in colonial affairs.

Option #2:  Germany weakens the Entente by pressuring France. This required a bellicose negotiating stance and raising the specter of war to deter Britain from coming to France’s aid. (This option is associated with Friedrich von Holstein, the Political Secretary of the German Foreign Office.)

Risk:  While consistent with Germany’s heretofore assertive opposition to France’s dominance in Morocco, leaning on France too hard at Algeciras risked escalating a peripheral diplomatic dispute to major war in Europe, for which public support was less than certain. It could also precipitate an arms race and alienate the other delegations, especially since Germany had already secured concessions from France, including the dismissal of a disliked foreign minister and the conference itself. Furthermore, it was uncertain whether even a total diplomatic victory for Germany at Algeciras could weaken the Franco-British rapprochement, as the status of the Entente itself was not part of the negotiations, or even strengthen their resolve in the face of German adversity.

Gain:  Successfully pressuring France promised not only greater influence in colonial affairs in North Africa but also exposure of the hollowness of the Entente Cordiale. Without British support for either France or Russia—Britain had sided with Japan during the Russo-Japanese war—Germany’s position on the European continent would improve considerably, particularly since Russia and Germany had discussed a defense treaty the prior year. Separately dealing with the challenges at land and at sea would also make it easier for Germany to contest Britain’s maritime primacy at a convenient time, perhaps even with French support as the end of the Entente might reignite Franco-British competition. Domestically, humiliating France yet again could be expected to increase popular support for the Kaiser and the conservative elites.

Other Comments:  Kaiser Wilhelm II and Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow ultimately instructed their representatives at the conference to pursue Option #2.

With Britain, Italy, Russia, Spain, and the United States siding with France, however, Germany was largely isolated and, at last, had to accept an unsatisfying settlement. Germany’s actions in 1905 and its combative posturing at the conference failed to fracture the Entente[4]. To the contrary, rival blocks began to consolidate which severely limited the room for diplomatic maneuver in subsequent crises. Worsening tensions between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy (Triple Alliance) on the one side and Britain, France, and Russia (Triple Entente) on the other, ultimately led to the outbreak of general war in August 1914.

Recommendation:  None.


Endnotes:

[1] Lepsius, J., Mendelssohn Bartholdy, A., & Thimme, F. (1927). Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914. Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes: Vols. 20.1 & 20.2. Entente cordiale und erste Marokkokrise, 1904-1905. Berlin, Germany: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte.

[2] Anderson, E. N. (1930). The first Moroccan crisis, 1904-1906. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

[3] Sontag, R. J. (1928). German foreign policy, 1904-1906. The American Historical Review, 33(2), 278-301.

[4] Jones, H. (2009). Algeciras revisited: European crisis and conference diplomacy, 16 January-7 April 1906 (EUI Working Paper MWP 2009/01). San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy: European University Institute.

Germany Morocco Option Papers Rafael Loss Small Wars Journal Writing Contest

Assessment of the American-led Constabulary during the American Occupation of Haiti from 1915-1934 in Comparison to Later Occupations

This article is published as part of the Small Wars Journal and Divergent Options Writing Contest which ran from March 1, 2019 to May 31, 2019.  More information about the writing contest can be found here.


Travis Prendergast has served in the United States Army for eight years as a Rifle Platoon Leader, Staff Officer, and Rifle Company Commander. He currently works in USAREC. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessment of the American-led Constabulary during the American Occupation of Haiti from 1915-1934 in Comparison to Later Occupations

Date Originally Written:  May 31, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  September 16, 2019. 

Summary:  During the American occupation of Haiti from 1915-1934, the United States Marines officered a native constabulary called the Gendarmerie d’Haiti. Throughout the occupation, the Gendarmerie built infrastructure and assisted in the administration of the country. The success of the Gendarmerie can be compared with the failures of the Coalition Provisional Authority during the occupation of Iraq.

Text:  The United States of America began its longest military occupation of a foreign country in August 1915 when United States Marines landed in Port-Au-Prince, Haiti. The occupation was the Wilson administration’s reaction to the potential establishment of a European naval base that could control the Windward Passage, combined with growing instability in Haiti. This instability culminated in the violent execution of Haitian President Guillaume Sam by a group of Haitian elites. After landing, the Marines met little resistance and rapidly established control of the country. By September, the Marines had established garrisons in all the major towns in Haiti. In 1915 and again in 1918, the Marines used superior training and tactics to quell uprisings of the native cacos during the First and Second Caco Wars. Between these two wars and for the rest of the time that the Marines administered the government in Haiti, the Americans ran a native constabulary called the Gendarmerie d’Haiti[1].

The constabulary was comprised mostly of the noirs, which made up most of the population, but the officers of the constabulary were Marines. This was an attractive assignment for the Marines stationed in Haiti, as they would receive an additional stipend and a higher rank. For instance, a Corporal or Sergeant in the Marine Corps would be an officer in the Gendarmerie. In the same way, then Lieutenant Colonel Smedley Butler held the rank of Major General in the Gendarmerie while acting as its first commandant. The Gendarmerie d’Haiti was as a joint army-police organization, but their role didn’t stop there. The American-led constabulary also “administered prisons, roads, bridges, the water supply, telegraph lines, sanitation, and other vital services[2].” Despite allegations of war crimes and three resulting investigations, the American military presence in Haiti continued throughout the 1920s with general success. Towards the end of the decade, the Gendarmerie d’Haiti became gradually more comprised of Haitians, and in 1928, the government renamed it the Garde d’Haiti. With the help of the Garde d’Haiti, the American administrators ran an efficient government while reducing graft and increasing stability. Upon leaving Haiti in 1934, the American-run government left behind “1,000 miles of roads constructed, 210 major bridges, 9 major airfields, 1,250 miles of telephone lines, 82 miles of irrigation canals, 11 modern hospitals, 147 rural clinics” and more[3]. America also achieved its strategic goals of keeping out the Germans and creating stability. The occupation was ultimately a success, with the Gendarmerie a large part of that success.

Although the model used by the Gendarmerie d’Haiti had seen use in previous small wars, once the United States withdrew from Haiti, the native constabulary model did not see use again in the many counter-insurgency operations in the following century. The ensuing general distaste for overt American Imperialism ensured that white officers leading black foreigners in the service of an American-led government would not be a viable option. Instead, America favored train, advise, and assist (TAA) operations during the Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan conflicts to the extent that the United States Army is now establishing units to carry on TAA operations as an enduring mission[4]. However, these operations were and are mainly concerned with establishing security to enable the success of a new government in an unstable nation. To truly examine the legacy of the American-led constabularies of the early 1900s, we must look to institutions that sought to exercise authority over a foreign government in an unstable state. The best example of this is the Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) of the early Iraq War.

Formed in the early days of the Iraq War and led by L. Paul Bremer, the CPA exercised executive, legislative, and judicial power in Iraq for 14 months from April 2003 to June 2004 as a caretaker government which attempted to set the conditions for a sovereign Iraqi government to take control of the country[5]. Planners for the occupation of Iraq had looked to the military occupation of Japan for guidance, considering that if they modeled the occupation off a previously successful one, the occupation would transform Iraq into a functioning democracy[6]. In 2019, we know that this was not the case. Looking back at the CPA through the lens of the Haitian Gendarmerie can help us understand why.

The occupation of Haiti was successful compared to the occupation of Iraq due to the continuity and command-structure provided by the Gendarmerie d’Haiti. By giving enlisted Marines commissions in the Haitian constabulary, the occupying force garnered a commitment to the institution for which they were working. Furthermore, the Gendarmerie benefited from having the “advisors” in a command position over those they were seeking to influence. Unlike the current model of organizations tasked with TAA missions, placing Marines in command positions added to the buy-in needed to garner a vested interest in the organization. Finally, the constabulary gave the American administration the benefits of a military-run government. Like in the successful military occupation of Japan, the Marines of the Gendarmerie stayed for long periods of time, with a clear military structure. Compare these facts with the experience of the CPA. Few leaders in the CPA stayed for the duration of its short lifespan, and organizations within the CPA suffered from the lack of a clear structure[7]. The continuity and structure of the American-led constabulary allowed the Marines to see successes in their administration of the country.

Even considering the above, it is important to remember that the American-led Gendarmerie was not without its problems. The reintroduction of the corvée labor system and sometimes brutal methods of enforcing the corvée were morally wrong and almost immediately led to the Second Caco War, despite Butler’s predecessor abolishing the system in 1918. Also, not all Gendarmerie officers had enlightened views of their Haitian subordinates. Smedley Butler led them with affection, but Colonel Tony Waller had a decidedly more racist and less compassionate view of the Haitian gendarmes under his command[8]. Even with these problems, the Gendarmerie d’Haiti showed how an American-led military organization can aid in the occupation and administration of another nation. While the United States will likely not employ this type of organization in the future, the successes of the Gendarmerie d’Haiti are worth remembering if the United States once again engages in the risky act of nation building.


Endnotes:

[1] Boot, M. (2014). The savage wars of peace: Small wars and the rise of American power. NY, NY: Basic Books.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Lopez, C. T. (2017, June). SFABs to Free BCTs from Advise, Assist Mission. Infantry Magazine, 4.

[5] Ward, C. J. (2005, May). United States Institute of Peace Special Report: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Governance in Iraq (Rep. No. 139). Retrieved May 29, 2019, from https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr139.pdf

[6] Dower, J. W. (2003, April 01). Don’t expect democracy this time: Japan and Iraq. Retrieved May 30, 2019, from http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/dont-expect-democracy-this-time-japan-and-iraq

[7] Hunter-Chester, D. (2016, May/June). The Particular Circumstances of Time and Place: Why the Occupation of Japan Succeeded and the Occupation of Iraq Failed. Military Review, 41-49.

[8] Boot, M. (2014). The savage wars of peace: Small wars and the rise of American power. NY, NY: Basic Books.

Assessment Papers Haiti Insurgency & Counteinsurgency Iraq Small Wars Journal Writing Contest Travis Prendergast

Assessment of Nationalism in Bosnia and its Ramifications for Foreign Intervention

Editor’s Note: This article is the result of a partnership between Divergent Options and a course on nationalism at the George Washington University.


Chanson Benjamin recently enlisted in the U.S. Army Reserve as a Psychological Operations Specialist.  He is currently an undergraduate student at The George Washington University.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessment of Nationalism in Bosnia and its Ramifications for Foreign Intervention

Date Originally Written:  August 10, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  September 12, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author recently enlisted in the U.S. Army Reserve. This article is written from the point of view of America towards the Balkans while taking into account other nation building campaigns. 

Summary:  Nationalism is a relevant political force, especially in the Balkans. Under President Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia was one nation. Since Tito’s death, ethnic differences, exacerbated by the U.S.-facilitated Dayton Accords, have split the country. These ethnic divisions suggest that nationalist sentiment cannot be replaced immediately with liberal democratic structures but that said structures need to be built up in tandem with economic support. 

Text:  Nationalism is relevant. There is no consensus on what exactly it is, but it is a force that influences, intentionally or otherwise, political discourse and action. It affects the nation, an equally vague term defining some subset of humanity with characteristics made salient by their presence or lack thereof in non-nationals. Nationalism provides a motivator for people to act in a way that subsumes personal identity and interests to those of the collective nation. Nationalism provides an opportunity for collective action by defining an associated identity that the actors can emotionally invest in. This collective action can be harnessed by different groups, but it is first and foremost an opportunity to build up effective, stable states[1]. 

In the Balkans, especially Bosnia-Herzegovina, nationalism is especially relevant because of the current political situation and the history that preceded it. The country is split into two political entities: the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The former consists mainly of ethnic Serbs while the latter is mostly Croats and Bosniaks. All are Bosnians, reflecting their status as citizens, but many Serbian and Croatian Bosnians feel an ethnic identity linked to the neighboring countries of Serbia and Croatia. The internal political situation is split along these lines, both in terms of parties and in official state structures; for example, the presidency has three members[2].

For much of the Cold War, the country was ruled as part of Yugoslavia by Josip Broz Tito, a Communist strongman. He built up a Yugoslavian national identity based on past glories and a cult of personality. Self-liberation in World War 2 and rejection of Soviet influence in favor of his nationally-oriented socialism were things Yugoslavians could be proud of and invest in simply by having the national identity of Yugoslavia. Tito did not appeal to any of the shared cultural traditions of Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats because he was more interested in securing his own power than intentionally developing the nation, but by forcibly removing any opposition he ended up unintentionally doing exactly that[3][4].

Tito’s nationalism benefited the people of Yugoslavia by bringing them together as one nation without ethnic violence, and many former citizens still cherish the memory of Tito because of this[5]. Nationalism, by relying on identity markers common across ethnic groups, could bridge the literal Balkanization of the region to create one nation, stable under Tito. This nationalism was dependent on Tito as the face and guarantor of Yugoslavian national identity, so it died with him. However, when he was alive the genuine nationalism he unintentionally cultivated provided a basis for unified collective action and stability. 

After Yugoslavia broke up, the Balkans fell into ethno-nationalist conflict. To stop the violence, American diplomats took leaders from all three sides to Dayton, Ohio where they produced the Dayton Accords: a peace treaty that would define the political structure of modern Bosnia-Herzegovina. By defining the nations as reflective of ethnic identities, the agreement implicitly says nationalism as a motivating force will only act upon ethnic identity rather than one Bosnian identity. There is no Bosnian nationalism under Dayton, because there is no Bosnian nation[6].

The intention was to give ethnicity a role in society somewhere between Titoist repression and the violence that followed it and allow for the controlled venting of ethnic tensions. However, the result of the Dayton Accords is that the three most popular political parties are ethnically defined[7]. Furthermore, the history of the Bosnian War means venting will always have a subtext of real violence. The Bosnian society produced by Dayton is almost too fragmented to function, and nationalism only creates opportunities for dividing the country and promoting instability based on existing ethnic divides. 

Comparing Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is apparent that if nationalism is to grant opportunities for stability, a constitutive story must be implemented that unifies all citizens behind a controlled and abstract concept of nationhood. This means there must be some myth, real or imagined, which becomes an important identity marker for nationals. The treatment of ethnicity in the Dayton Accords precludes these identity markers. Nation-building means offering a set of identity markers that have emotional value. Dictators like Tito offer these by definition. Support of the military conjures up imagery of success on the battlefield, incentivizing citizens to buy into the idea of the nation in order to view themselves as winners. Authoritarian rule is perpetuated through a form of selection bias: those who do not buy into the nation are less likely to remain alive. Finally, the dictator serves as a symbol of the nation, seen as a tangible embodiment of all people who are nationals. Lacking this cultivated nationalism, people in an area will fall victim to ethnic or other differences as they did in Yugoslavia and Bosnia after Tito died.

Building a nation in the vacuum left by the fall of an authoritarian dictator demands actively fulfilling national identity markers while effectively promoting economic success. Otherwise, the people of a country will fall into Balkanized nationalist divides based on previously suppressed identity markers, like ethnicity after Tito died. A toppled dictator cannot be replaced by democratic institutions meant to determine who will rule the nation without the cultivation of the nation itself, as an entity congruent with the state and superseding other sub-national cleavages. A dictator can only be replaced by a new and wholeheartedly national identity and the improvement of economic conditions, from which liberal democracy can then arise. 

A nation needs some seed from which its identity grows. World War 2 provided an excellent opportunity for Tito to build up his own myth along with that of Yugoslavia; the Bosnian War and the Dayton Accords both built up national myths of three nations in Bosnia. Once this myth has been identified or manufactured, nationalism provides an opportunity for stability through collective action and through an emotional awareness that a citizen has a national identity shared with all nationals, congruent with a state, and separate from all non-nationals.


Endnotes:

[1] Hechter, M. (2010). Containing Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[2] Hajdari, U., & Colborne, M. (2018, October 12). Why Ethnic Nationalism Still Rules Bosnia, and Why It Could Get Worse. Retrieved August 10, 2019 from https://www.thenation.com/article/why-ethnic-nationalism-still-rules-bosnia-and-why-it-could-get-worse/

[3] Djilas, Aleksa. (1995, July/August). Tito’s Last Secret: How Did He Keep the Yugoslavs Together? Retrieved August 10, 2019 from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/1995-07-01/titos-last-secret 

[4] Gellner, Ernst. (2006). Nations and Nationalism. Cornell: Cornell University Press.

[5] Synovitz, Ron. (2010, May 4). Thirty Years After Tito’s Death, Yugoslav Nostalgia Abounds. Retrieved August 10, 2019 from https://www.rferl.org/a/Thirty_Years_After_Titos_Death_Yugoslav_Nostalgia_Abounds_/2031874.html 

[6] Hajdari, U., & Colborne, M. (2018, October 12). Why Ethnic Nationalism Still Rules Bosnia, and Why It Could Get Worse. Retrieved August 10, 2019 from https://www.thenation.com/article/why-ethnic-nationalism-still-rules-bosnia-and-why-it-could-get-worse/

[7] (2018, September 4). Key political parties. Retrieved August 10, 2019 from https://balkaninsight.com/2018/09/24/key-political-parties-09-21-2018/ 

Bosnia Chanson Benjamin Nationalism Option Papers

An Assessment of Air Force Advising Concepts in Small Wars, “Paper Falcons”

This article is published as part of the Small Wars Journal and Divergent Options Writing Contest which runs from March 1, 2019 to May 31, 2019.  More information about the writing contest can be found here.


Riley Murray is a Second Lieutenant in the United States Air Force currently pursuing his master’s degree in the Georgetown Security Studies Program.  He can be found on Twitter @rileycmurray.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  An Assessment of Air Force Advising Concepts in Small Wars, “Paper Falcons”

Date Originally Written:  May 29, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  September 9, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is an active duty Air Force Officer. The Article is written from the Point of View of the United States Air Force in Air Advising and Security Cooperation operations.

Summary:  Andrew Krepinevich’s “Army Concept” provides a useful model for understanding the mindset military organizations take towards advising operations, which subsequently shapes outcomes, including the U.S. Air Force’s advising efforts in small wars. Efforts to advise the South Vietnamese Air Force and Afghan Air Force demonstrate that U.S. Air Force advising concepts have been poorly suited towards irregular conflicts, creating counterproductive effects.

Text:  Andrew Krepinevich coined the term “Army Concept” in his 1986 study of the Vietnam War. The U.S. Army uses the Army Concept framework to hypothesize how wars will be fought, and to shape its operational planning and training[1]. During the Vietnam War, the Army Concept focused on large-scale conventional warfare against the Soviets in Central Europe with emphasis on firepower and technology[2]. Krepinevich criticizes the Army for using this conventionally oriented concept to advise the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) during its campaign against an irregular foe: The National Liberation Front (Viet Cong)[3]. This counterproductive (ineffective) assistance program resulted from a failure to understand the threat faced by the ARVN, a poorly conceived plan to address the insurgency, and advisors that had spent their careers preparing for conventional warfare[4]. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) has made similar mistakes when advising its partner forces.

