Benjamin Martell is a Military Intelligence Officer in the U.S. Army with previous experience as an active-duty Armor Officer. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature, nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.
National Security Situation: Houthi attacks against commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden continue to have significant impacts on international trade.
Date Originally Written: June 08, 2025
Date Originally Published: July 13, 2025
Author and / or Article Point of View: The author is an active-duty U.S. military member who believes in the importance of combating aggression towards the transportation of global goods leveraging both a U.S. presence and the help of international parties.
Background: Conflicts around the globe do not solely affect populations where combatants fight; but instead, regionally confined conflicts create global impacts. Iran-backed Houthi rebels are the catalyst behind many recent delays and price increases in the global transportation of consumer goods. The primary route when transporting goods from Europe to Asia, or vice versa, is through the Suez Canal into the Red Sea [1]. However, recent attacks against commercial shipping vessels off the western coast of Yemen have prompted a global response. The Houthi’s motivations behind these attacks stem from their interest in disrupting shipments tied with Israel – with goals to end the conflict in Gaza in support of Hamas [3]. Upon further review of these Houthi attacks against commercial shipping, the need for an international response becomes a prerequisite for the restoration of order in the Red Sea.
Significance: Houthi attacks cost major international shipping organizations both time and money. With roughly 12% of international oil and 8% of liquified natural gas (LNG) transiting the Suez Canal, attacks necessitate an alternate plan to meet global energy demands [1]. Such a diversion entails a route along the Horn of Africa costing upwards of $1 million in additional fuel costs and adding roughly ten days of travel to schedules [3]. Initially, the Houthis targeted only Israeli-based vessels but soon after changed course and targeted U.S., British, and dozens of other foreign ships — indiscriminately attacking against anyone within the Red Sea [3]. Israel does not solely bear the burden of these attacks. Instead, all nations that rely on efficient and safe shipping through the Red Sea suffer.
Option #1: The U.S. continues to grow the approach of enhancing military presence in the region, first started under the Biden Administration, with a twenty-country maritime task force [1]. This approach would consolidate means from surrounding nations to bolster security in the Red Sea by degrading the Houthi’s regional presence [2]. However, this option would only succeed if Saudi Arabia increased their combative momentum as they previously did in Operation al-Hazm Storm in March 2015, countering Houthi rebels in Yemen through a comprehensive air campaign [9]. All of which would aid in the defense of global trade routes on their western coast.
Risk: Saudi Arabia risks provoking more aggressive action from the Houthis if they increase their offensive efforts against their neighboring state [2]. Saudia Arabia has the benefit of bypassing the Bab el Mandeb Strait, a canalizing body of water between Djibouti and Yemen that any vessel maneuvering through the Red Sea must pass [7]. Instead, the Saudis can extract crude oil from their eastern provinces and transport it to west coast refineries via domestic pipelines [7]. Many analysts infer that the risk of sparking further conflict against the Houthis does not outweigh Saudi Arabia’s interest in bypassing the issue and maintaining their internal freedom of transport.
Gain: The efforts of Saudi Arabia seeking its own peace talks with Yemen and the Houthis hold potential for greater cooperation on the Red Sea conflict. The Saudis have the leverage to incorporate the Red Sea crisis into their peace negotiations with the Houthis, where they could come to an agreement that would potentially minimize maritime attacks in return for enhanced Saudi Arabian relations [8]. Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s demand towards a ceasefire in Gaza may yield results favorable for both the Houthis and international shipping. However, failure to do so could result in an escalation of force from the Houthis [10]. Furthering Saudi Arabia’s need to mitigate international involvement and terminate future aggression within the Red Sea.
Option #2: The U.S. initiates conversations with both China and Russia — two world superpowers that struggle similarly to navigate the Red Sea unhindered from Houthi aggression. The U.S. would leverage the negative effects of these attacks by working with China and Russia to bind together and invest in infrastructure and technologies that lessen the global reliance on the Red Sea route [5]. Additionally, cooperation between the three nations would prompt a growth in collective compassion towards international security in travel.
