Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, and United States Army. In addition to Divergent Options, he has been published in the Center for Maritime Strategy, the Center for International Maritime Security, the Washington Monthly, The Liberal Patriot, The Defense Post, Merion West, Wisdom of Crowds, Braver Angels, and more. He can be found on Twitter at @MDPurzycki, and on Substack at The Non-Progressive Democrat. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature, nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.
Title: Options for Continuing to Prepare for a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan in 2028 and Beyond
Date Originally Written: October 15, 2025
Date Originally Published: October 22, 2025
Author and / or Article Point of View: The author believes that, even if China does not invade Taiwan in 2027, the United States should still be prepared to defend Taiwan on an enduring basis.
Background: In 2021, when Admiral Philip S. Davidson warned that China would be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, he was not stating definitively that China would launch such a war in 2027 and not later [1]. A China prepared to fight a war in 2027 would conceivably be even better prepared to do so in 2028, and even more so in 2029, etc. The more time passes, the better prepared China will become.
Significance: While a Chinese attempt to conquer Taiwan is not the only major threat to U.S. national security interests for which the U.S. military can prepare, Washington’s prioritization of countering such an action by China will significantly affect the systems, platforms, and personnel available to respond to threats elsewhere in the world.
Option 1: The U.S. Navy continues with its present plans for building conventional and unmanned vessels, proceeding toward its goal of a 515-ship fleet [2].
Risk: Major defense contractors often face difficulties including hiring and retaining skilled workers, as well as the economic uncertainty caused by tariffs [3] [4]. There is also a shortage of publicly owned shipyards (only four, down from eight at the end of the Cold War) in which the Navy can repair and maintain vessels [5].
Gain: Continuing toward the 515-ship Navy will signal to China that the U.S. is prepared to repel an attack on Taiwan should Beijing choose to launch one. A long-term investment would show that America is “in it for the long haul.”
Option 2: The U.S. pursues a wide variety of new designs for air and sea drones, rapidly developing and deploying the most promising systems and platforms.
Risk: Relying too heavily on unproven designs could put the U.S. at a disadvantage during a war.
Gain: Ukraine’s embrace of rapid development and deployment of air and sea drones since 2022 to repel Russia’s invasion sets a precedent that the U.S. can follow [6] [7] [8]. Bringing in more types of machines, complementing (though not replacing) traditional systems like manned vessels and manned aircraft, can take advantage of America’s history as a land of innovation that provides opportunities for new companies with new products [9].
Option 3: The U.S. seeks out new bases in allied and partner nations in which it can base its vessels and aircraft.
Risk: Even a longtime ally or partner of the U.S. may chafe at being pressed to choose between Washington and Beijing, and may instead seek good relations with both, if it perceives the U.S. to be an unreliable actor on the world stage.
Gain: Permanently basing vessels and aircraft in countries like Australia and the Philippines (both treaty allies of the U.S.), rather than merely having access to bases in those countries, would let the U.S. send forces to Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack more quickly than deploying those forces from the U.S. West Coast [10] [11]. Forward deployments could also solidify U.S. relations with allies during uncertain times.
Option 4: The U.S. forward deploys more vessels and aircraft to locations at which its platforms are already based.
Risk: In an award-winning 2018 article in Proceedings, Captain Dale Rielage warned about the dangers of deploying too many forces away from the homeland [12]. If an adversary’s reach and capabilities improve, even a large forward-deployed force will be at risk of destruction.
Gain: As with Option 3, having more assets based closer to Taiwan would allow the U.S. to respond more quickly to a Chinese attack on the island.
Option 5: The U.S. government increases its stockpiles of petroleum dedicated to military uses.
Risk: Any governmental action that may plausibly increase the price of gasoline (as a reduction in the supply of petroleum in the private-sector economy might) risks strong domestic political pushback.
Gain: As the Department of Defense is the government’s largest energy consumer, the more petroleum it has at its disposal before a war breaks out, the better [13]. There is a serious risk that, in a war with the People’s Liberation Army Navy over the fate of Taiwan, the U.S. Navy will run out of fuel before its adversary does [14].
Option 6: The U.S. government increases taxes on its citizens to fund preparations for a possible war with China in defense of Taiwan.
Risk: Any tax increases that affect middle- and working-class Americans risk political pushback, even if the increased revenue is targeted toward national defense.