Any conceptual approach to advising begins by assessing the environment and threats partner forces face. This analysis is the basis for decisions regarding prioritization and risk that result in concepts of what air elements should be able to do[5]. This strategic view is then translated into operational and tactical tasks. However, planning and execution are heavily impacted by variety of factions involved in advising missions, each with unique concepts and different decision-making processes, leading to mixed outcomes. In an ideal world, planning any advising mission would be a cyclical process of tightly coordinated activities that continually reconsiders assumptions and adjusts policy accordingly. However, even under clear planning guidance, this policy-tailoring process can be undermined by the interests of subordinate organizations.

In Vietnam, the U.S. military attempted to meet the Kennedy administration’s directive to prepare for “wars of national liberation.” The USAF responded to this challenge by establishing the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron with the mission to develop and train foreign air forces on counter-guerrilla tactics[6]. Outside of this unit though, the USAF made no major changes in organizational guidelines or doctrine. Although the counterinsurgency mission was accepted, USAF doctrine did not highlight the role of local air forces or advising[7]. The USAF developed “what amounted to an absolute model of airpower in warfare,” based on the principles of classical airpower theory (primarily the primacy of offensive, strategic, and independent air operations)[8]. This single-minded view drove the USAF’s organization and mentality, but largely neglected the lessons learned from irregular conflicts since World War II and assumed that alternate concepts were unnecessary. The USAF failed to understand airpower’s role in effective irregular warfare strategy and to foresee the potential negative effects airpower could have when fighting a guerrilla force. This made the USAF ill-equipped to develop a reliable partner force in Vietnam.

U.S. President John F. Kennedy authorized an advising mission in 1961 to assist the South Vietnamese military in countering the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese supporters. The USAF was tasked with training the South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), but its actions and ideas were often counterproductive to the VNAF[9]. The USAF entered Vietnam planning to develop tactics for fighting guerrillas but was unprepared and unwilling to effectively assess and address strategic and operational issues. USAF advisors helped the VNAF develop a centralized air control system in alignment with USAF doctrine, which increased efficiency, but also dramatically hindered air-ground coordination and resulted in operations that had little strategic value in counterinsurgency[10]. When the USAF and VNAF did develop useful tactics, many of these innovations were simply relearning the lessons of previous conflicts (such as the Marine Corps’ small wars in the Caribbean)[11]. U.S. assistance dramatically increased the VNAF’s size, but contemporary USAF emphasis on jet aircraft led to a force that was incredibly difficult to maintain without U.S. assistance. Rapid growth was coupled with USAF advisors frequently flying the missions themselves and neglecting the tactical development of the VNAF[12]. After a decade of advising efforts, the end result was a VNAF that could not independently perform many key processes and was poorly oriented towards the threat faced by South Vietnam.

Many of these conceptual failures continue to plague the USAF’s mission to advise the Afghan Air Force (AAF). As the Afghan Taliban resurgence threatened security in Afghanistan in 2007, the original USAF advisory mission of establishing an AAF presidential airlift capability was expanded and the AAF became a “helicopter/transport/light-attack-based fleet” oriented towards counterinsurgency[13]. Developing these capabilities has been difficult, particularly without consensus on the roles and missions the AAF should be able to conduct. USAF advisors have labored to develop a centralized control system, but this doctrinal solution continues to conflict with the structure of the Afghan military and its entrenched habits[14]. There is also a split between the conventional AAF and the Special Mission Wing and their respective advisors which focuses on direct support for Afghan special operations forces, resulting in two parallel concepts that remain poorly integrated at both the tactical and strategic levels[15]. The mission statement of the 428th Air Expeditionary Wing in 2014 emphasized the importance of developing “a professional, capable, and sustainable [Afghan] Air Force[16].” However, without a clear concept driving what these terms mean and how they should be pursued, air advising operations cannot be successful. In 2018, a DoD Inspector General report highlighted that Train Advise Assist Command-Air (TAAC-Air) lacked a defined end state for AAF development and failed to explain how the AAF would integrate with U.S. forces in Afghanistan[17]. Without an end state or effective strategic plan, the USAF cannot integrate and leverage its full range of advising capabilities.

While Vietnam highlighted the dangers of applying the wrong concept to air operations in counterinsurgency, Afghanistan demonstrates that the lack of a unified concept that similarly undercuts advising operations. Concepts are difficult to quantify, but they have had an unmistakable impact on advising operations. Success requires both a holistic view of the strategic value of air operations in irregular warfare and the capability to assess individual cases and tailor advising approaches. With a clear strategic concept, advising, planning and operations can be synchronized, ensuring that the United States effectively leverages its capabilities to assist partners and allies.


Endnotes:

[1] Krepinevich, A. F. (1990). The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. P. p. 5.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Krepinevich, A. F. (1990). The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. P. pp. 258-260.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Krepinevich, A. F. (1990). The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. P. pp. 11-14.

[6] Corum, J. S., & Johnson, W. R. (2003). Airpower in South Vietnam, 1954-1965. In Airpower in small wars: Fighting insurgents and terrorists (pp. 225-278). Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. pp. 238-239.

[7] Corum, J. S., & Johnson, W. R. (2003). Airpower in South Vietnam, 1954-1965. In Airpower in small wars: Fighting insurgents and terrorists (pp. 225-278). Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. pp. 242-243, 246-247.

[8] Corum, J. S., & Johnson, W. R. (2003). Airpower in South Vietnam, 1954-1965. In Airpower in small wars: Fighting insurgents and terrorists (pp. 225-278). Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. pp. 267-270.

[9] Corum, J. S., & Johnson, W. R. (2003). Airpower in South Vietnam, 1954-1965. In Airpower in small wars: Fighting insurgents and terrorists (pp. 225-278). Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. pp. 241-244.

[10] Sheehan, N. (2013). A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York, NY: Vintage Books, a division of Random House. pp. 112-115.

[11] Corum, J. S., & Johnson, W. R. (2003). Airpower in South Vietnam, 1954-1965. In Airpower in small wars: Fighting insurgents and terrorists (pp. 225-278). Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. p. 261.

[12] Corum, J. S., & Johnson, W. R. (2003). Airpower in South Vietnam, 1954-1965. In Airpower in small wars: Fighting insurgents and terrorists (pp. 225-278). Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. pp. 271-273.

[13] Marion, F. L. (2018). Flight Risk: The Coalition’s Air Advisory Mission in Afghanistan: 2005-2015. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. pp. 51-52.

[14] Marion, F. L. (2018). Flight Risk: The Coalition’s Air Advisory Mission in Afghanistan: 2005-2015. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. p. 156.

[15] Marion, F. L. (2018). Flight Risk: The Coalition’s Air Advisory Mission in Afghanistan: 2005-2015. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. p. 55.

[16] Marion, F. L. (2018). Flight Risk: The Coalition’s Air Advisory Mission in Afghanistan: 2005-2015. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. p. 186.

[17] United States, Department of Defense, Inspector General. (2018). Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air Force (pp. 1-76). Arlington, VA: U.S. Department of Defense.

Afghanistan Assessment Papers Capacity / Capability Enhancement Riley Murray Small Wars Journal Writing Contest Training United States

Assessment of the European Intervention Initiative and Overcoming Nationalist Barriers

Editor’s Note: This article is the result of a partnership between Divergent Options and a course on nationalism at the George Washington University.


David Perron is a recent graduate of The George Washington University, with a B.A. in International Affairs and concentration in international economics.  His interests lie in the intersection of international relations and private enterprises, and regionally in France and the European Union.  He can be found at https://www.linkedin.com/in/david-perron/. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessment of the European Intervention Initiative and Overcoming Nationalist Barriers

Date Originally Written:  August 10, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  September 6, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article examines the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) within the long-term goals and vision of French president Emmanuel Macron: that EI2 would lead to a “real European army,” which would increase security and foreign policy-making capabilities for the continent. 

Summary:  EI2 is a proposed joint-European military force which would protect European security interests abroad. Member states would benefit from increased power projection capabilities which would enhance collective security and reduce military reliance on the U.S. However, nationalism may pose risks to future EI2 membership and its long-term durability.

Text:  French President Emmanuel Macron has become a leading supporter of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2). EI2 will be a joint military force which would deploy forces abroad in response to European security interests. Work on EI2 began in response to threats posed by Russia after their 2014 annexation of Crimea. EI2 has been further catalyzed due to recent uncertainty in European Union (EU)-U.S. relations. EI2’s official objective is to “develop a shared strategic culture, which will enhance our ability, as European states, to carry out military missions and operations under the framework of the EU, NATO, the UN and/or ad hoc coalition[1].” However, Macron has publicly stated that he envisions a “real European army” which would remove the continent’s security dependence on the U.S.[2].

EI2 would create European joint operations, which could involve the use of military forces outside of Europe, in both combat and non-combat operations. EI2 is intended to increase the security of its member states while maximizing their total military resources. For Macron, and other EI2 proponents, the long-term strategic benefits would be vast. Europe would not only have greater collective security, but it would gain a powerful option in its foreign-policy toolkit. EI2 would secure Europe’s long-term position against rising actors such as Russia, China, and transnational terrorist groups.

But EI2’s goals also imply that member states will lose some level of sovereignty with regards to use of their military forces. Similar characteristics can be observed in the integration policies of the EU. EU members give up some sovereignty in exchange for greater social, economic, or political benefits. This surrendering of sovereignty has led to backlash from populist movements, with right-wing nationalist movements calling for the dissolution of the EU. The consequences of such backlash have been increased political division and economic uncertainty, such as in the case of Brexit. But in other cases, the surrendering of sovereignty has led to violence, as seen in the Yellow Vest protests in France. The areas that nationalist-populist groups in Europe contest include immigration, culture, and security[3]. These protested areas are issues in national identity, and the link between what the national unit is and what the state is. These are subjects which are inherently national. 

Conflicts with European integration policies have created national sentiment. As scholar Ernest Gellner states in Nations and Nationalism, “nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment[4].” The principal nationalist violation which arises from European integration policies is that of political rule. Nationalist sentiment can arise “if the rulers of the political unit belong to a nation other than that of the majority ruled[5].” In this case, sentiment will arise when the EI2, as a supranational institution governed by people who are not all members of the nation, make decisions which are perceived as either neglecting or hurting the nation. The world should expect a positive relationship between the increase in military cooperation and reactionary nationalist sentiment in EI2 member states.

National sentiment would challenge the development and durability of EI2. States will need to be convinced to set aside some sovereignty and national interests as EI2 integration continues. Furthermore, Brexit and the rise of nationalist-populist political parties have shown that European integration can be fragile. Thus, the durability of EI2 will continue to be contested by certain groups within member states. This is an area Russia can continue to exploit to destabilize European nations. If Macron and other EI2 proponents want the initiative to be successful, they will need to address nationalist sentiments through accommodation or construction.

There have already been some concerns voiced over EI2, as Germany has signaled a reluctance to take a part in “unnecessary military adventures” led by French foreign interests[6]. France’s foreign interventions have been largely related to its former colonies. Meanwhile, Germany’s memories of the World Wars have made them cautious of military operations. The different foreign policy focuses of France and Germany are guided by their distinct constitutive stories. From a constructivist view, these are stories which shape national identity. As Rogers M. Smith states, constitutive stories typically have three features: (1) they are intrinsically normative, (2) explain the importance of membership in the nation, and (3) are “less subject to tangible evidence than economic or political power stories[7].” Each member of EI2 has a distinct constitutive story, recurrent in their politics and culture, and distributed through mass-schooling and social traditions. Currently, the way that EI2 has been drafted has accommodated these differing stories by making compromises in its policies.

But another possibility which may be pursued is to change the construct of nationality. An important element of this change will be to alter Europe’s constitutive story, just as the EU is attempting to. This change is implied within the first part of the EI2 objective statement: “The ultimate objective of EI2 is to develop a shared strategic culture[8].”  The EU, for example, emphasizes values such as pluralism, secularism, and suffrage as preconditions to acceptance and profiting from various economic and political agreements. These are values which deemphasize Europe’s historical legacies of feudalism, non-secularism, and authoritarianism. This EI2 “strategic culture” could create a shared constitutive story which unifies members under a new narrative thereby defining when intervention is morally correct and what its benefits are, beyond strictly political or economic terms. If all EI2 members accept and recirculate this story, it could create popular support for the project, increasing membership in EI2 and make it more durable.

For Macron, nationalism presents a great barrier to EI2 and his aspirations for a “real European army.” For EI2 to work, it must transcend barriers created by distinct constitutive stories. EI2 will either develop in a manner which reduces nationalist sentiments by accommodating each nation’s unique demands, or leaders will change the constitutive story all together. If these nationalist barriers are overcome, the payoff would be a more secure, more capable, and more unified Europe.


Endnotes:

[1] Ministère des Armées. (2018). Letter of Intent Between Defense Ministers of Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom Concerning the Development of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2). Paris, FR: Author.

[2] Europe 1. (2018, November 26). Emmanuel Macron: son interview par Nikos Aliagas sur Europe 1 (INTEGRALE) [Video file]. Retrieved from https://youtu.be/ilggBgh8Lhw

[3] Gramlich, J., & Simmons, K. (2018). 5 key takeaways about populism and the political landscape in Western Europe. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from: https://pewrsr.ch/2N6j8cx

[4] Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

[5] Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

[6] Sanders, L. (2018). Germany cautious as France leads European defense initiative. DW News. Retrieved from: https://p.dw.com/p/37r61

[7] Smith, R. M. (2001). Citizenship and the Politics of People-Building. Citizenship Studies, 5(1), 73-96.

[8] Ministère des Armées. (2018). Letter of Intent Between Defense Ministers of Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom Concerning the Development of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2). Paris, FR: Author.

Allies & Partners Assessment Papers David Perron Europe European Union France Nationalism

Assessing the Goals of U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts in Somalia

This article is published as part of the Small Wars Journal and Divergent Options Writing Contest which runs from March 1, 2019 to May 31, 2019.  More information about the writing contest can be found here.


Mathew Daniels is a graduate of Old Dominion University, holding a Bachelor of Arts in History with a minor in International Relations.  He served six years in the U.S. Coast Guard Reserves.  He has a diverse professional background including both Law enforcement and education.  Fluent in both Spanish and English he is currently learning Japanese, while residing in Japan as a military spouse.  He has moved three different times in the past three years.  He just concluded student teaching and is preparing to take the Foreign Service Officer Test while awaiting to start employment with the Child Youth Military Program.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessing the Goals of U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts in Somalia

Date Originally Written:  May 31, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  September 5, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  Author is a former member of the U.S. Coast Guard  and a military spouse.

Summary:  As the Global War on Terror continues to expand, the U.S. believes it is important to maintain sound strategy and policy in order to bring about success and avoid costly foreign policy and militaristic commitments. This is especially true in Somalia, where the U.S. is engaged in a small war which currently has a light footprint approach, but risks of increased involvement are possible. 

Text:  The Global War on Terror continues to wax and wane with the foreign policy objectives of the United States. This is especially true in Africa, specifically in Somalia, where a U.S. presence has been in country intermittently since 2003. Somalia is one of the United States’ many small wars that are part of the campaign against Islamist Terrorism post 9/11.  The current terrorist organization that warrants a U.S. military presence is Al Shabaab. It is important to understand that Al Shabaab is allied with and mimics Al Qaeda.  However, some members claim that “they do not wish to wage a global jihad, merely to dominate East Africa[1].”  In this way Al Shabaab may differ from Al-Qaeda but this difference makes them no less of a threat to U.S. national security.  Furthermore, Al Shabaab routinely attacks civilian populations and is a threat to the  U.S.-backed government in Mogadishu. In 2007 African Union Forces were able to drive out Al Shabaab militants and retake most of Mogadishu, however Al Shabaab continued to exist in the suburbs and threaten the capital[2]. 

Presently, the Somalia National Army and police forces with assistance from African Union, Kenyan, and Ethiopian militaries, continue to wage a counter insurgency campaign against Al Shabaab. The United States continues to be involved indirectly in combating Al Shabaab by supporting regional forces with  military advisors. However, without a clear-cut purpose and end goal, the United States risks mission creep and more potential long-term militaristic commitments. 

As part of the Global War on Terror the U.S. has had a presence in Somalia since as early as 2003[3].  This early presence in Somalia was made up of the Central Intelligence Agency and small elements of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), specifically the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU), also known as SEAL Team 6. These early elements  focused on intelligence gathering and relying on local warlords bankrolled with U.S. cash to eliminate Islamist groups in the region[3]. 

In 2011 U.S. President Barack Obama authorized a drone strike campaign in Somalia targeting Al Shabaab[2].  This was a shift from the Bush administration whose primary focus was intelligence gathering and counter-piracy operations.   Under the current Trump administration, Obama’s  policy of drone strikes has continued, and JSOC has become heavily involved in Somalia[2]. This involvement  represents an increase of American commitment to the anti-Al Shabab effort over a significant amount of time. Combat by American forces is not officially confirmed. Multiple sources report that the Pentagon is extremely tight- lipped on operations in Africa and especially Somalia[2][4]. According to The New Yorker, the Pentagon did not respond to a request for information on ongoing operations in Somalia[2]. Nick Terse quotes a “reliable source within the JSOC community who stated, we are heavily engaged in combat as well as advise missions and have sustained casualties, but things are kept as quiet as possible[5].” It appears that the advise and assist role requires members of the U.S. military to accompany local forces on missions which can lead to actual combat for U.S. troops.  

Whatever the official policy, if U.S. forces are at risk, American public and policy makers awareness is of value so they can realize the potential consequences, should mishaps or potential loss of life occur. In fact, casualties have occurred in Somalia, Kenya, Chad and Cameroon  according to Retired U.S. Army Brigadier General Donald Bolduc formerly in charge of special operations in Africa[5]. Make no mistake, American service members are at risk in these advise and assist operations, with or without public knowledge of their presence. Furthermore, absence of sound policy or strategy may mean that these service members sacrifices are in vain.

It is unclear whether U.S. policymakers and senior defense officials consulted the Powell-Weinberger doctrine prior to the deployment of forces to Somalia. Consulting this doctrine  would have helped provide needed clarification for the U.S. military mission in Somalia. For example, why is the U.S. in Somalia? To fight Al Shabaab? To preserve geopolitical stability? At what point will Al Shabaab be defeated? The Powell-Weinberger doctrine would ask if it is politically feasible to win in Somalia, and more importantly what does winning look like? What size of force would be needed to accomplish the goal? Also, what is the compelling U.S. national interest in Somalia?