Risk: The risk for the U.S. to not include China and Russia in the deliberate planning of actions against the Houthis potentially promotes further separation between the three nations. Both Russia and China have struck agreements with the Houthis, allowing them to navigate through the Red Sea without conflict in exchange for political support [4]. Further diplomatic progress between these Russia, China, and the Houthis indirectly supports both Iran and Iran-backed rebel groups — insulating Russia and China from potential commercial disruption [4]. It would be counterproductive for the U.S. and its international partners to avoid working alongside Russia and China. All parties have common interests in halting Houthi attacks and restoring freedom of navigation to the Red Sea.
Gain: The advantage of seeking cooperation with both China and Russia lies in the potential capacity to grow relations and work together on a common issue. Cooperation would stem from a mutual understanding between the U.S., China, and Russia on the importance of protecting international shipping and retaining freedom of navigation between key waterways [6]. Enduring stability in the region will require a holistic approach of military, diplomatic, and economic strategies, all of which should be in the interest of Russia and China if they seek to maintain a global presence in the commercial shipping of goods [6]. The Red Sea crisis presents an opportunity for these three nations to overcome previous challenges and work towards a mutually beneficial solution.
Other Comments: None.
Recommendation: None.
Endnotes:
[1] Berman, N. (2024, January 12). How Houthi attacks in the Red Sea threaten global shipping. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-houthi-attacks-red-sea-threaten-global-shipping
[2] Faries, B. (2024, January 10). Houthis launch barrage of missiles and drones in latest Red Sea attack. Time. https://time.com/6553746/houthis-missiles-launch-drones/
[3] Nandini, Maarif, S., Syamsunasir, & Widodo, P. (2024, August). The Red Sea crisis: Implications of the Houthi attack on maritime trade and global security. International Journal of Humanities Education and Social Sciences (Volume 4, Number 1, August 2024, Page. 151-158). http://www.ijhess.com/index.php/ijhess/article/view/1135/875
[4] Krasna, J. (2024, April 9). Dire Straits – Houthi aggression in the Bab al-Mandab Strait: Joshua Krasna [Review of Dire Straits – Houthi aggression in the Bab al-Mandab Strait: Joshua Krasna]. Macdonaldlaurier (MLI). https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/dire-straits-houthi-aggression-bab-al-mandab-joshua-krasna/
[5] Ferraa, O., Kanboui, L., & Touzi, B. (2024). Red Sea disruptions: Exploring global trade implications through a literature review. International Conference on Science, Innovations and Global Solutions. (pp. 173-178). Futurity Research Publishing. https://futurity-publishing.com/international-conferenceon-science-innovations-and-global-solutions-archive
[6] Beradze, D. (2024, November 6). Yemen’s Houthis: Impact of Red Sea attacks on global economy and counter-terrorism strategies [review of Yemen’s Houthis: impact of Red Sea attacks on global economy and counter-terrorism strategies]. Journals.org.ge; Free University Journal of Asian Studies. https://journals.org.ge/index.php/asianstudies/article/view/182/317
[7] English, A. A., & Bell, J. (2024, February 16). Report: Saudi Arabia’s strategic maneuvers in the face of the Red Sea shipping crisis [Review of Report: Saudi Arabia’s strategic maneuvers in the face of the Red Sea shipping crisis]. English.alarabiya.net. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2024/02/16/Report-Saudi-Arabia-s-strategic-maneuvers-in-the-face-of-the-Red-Sea-shipping-crisis
[8] Ali-Khan, V. (2024, January 22). Why Saudi Arabia is staying on the sidelines in the Red Sea conflict. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/16/saudi-arabia-red-sea-conflict-houthis-us-strike/
[9] Botelho, G., & Ahmed, S. (2015, March 26). Saudi-led coalition strikes rebels in Yemen, inflaming tensions in region. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2015/03/26/middleeast/yemen-saudi-arabia-airstrikes/
[10] Fenton-Harvey, J. (2025). Will Gaza’s ceasefire impact the Houthis’ Red Sea strategy? The New Arab. https://www.newarab.com/analysis/will-gazas-ceasefire-impact-houthis-red-sea-strategy