Gain: With the military being one of the most highly regarded institutions in the United States, citizens may be willing to make financial sacrifices to improve its readiness [15]. It would also invoke the spirit of World War II, which saw the introduction of income tax withholding for ordinary Americans [16].
Option 7: The U.S. government issues a new class of “war bonds” to fund defense, as it did during World War II [17].
Risk: Citizens may be unwilling to buy government bonds, even for defense, if options in private financial markets promise higher returns on investment.
Gain: As with Option 6, invoking the spirit of World War II could convince Americans who do not serve in uniform to make monetary sacrifices to benefit those who do.
Other Comments: None.
Recommendation: None.
Endnotes:
[1] Robertson, Noah. “How DC became obsessed with a potential 2027 Chinese invasion of Taiwan.” Defense News, May 7, 2024. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/05/07/how-dc-became-obsessed-with-a-potential-2027-chinese-invasion-of-taiwan/
[2] Congressional Budget Office. “An Analysis of the Navy’s 2025 Shipbuilding Plan.” January 2025. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61155
[3] Cordell, Carten. “Inflation, workforce issues challenge defense contractors amid security pivot.”
Nextgov, February 10, 2023. https://www.nextgov.com/defense/2023/02/inflation-workforce-issues-challenge-defense-contractors-amid-security-pivot/382822/
[4] McLeary, Paul, and Joe Gould. “Trump’s tariffs threaten US weapons production.” Politico, April 3, 2025. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/04/03/trump-tariffs-defense-weapons-supply-chains-00006481
[5] Watson, Ben. “Defense One Radio, Ep. 167: How U.S. Navy shipbuilding sank so low.” Defense One, November 27, 2024. https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2024/11/defense-one-radio-ep-167-how-us-navy-shipbuilding-sank-so-low/401355/
[6] Vlasova, Svitlana, and Brad Lendon. “Ukraine’s drones sink another Russian warship, Kyiv says.” CNN, March 6, 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/05/europe/russian-warship-destroyed-ukraine-intl-hnk-ml/
[7] Kirichenko, David. “Ukrainian drones and missiles target Putin’s war machine inside Russia.” Atlantic Council, January 28, 2025. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukrainian-drones-and-missiles-target-putins-war-machine-inside-russia/
[8] Kirichenko, David. “Ukraine’s Marauding Sea Drones Bewilder Russia.” Center for European Policy Analysis, January 30, 2025. https://cepa.org/article/ukraines-marauding-sea-drones-bewilder-russia/
[9] Ungar-Sargon, Batya. “Here Come the New Industrialists.” The Free Press, July 21, 2025. https://www.thefp.com/p/here-come-the-new-industrialists-tech-working-class-politics
[10] Mahadzir, Dzirhan. “Marine Rotation Force-Darwin Heading Home After Rotation.” USNI News, October 10, 2025. https://news.usni.org/2025/10/10/marine-rotation-force-darwin-heading-home-after-rotation
[11] Lema, Karen. “Philippines reveals locations of 4 new strategic sites for U.S. military pact.” Reuters, April 3, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-reveals-locations-4-new-strategic-sites-us-military-pact-2023-04-03/
[12] Rielage, Captain Dale. “How We Lost the Great Pacific War.” Proceedings, May 2018. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/may/how-we-lost-great-pacific-war
[13] Clark, Joseph. “DOD Forges Clean Energy Pathway With Carbon Pollution-Free Electricity Contract.” United States Department of Defense, June 18, 2024. https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3811465/dod-forges-clean-energy-pathway-with-carbon-pollution-free-electricity-contract/
[14] Orlowski, Andrea K. “Petroleum at a Premium.” Proceedings, July 2021. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/july/petroleum-premium
[15] Pew Research Center. “From Businesses and Banks to Colleges and Churches: Americans’ Views of U.S. Institutions.” February 1, 2024. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/02/01/from-businesses-and-banks-to-colleges-and-churches-americans-views-of-u-s-institutions/
[16] Hill, Adriene. “How tax withholding became the norm for American workers.” Marketplace, July 31, 2017. https://www.marketplace.org/story/2017/07/31/how-tax-withholding-became-norm-american-workers
[17] National Park Service. “Funding the War Effort.” https://www.nps.gov/articles/war-bonds.htm