It is significant to note that African Union forces will be withdrawing from Somalia in 2020[2]. Is the United States going to fill this security void by increasing their footprint, or maintain its current approach?  Without a clear end goal in mind, the American military in Somalia is left without a real direction, other than to train Somali forces and conduct joint raids against Al Shabaab.  It is worth considering that Somalia has lacked any real centralized government that maintained control since it was a colonial possession.  As a result of this weak government, insurgencies such as Al Shabaab thrive and prosper. The likelihood of the United States defeating the insurgency and propping up a stable government  in Somalia without a large  militaristic and diplomatic commitment is slim. Development of clear goals and strategy can help the U.S. achieve victory in Somalia without being dragged into a quagmire abroad. 


Endnotes:

[1] Who are Somalia’s al-Shabab? (2017, December 22). Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689

[2] Ferguson, J. (2018, March/April). Trump’s Military Escalation in Somalia Is Spurring Hope and Fear. The NewYorker.

[3] Naylor, S. (2016). Relentless strike: The secret history of Joint Special Operations Command. New York, NY: St. Martins Griffin.

[4] Bowman, T. (Writer). (2019, February/March). How Global Is The Global War On Terror?[Radio broadcast]. In 1A. Washington D.C.: NPR.

[5] Turse, N. (Writer). (2019, February/March). How Global Is The Global War On

Assessment Papers Mathew Daniels Small Wars Journal Writing Contest Somalia Strategy United States

Options for New Zealand’s National Security Posture

Dr Simon Ewing-Jarvie is a business consultant, Defence commentator and military fiction writer.  He served 25 years in the New Zealand Defence Force, including two operational deployments, retiring as a Lieutenant Colonel (Infantry).  He works at TorquePoint.co.nz where he designs business war games and provides Red Team services.  He was Senior Lecturer in Command Studies at Massey University (NZ) and Senior Advisor to the NZ Associate Defence Minister.  He writes on NZ National Security at unclas.com.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


National Security Situation:  Options for New Zealand’s national security posture.

Date Originally Written:  May 27, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  September 2, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  Author is a critic of New Zealand’s lack of a national security strategy.

Background:  As a former colony of the United Kingdom (UK), New Zealand (NZ) has traditionally been politically and militarily aligned with the West, more specifically, the UK. This alignment shifted from being UK to the United States (U.S.) during the Vietnam War as did NZ’s major military platforms. The alignment was breached in deed when NZ declared itself nuclear free, effectively ending its part in the 1951 Australia, New Zealand, U.S. Security (ANZUS) Treaty [1]. However, while the potential for great power conflict and regional insecurity grows, NZ seems unwilling to invest significant resources into national security capability, instead opting for the ‘umbrella’ protection of its traditional allies in the Five Eyes (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and U.S.) intelligence sharing arrangement [2].

Significance:  Current friction between the U.S. and China has significant economic implications for NZ. China is the country’s largest trading partner, accounting for nearly 25% of NZ’s total exports [3]. There has been controversy over Huawei’s involvement in NZ’s 5G network [4] and NZ has been openly critical of China’s growing regional influence [5]. China is pursuing its ‘belt and road’ economic policy in the South Pacific [6]. NZ’s claim to having an independent foreign policy will be tested over these and other developments in its region.

Option #1:  NZ maintains a posture of armed alignment with current allies and partners.

Risk:  NZ will continue to be drawn into any conflict involving traditional allies. Apart from the military cost of operations, it makes NZ, its people and assets a target internationally. NZ will continue to be reliant on protection from allies. The economic harm would be significant if China was a belligerent. It would take decades to rebuild trust and levels of trade following an East/West conflict.

Gain:  This is the least expensive option for NZ. Capabilities and systems are largely aligned and existing allies remain patient regarding NZ’s lack of investment in defence. Regarding NZ’s trade, 42% is currently with countries that would likely fall behind a U.S.-led coalition [7].

Option #2:  NZ actively seeks new treaties and allies/partners more closely aligned to the protection of its economic interests e.g. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)[8].

Risk:  The loss of current intelligence sharing arrangements (Five Eyes) would be immediate. Logistics and support for currently held military platforms and capabilities that are manufactured in the U.S., Europe, Canada and Australia would be constrained or unavailable. Trade with traditional Five Eye countries would be negatively impacted.

Gain:  New allies might be more motivated to re-equip NZ’s defence capabilities at little or no cost. Trade barriers in these countries could be lowered.

Option #3:  NZ adopts a strategy of armed non-alignment.

Risk:  This option could be seen as a lack of commitment to ‘coalitions of the willing’ and therefore have trade and other political and military implications. Interoperability with other military forces would degrade over time and a drift toward peace support operations capability would be likely.

Gain:  This option enables NZ to only pursue armed interventions that fit with its foreign policy rather than being drawn into all conflicts involving allies. This option aligns well with NZ’s usual position of only committing armed forces in support of United Nations Security Council resolutions [9].

Option #4:  NZ adopts a strategy of armed neutrality.

Risk:  No longer being a member of any treaties or alliances would make NZ vulnerable to attack and occupation. The most likely motivation for an attack on NZ is assessed as access to Antarctica. This would be the most expensive option and would require international arms supply arrangements or a significantly enhanced NZ defence industry. A transition period of up to ten years would be required to develop the enhanced capability required.

Gain:  This option would return NZ to full combat capability through dramatically increasing its funding to defence and other national security capabilities. This option could open pathways for NZ to be a broker between states in conflict in the region in a similar fashion to Switzerland.

Other Comments:  The Closer Defence Relationship with Australia [10] is a harmonisation agreement not a mutual defence treaty. The Five Power Defence Arrangement [11] is focussed largely on security events involving Singapore and Malaysia. The lack of discussion toward a national security strategy for New Zealand is an impediment to a whole-of-government approach to these options.

Recommendation:  None.


Endnotes:

[1] New Zealand History. New Zealand Becomes Nuclear-Free. (June 8, 1987). Retrieved from https://nzhistory.govt.nz/new-zealand-becomes-nuclear-free.

[2]  Tossini, J.V. (November 14, 2017). Retrieved from https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-five-eyes-the-intelligence-alliance-of-the-anglosphere/.

[3] Workman, D. (February 4, 2019). Retrieved from  http://www.worldstopexports.com/new-zealands-top-trade-partners/.

[4] Griffin, P. (March 12, 2019). Retrieved from https://www.noted.co.nz/tech/huawei-5g-what-controversy-is-all-about/.

[5] New Zealand Government. Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018. (July 6, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/strategic-defence-policy-statement-2018-launched.

[6] Devonshire-Ellis, C. (May 23, 2019). China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Pacific Islands. Retrieved from https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2019/05/23/chinas-belt-road-initiative-pacific-islands/.

[7] Workman, D. (February 4, 2019). Retrieved from http://www.worldstopexports.com/new-zealands-top-trade-partners/.

[8] Goodman, M. (March 8, 2018). From TPP to CPTPP. Retrieved from  https://www.csis.org/analysis/tpp-cptpp.

[9] Purser, P. (November 24, 2014). Troop Deployments Abroad: Parliamentary Consent. Retrieved from https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/research-papers/document/00PLLawRP2014051/troop-deployments-abroad.

[10] Australian Government. Australia-New Zealand Joint Statement on Closer Defence Relations. (March 9, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/statements/australia-new-zealand-joint-statement-closer-defence-relations.

[11] Huxley, T. (November 8, 2012). The Future of the Five power Defence Arrangements. Retrieved from https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-future-of-the-five-power-defence-arrangements/.

Dr Simon Ewing-Jarvie New Zealand Option Papers Strategy

Call for Papers: Cyber and Space

Background:

Divergent Options is a non-politically aligned non-revenue generating national security website that, in 1,000 words or less, provides unbiased, dispassionate, candid articles that assess a national security situation, present multiple options to address the situation, and articulate the risk and gain of each option.  Please note that while we assess a national security situation and may provide options, we never recommend a specific option.

Call for Papers:

Divergent Options is calling for national security papers assessing situations or discussing options related to Cyber and Space.

For the purpose of this Call for Papers we define Cyber as a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.

For the purpose of this Call for Papers we define Space as the area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible.

Please limit your article to 1,000 words and write using our Options Paper or Assessment Paper templates which are designed for ease of use by both writers and readers alike.

Please send your article to submissions@divergentoptions.org by October 19, 2019.

If you are not interested in writing on this topic, we always welcome individual articles on virtually any national security situation an author is passionate about.  Please do not let our call for papers cause you to hesitate to send us your idea. We look forward to hearing from you!

Call For Papers

Assessment of the Inclusiveness of American Nationalism

Editor’s Note:  This article is the result of a partnership between Divergent Options and a course on nationalism at the George Washington University.


George Taboada has worked in the 19th District New Jersey State Legislative Office in the United States of America.  He currently is an undergraduate student at The George Washington University.  He can be reached at gleetaboada@gmail.com.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessment of the Inclusiveness of American Nationalism

Date Originally Written:  August 9, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  August 19, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is a grandchild of Cuban immigrants to the United States of America. He believes that progressive political action (anti-discrimination, improved access to healthcare, debt-relief, etc.) is necessary to form a truly democratic society in the USA. 

Summary:  The rise of far-right terrorism in the United States is bringing the question of who and what constitutes the American nation to the forefront of public consciousness. If Americans fail to write their own history as one of inclusion rather than exclusion, violence and ostracization will continue.

Text:  In the wake of two mass shootings and the new surge in far-right terrorism, Americans peer further and further into the belly of the beast that is their nation. What has been statistically clear has slowly drilled itself into the center of the public consciousness: most terrorist attacks in the United States are perpetrated by domestic far right elements rather than Islamist actors. Between 2009 and 2018, 73.3% of murders related to extremist political ideologies were committed by those on the right-wing[1]. The names of innocent communities such as Charlottesville, Pittsburgh, and Parkland have become synonymous with fascist violence. The United States as a whole is beginning to garner a similar dark reputation; Uruguay and Venezuela joined an already expansive list of countries that issue travel warnings to citizens visiting the US due to white supremacist and gun violence[2]. 

It is no coincidence that Jill Lepore published her article “A New Americanism” in the midst of a very old kind of American violence. Indeed, she writes that the conflict between egalitarian and ethnocentric forces “was a struggle over two competing ideas of the nation-state. This struggle has never ended; it has just moved around[3].” In this, Lepore explores a framework of understanding American history that is most condensed in Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow. Alexander describes an America where successive generations “have not ended racial caste in America… but… merely redesigned it.” The slavery, the lynching, the segregation, the poverty, and the police brutality inflicted upon African Americans are not separate systems, but rather the same perpetual phenomenon that is modified to make their suffering palatable to the white majority[4]. At the essence of both of these arguments are the questions that floats through the minds of Americans after the terror and sorrow of a brutal hate crime subsides. Who are we and how much more are we willing to tolerate fascist violence?

There are new factors in this current discourse, but it is also retreading themes of classical literature on nationalism. In fact, Jill Lepore cites Ernest Renan’s defining work, “What is a Nation?[5].” According to Renan, nationalist ideology “presupposes a past but is reiterated in the present by a tangible fact: consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life[6].” Despite the myths of great men being the writers of history, the core dynamic of nationalism is in the hands of anyone who reads, writes, and reforms it. The discourse that defines the nation occurs not just in Congress, but in classrooms, in cafes, in homes, and in the street. Renan’s theory of nationalism is at its core democratic; in the “daily plebiscite,” the people themselves give the nation substance by supporting it and participating in its reformations.

However, republics are vulnerable to those who participate in their institutions with the intent to destroy the values that define and defend democracy. The danger of democratic backsliding is that those who are assaulting human rights do so while wrapping their language in the rhetoric used by those trying to defend it. White supremacists have a long history of doing just that. Leading Nazi figure Joseph Goebbels wrote, “We enter the Reichstag to arm ourselves with democracy’s weapons. If democracy is foolish enough to give us free railway passes and salaries, that is its problem… We are coming neither as friends or neutrals. We come as enemies! As the wolf attacks the sheep, so come we[7].”

This “boots for suits” tactic is not a foreign phenomenon; Lepore and Alexander have both chronicled its centrality to the American republic. The Confederate government formalized white supremacy by writing it into their constitution[8]. Alexander traces the family history of Jarvious Cotton, an American man. Time and time again, the Cottons are denied the fundamental ability to participate in Renan’s daily plebiscite: the ballot. Either through legal restrictions or through real physical violence. The slave-owner, the Klansman, and the police beat black people out of the discourse; constitutions, Jim Crow, and laws make the public feel as though that abuse is justified[9].

Beyond the question an American may ask themselves regarding who they are and how much longer they are willing to tolerate fascist violence lies another question: How much longer should we wait to end fascist ostracization? There is only one answer: immediately. But answering that question has eluded Americans of all kinds for over four centuries. The United States’ constitutive story as a nation is one that promises people freedom and viciously excludes wide swaths of humanity from those inalienable rights. To academicize the question of, “Who are we?”, the author posits, “How do we include people in a constitutive story written to specifically exclude them?”

Without a truly democratic daily plebiscite, those who are victimized by far-right violence will continue to be pushed to the margins of American society. To counter disenfranchisement, a discursive space where all are able to contribute to the building of the nation is necessary. However, open discourse about the nation’s path cannot exist as long as people who seek to raze it to the ground are afforded the same privileges as those who seek to enrich it. Without safeguards that prevent those who target the most vulnerable in society from disenfranchising them, marginalization will persist.

By including the experiences of other nations in the fight for liberation, Americans can further shatter the illusion of a racial ethnostate. Americans can find answers to their soul-searching in a wide range of countries and societies. There is already a prolific literature comparing denazification in Germany to American Reconstruction after the Civil War. From Germans, Americans can learn how to secure justice after a civilizational crime[10]. Another example is the progress of LGBTQ+ rights in Cuba. After the Revolution succeeded in 1959, Cuba was the second country in the world to establish marriage as a strictly heterosexual institution. Since the turn of the century, Cuban society has been more inclusive and more proactive towards achieving LGBTQ+ equality. Those LGBTQ+ who were once violently excluded from the foundation of the Cuban nation were able to write themselves into the Revolution and make it their own. 

To conclude, if Americans fail to write their own stories, those who carry the torches of Klansmen will gladly pick up the pen.


Endnotes:

[1] Anti-Defamation League (2019). Murder and Extremism in the United State in 2018. ADL. 

[2] Hu, Caitlin (2019, August 10). What they really think: America seen through the world’s travel warnings. CNN.

[3] Lepore, Jill (March/April 2019). A New Americanism. Foreign Affairs, 98.

[4] Alexander, M. (2010). The New Jim Crow: Mass incarceration in the age of colorblindness. New York: New Press.

[6] Renan, Ernest (1882, March 11) What is a Nation? text of a conference delivered at the Sorbonne on, in Ernest Renan, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?, Paris, Presses-Pocket, 1992. (translated by Ethan Rundell).

[7] Goebbels, Joseph (1935) Aufsätze aus der Kampfzeit. Der Angriff, pp. 71-73.

[8] Lepore, Jill (March/April 2019). A New Americanism. Foreign Affairs, 98.

[9] Alexander, M. (2010). The New Jim Crow: Mass incarceration in the age of colorblindness. New York: New Press.

[10] Neiman, Susan (2013, August 12). History and guilt: Can America face up to the terrible reality of slavery in the way that Germany has faced up to the Holocaust? Aeon.

[11] De Llano, Pablo (2018, July 23). After decades of homophobia, Cuba closer to allowing same-sex marriage. El País.

Assessment Papers George Taboada Human Rights / Universal Rights Nationalism United States

Turning “Small” Wars into “Big” Wars: How Tacticians Endanger Us All

This article is published as part of the Small Wars Journal and Divergent Options Writing Contest which ran from March 1, 2019 to May 31, 2019.  More information about the writing contest can be found here.


Dr. Heather Venable is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies at the Air Command and Staff College, where she teaches classes on airpower and the historical experience of combat. She has written a forthcoming book entitled How the Few Became the Proud: Crafting the Marine Corps Mystique, 1874-1918.  She also has written for War on the Rocks, Strategy Bridge, and other online blogs.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group. 


Title:  Turning “Small” Wars into “Big” Wars: How Tacticians Endanger Us All

Date Originally Written:  May 31, 2019. 

Date Originally Published:  August 26, 2019.

Author / or Article Point of View:  The author is a professor of airpower. The author wants to point out the tensions in military thinking between the tactical and the strategic and how this has the potential to lead to escalation of “small” wars amidst the return to great power conflict.  

Summary:  Small wars remain highly likely even as the U.S. stresses the return to great power conflict. In these coming conflicts, some frustrated military leaders will exhibit tension between strategic and tactical thinking. This tendency can be seen in the following discussion of Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg, who had a problematic vision of targeting the Chinese mainland during the Korean War that exemplifies tactical thinking at the expense of considering strategic ends. 

Text:  He talked the talk. But he did not walk the walk. In a lecture given to the Air War College in May of 1953, Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt Vandenberg initially exemplified strategic thinking by providing compelling reasons why the Korean War should remain confined to the peninsula. In the subsequent question and answer session, however, he demonstrated a clear desire to widen the war and target the Chinese mainland. Vandenberg’s lecture epitomizes the tensions in the minds of military leaders between tactical and strategic thinking, which pose dangerous risks of escalation, particularly in small wars. 

In the lecture, Vandenberg explained that he had no easy solutions “tied up in pink bows[1].” He also shared how his vantage point provided him with unparalleled perspective on the importance of allies and Cold War grand strategy. As such, he pointed out the problems he saw in expanding the war into China, explaining that striking a key air base inside Chinese territory required the U.S. to “do it with our eyes open” in light of a Sino-Soviet mutual defense treaty. Vandenberg also highlighted the risks of lengthening the United Nations’ own lines of communication. These comments epitomize a solid strategic consideration characterized by continually asking: then what? 

In the ensuing question and answer session, however, Vandenberg dangerously undercut his previous comments. When asked to discuss the Far East’s “strategic importance” during a “hot war,” Vandenberg ignored realities like the aforementioned treaty[2].  Caveating his opinion as being “almost as dangerous” as clamoring for preventative war against the Soviet Union, Vandenberg continued on recklessly:  “My solution has always been . . . we ought to put on a very strong blockade of the Chinese Coast; that we ought to break her rail lines of communication that carry the wheat from the North and the rice from the South . . . that we ought to mine her rivers . . . and that we ought to destroy those small industrial installations . . . .”

In addition to expanding the war and possibly inciting a famine, he suggested that the U.S. start its own “brushfire” to demonstrate, “BY GOD, that we are getting fed up with it.” Vandenberg’s address to War College students on the challenges of making sound strategic decisions devolved into sharing his emotionally-laden tactical responses, which lacked careful consideration of desired ends. Yet Vandenberg characterized his approach as “realistic[3].” 

Ironically, Vandenberg believed himself to be thinking rationally when, in fact, he was thinking romantically. In 1959, Bernard Brodie counterintuitively described the military mind as romantic, explaining how officers preferred “strong action over negotiation, boldness over caution, and feeling over reflection[4].” Vandenberg’s irrational suggestion that the U.S. start a new war because he was “fed up” epitomizes the mentality Brodie sketched. Today, many military officers also characterize themselves as pragmatic realists; in practice, though, they may act very differently.

This romantic attitude permeates tactical thinking, which can undermine a strategic vision. In theory, the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war are neatly bundled together. In reality, the frustrations of small wars often reveal the gaping seams between the tactical and the strategic as the limitations of military force to quickly meet political objectives become evident. 

A tactical thinker concentrates on the short-term prospect of winning a clear-cut victory. A strategic one, by contrast, seeks to play the long game. At times, these two inter-related but competing perspectives cause tension. In the case of a parent teaching a child to play chess, the tactical mindset of seeking to “win” a game sits at odds with the more strategic perspective of keeping children motivated to learn by letting them win[5]. 

Meanwhile, this seductive tactical vision entices military thinkers and decision makers with the promise of decisive action, with the potential to solve a problem once and for all. But nothing in warfare is ever final. The Army officers who produced a recent study on Operation Iraqi Freedom entitled The U.S. Army in Iraq epitomize the dangers of this tactical tendency. Chafing at what they consider to be the imposition of problematic “artificial geographic boundaries,” they wish the U.S. had enlarged the war to include Iran, thus eliminating the sanctuary areas of small wars that are understandably so frustrating to officers[6]. This “if only” mindset seeks short-term military advantage at the cost of a stronger, more durable state of peace that should be the guiding principle underlying and linking together each level of war. 

Small wars on the periphery remain highly likely even as the U.S. returns to stressing great power conflict. In these coming conflicts, some frustrated military leaders will demonstrate tension between the strategic and the tactical just as Gen Vandenberg did. Indeed, the likelihood of this tendency has increased because the U.S. military has become imbued with a “killing and destroying things” mindset[7].  In focusing more on how to kill and destroy than why, the military has reified the tactical and operational at the expense of the strategic. We can only hope that politicians choose not to follow through on fool-hardy tactical ventures; amidst the democratization of weapons technology, such impulses risk endangering us all[8]. 


Endnotes:

[1] Vandenberg, H. (1953, May 6). Lecture Presented by General Vandenberg to Air War College. K239.716253-118, Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA). 

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Brodie, B. (1959). Strategy in the Missile Age. Palo Alto, CA: Rand, p. 266.

[5] Dolman, E. (2016). “Seeking Strategy” in Strategy: Context and Adaptation from Archidamus to Airpower. Eds. Richard Bailey and James Forsyth. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2016, pp. 5-37.

[6] Finer, J. (2019, May 28). Learning the Wrong Lessons from Iraq. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2019-05-28/last-war-and-next. 

[7] Kagan, F. (2006). Finding the Target. New York: Encounter Books, 2006, p. 358.

[8] Krepinevich, A. (2011, August 15). Get Ready for the Democratization of Destruction. Foreign Affairs. https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/15/get-ready-for-the-democratization-of-destruction/.

 

 

Assessment Papers Dr. Heather Venable Mindset Small Wars Journal Writing Contest Strategy United States

Assessment of Civilian Next-Generation Knowledge Management Systems for Managing Civil Information

This article is published as part of the Small Wars Journal and Divergent Options Writing Contest which runs from March 1, 2019 to May 31, 2019.  More information about the writing contest can be found here.


Ray K. Ragan, MAd (PM), PMP is a Civil Affairs Officer in the U.S. Army Reserve and an Assistant Vice President of Project Management for a large Credit Union.  As a civilian, Ray worked in defense and financial technology industries, bringing machine learning, intelligence systems, along with speech and predictive analytics to enterprise scale.  Ray holds a Master’s degree in Administration from Northern Arizona University and a Certificate in Strategic Decision and Risk from Stanford University. He is a credentialed Project Management Profession (PMP) and has several Agile Project Management certifications.  Ray has served small and big war tours in Iraq and the Philippines with multiple mobilizations around the world, working in the U.S. National Interests.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessment of Civilian Next-Generation Knowledge Management Systems for Managing Civil Information 

Date Originally Written:  May 25, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  August 19, 2019.

Summary:  Current Civil Information Management Systems are not taking advantage of the leaps of technology in knowledge management, specifically in the realm of predictive analytics, Natural Language Processing, and Machine Learning. This creates a time cost that commanders must pay in real-time in their operating environment, particularly felt in small wars. This cost also diverts resources away from direct mission-enabling operations.

Text:  Currently Civil Information Management (CIM) systems employed by the U.S. Military are not keeping pace with the current revolution seen in civilian next-generation knowledge management systems (KMS)[1][2]. These KMS are possible through the convergence of modern computing, predictive analytics, Natural Language Processing (NLP), and Machine Learning (ML)[3]. This CIM limitation is unnecessary and self-imposed as a KMS offers persistent and progressing inputs to the common operating picture. This assessment explores how civilian business harnessed this revolution and how to apply it to CIM.

Generally, CIM represents the operational variables (OV) of an operational environment (OE) and as practiced today, resides in the domain of information rather than knowledge[4]. The DIKW pyramid framework, named for its Data, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom structure informs the structure of learning[5]. Further, one can infer that traversing each step represents time and effort, a price paid by commanders in real-time during operations. Small wars demand speed and agility. Current CIM takes time to gather data, input it into a database, run queries, overlay on maps, and eventually infer some knowledge to inform decision making by the commander[6]. 

Using the 1999-invented Cynefin Framework to aid decision-making, commanders needlessly leave many of the OVs in the chaotic domain[7]. Moving from the chaotic to the complex domain the OVs must come from a KMS that is persistent and automatically progressing. Current CIMs do not automatically update by gathering information from public sources such as broadcast, print, and digital that are digitized with NLP and speech/text analytics[8].   Instead, human operators typically located in the OE, manually update these sources. Because of this, today’s CIMs go stale after the operators complete their mission or shift priorities, making what information was gathered devolve to historic data and the OE fog of war revert to chaos[9].

The single biggest advantage a quality KMS provides to a commander is time and decision-making in the OE[10]. Implemented as a simple search engine that is persistent and progressing for all OEs, would mean a commander does not need to spend operational time and effort on basic data gathering missions. Rather, a commander can focus spending operational resources on direct mission-enabling operations. Enticingly, this simple search engine KMS allows for the next advancement, one that businesses around the world are busily employing – operationalizing big data.

Business systems, such as search engines and other applications scour open sources like in court records and organizes them through a myriad of solutions. Data organized through taxonomy and algorithms allow businesses to offer their customers usable information[11]. The advent of ML permits the conversion of information to knowledge[12]. Civilian businesses use all these tools with their call centers to not only capture what customers are saying, but also the broader meta conversation: what most customers are not saying, but revealing through their behavior[13]. 

This leap in application of informatics, which civilian business use today, is absent in today’s CIM systems. The current model of CIM is not well adapted for tomorrow’s battlefield, which will almost certainly be a data-rich environment fed by robotics, signals, and public information[14]. Even the largest team of humans cannot keep up with the overwhelming deluge of data, let alone conduct analysis and make recommendations to the commander of how the civilian terrain will affect his OE[15].

In civilian business, empiricism is replacing the older model of eminence-based decision-making. No longer is it acceptable to take the word of the highest-paid person’s opinion, business decisions need to have evidence, especially at the multi-billion dollar level company level[16]. KMS enables for hypothesis, experimentation, and evidence. Applied in the civilian terrain, if the hypothesis is that by drilling a well reduces insurgency, a global KMS will reveal the truth through the metrics, which cannot be influenced, as former-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice criticized[17]. 

Using text preprocessing with speech analytics and NLP, the KMS would solve an OE problem of data quality, as operators when supplementing the KMS with OE reports, would use speech whenever possible. This overcomes a persistent problem of garbage in and garbage out that plagues military and business systems alike. Rather than re-typing the field notes into a form, the human operator would simply use an interactive spoken dialog for input where feasible[18].

A persistent and progressive KMS also addresses a problem with expertise. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. State Department could not find enough experts and professionals to fill the voids in transitional governance. This problem was such that then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates volunteered to send Department of Defense civilians in their place[19]. With a KMS, commanders and policymakers can draw on a home-based cadre of experts to assess the data models of the KMS and offer contextualized insights into the system to commanders in the field.

As the breadth and quality of the data grows, system administrators can experiment with new algorithms and models on the data in a relentless drive to shorten OV-derived insights into operations planning. Within two years, this KMS data would be among the richest political science datasets ever compiled, inviting academia to write new hypothetical models and experiment. In turn, this will assist policy makers in sensing where new sources of instability emerge before they reveal themselves in actions[20].

“How do you put the genie of knowledge back in the bottle,” P. W. Singer rhetorically asked[21] in his book, Wired for War about the prospect of a robotic, data-enabled OE. This genie will not conveniently return to his bottle for robotics or data, instead commanders and policy makers will look to how to manage the data-enabled battlefield. While it may seem a herculean task to virtually recreate OEs in a future KMS, it is a necessary one. Working through the fog of war with a candle and ceding OVs to chaos is no longer acceptable. Civilian business already addressed this problem with next-generation knowledge management systems, which are ready for today’s OE.


Endnotes:

[1] APAN Staff (n.d.) Tools. Retrieved May 9, 2019, from https://www.apan.org/(S(12adofim0n1ranvobqiyfizu))/pages/tools-communities

[2] Williams, Gregory (2016, December 2). WFX 16 tests Civil Affairs Soldiers. Retrieved May 12, 2019, from https://www.dvidshub.net/news/189856/wfx-16-tests-civil-affairs-soldiers

[3] Szilagyi and P. Wira (2018) An intelligent system for smart buildings using machine learning and semantic technologies: A hybrid data-knowledge approach, 2018 IEEE Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS), St. Petersburg, pp. 22-24.

[4] Chief, Civil Affairs Branch et al. (2011). Joint Civil Information Management Tactical Handbook, Tampa, FL, pp. 1-3 – 2-11.

[5] Fricke, Martin (2018, June 7). Encyclopedia of Knowledge Organization: Knowledge pyramid The DIKW hierarchy. Retrieved May 19, 2019, from http://www.isko.org/cyclo/dikw

[6] Chief, Civil Affairs Branch et al. (2011). Joint Civil Information Management Tactical Handbook, Tampa, FL, pp. 5-5, 5-11.

[7] Kopsch, Thomas and Fox, Amos (2016, August 22). Embracing Complexity: Adjusting Processes to Meet the Challenges of the Contemporary Operating Environment. Retrieved May 19, 2019, from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2016-Online-Exclusive-Articles/Embracing-Complexity-Adjusting-Processes/

[8] APAN Staff (n.d.) Tools. Retrieved May 9, 2019, from https://www.apan.org/(S(12adofim0n1ranvobqiyfizu))/pages/tools-communities

[9] Neubarth, Michael (2013, June 28). Dirty Email Data Takes Its Toll. Retrieved May 20, 2019, from https://www.towerdata.com/blog/bid/116629/Dirty-Email-Data-Takes-Its-Toll

[10] Marczewski, Andrzey (2013, August 5). The Effect of Time on Decision Making. Retrieved May 20, 2019, from https://www.gamified.uk/2013/08/05/the-effect-of-time-on-decision-making/

[11] Murthy, Praveen et al. (2014, September). Big Data Taxonomy, Big Data Working Group, Cloud Security Alliance, pp. 9-29.

[12] Edwards, Gavin (2018, November 18). Machine Learning | An Introduction. Retrieved May 25, 2019, from https://towardsdatascience.com/machine-learning-an-introduction-23b84d51e6d0

[13] Gallino, Jeff (2019, May 14). Transforming the Call Center into a Competitive Advantage. Retrieved May 25, 2019, from https://www.martechadvisor.com/articles/customer-experience-2/transforming-the-call-center-into-a-competitive-advantage/

[14] Vergun, David (2018, August 21). Artificial intelligence likely to help shape future battlefield, says Army vice chief.  Retrieved May 25, 2019, from https://www.army.mil/article/210134/artificial_intelligence_likely_to_help_shape_future_battlefield_says_army_vice_chief

[15] Snibbe, Alana Conner (2006, Fall). Drowning in Data. Retrieved May 25, 2019, from https://ssir.org/articles/entry/drowning_in_data

[16] Frizzo-Barker, Julie et al. An empirical study of the rise of big data in business scholarship, International Journal of Information Management, Burnaby, Canada, pp. 403-413.

[17] Rice, Condoleezza (2011) No Higher Honor. New York, NY, Random House Publishing, pp. 506-515.

[18] Ganesan, Kavita (n.d.) All you need to know about text preprocessing for NLP and Machine Learning. Retrieved May 25, 2019, from https://www.kdnuggets.com/2019/04/text-preprocessing-nlp-machine-learning.html

[19] Gates, Robert (2014). Duty. New York, NY, Penguin Random House Publishing, pp. 347-348.

[20] Lasseter, Tom (2019, April 26). ‘Black sheep’: The mastermind of Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday bombs. Retrieved May 25, 2019, from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-blasts-mastermind-insight/black-sheep-the-mastermind-of-sri-lankas-easter-sunday-bombs-idUSKCN1S21S8

[21] Singer, Peter Warren (2009). Wired for War. The Penguin Press, New York, NY, pp. 11.

Assessment Papers Information and Intelligence Information Systems Insurgency & Counteinsurgency Ray K. Ragan Small Wars Journal Writing Contest

Assessment of French Intervention in the Sahel Region, 2013-2019

This article is published as part of the Small Wars Journal and Divergent Options Writing Contest which ran from March 1, 2019 to May 31, 2019.  More information about the writing contest can be found here.


Hannah Richards has an M.A. in Conflict, Security and Development from the University of Exeter and has recently completed a research internship for the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense think tank. She can be found on Twitter at @h_k_richards.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessment of French Intervention in the Sahel Region, 2013-2019

Date Originally Written:  May 31, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  August 12, 2019.

Summary:  Despite the initial success of Operation Serval in 2013, French intervention in the Sahel region has now reached impasse. The already intricate situation is further complicated by France’s status as a former colonizer operating in the region. Understanding how France’s former colonial status translates into relationships between local communities, French troops, and armed terrorist groups will influence long term engagement. 

Text:  In light of the growing instability in Libya, the enduring presence of Boko Haram in Nigeria and the territorial decline of the Islamic State in the Middle East, attention will increasingly turn to the Sahel as a crucial battleground in the fight against violent non-state actors. As such, the significance of recent French operations in the region cannot be understated.

Due its sheer scale, inaccessibility and geopolitical complexity, the Sahel provides optimal conditions that enable armed terrorist groups to prosper. It is no surprise, therefore, that the region has long served as an important theater for international counterterrorist operations. Launched in 2013 at the behest of the Malian government, the French-led Operation Serval marked an evolution in the level of international engagement in the region. Widely regarded as a military success, Serval was lauded for the rapid reaction and deployment of French troops and for meeting the ultimate objective of pushing back armed terrorist groups from the center of the country. Perhaps more unusually, it also received initial widespread praise from both local and international actors[1].  

However, time has revealed Serval’s successes to be momentary. The operation did little to contribute to the overall stabilization and restoration of Malian state authority, with the security situation now widely accepted to have worsened since 2014[2]. The decision to launch Operation Barkhane in 2014 confirmed that Serval, despite its strengths, had failed to address the underlying causes of the Malian conflict; causes which have only been compounded and exploited by the enduring presence of the armed terrorist groups and fighters traveling to the region from the Middle East[3]. 

Unlike Serval, which fielded small, highly agile forces that were tailored to the specific political goals of the intervention[4], Barkhane reflects a much broader regional counterterrorist effort. The declared aims of the operation are carefully aligned to those countries of the G5 Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) and emphasize the need for capacity building that enables local partners to secure their own safety independently[5]. This close coordination with, and emphasis on, local state actors in the region signifies a clear departure from the operational independence of Serval. Barkhane has had some notable achievements in terms of both hard and soft power[6], however, what constitutes success at a broader strategic level remains unclear. The wide-ranging aims of the current operation are ambiguous and ill-defined, ultimately rendering France’s departure an uncertain prospect. This vagueness, when viewed alongside the complexity of the region, is a clear indicator of the impasse that lies immediately ahead of French forces.

Despite these foreboding circumstances, there are numerous factors that have influenced France’s decision to remain firmly engaged with the region. The initial framing of Serval in the context of the ‘War on Terror’ is crucial to understanding continued involvement. Since Serval’s launch in 2013, France has suffered numerous domestic terrorist attacks. France’s continued investment in tackling terrorism overseas thus represents not only an attempt to ensure regional stability within the Sahel, but a broader commitment to safeguarding its own citizens both abroad and at home. With the acknowledgement that a premature departure could in fact worsen the situation and create conditions that would facilitate the expansion of international terrorist organisations, the idea of a quick exit for France is therefore difficult to entertain[7]. 

In addition, by presenting intervention predominantly through the lens of a counterterrorist mission, France has distanced itself from the intricate political problems within Mali and allowed for the expansion of operations into neighboring countries[8]. As such, a second motivation for remaining in the region becomes evident; Serval and Barkhane have enabled the establishment of French military bases across the region, placing it in a unique position amongst its allies. By redressing its diminished authority in the Sahel, these interventions have presented France with the opportunity to reaffirm its role as a key player on the international stage. 

However, certain international observers have interpreted this strong narrative of counterterrorism as a thinly veiled attempt to detract attention from France’s actual aim of furthering its own national interest in the region, with clear inferences being made to a neo-colonial agenda[9]. Although often crude and reductionist, such criticism does serve to highlight the symbolic connotations of a permanent French military presence in the Sahel for the first time since the end of the colonial period. Although theoretical discussions centered on neo-colonialism may appear ancillary to an assessment of military intervention to date, how these translate into dynamics on the ground will prove crucial to France’s ability to combat armed terrorist groups in the longer term.

The polarizing effect of French intervention on local communities is becoming apparent, demonstrating that it is not just foreign opinion that harbors skepticism about the enduring international presence in the region[10]. Journalistic accounts from Mali have highlighted that, in the aftermath of Serval, questions were raised about continued Malian dependence upon the French state which, followed by Barkhane, has left “many in the region to talk of neo-colonialism[11].” Similarly, images from recent protests, show the disdain felt by certain portions of the Malian population towards continued French presence[12].Should the armed terrorist groups operating in the region harness this acrimony and exploit such narratives to motivate, recruit and encourage others to commit acts of terrorism, the mere presence of French troops may ultimately prove beneficial to those that they are there to combat. 

Although the overall contribution of Barkhane to the stability of the Sahel is as yet unclear, France’s military commitment remains steadfast. When viewed in the context of its historic engagement with the region, the implications of a permanent French presence are vast. As such, a nuanced understanding of the different narratives at play will be increasingly important in determining whether French intervention is ultimately regarded as a success or failure. 


Endnotes:

[1] Boeke, S., & Schuurman, B. (2015). ‘Operation ‘Serval’: A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014’. Journal of Strategic Studies, 38(6), 801-825.

[2] Charbonneau, B. (2019, March 28). The Military Intervention in Mali and Beyond: An Interview with Bruno Charbonneau. Oxford Research Group. Retrieved May 1, 2019, from https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/the-french-intervention-in-mali-an-interview-with-bruno-charbonneau

[3] Carayol, R. (2018, July 1). Mali disintegrates. Le Monde Diplomatique. Retrieved April 27, 2019, from https://mondediplo.com/2018/07/02mali

[4] Shurkin, M. (2014). France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army. RAND Corporation. Retrieved April 28, 2019 from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR770.html

[5] Le Drian, J. (2013, January 12). Conférence De Presse Du Ministre De La Défense, Jean-Yves Le Drian (France, Ministère des Armées). Retrieved April 28, 2019, from https://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/operations/conference-de-presse-samedi-12-janvier-2013-mali-somalie

[6] Ministère des Armées. (2019, February). Dossier de Presse : Opération Barkhane [Press release]. Retrieved April 28, 2019, from https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/barkhane/dossier-de-presentation/operation-barkhane

[7] Chalandon, M. & Gérard, M. (Producers). (2019, May 17). Table ronde d’actualité internationale Opération Barkhane : La France s’est-elle enlisée au Sahel ? [Audio podcast]. Retrieved May 29, 2019, from https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/cultures-monde/table-ronde-dactualite-internationale-operation-barkhane-la-france-sest-elle-enlisee-au-sahel

[8] S. D. Wing (2016) French intervention in Mali: strategic alliances, long-term regional presence?. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27:1, 59-80

[9] See for example; Galy, M. (2014, December 4). Cinquante ans de fiasco de la « Françafrique ». Le Monde. Retrieved April 28, 2019, from http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2013/12/04/cinquante-ans-de-fiasco-de-la-francafrique_3525416_3232.html, or Kane, P. S. (2014, September 6). Mali: The forgotten war. Al Jazeera. Retrieved April 28, 2019, from http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/09/mali-forgotten-war-20149691511333443.html

[10] Chalandon, M. & Gérard, M.

[11] Hicks, C. (2016). How the French Operation Serval was viewed on the ground: A journalistic perspective. International Journal of Francophone Studies, 19(2), 193-207

[12] Mali attacks: Protests held against jihadist violence. (2019, April 5). BBC News. Retrieved April 28, 2019, from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-47834214

Assessment Papers France Hannah Richards Sahel Small Wars Journal Writing Contest

Assessment of U.S. Strategic Goals Through Peacekeeping Operations in the 1982 Lebanon Intervention

This article is published as part of the Small Wars Journal and Divergent Options Writing Contest which ran from March 1, 2019 to May 31, 2019.  More information about the writing contest can be found here.


Edwin Tran is a political analyst with the Encyclopedia Geopolitica and is an editor for the International Review.  Edwin focuses on Levantine politics and civil society, and can be found on Twitter at @En_EdwinT.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessment of U.S. Strategic Goals Through Peacekeeping Operations in the 1982 Lebanon Intervention

Date Originally Written:  May 31, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  August 8, 2019.

Summary:  The United States’ intervention in the Lebanese Civil War was a peacekeeping operation defined by long term strategic goals centered around increasing American hegemony in the region. The United States sought to leverage its position as a peacekeeper against Israeli and Syrian advances. However, significant overreach and unplanned events would play a substantial role in limiting the extent of American success in Lebanon. 

Text:  In 1975, tensions between Lebanon’s sectarian groups erupted into civil war[1]. The influx of Palestinian refugees throughout the 1940s-1960s threatened the political status quo of the country and civil war saw Palestinian militias engage Maronite militias[2]. As the Lebanese Civil War waged on, various peacekeeping operations were attempted. June 1976 saw the entrance of the Syrian military on behalf of Maronite President Suleiman Frangieh. This entrance was followed by a task force known as the Arab Deterrent Force founded in October of that year[3]. In response to the 1978 Israeli invasion of South Lebanon, the United Nations Security Council enacted resolutions 425 and 426, which created the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL)[4]. Despite these measures, further instability was promoted by the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The U.S. Reagan administration was deeply divided by these actions, and after serious cabinet discussions, Secretary of State Alexander Haig resigned. Haig was replaced by George Shultz, and after further discussions with the Lebanese regime of Elias Sarkis, it was decided that the U.S., United Kingdom, France, and Italy would establish a peacekeeping mission[5]. Known as the Multinational Force in Lebanon (MNF), this iteration of international peacekeeping operations would, as described by U.S. Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes, “facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area and thereby further its efforts… to bring an end the violence which has tragically recurred[6].”

On August 21, 1982, the U.S. 2nd Battalion 8th Marines entered Beirut[7]. Additional forces would arrive in the following days. From the onset, the U.S. and its allies were chiefly involved in establishing peace in the direct vicinity of Beirut. Such ideations were made clear in covert meetings conducted between Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and U.S. Ambassador Philip Habib. Declassified Department of State documents reveal that in the months prior to the MNF intervention, negotiations with the Israelis emphasized “the serious situation in the city of Beirut, where [Habib was] informed of the lack of gas, electricity and other basic needs[8].” Contingent on such peace developments was the removal of Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from Lebanon. The removal was believed to be paramount for peace developments in the country[9]. August 30 became the climax of these operations, as the U.S. and its allies were successful in moving Yasser Arafat and a sizeable portion of the PLO out of Lebanon[10].

However, such actions in the first weeks of MNF operations represented a small aspect of more complicated designs. The Reagan administration, recognizing the strategic importance of the region, hoped to use these developments as leverage against the Israelis, Lebanese, and Syrians. Significant weight was placed on furthering the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel, though this time with Lebanon and Jordan[11]. This culminated in the development of the Reagan Peace Plan, which was shown to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on September 1. This plan emphasized the U.S.’s commitment to peace throughout the region and to its specific operations in Lebanon[12]. More contentious were the Peace Plan’s desires for the Israelis to vacate the Palestinian territories, and for a potential merger between Palestinians and Jordan. Although Egypt accepted the deal, every other party was either hostile or highly suspicious.

Other strategic goals of the U.S. became threatened in the immediate aftermath of the PLO’s expulsion. It was believed by many that U.S. intervention would correlate with a weakened Syrian presence and a stronger central government. Such thought was justified by the results of the 1958 Lebanon War, where U.S. intervention resulted in the immediate stability of Lebanon and in the strengthening of Lebanese President Fuad Chehab’s political grip[13]. In the case of the 1982 intervention, the U.S. and its plans were abruptly derailed by the September 14th assassination of Bachir Gemayel, a senior member of the Christian Phalange party and the founder and supreme commander of the Lebanese Forces militia. Peacekeeping attempts by the MNF hinged on a strong Maronite presence in Beirut. With Bachir Gemayel assassinated, the Maronites would be prone to infighting, the Syrians would see a resurgence in military capabilities, and the MNF would have to exert additional efforts in maintaining stability as the Maronites attempted to find new leaders. 

Even before the 1983 bombings of the U.S. embassy and the Beirut barracks, it was clear that the U.S. had failed in its strategic goals. According to U.S. intelligence officers, the unveiling of the Reagan Peace Plan created a situation that threatened Israeli sovereignty[14], and some postulated that the Israelis “could react to the President’s peace initiative by stirring up the pot[15].” Such ideas came to fruition as the Israelis strengthened their hold over West Beirut and engaged in additional attacks. The death of Gemayel, who had also been crucial for the Israelis, meant that Israel was now forced to act in Lebanon without internal actors they could coordinate with. For the U.S. the death of Gemayel meant its own actions would face similar problems and lacking a principle leader to rally behind meant U.S. peacekeeping operations would be examined with a sense of extra-judiciality[16].

In the aftermath of the 1983 bombings, President Reagan addressed to the U.S. public his reasoning for why Lebanon was so valuable. It was, according to the President, a region of substantial importance, an area that was “key to the economic and political life of the west[17].” While such ideals may have been the impetus for the U.S.’s involvement in Lebanon, the reality of the situation proved to be one of catastrophic failure, and the political blunders made by the Reagan administration meant that its efforts were wasted. These points are made somberly in a 1983 memo from National Intelligence Officer Graham E. Fuller to Acting Director William Casey of the Central Intelligence Agency. In it, Fuller writes that “the events of the past… present us with a singularly bleak outlook for U.S. interests in Lebanon… we must face the prospect that our current policies towards Lebanon are not going to work[17].”


Endnotes:

[1] Rabinovich, I. (1989). The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985. (pp.40-41) Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

[2] Khalaf, S. (2002). Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Human Contact. (pp. 167, 229) New York: Columbia University Press.

[3] Rabil, R. (2005). From Beirut to Algiers: The Arab League’s Role in the Lebanon Crisis. Retrieved 23 May 2019 from https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/from-beirut-to-algiers-the-arab-leagues-role-in-the-lebanon-crisis

[4] United Nations Security Council (1978). Resolution 425. Retrieved 23 May 2019 from https://undocs.org/S/RES/425(1978)

[5] Goldschmidt, A. (1996). A Concise History of the Middle East. (pp. 348-350) Colorado: Westview Press.

[6] Speakes, L. (1982). Ronald Reagan Administration: Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on the Situation in Lebanon. Retrieved 23 May 2019 from https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/deputy-press-secretary-speakes-on-the-situation-in-lebanon-september-1982

[7] Cimbala, S. and Foster, P. (2010). Multinational Military Intervention: NATO Policy, Strategy, and Burden Sharing. (pp. 37) Abingdon: Routledge.

[8] Lebanon: Second Meeting with Begin – June 1982 (1982). Retrieved 23 May 2019 from https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490020-5.pdf

[9] National Intelligence Daily (Cable) 27 August 1982 (2016). Retrieved 23 May 2019 from https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84T00301R000400010198-5.pdf

[10] P.L.O Troops begin Pullout in Beirut; French Enter City (1982). The Associated Press. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/1982/08/22/world/plo-troops-begin-pullout-in-beirut-french-enter-city.html

[11] Aruri, N. H. (1985). The United States’ Intervention in Lebanon. Arab Studies Quarterly 7(4), 60-61.

[12] The Reagan Plan (1982). Retrieved 23 May 2019 from https://ecf.org.il/media_items/551

[13] Geyelin, P. (1982). Lebanon—1958 and Now. The Washington Post. Retrieved 23 May 2019 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/08/03/lebanon-1958-and-now/66bde27f-c951-4a7c-bbd7-068ef601e5ad/

[14] Harkabi, Y. (1988). Israel’s Fateful Hour. (pp. 111) New York: Harper and Row Publishers.

[15] Talking Points on Lebanese Internal Situation for 3 September (1982). Retrieved 23 May 2019 from https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84B00049R001800230010-2.pdf

[16] Talking Points on Lebanon: Post-Assassination Update (1982). Retrieved 23 May 2019 from https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84B00049R001403460004-5.pdf

[17] Aruri, N. H. (1985). The United States’ Intervention in Lebanon. Arab Studies Quarterly 7(4), 60.

[18] Downward Spiral in Lebanon (1983). Retrieved 23 May 2019 from https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85M00364R001402440042-4.pdf

Assessment Papers Edwin Tran Lebanon Small Wars Journal Writing Contest United States

Strategic Futures: Nigerian Air Force Requirements In The Post Insurgency Era

The following is content from our partners at the Conflict Studies And Analysis Project at the Global Initiative for Civil Stabilisation.  During 2019 you will occasionally see their content on our website and vice versa.  The original content can be viewed here.  


Mohammed Mohammed is an officer in the Nigerian Armed Forces, and a recipient of the General Service Medal, the Operation Lafoya Dole Campaign Medal, and the Operation Zaman Lafiya Medal. He tweets via @Google_12point7.  

While Conflict Studies And Analysis Project and other GICS content may feature writing by serving military and intelligence officers and other government officials, either under their own name or pseudonyms, it does not contain information of a classified or otherwise official nature. Conflict Studies And Analysis Project and other GICS content, do not represent the views of any government or organisation.


Preamble

Nigeria is Africa’s largest economy, and most populous country, possessing a population estimated to be above 200million people, and covering an area of 923,763 sqkms. It is situated in the middle of an increasingly restive region, with chaos in the Western Sahel and Libya to its north and west, a longrunning Islamist insurgency in its own northeast periphery, an increasingly violent secessionist conflict in Cameroon to its east, and fragile states in Chad and Central Africa, with the former country its only buffer from the chaos in Sudan.

Historically, Nigeria has been one of Africa’s preeminent continental powers, and the leading power in the West African region, with its military leading stabilising interventions in other African countries wracked by conflict including Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. In addition, it has also played a strong role in supporting United Nations Peacekeeping Operations globally, with deployments in theatres from Darfur to East Timor.

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Mohammed Mohammed Nigeria Partner - Conflict Studies And Analysis Project

An Assessment of the Private Military Industry and its Role in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

This article is published as part of the Small Wars Journal and Divergent Options Writing Contest which ran from March 1, 2019 to May 31, 2019.  More information about the writing contest can be found here.


Naiomi Gonzalez is currently a doctoral student in history at Texas Christian University. She can be found on twitter at @AmericanUnInte1.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  An Assessment of the Private Military Industry and its Role in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

Date Originally Written:  May 31, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  August 5, 2019.

Summary:  The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required the support of the private military industry. However, the United States government’s increased reliance and dependency on private military firms has not been without controversy. In fact, the lack of accountability that has allowed certain sectors of the private military industry to act with impunity have arguably complicated the U.S. military’s already difficult missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Text:  The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have brought the United States government’s increased reliance on private military firms to the forefront[1]. During the Vietnam War, it is estimated that there was 1 contractor for every 55 uniformed military personnel. In Iraq the ratio has hovered around 1 contractor for every 1 military personnel and in Afghanistan the number is 1.43 for every 1 military personnel[2]. During specific time periods, the number of contractors has even surpassed that of uniformed military personnel[3].

Private military firms undoubtedly provide much needed services and therefore, should not be discounted for their services. Private military firms, for instance, can draw on a large pool of expertise in a variety of fields while the military is limited by who they can recruit. This private military firm manpower flexibility is particularly important as technology continues to develop at a rapid pace. The Department of Defense (DoD), like most other government agencies, already heavily relies on the private sector to meet many of its technological needs. For example, the DoD has close relationships with many commercial agencies and contractors in order to develop and maintain the latest computer systems. If the DoD were to focus on developing their own computer systems, it would take about seven years for it to become operational. By that time the system would be obsolete and the efforts a waste[4]. For the DoD, which is often inundated by numerous other concerns and responsibilities, it makes sense to team up with private enterprises whose expertise lie in remaining on the cutting edge of new technological advances. Likewise, when it comes to maintaining the military’s vast and increasingly sophisticated technological arsenal, it benefits the DoD to hire contractors who already have years of experience on using and maintaining these specialized weapon rather than rely on military technicians who are most likely not trained in the nuances of a specific piece of equipment[5].

Another benefit of using contractors is that they provide a degree of political flexibility that enables political and military leaders to engage in policies the larger American citizenry might find objectionable. For instance, since the Vietnam War, Americans have shown a disdain for large scale conflicts that result in a large number of U.S. military causalities[6]. This low tolerance for long, drawn out wars became more pronounced as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan dragged on, year after year. However, this aversion to American casualties does not always extend to those working as contractors, especially if those contractors are locals or third-world nationals. Because their roles in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars is not always obvious, contractor deaths and injuries usually attract little attention. Exceptions to this disinterest usually center on particularly vicious deaths or injuries[7]. While not a panacea for increasingly unpopular wars, the use of contractors, especially in place of uniformed military personnel, ensures that extended conflicts remain palpable to the American public for a longer period of time.

However, the use of private military firms also comes with some severe drawbacks. On the economic front, their cost-effectiveness is in doubt. By 2012 the U.S. had spent about $232.2 billion on contractors and about $60 billion had been lost as a result of waste, fraud and abuse on the part of the contractors[8].

Much more concerning is the lack of accountability and impunity that has plagued the industry. In April 2004, CBS News published photographs showing the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by American personnel. While media focus centered on uniformed American personnel who were abusing prisoners and on their courts martial, contractors also played a role in the scandal. Two private military firms, Titan[9] and CACI provided all of the translators and about half of the interrogators involved in the abuse case[10]. Yet no contractor was held legally responsible for their role in the abuse.

Private military provider/security firms have their own unique sets of issues and problems. While they make up the smallest number of contractors[11], the controversy they provoke belies their relatively small numbers. Blackwater Security[12] was the most notorious of these private military provider firms.

The 2007 Nisour Square case involving Blackwater helped spur the wider American population to question the utility of private provider/security firms. On September 16, 2007, Blackwater contractors shot, killed, and injured dozens of Iraqi civilians, in what they claimed was an act of self-defense[13].” The killings provoked widespread outrage. The Iraq government claimed, “The murder of citizens in cold blood…by Blackwater is considered a terrorist action against civilians[14]…” At that time, questions arose regarding whether private provider firms aid or hinder the United States’ mission in Iraq. Then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates admitted that the provider firms’ singular focus on completing their mission, can at times mean that they are working “at cross-purposes to our larger mission in Iraq[15].”

This obsession with ensuring that they complete their assigned task, no matter their costs, can be attributed to the for-profit nature of the companies and the personnel they hire, many of whom have a mission-focused mindset from their former military experiences. Before the Nisour Square incident, Blackwater took pride in its ability to get the job done, no matter what. Such a mindset ensured its success and profitability. However, the Nisour Square episode forced contractors, the government and the public at large to doubt the utility of such a mindset, especially when it results in the deaths of civilians, which only inflames anti-American sentiment. It is difficult to win “hearts and minds” by killing civilians. Moreover, the process of holding the contractors legally responsible for civilian deaths has met with many obstacles. The legal cases against four contractors involved in the Nisour Square incident has dragged on for years[16] while mainstream media attention has faded.

Private military firms have played vital roles in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their roles will only continue to expand. However, the U.S. government’s increased dependency on private military firms has not been without controversy or problems. These problems and controversies have hindered rather than aided the U.S. in completing their already difficult missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.


Endnotes:

[1] Peter W. Singer divides private military firms into three groups: military provider firms (aka private security firms), military consulting firms, and military support firms. While in some cases it is clear which firms fall into what category, in other cases the lines are more blurred as some companies take on a variety of roles. For an in-depth explanation of the different groups see Singer, P. W. (2008). Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press

[2] Taylor, W. A. (2016). Military Service and American Democracy: From World War II to the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. (pg. 172) Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.

[3] For instance, during the third quarter of fiscal year 2008, there were 162,428 total contractors in Iraq, compared to 153,300 uniformed military personnel. In Afghanistan the contrast in numbers is much more pronounced. During the fourth quarter of the 2009 fiscal year there were 104,101 total contractors compared to 62,300 uniformed personnel. See Peters, H. M., & Plagakis, S. (2019, May 10). Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq: 2007-2018. Retrieved May 23, 2019, from https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44116.html

[4] Ettinger, A. (2016). The Patterns, Implications, and Risks of American Military Contracting. In S. V. Hlatky & H. C. Breede (Eds.), Going to War?: Trends in Military Interventions (pp. 115-132). Montreal, CA: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Stanger, A., & Williams, M. E. (Fall/Winter 2006). Private Military Corporations: Benefits and Costs of Outsourcing Security. Yale Journal of International Affairs, 4-19.

[7] For instance, on March 31, 2004 four Blackwater contractors were killed, dismembered and their body parts paraded through the streets of Fallujah. Blackwater faced criticism for its decision to send only four contractors instead of six into an incredibly hostile part of Iraq in jeeps that were armored only with one steel plate. See In Re: BlackWater Security Consulting LCC, http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/051949.P.pdf 1-28 (United Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 2006).

[8] Taylor, 117. This number is most likely an undercount.

[9] In 2005 Titan was acquired by L3 Communications. See Staff, SSI. “L-3 Communications Agrees to Merger With Titan Corp.” Security Sales & Integration, Security Sales & Integration, 7 June 2005, www.securitysales.com/news/l-3-communications-agrees-to-merger-with-titan-corp/.

[10] Singer, P. (2005, April). Outsourcing War. Retrieved May 24, 2019, from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2005-03-01/outsourcing-war.

[11] The number of private military provider/security firms peaked in Iraq at 15,000 individuals and in 2012 at 28,000. See Peters, H. M., & Plagakis, S. (2019, May 10). Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq: 2007-2018. Retrieved May 23, 2019, from https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44116.html

[12] Blackwater was eventually sold and it underwent numerous name changes. It is currently called Academi. See Ukman, J. (2011, December 12). Ex-Blackwater Firm gets a Name Change, Again. Retrieved May 23, 2019, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/ex-blackwater-firm-gets-a-name-change-again/2011/12/12/gIQAXf4YpO_blog.html

[13] A subsequent FBI investigation found the shooting to be unjustified. See Johnston, D., & Broder, J. M. (2007, November 14). F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without Cause. Retrieved May 27, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/world/middleeast/14blackwater.html

[14] Tolchin, M., & Tolchin, S. J. (2016). Pinstripe patronage: Political favoritism from the clubhouse to the White House and beyond. Pg. 183 London, UK: Routledge.

[15] Spiegel, P. (2007, October 19). Gates: U.S., Guards are at Odds in Iraq. Retrieved May 23, 2019, from https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-oct-19-na-blackwater19-story.html

[16] See Collins, M. (2018, December 19). Former Blackwater Guard Convicted of Instigating Mass Shooting in Iraq. Retrieved May 23, 2019, from https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/12/19/iraq-war-jury-convicts-ex-blackwater-guard-second-time-massacre/1941149002/

Afghanistan Assessment Papers Iraq Naiomi Gonzalez Private Military Companies (PMC etc) Small Wars Journal Writing Contest United States

Strategic Futures: Fostering Turkish-Nigerian Strategic Cooperation

The following is content from our partners at the Conflict Studies And Analysis Project at the Global Initiative for Civil Stabilisation.  During 2019 you will occasionally see their content on our website and vice versa.  The original content can be viewed here.  


Fulan Nasrullah is the Executive Director of the Conflict Studies And Analysis Project at the Global Initiative For Civil Stabilisation. He focuses on Nigeria’s national security architecture, the conflict in the Lake Chad region, the Nigerian military and strategic futures. He sometimes tweets via @fulannasrullah. Ken’an E. Toprak is a Turkish researcher focusing on Turkish-Nigerian relations. He tweets via @kenanebubekir633.


Preamble

As both the Turkish and Nigerian governments pursue reorientations of their countries from previous courses they were following, it has become imperative that they seek partnership and cooperation outside the traditional areas, they were tied to, in order to sustain the trajectories they are setting their countries on.

In an era of increasing great power competition, where large powers increasingly use a variety of coercive means (sanctions for the US, and debt for China) to compel small states into their respective camps, middle powers that are too big to be easily coerced into submission by great powers, and yet too small to challenge the great powers directly, can balance out pressure from the larger powers and their poles and also project out of their areas, by aligning strategically with like minded middle powers.

Such an arrangement is more beneficial as it allows powers of equal capabilities in geographically divergent regions that cannot otherwise project power, into each others spheres of influence, to work together to achieve mutually beneficial goals of maintaining strategic autonomy, and playing on a global strategy. For example we currently see a growing alignment between Japan, India and Australia, to balance out China, and France and Germany to shepherd European integration and stability in the face of American uncertainty and also balance out the threat posed by Russia.

To that end, we decided to examine what a strategic partnership between two middle powers i.e Nigeria and Turkey would look like. In putting together this paper, we interviewed private actors and government officials, especially diplomats and businessmen, in both countries, and from our conversations plus our assessment of the state of bilateral relations etc, we have written what we hope is a road map of sorts, to serve as a reference on fostering a strategic partnership between Nigeria and Turkey.

Download the rest of the report from here.

Fulan Nasrullah Ken’an E. Toprak Partner - Conflict Studies And Analysis Project

Assessment of U.S. Involvement to Counter Hutu Extremists’ Plans for Tutsi Genocide in Early 1994

This article is published as part of the Small Wars Journal and Divergent Options Writing Contest which ran from March 1, 2019 to May 31, 2019.  More information about the writing contest can be found here.


Scott Martin is a career U.S. Air Force officer who has served in a multitude of globally-focused assignments.  He studied Russian and International Affairs at Trinity University and received his Masters of Science in International Relations from Troy University.  He is currently assigned to Ft. Meade, Maryland.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessment of U.S. Involvement to Counter Hutu Extremists’ Plans for Tutsi Genocide in Early 1994

Date Originally Written:  May 31, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  July 29, 2019.

Summary:  The U.S. could have countered the genocide the April 1994 genocide in Rwanda. While it is very difficult to envision a scenario whereby the U.S. conducted unilateral military actions once the genocide started, the various indicators prior to that date offered the U.S. the opportunity, working through the United Nations (UN), to act to prevent the genocide before it started. 

Text:  On April 6, 2019, the world reflected on the 25th anniversary of the genocide of 800,000 Tutsi and sympathetic Hutus by Hutu extremists in Rwanda. Since then, many asked the question “Why didn’t someone stop this?” Since 1994, the U.S. expressed remorse at the genocide in Rwanda. Yet in 1994, the U.S. took pains to avoid direct involvement/action in Rwanda. Given a lack of significant geo-political or economic equities and disgusted by the failures of their humanitarian action in Somalia, the U.S. argued they had no role in Rwanda. Yet, with the U.S. taking a remorseful tone with the Rwandan Genocide, it begs the question: What if the U.S. did take action?

There is no shortage of debate on this issue. Some, such as former United Nations (UN) Ambassador Samantha Power, felt that U.S. military involvement, even on a small scale could have reduced if not halted the genocide[1]. Such actions ranged from the deployment of an Army Brigade (overseas or stateside based) to the use of the Air Force’s Commando Solo Electronic Warfare / Information Operations platform. Others, such as scholar Alan Kuperman, note that the U.S. did not have enough confirmation of genocide until April 20, by which time, most of the killing was completed[2]. Thus, the deployment of U.S. forces, in addition to not being in position to significantly impact the genocide, would place undue burdens on the U.S. military, and present America with another unnecessary U.S. humanitarian quagmire.  Subsequent analyses looked at options from the deployment of 5,000-150,000 troops, but a unilateral U.S.-led deployment, no matter the options, is always seen as unlikely, given the lack of bi-partisan political support in Washington D.C.  

Yet, the genocide did not spontaneously start in April 1994. After Rwandan independence in 1961, the long-standing differences between Hutu and Tutsi populations manifested themselves into multiple conflicts. Since 1990, conflict between displaced Tutsi (Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)) and the Hutu led-military/militia forces plagued the country. Despite international-led efforts to end the warfare, many within the Hutu-dominated government planned for actions to eliminate the Tutsi from Rwanda. The international community had indications of such plans as far back as 1992[3]. From 1990-1993, Hutu militias executed nearly 2000 Tutsi, a preview of Hutu plans[4]. By January 1994, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) received intelligence that the Hutu-led government was actively planning for a mass extermination of all known Tutsi and sympathetic elements within the country. The UNAMIR commander, Canadian General Romeo Dallaire, notified the UN Security Council on 11 January of this development and asked for authorization to deal with this emerging threat[5]. 

It is in this January 1994 scenario that the U.S. could have plausibly acted to counter the genocide, leveraging the UN Security Council to modify and increase the authority and resources of UNAMIR. Instead of working to withdraw forces from Rwanda, the U.S. and the UN Security Council could have reauthorized and increased troop deployments from the 2,500 in country in early 1994[6]. While 5,000 troops (the number requested by Dallaire to aid UNAMIR in 1994) would not be enough to halt a nation-wide genocide if it kicked off, a strong international presence, combined with a public proclamation and demonstration of increasing troop deployments to maintain peace and thwart extremist actions, might have curtailed Hutu ambitions[7]. While a major strategy of the Hutu extremists was to kill several of the international peacekeepers, taking active measures to protect those forces while not redeploying them would also thwart Hutu strategy. 

In this scenario, the U.S. would have provided political and logistical support. The U.S. faced logistical challenges dealing with a land-locked country, but its airpower had the capability to use existing airfields in Rwanda and neighboring countries[8]. While Hutu extremists could target U.S. assets and personnel, they were more likely not to directly interfere with international forces. During the actual genocide, while Hutu extremists killed 10 Belgian peacekeepers, Tutsis protected by the limited number of international forces usually found themselves safe from attack[9]. Even in situations where Hutu killers greatly outnumbered international forces, the Hutu did not attack the international peacekeepers[10]. 

This is not to say that increased authorities and manpower for the UN Peacekeepers would have solved all the problems. How the UN could have dealt with the Tutsi forces looking to reenter Rwanda and defeat the Hutu forces presented a difficult long-term problem. The Hutu extremists would not have simply stopped their efforts to drum up support for Tutsi elimination. It is possible the Hutu extremists would look to target UN forces and logistics, especially if it was an American asset, in a repeat of Somalia. Even by offering American equipment and indirect support, domestic political support would be tenuous at best and U.S. President William Clinton’s opponents would use those actions against him, with Clinton’s party still suffering historic losses in the 1994 midterm elections. It is possible that the Hutu and Tutsi would try to wait out the UN forces, coming to a “peaceful” government, only to hold their fire until after the peacekeepers are sent home. 

Yet, acting through the UN Peacekeepers before April might have stopped the genocide and all the ills that followed. While Paul Kagame may never come to power and Rwanda’s economic and social resurgence would have taken a different path, there may have been hundreds of thousands of Rwandans still alive to make their mark in improving the life of the nation. Additionally, the Hutu extremists may not have been so active in spreading their ethnic hatreds beyond their borders. The Congo Wars of the late 1990s/early 2000s have their genesis in the Hutu extremists who fled into the refugee camps[11]. If there is no mass displacement of those extremists into Democratic Republic of Congo, perhaps Africa avoids a brutal conflict and over 5 million lives are saved[12]. Perhaps assisting the UNAMIR with U.S. support/logistics might not have been a popular move in 1994, but if executed, the U.S. may not have to look back in 2019 to say “We should have done something.” 


Endnotes:

[1] Power, Samantha (2001, September). Bystanders to Genocide. The Atlantic. retrieved 15 Mar 2019 from (https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/. 

[2] Kuperman, Alan J (2000, January/February). Rwanda in Retrospective. Foreign Affairs (Vol 79, no.1) 101. 

[3] Stanton, Gregory H. (2004, June). Could the Rwandan Genocide have been Prevented? Journal of Genocide Research. 6(2). 212

[4] Ibid 

[5] Ibid

[6] Rauch, J. (2001) Now is the Time to Tell the Truth about Rwanda, National Journal, 33(16) retrieved 14 Mar 2019 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=4417527&site=ehost-live

[7] Wertheim, Stephen. (2010). A Solution from Hell: The United States and the Rise of Humanitarian Interventionism, 1991-2003. Journal of Genocide Research, 12(3-4), 155. 

[8] Stanley, George (2006) Genocide, Airpower and Intervention, 71. 

[9] Power, Samantha (2001, September). Bystanders to Genocide. The Atlantic. retrieved 15 Mar 2019 from https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/.

[10] Ibid

[11] Beswick, Danielle (2014). The Risks African Military Capacity Building: Lessons from Rwanda. African Affairs, 113/451, 219. 

[12] Reid, Stuart A (Jan/Feb 2018). Congo’s Slide into Chaos. How a State Fails. Foreign Affairs, 97/1. 97. 

Assessment Papers Mass Killings Rwanda Scott Martin Small Wars Journal Writing Contest

Assessing the Jefferson Administration’s Actions During the First Barbary Wars and their Impact on U.S. Small War Policy

This article is published as part of the Small Wars Journal and Divergent Options Writing Contest which runs from March 1, 2019 to May 31, 2019.  More information about the writing contest can be found here.


Samuel T. Lair is a research associate at the Kenny Guinn Center for Policy Priorities.  He received his undergraduate degree from the University of Nevada, Reno studying U.S. Foreign Policy and American Constitutionalism.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessing the Jefferson Administration’s Actions During the First Barbary War and their Impact on U.S. Small Wars Policy

Date Originally Written:  May 24, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  July 25, 2019.

Summary:  The First Barbary War of 1801 was the first significant American engagement outside of the Western Hemisphere and the second significant engagement against a foreign state without a formal declaration of war. Furthermore, this war’s multilateral strategy of using a coalition and diplomatic pressure provides valuable insight into the elements of a successful limited military operation. 

Text:  In the early 18th century, the independent state of Morocco and the Ottoman vassal states of Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripolitania (comprising modern-day Libya) formed what is known as the Barbary States. These rogue states would frequently engage in piracy, slave trading, and extortion along the Mediterranean coast, harassing the mercantile fleets of Europe in a form of textbook state-sponsored terrorism[1]. Prior to 1776, the American mercantile fleet under the tutelage of the British Empire was provided indemnity from the molestation of its Mediterranean trade. However, with the procurement of self-determination came an abrogation of many of the former Colonies’ favorable commercial pacts, including that with the Barbary States of North Africa. The United States’ mercantile fleet soon became frequently subject to the harassment of the Berber corsairs, subjecting American citizens to foreign slave camps and threatening the economy of the fledgling republic. In response, U.S. President George Washington agreed to pay tribute to the Barbary States in 1796. Following the election of U.S. President Thomas Jefferson in 1801, the Pasha of the Eyalet of Tripoli demanded increased tribute then shortly after declared war on the United States. In an unprecedented display of executive authority, President Jefferson responded by sending U.S. Navy Commodore Dale to protect U.S. interests in the Mediterranean and thus began the nation’s first small war.

Among the most impactful consequences of the First Barbary War was the now established authority of the Executive Branch to engage in limited military operations against foreign adversaries without a formal declaration of war. The President of the United States, although the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, has no expressed Constitutional authority to engage in acts of war without U.S. Congressional approval. Prior to the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the authority of the Executive Branch to proactively respond to threats against American interests abroad relied on the precedent of limited military operations beginning with Thomas Jefferson’s conduct during the First Barbary War. Jefferson received no formal authority from Congress before sending Commodore Dale in command of a small squadron to the courts of the Berber rulers to negotiate terms and protect U.S. merchant vessels, and it was not until after hostilities began that Congress retroactively authorized military force nearly nine months later[2]. Regardless, President Jefferson’s tactful use of executive authority in the commencement of the campaign and subsequent negotiation with the Maghreb states left an indelible mark for the standard of response to affronts on American interests.

Other notable precedents set during the First Barbary War was the multilateral approach of the Jefferson Administration. The war, though fought primarily by the United States Navy, was not entirely unilateral. The United States at the beginning of the war conducted operations jointly with the Royal Navy of Sweden in its blockade of Tripoli. Moreover, American forces received valuable logistical support from the Kingdom of Sicily, who provided ships, sailors, and a base of operations in the port city of Syracuse[2]. The American mission also applied ample diplomatic as well as military pressure in order to achieve its aims. In an apparent precursor to the Perry Expedition and the opening of Japanese markets to U.S. goods through gunboat diplomacy, the American mission was able to force the capitulation of both Morocco and Tunisia by employing bellicose diplomacy. The only Barbary State that the United States actively engaged in combat with was the Eyalet of Tripolitania under Pasha Yusuf Qaramanli.

In the commencement of military action against Pasha Qaramanli, the United States utilized both conventional and unconventional warfare. The first strategy was to deploy the United States Navy to blockade Tripoli and when appropriate, commence naval assaults on combatant naval forces and naval bombardments on Tripolitan cities. However, following the limited success of the naval operations, William Eaton, American consul to neighboring Tunisia, conspired to depose the Pasha and install his exiled brother, Hamet Qaramanli, on the Tripolitan throne[1]. Meeting in Alexandria, Egypt, Eaton and Hamet with a small squadron of six U.S. Marines and a homogenous force of 400-500 Greek, Arab, and Turkish mercenaries began their march to Tripoli. En route, the motley force with naval support from U.S. Naval warships commenced the first land battle fought on foreign soil, assaulting and capturing the port city of Derna.

Despite the success of the Derna operation, it would be the joint use of force and diplomacy that would end hostilities between the United States and the Eyalet of Tripoli. With the Treaty of Tripoli, the United States agreed to abandon support for Hamet Qaramanli and pay 60,000 U.S. dollars. In return, the Pasha released all the American nationals taken as prisoner throughout the war and the United States once again received assurance its Mediterranean trade would commence unabated[2]. If not for the success of the Battle of Derna and the U.S. Naval Blockade, it is likely that such an agreeable settlement would not have been impossible. Although Eaton’s and Hamet’s forces may have been able to take Tripoli and forced peace without having to pay ransom for the American prisoners, it is equally plausible the continued campaign would have turned into a drawn out and increasingly costly venture. Therefore, an assured and expedient end to the war required both skilled diplomacy and military ferocity. 

The First Barbary War stands as a model for pragmatic foreign policy and whose lessons touch upon the nuance necessary for even contemporary issues of national interest. Its lessons demonstrate that sound foreign policy requires a balanced, multilateral approach which recognizes that military aggression ought to be matched with ample diplomatic pressure, the benefit of coalition building, the necessity of combined arms operations, and the opportunity in unconventional warfare. The United States’ engagement on the shores of Tripoli echoes in future engagements from Nicaragua to China and numerous other small wars which act as an indelible mark on American foreign policy. These engagements range in scope and outcome, geography and foe, but regardless, it is upon the bold precedent set by President Jefferson during the First Barbary War that all proceeding American small wars stand.


Endnotes:

[1] Turner, R. F. (2003). State Responsibility and the War on Terror: The Legacy of Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates. Chicago Journal of International Law, 121-140. Retrieved April 7, 2019, from https://heinonline org.unr.idm.oclc.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/cjil4&id=145&men_tab=srchresults

[2] Boot, M. (2014). The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. Retrieved April 7, 2019, from https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=YX7ODQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=savage+wars+of+peace+barbary+wars&ots=GxfcnIpmJY&sig=B7XyieNfzbC50MINDvo-92k4y7I#v=onepage&q=savage%20wars%20of%20peace%20barbary%20wars&f=false

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Options for the Nigerian Air Force to go on the Offensive in the Counterinsurgency War

Ekene Lionel presently writes for African Military Blog as a defense technology analyst.  His current research focuses on how technology intersects national defense.  He holds a Bachelor’s Degree from Michael Okpara University.  He can be found on Twitter @lionelfrancisNG.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


National Security Situation:  The counter-insurgency war in Nigeria has prevailed for seven years; causing untold hardship to the citizens of the region, devouring a great number of financial resources as well as precious unrecoverable lives[1]. The much sought-after victory has continued to elude the Nigerian Military despite its determined efforts to triumph over the terrorists. In the conflict, the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) has been criticized severally for being absent in the war efforts due to unavailable capable weapons platforms[2].

Date Originally Written:  May 15, 2019. 

Date Originally Published:  July 22, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author writes from the perspective of a seasoned regional defense technology analyst focusing on Africa. The article is written from the point of view of the Nigerian Air Force decision-makers considering using modern technologies to sustain the counter-insurgency war, as well as offering options on the building of aerial capabilities in order to degrade the terrorist elements.

Background:  Since the 1970s, the NAF has largely lost its capability to conduct full-scale conventional warfare against near-peer adversaries. This loss has directly affected its ability to wage a successful counter-insurgency (COIN) efforts against Boko Haram and the Islamic State[3].

The Nigerian Air Force’s emphasis on utilizing cost-effective aerial platforms such as trainers aircrafts pressed into service in the frontlines has left the force with fewer capable platforms to properly prosecute the COIN war. However, with the insurgents’ ever-changing combat and survival tactics coupled with the increasing regional security uncertainties, the NAF began examining new approaches in meeting its constitutional mandates, even with its shrinking budget[4][5].

Significance:  When the Nigerian Air Force cannot undertake its mandates due to limited aerial capability, the counter-insurgency efforts cannot be sustained. The military echelon will find it difficult to perform optimally, for instance, the NAF’s various Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms are critical in providing valuable information on the enemy’s disposition, troops strength and composition. Also, the NAF’s strike and attack aerial apparatus are seen as the Nigerian Military’s de facto ‘far-reach’ capability; first to see the enemy, first to strike the enemy and first to report the enemy’s position. The Nigerian Air Force is simply the fulcrum that ties all the components involved in fighting the war, its role cannot be over-emphasized[6].

Option #1:  The NAF distributes its platforms and combines them with an integrated observation system.

The NAF disperses rather than concentrates its forces, relying on new weapons, sensors, training, and tactics to defeat the aggressors. Distributed lethality is becoming the newest paradigm shift in offensive combat, aimed at ensuring joint force contribution[7].

This option would ensure the NAF controls the battlefield; which enables deterrence of aggression, power projection, as well as providing theatre security. This concept relies largely on resilient networks to coordinate the activities of all in-theatre airplanes spread over vast areas of landmass as seen in Nigeria’s northeast region. Every aircraft (offensive and otherwise), unmanned aerial vehicles and helicopters are a potential sensor and shooter in the shared effort, but the ability of the enemy to detect, track and adapt is greatly complicated.

While West African based terror organizations lack a credible anti-air / aerial-denial capability, when NAF campaigns are organized around using just light attack aircraft, Unmanned Combat Aerial Systems (UCAS) and attack helicopters, it doesn’t take a lot of thought for the enemies to figure out what to target. But when an offensive campaign is waged by diverse aircraft (fighters, trainers, transport, helicopters, UCAS, etc) scattered over many miles, the enemy is challenged in determining where to focus its response.

This strategy could contribute to regional deterrence, enhance the survivability of the force in wartime, and get more value out of each warfighting asset.

Risk:  As with all new changes especially in the defense sector, misusing money is always an issue. However, a staggered approach to implementation could be proposed. Instead of procuring new platforms, little bits of technology could be added to each platform. Such an approach would glue together the aerial platforms, sensors, and weapons, and these incremental improvements would be a step in the right direction. Furthermore, the NAF engineers have shown countless times that they are quite adept at rejigging non-offensive platforms into highly potent warfighting machines.

Additionally, adapting the NAF for distributed lethality requires it to restructure its tactics, training and warfighting tools to a new way of waging war.  This new way of war’s most important items are weapons, networking, and sensors with increased offensive reach, integrated precision munition, improved battlespace awareness, and high-mobility training.

Gain:  This option would increase battlefield coherence, tactical units synergy, and also the possibility of integrating more features like a battlefield ‘friendly force tracker’ in the future. The overall picture is one of a force that will likely gain reconnaissance assets with wider operational range; communications links that better support timely targeting of threats; procedures to optimally pair weapons with targets in a distributed environment; precision munitions with greater over-the-horizon capability. 

Option #2:  The NAF focuses on persistent ISR, real-time target data sharing and rapid reaction engagement.

Another option is to dedicate the Nigerian Air Force’s ISR assets in a persistent deployment mode whereby multiple ISR platforms are deployed to the forward edge of the battlespace for a longer period of time. These ISR platforms will be tied to a theatre-wide real-time target data sharing network (or data link similar to South Africa’s Link ZA or the United States’ Link 16) to instantaneously transmit the target’s data (location and imagery) to standby rapid reaction assets deployed in Forward Operating Bases[8][9]. 

Risk:  With the ever-shrinking defense budget, deploying multiple aircraft for a long period of time drastically increases the operational cost. The amount of money needed to keep military aircraft airborne or in constant high-alert mode is considerable. Moreover, an increase in deployment or sortie rate results in aircraft downtime and the maintenance time required.  With the NAF currently being deployed in multiple fronts, Option #2 could result in security lapses in some areas in the country. However, UCAS could be especially useful in closing some of the gaps identified.

Gain:  Option #2 offers the benefits of a quicker engagement time since the time required from target detection to engagement is significantly reduced. With this in mind, surprising attacks from terrorists are lessened. Furthermore, the decision-making process in target engagement is also reduced because the burden would be passed on the field commanders, thereby lessening the strain on the command and control process. 

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendation:  None.


Endnotes:

[1] Gillian, L. ( 2018, January 24), The impact of the Boko Haram insurgency in Northeast Nigeria on childhood wasting: a double-difference study. Retrieved May 16, 2019, from https://conflictandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13031-018-0136-2

[2] Leadership Newspaper. ( 2017, June 29), Distractions On The Path To Glory: The Nigerian Air Force Experience. Retrieved May 16, 2019, from https://leadership.ng/2017/06/29/distractions-path-glory-nigerian-air-force-experience/

[3] Ekene, L. (2018, June 28), AIR SUPREMACY: Has the Nigerian Air Force lost its teeth? Retrieved May 16, 2019, from https://www.africanmilitaryblog.com/2018/06/air-supremacy-has-the-nigerian-air-force-lost-its-teeth

[4] Vanguard Newspaper. (2017, November 16) War on Terror: Airforce converts L-39ZA Albatross jets to fighter aircraft. Retrieved May 16, 2019, from  https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/11/war-terror-airforce-converts-l-39za-albatross-jets-fighter-aircraft/

[5] Sadique Abubakar. (2018, December), Air Power And National Security Imperatives. Retrieved May 16, 2019, from https://leadership.ng/2018/11/20/air-power-and-national-security-imperatives/

[6] Chris Agbambu. (2017, May 28), Nigerian Air Force Has Played Significant Role In Tackling Insecurity. Retrieved May 16, 2019, from https://www.tribuneonlineng.com/94666/

[7] U.S. Naval War College. (2015, October 10), ‘Distributed Lethality’ concept gains focus at NWC. Retrieved May 16, 2019, from https://usnwc.edu/News-and-Events/News/Distributed-Lethality-concept-gains-focus-at-NWC

[8] Reutech Communications. Link ZA. Retrieved May 16, 2019, from http://www.reutechcomms.com/linkza/

[9] Defense Web. (2010, January 18) Link ZA: Fact File. Retrieved May 16, 2019, from https://www.defenceweb.co.za/resources/fact-files/fact-file-link-za/?catid=79%3Afact-files&Itemid=159

Air Forces Ekene Lionel Nigeria Option Papers

Options for U.S. Use of Private Military and Security Companies

This article is published as part of the Small Wars Journal and Divergent Options Writing Contest which runs from March 1, 2019 to May 31, 2019.  More information about the writing contest can be found here.


Christophe Bellens is a policy advisor at the European Parliament. He completed two MS degrees from the University of Antwerp in History (2017) and International Relations (2018).  His thesis focused on the use of Private Military and Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. He can be found on LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/in/christophe-bellens/ and on Twitter @ChristosBellens.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


National Security Situation:  The use of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC) by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan and its consequences on military effectiveness in a counterinsurgency.

Date Originally Written:  May 6, 2019. 

Date Originally Published:  July 15, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article considers from the perspective of the United States government what options are on the table in the use private military forces. Decision makers have three possibilities, explained by their effectiveness in Iraq or Afghanistan, for a future PMSC-strategy.

Background:  Since the start of the ‘Global War on Terror’, U.S. government organizations such as the Department of Defense (DoD), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State (DoS) have contracted PMSCs to manage security risks. The employees of these corporations perform duties that until recently were fulfilled by military members, such as the protection of key personnel, convoys and sites. Due to a reduction in troop numbers and an environment where privatization was heavily favored, PMSCs became a vital component of counterinsurgency. Despite their importance, planners often overlook the role of these contractors. The two cases of Iraq and Afghanistan offer three pathways to reach the envisioned political, tactical, operational and strategic objectives during counterinsurgency. 

Significance:  Private security contractors are part of contemporary small wars. In 2010, around 30,479 contractors worked for the DoD in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, the DoS and USAID employed around 1850 and 3770 security contractors respectively in Afghanistan alone. Hence, per 1 security contractor 3.7 U.S. military members were deployed in Afghanistan in 2010[1]. As a vital component of the security environment, they strongly influenced the outcome of the counterinsurgency. 

Option #1:  The US employs mainly security contractors from outside the host state as in Iraq. Between Q3 2008 and Q4 2013, 90% of the private security contractors were non-Iraqi citizens[2]. 

Risk:  Major potential drawbacks of employing non-native contractors exist in the political and strategic dimensions. PMSCs are there to protect their clients, not to win the hearts and minds of the population. This client protection focus led to a ‘shoot first, ask questions later’-policy vis-à-vis potential threats. During the ‘Nisour Square’-shooting seventeen Iraqi civilians were killed. The worldwide public outcry that followed, worsened relations between the Iraqi government and the U.S. Insurgents gladly used this outcry against the lawless look-alike U.S. military members. Insurgents later released a video named ‘bloody contracts’ bemoaning the abuse, aggression and indiscriminate killing by U.S. contractors[3].

Foreign nationality (especially British or U.S. citizens) make contractors a valuable target for insurgents[4]. During the 2004 Fallujah incident the non-American truck drivers were able to escape as the insurgents focused on what they imagined were agents of the Central Intelligence Agency. In fact, the convoy was rushed and understaffed by the PMSC to show how quick they could perform contract obligations. After a video of their bodies being paraded through the streets hit the news, U.S. President George W. Bush favored immediate military retaliation. The First Battle of Fallujah ended in an operational failure and shifted the focus away from the strategic goal of strengthening the Iraqi government. 

Gain:  These PMSCs were often well equipped. Their arsenal existed of a variety of small arms, machine guns and shotguns in addition with grenades, body armor and encrypted radio communication. Their vehicles ranged from local undercover secondhand cars to military-style high mobility multi-wheeled vehicles. Blackwater even had eight Boeing Little Bird helicopters in Baghdad. The personnel operating this equipment often had a law enforcement or military background. In addition, contractors for the DoS had to undergo 164 hours of training in protective detail[5]. Hence, experienced foreigners are likely to demonstrate the necessary skills to ensure the successful completion of the assigned tasks.

Option #2:  The U.S. employs mainly local contractors as in Afghanistan. Ninety percent of the private security contractors between Q3 2008 and Q4 2013 were Afghan citizens.

Risk:  Eighty percent of the Afghan contractors were former militiamen or part of an existing armed group[6]. While this often provided valuable combat experience, it was a potential security hazard. Consequently, foreigners protected high-profile targets. Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s use of the PMSC Dyncorp security detail reinforced the image for many Afghans that he was a U.S. pawn. The former militiamen often lacked the ability to read or write, let alone speak a foreign language. This only reinforced the lack of integration with allied forces. 

While problems with equipment did exist as the contractor normally was obliged to bring their own aging gun (AK47, AMD-65, PKM and RPK), studies show that a PMSC had 3.47 firearms per contractor[7]. The problem here is the lack of disarmament and demobilization by legitimizing existing armed groups. Consequently, the Afghan state couldn’t create a monopoly on violence. 

Gain:  A major gain, among giving locals an instant job and income, is the use of local knowledge and connections. The downside, however, is the potential to insert oneself into local rivalries and even fuel conflict by starting competition over a contract[8]. 

Option #3:  The U.S. helps to create a public company in the host state that offers protection services. An example being the creation of the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) in 2010.

Risk:  In the beginning, the APPF lacked equipment and had to be trained by PMSCs. Customers lamented the slow reaction of the APPF[9]. The force was mainly based in Kabul where they offered their services. If they managed to offer their services in the periphery, the gain of using local contractors, such as their local knowledge and connections was lost.

Secondly, the creation of a public company gives a -potentially corrupt- host leadership indirectly incentives to let some level of threat exist in its territory. The public company -and hence the state- would lose income if the security environment improves.  

Gain:  Compared to giving contracts to local warlords, the APPF-system reduces the risk of financing and legitimizing local organized crime and insurgent groups. 

Moreover, such a force can greatly improve the integration in the overall force due to centralization. In addition, in a state of emergency, the public enterprise can be used for the public good. 

Other Comments:  None. 

Recommendation:  None.


 

Endnotes: 

[1] Bellens, Christophe, Antwerp. (2018). “De impact van de uitbesteding aan Private Military and Security Companies op de militaire doeltreffendheid van de COIN-campagnes in Irak en Afghanistan”, 18 & 60-62.

[2] Ibid.

[3] S.N. (2008), “IAI Documentary Exposes Blackwater’s Crimes in Iraq”, CBSnews. Retrieved from https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iai-documentary-exposes-blackwaters-crimes-in-iraq/

[4] S.N. (2007), “Blackwater says guards were betrayed by Iraqi forces on 2004 mission”, Newsweek. Retrieved from https://www.newsweek.com/blackwater-says-guards-were-betrayed-iraqi-forces-2004-mission-103555

[5] Isenberg, David (2008) “Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq”, Praeger Security International, 31.

[6] Joras, Ulrike, and Adrian Schuster, editors. (2008). “Private Security Companies and Local Populations: An Exploratory Study of Afghanistan and Angola”, Swisspeace, 13, 33-34.

[7] Small Arms Survey, Geneva. (2011). Small Arms Survey 2011: States of Security (Small Arms Survey). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 15.

[8] See the case of Shindand airbase in: McCain, John. (2010). “Inquiry into the Role and Oversight of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan”: Congressional Report: DIANE Publishing.

[9] Bellens, Christophe. (2018). “De impact van de uitbesteding aan Private Military and Security Companies op de militaire doeltreffendheid van de COIN-campagnes in Irak en Afghanistan”, 23 & 33-34.

Afghanistan Christophe Bellens Iraq Option Papers Private Military Companies (PMC etc) Small Wars Journal Writing Contest United States

Assessment of the Existential Threat Posed by a United Biafran and Ambazonian Separatist Front in West Africa

This article is published as part of the Small Wars Journal and Divergent Options Writing Contest which runs from March 1, 2019 to May 31, 2019.  More information about the writing contest can be found here.


Ekene Lionel presently writes for African Military Blog as a defense technology analyst.  His current research focuses on how technology intersects national defense.  He holds a Bachelor’s Degree from Michael Okpara University.  He can be found on Twitter @lionelfrancisNG.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessment of the Existential Threat Posed by a United Biafran and Ambazonian Separatist Front in West Africa

Date Originally Written:  May 11, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  July 11, 2019.

Summary:  The Nigerian separatist group the Indigenous People’s of Biafra, under pressure from the Nigerian military, recently met with representatives from the Cameroonian separatist forces who operate under the banner of the Ambazonian Defense Force.  If these two organizations form an alliance, it could represent an existential threat to both Nigeria and Cameroon and lead to civil war.

Text:  Two countries currently at war, one against ravaging Islamist terrorists trying to carve out a new caliphate governed on the basis of Sharia law, the other, against Anglophone separatist forces seeking to establish a new autonomous nation. Nigeria is currently neck-deep in a bitter war against both the Islamic State’s West African Province (ISWAP), as well as Boko Haram colloquially known as the Jamaa’atu Ahlis-Sunnati Lid-Da’wati Wal-Jihad. However, Nigeria has successfully curtailed a growing threat in the form of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)– a highly organized separatist group led by Mazi Nnamdi Kano; a Nigerian with British citizenship. The IPOB was formed as a breakaway group of the Movement for the Actualisation of Biafra with the sole purpose of completely severing ties with Nigeria through non-violent secession.

Meanwhile, across Nigeria’s eastern border towards Cameroon, a new war has been brewing for some months’ now, the Ambazonia War. For years, Southern Cameroonian citizens predominately located in the Anglophone territories of the Northwest and Southwest region have been constantly oppressed by the Cameroonian Regime led by Paul Biya, a former rebel leader. This oppression led to protests across the Southern Cameroon region. Biya responded by cracking down on the protesters resulting in at least 17 people killed. As calls for either integration or autonomy grew louder, the regime stepped in with heavy-handed tactics. Security forces were deployed to the regions; protests were met with violence, arrests, killings, and hundreds of homes were razed. Biya’s actions forced separatist forces under the banner of the Ambazonian Defense Force (ADF) to initiate a full-fledged guerrilla war in Southern Cameroon[1].

At the moment, the West African battleground poses a unique challenge to defense planners in the region simply because the ADF continue to grow stronger despite determined efforts by the Cameroonian Military to dislodge them. Several different armed groups have since emerged in support of the ADF such as the Red Dragons, Tigers, ARA, Seven Kata, ABL amongst others[2].

The Ambazonian War has since caused the death of more than 2000 people while 530,000 have been displaced. About 180,000 Cameroonians have fled to Nigeria putting more pressure on the already stressed infrastructure in the country’s Eastern flank[3]. Furthermore, the Cameroonian military which was focused on the Boko Haram insurgency, has divided its attention and deployed on multiple fronts, resulting in an upsurge in Boko Haram activities in the country. On a more tactical level, the Cameroonian Military’s most elite fighting force, the Rapid Intervention Battalion, which has been traditionally tasked with halting the rampaging Boko Haram terrorist’s onslaught, has also been largely withdrawn from the North and redeployed to the Anglophone region[4].

On the Nigerian front, as the IPOB continuously loses focus, ground, and drive as a result of the Nigerian Government’s “divide and destroy tactics” coupled with the intimidation of the Biafran separatist members, this breeds resentment amongst the rank and file. With this in mind, the top echelons of the Biafran separatist struggle under the banner of the Pro Biafra Groups, met in Enugu State, with the prime minister of Biafra Government in Exile in attendance and some other diaspora leaders of other pro-Biafra groups where they resolved to work together. The coalition met with the leadership of the Ambazonian Republic from Southern Cameroon where it discussed bilateral relationship as well as a possible alliance in achieving their objective[5].

Leveraging cultural and historical sentiments, since they share a common history and heritage, both the Biafran and Ambazonian separatists could band together and present a more formidable opponent to national forces in the region. On a strategic level, this partnership or alliance makes perfect military sense, given that both share a similar ideology and ultimately, the same goal. In an asymmetric conflict, the separatist forces can easily share valuable scarce resources, bolster their depleted ranks, accumulate valuable combat experience, provide a safe haven for fighters and also acquire human intelligence through the notoriously porous Nigeria/Cameroon border. 

Such an alliance poses an existential threat to the unity and existence of both Nigeria and Cameroon given that at the moment, Boko Haram and ISWAP are constantly pushing and probing from the Northeast of Nigeria, bandits are ravaging the Northcentral along with the current farmer/herder crises still troubling Nigeria’s center. The Nigerian military, although quite tenacious, cannot realistically hold these multiple forces at bay without crumbling.

Nigeria is the largest oil and gas producer in Africa, with the majority of its crude oil coming from the delta basin. Nigeria desperately needs its oil revenue to keep its battered economy running. Also, the bulk of Cameroon’s industrial output, including its only refinery, is in the Ambazonian region[6][7]. Hence, the economic impact of such an alliance could threaten the integrity of the West Africa, the future of the Economic Community of West African States, also known as ECOWAS, and the overall security, stability and progress of the entire subcontinent. 

With the militaries of both Nigeria and Cameroon already stretched thin and battered by years of constant war, if an alliance of ADF and Biafran separatist is allowed to succeed, it would open up opportunities for Boko Haram and ISWAP to grow stronger and overrun several key cities in the region, destabilize the economic balance and also the equipoise of military region in Africa.


Endnotes:

[1] Sarah, L. (2018, June 14). Cameroon’s anglophone war, A rifle is the only way out. Retrieved May 14, 2019, from https://www.africanmilitaryblog.com/2018/06/cameroon-ambazonia-war

[2] BBC. (2018, Oct 4) Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis: Red Dragons and Tigers – the rebels fighting for independence. Retrieved 14 May 2019, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45723211 

[3] Aljazeera (2018, August 2). In Nigeria, Anglophone Cameroonians turn to low paid labor. Retrieved 13 May 2019, from https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/nigeria-anglophone-cameroonians-turn-paid-labour-180801222453208.html

[4] The National Times. (2019, March 12). Insecurity Escalates In North Region As Gov’t, Military Concentrate In Anglophone Regions. Retrieved May 14, 2019, from  https://natimesnews.com/cameroon-national-times-there-has-been-growing-insecurity-in-the-three-northern-regions-of-cameroon-as-both-the-government-and-the-military-concentrate-their-strength-and-might-in-fighting-an-endles/ Archived

[5] Jeff, A. (2018, June 27). Pro-Biafra groups vow to be under one leadership. Retrieved 14 May 2019, from  https://www.sunnewsonline.com/biafra-pro-biafra-groups-vow-to-be-under-one-leadership/

[6] John, D. (2012, March 25). Cameroon, West Africa’s Latest Oil Battleground. Retrieved May 14, 2019, from https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Cameroon-West-Africas-Latest-Oil-Battleground.html

[7] Ajodo, A. (2017, September 12). Towards ending conflict and insecurity in the Niger Delta region. Retrieved May 13, 2019, from https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/towards-ending-conflict-and-insecurity-niger-delta-region

Africa Assessment Papers Cameroon Ekene Lionel Existential Threat Nigeria Small Wars Journal Writing Contest

Assessment of Rising Extremism in the Central Sahel

Chris Wozniak is an independent analyst. He holds a BA in Political Economy from the University of Washington. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessment of Rising Extremism in the Central Sahel

Date Originally Written:  May 15, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  July 8, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is a civilian analyst with an interest in national security, diplomatic, and development issues. This article is written from the point of view of a United States committed to its strategic objective of denying transnational terrorists safe havens in ungoverned spaces. 

Summary:  Violent extremist organizations in the Central Sahel (the Fezzan in Libya’s south, Niger and the Lake Chad Basin) are exploiting environmental change, economic grievances, and longstanding social cleavages to recruit and expand. United States Africa Command is explicitly tasked with countering significant terrorist threats but fluctuating resources and underuse of diplomatic and economic tools risks allowing extremists to consolidate their gains and establish safe havens. 

Text:  The 2018 National Defense Strategy advocates for the use of multilateral relationships to address significant terrorist threats in Africa. Tasked with the execution of this goal, the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) has adopted a “by, with, and through” approach emphasizing partner-centric solutions in a challenging operating environment. Africa’s population is expected to nearly double by 2050 while climate change continues unabated[1]. These twin pressures increase food insecurity and exacerbate social cleavages, providing opportunities for violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to operate, recruit, and expand. African governments struggling to respond to the threat find themselves resource constrained, lacking training, and derelict in their governance of vulnerable areas.  As one of the regions most vulnerable to these pressures, the Central Sahel is a key area for USAFRICOM to mobilize its limited resources in the global campaign against extremism in order to deny terrorists access to ungoverned territory where they can consolidate their organizations.  

USAFRICOM faces intensifying VEO activity in the Central Sahel and efforts to stem the violence have centered primarily on joint exercises with partner nations. The number of reported violent events linked to militant Islamist group activity in the Sahel has doubled every year since 2016, with 465 instances recorded in 2018. Reported fatalities have also risen from 218 in 2016 to 1,110 in 2018[2]. Joint training exercises such as the annually recurring Operation Flintlock incepted in 2005, are designed to enhance the capabilities of the G5 Sahel nations (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger), foster coordination with regional and western partners, bolster the protection of civilians, and deny VEOs safe havens. Mali’s 2012 crisis underscores the need for these exercises. In the absence of adequate training and security coordination between Sahel and western nations, a coalition of extremist Islamist groups and separatists – chiefly Al Qaeda affiliate Ansar Dine and Tuareg separatists – were able to cooperate and seize several cities. It ultimately took a multiple brigade, eighteen-month unilateral French military intervention to oust the extremists. Mali remains the epicenter of violence in the region, accounting for roughly 64 percent of the reported events in the region in 2018[3].

Mali is not only the focal point of violence in the Sahel, it is also exemplary of how efforts to stamp out VEOs must address the inter-communal conflicts, lack of economic opportunity, and poor governance that fuel them. Operating in central Mali, the Macina Liberation Front (FLM) has exploited these factors to operate, recruit, and expand.  Invoking the memory of the 19th century Macina Empire – which was primarily composed of the Fulani ethnic group – the FLM has exploited the absence of economic opportunity available to Fulani herdsmen to drive a wedge between them, local farmers, and the Malian government[4]. FLM leadership relentlessly propagandizes longstanding tensions between Fulanis and farmers with whom they compete for land, pasture, and water resources in an increasingly arid environment. The growing intensity of competition increasingly boils over into tit-for-tat ethnic violence, driving desperate herdsmen into the arms of VEOs in search of security and a reliable wage[5]. Malian government attempts to provide security and basic services in the area have been followed by complaints of corruption, poor oversight, and retaliatory violence[6]. Similar cleavages exist in all Sahel nations and the cost of economic, environmental, and governance problems that drive VEO recruitment in the Central Sahel are quantifiable; Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb was the only operational group in 2012 compared to more than ten active groups in 2018[7]. 

USAFRICOM’s capability to address this proliferation of VEOs has been complicated by fluctuations in resources and autonomy that the command is able to wield in the region. Currently USAFRICOM commands approximately 6,000 troops supported by 1,000 civilians or contractors, but plans to cut personnel ten percent overall by 2022. This reduction will disproportionately affect operations troops, who will experience a fifty percent reduction[8]. Cutbacks in special operations troops will be keenly felt given that they are well suited to carrying out the training and assist operations core to USAFRICOM’s strategy. Over the same timeline, the United States plans a tenfold increase of military equipment support for the Burkinabe military totaling $100 million from a total of $242 million in military aid to the G5 Sahel as a whole[9]. The effect of reducing training resources yet increasing equipment and funding remains to be seen. However, the memory of a well-equipped Iraqi army’s 2014 defeat by Islamic State militants is still fresh. Operational autonomy within USAFRICOM has also been curtailed following the widely publicized 2017 Niger ambush that left four American Special Forces Soldiers killed in action. Restrictions stemming from fallout of the ambush include a requirement for sufficient Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) resources and stricter mission planning[10]. USAFRICOM can expect a reduction in the number of operations it can conduct overall due to the frequently limited availability of ISR platforms. Fewer personnel and tighter oversight could make it more difficult for AFRICOM to provide a healthy security environment crucial to any diplomatic or economic project addressing the causes of VEO proliferation. 

Nearly twenty years into the war on terror, VEOs continue to thrive and proliferate amid escalating violence in the Sahel. USAFRICOM’s multilateral strategy has enhanced the Sahel G5 nations’ ability to cooperate and mitigate the risk of campaigns analogous to Mali’s 2012 crisis. However, the strategy has been slow to address underlying causes of extremism. U.S. diplomatic and economic instruments will play a key role in any future moves to address the environmental pressures, economic grievances, and governance issues plaguing the region and fueling extremist activity. Reducing the U.S. footprint in the area does not signal USAFRICOM will be equipped to provide the security environment necessary for such projects. If the United States neglects the increasingly stressed Central Sahel region, it risks allowing extremist exploitation of ungoverned areas that has historically enabled VEOs to consolidate, train, and launch international attacks.


Endnotes:

[1] United States, Department of Defense, Africa Command. (2018, March 13). Retrieved April 3, 2019, from https://www.africom.mil/about-the-command/2018-posture-statement-to-congress

[2] The Complex and Growing Threat of Militant Islamist Groups in the Sahel (Rep.). (2019, February 15). Retrieved April 12, 2019, from Africa Center for Strategic Studies website: https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-complex-and-growing-threat-of-militant-islamist-groups-in-the-sahel/

[3] Ibid 

[4] Le Roux, P. (2019, February 22). Confronting Central Mali’s Extremist Threat (Publication). Retrieved April 17, 2019, from Africa Center for Strategic Studies website: https://africacenter.org/spotlight/confronting-central-malis-extremist-threat/

[5] Dufka, C. (2018, December 7). “We Used to Be Brothers” Self-Defense Group Abuses in Central Mali (Rep.). Retrieved April 18, 2019, from Human Rights Watch website: https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/12/07/we-used-be-brothers/self-defense-group-abuses-central-mali

[6] Le Roux 

[7] Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2019, February 15

[8] Schmitt, E. (2019, March 1). Where Terrorism Is Rising in Africa and the U.S. Is Leaving. The New York Times. Retrieved April 9, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/01/world/africa/africa-terror-attacks.html

[9] Ibid

[10] Department of Defense, United States Africa Command. (2018, May 10). Department of Defense Press Briefing on the results of the Investigation into the October 4, 2017, Ambush in Niger [Press release]. Retrieved May 3, 2019, from https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1518332/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-the-results-of-the-investigation-into-t/

Africa Assessment Papers Chris Wozniak Lake Chad Niger Violent Extremism

Options for the U.S. Department of Defense to Balance Peer Competition with Military Operations Other Than War

Greg Olsen is a cyber security professional and postgraduate researcher at University of Leicester doing his PhD on peacekeeping and civil wars. He can be found on Twitter at @gtotango. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


National Security Situation:  The U.S. Department of Defense faces a significant challenge trying to balance preparations for peer competition while maintaining the capability of executing military operations other than war (MOOTW).

Date Originally Written:  May 9, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  July 1, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is a cyber security professional currently researching the determinants for successful peacekeeping in civil wars for a PhD at University of Leicester.

Background:  With the release of the 2017 National Security Strategy, the United States is executing a policy pivot towards preparing for peer competition and away from nearly two decades of counterinsurgency. Yet, the most likely future military conflicts will continue to be small wars[1] and MOOTW—such as security force assistance, counter terrorism missions, evacuating U.S. nationals from conflict zones, and robust peacekeeping.

Significance:  The post-Cold War period of unipolarity has ended with a return to great power competition. Revisionist great powers are asserting themselves militarily in their near abroad and challenging Western hegemony. Consequently, the United States’ national security priorities have shifted to counter the threat. However, small wars and MOOTW are likely to be the dominant form of actual military conflict for foreseeable future. The challenge for the U.S. military is preparing for peer competition and continental conflict while maintaining the ability to execute MOOTW. For example, the U.S. Army has shifted from Brigade Combat Teams designed for counter insurgency warfare to warfare against peers[2]. What follows are three options for addressing the continuing need for conducting MOOTW.

Option #1:  The U.S. primarily employs Special Operations Forces (SOF) to address small wars and MOOTW. Currently, much of the U.S. counter terrorism mission is executed by SOF. Within SOF, the U.S. Army Special Forces were created to assist host governments in developing the capabilities to execute counter insurgency and counter terrorism missions. Other SOF are trained and deployed for direct action missions against high value targets. In many ways SOF is ideal forces for executing certain missions with a low footprint.

Risk:  The principal risk to this option is that special operations forces are not large enough nor equipped and trained to execute certain types of MOOTW, for example, evacuation of nationals during conflict, humanitarian disaster response, nor peacekeeping/peace enforcement missions.

Another risk is the inability to train and deploy enough SOF to the myriad conflict zones around the world. There is currently an arc of ethnic and sectarian conflict from Mali in western Africa through central Africa to the Horn of Africa[3]. Libya, Somalia and South Sudan are already failed states[4]. Transnational terrorist networks are active in the Sahel, the Middle East, and South Asia, and Southeast Asia[5]. Three Latin American states are in crisis: Guatemala, Honduras, and Venezuela[6]. These forces are part but not the whole solution to the MOOTW challenges across the globe.

Gain: SOF are ideal for executing hostage rescue, counter terrorism missions, and for training partner forces in counter insurgency missions.  SOF taking the lead for MOOTW frees up conventional forces to focus on their conventional mission.

Option #2:  The U.S. primarily employee military reserve units to address small wars and MOOTW.

Military reserve units provide capabilities that are useful for various types of MOOTW. The military reserves have been the bank upon which the active duty draws specialized capability from in surge scenarios, such as logistics, communications, intelligence, medicine, construction, and military policing.

Risk:  The principal risk to a strategy based on mobilizing reserve forces is political. If reserves were mobilized for a mission with low stakes, such as six months of peacekeeping in South Sudan, then public opposition to the policy is likely to be high. Furthermore, significant casualties would increase opposition and limit policy options.  An additional risk is the time it takes to mobilize these forces.  Certain crises require a rapid reaction and these forces take time to prepare for overseas deployment to a conflict zone.

Gain: These military reserve capabilities would be valuable to missions such as humanitarian disaster relief, occupation, security sector reform and partner training missions, and peacekeeping.

Option #3:  The U.S. primarily employee the Marine Corps, in a role it has historically held, to address small wars and MOOTW.

The United States Marine Corps (USMC), with its embarked Marine Expeditionary Concept, is ideal for rapid response to humanitarian disasters, evacuation of nationals from conflict zones, robust peacekeeping, and military assistance to host governments facing an insurgency. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Marines were landed for America’s “small wars”. Indeed, the deployments to Haiti (1915-1934) and Nicaragua (1926-1933) were precursors to modern twenty-first century robust peacekeeping operations[7]. Marines landed to restore order, evacuate nationals and/or secure multinational corporation property, organize and supervise elections, train police and military forces, and conduct counter insurgency operations. This “halls of Montezuma” and “shores of Tripoli” heritage is part of the strategic culture of the USMC.

Risk:  The principal risk is that it will divert the USMC from operating concepts needed for peer competition, but this risk can be overstated. Presence is key to the deterrence mission. In the European theater, this is the principal role of the USMC: deter by presence as both a trip wire and force for countering adversary hybrid warfare strategies[8]. In the Pacific theater, two operating concepts define the USMC role in great power conflict: (1) Littoral operations in a contested environment and (2) expeditionary advanced base operations[9]. The viability of both concepts has been brought into question based on analogies from World War II. The opposed amphibious landing may be an obsolete operating concept due to the political price paid for the high casualties that result if facing a peer enemy. The expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) concept is innovative but may not be viable. EABO proposes to use land-based resources to augment the Navy’s surface fleet for sea control, logistics, and ISR. The fundamental flaw is the vulnerability of forces ashore. A ship on an ocean is a difficult target to find and fix, but an atoll is a stationary target. Like the defenders at Wake Island in World War II, they are exceedingly vulnerable. The primary benefit of deployment to islands in the Pacific is as a tripwire deterrent, not as a viable fighting force when the shooting starts.

An additional risk is the damage that may be done to esprit de corps, if Marines begin to think that they are not contributing to the primary strategic challenge of peer competition. The USMC must guard against the impression that MOOTW amounts to “scallywag soldiering” like that of the period of British high empire. The USMC has a unique warrior ethos that must be maintained. In addition to the primary mission of small wars, the USMC must continue to be able to deter aggression and blunt the military adventures of a peer adversary as the “first to fight.”

Gain:  The United States Marine Corps (USMC), with its embarked Marine Expeditionary Concept, is ideal for rapid response to humanitarian disasters, evacuation of nationals from conflict zones, robust peacekeeping, and military assistance to host governments facing an insurgency. Rapid reaction and a flexible mix of capabilities makes this an ideal tool, especially in non-permissive environments. A battalion of Marines is the wrong tool for counter terrorism