Title: An Assessment of the Implications of the Fall of Assad on the Rules Based Order

Date Originally Written: 14 January 2025

Date Originally Published: 26 January 2025

Authors and / or Article Point of View:

Both authors believe that U.S. actions in the Middle East are viewed with scepticism by many states. In an era of strategic competition and the relative rise of hitherto smaller states, this scepticism has important repercussions for the legitimacy of the American led rules-based order. How the U.S. and its key allies manage the developments in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime potentially serves as an important pivot point for the future of international relations.

Summary:

U.S. actions in the Middle East are viewed with scepticism by many states.  These states view the American led rules-based order as a selectively applied set of norms used to the advantage of specific interests. Conversely, the U.S. and its allies consider the order’s survival as an important prong of their collective security strategies. American actions in the Middle East along with continued support for Israel during its war with Gaza give cause for some states to challenge the selective nature of the rules-based order.  How the Americans and their allies proceed in Syria will have important implications for the legitimacy and staying power of this order.

Text:

On 8 December 2024, the embattled Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad quickly fell when Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) fought its way to Damascus causing President Assad to flee to Moscow [1], [2]. The Assad regime had largely endured during the previous 13-year civil war due to the support of Hezbollah, Russia, and Iran. However, Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine and Israel’s military actions against Iran and its proxy groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, weakened Assad’s patronage network [3].

This significant geo-political event occurred in parallel with increased solidarity between many states due to fatigue of the U.S. led rules-based order. This so-called “non-aligned movement” of states is less institutionalised, less ideological, and based more on national interests [4], [5]. The accumulated impact of interventions in the Middle East by the U.S. and its allies along with support for the controversial Israeli military action in Gaza has created increased scepticism about Western intentions in the region. Forthcoming decisions on Syria and how states seek to shape its future may well determine the legitimacy of the rules-based order—especially in an era of great power competition where China and Russia vie for influence.

Türkiye was instrumental in the fall of the regime and the takeover by HTS. This role has given  Türkiye a commanding influence over a post-Assad Syria with the strength to impact the scope and influence of the U.S. supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Previously, under a weakened Assad, the SDF were able to carve out a de-facto autonomous Kurdish region. Türkiyeremains worried about a Syrian Kurdish semi-autonomous state inspiring Türkiye’s own Kurdish community and about ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a designated terrorist organisation. Erdogan has warned that Türkiye “cannot accept that Syria be divided under any circumstances, and if we detect even the slightest risk, we will act” [6]. The HTS takeover also provides an opportunity for Türkiye to return 3.5 million Syrian refugees and relieve domestic pressure caused by serving as the world’s largest Syrian refugee hosting country [7].

Russia and Iran have failed to keep their client regime in place in Syria. This weakens the power of these two key members of BRICS, an intergovernmental organization seeking to establish an alternative to the American-led order, and weakens perceptions of Russia’s international power. Russian President Vladamir Putin is working to project influence with Russian forces fighting in Mali, Libya, Burkina Faso, Niger, Central African Republic, Libya, and the Sahel while simultaneously waging war to secure Ukrainian territory [8], [9]. In Syria, Russia risks losing the Khmeimim airbase and Tartus port [10]. Tartus is Russia’s only overseas naval base—providing a position on NATO’s southern flank in the Mediterranean and access to the Red Sea [11]. The loss of these military bases will diminish Russia’s ability to pursue its interests in Africa [12], [13].

In 2024 Iran became a member of BRICS, whilst Türkiye became the first NATO country to be offered partner country status [14]. BRICS has a firmly “post western” outlook and as such reflects some limited synergy with Iran’s axis of resistance. The axis is Iran’s network of mostly non-state anti-western and anti-Israeli allies of which Assad’s Syria was a member [15].  BRICS members see the American-led order as “steeped in hypocrisy, especially regarding Gaza; [and] has overstayed its welcome as the head of global power” [16]. However, as Marwan Bishara, political analyst for Al Jazeera English,  states “hypocrisy and double standards are part of both Russian and American, Iranian and British foreign policy, and the way they try to sell the world that they are holier than thou, but at the end of the day,  both sides have been complicit in Israel’s war crimes and in Assad’s war crimes”[17].  Despite this, the appeal of the BRICS is growing, with many states increasingly deciding to balance between the U.S. and its allies and other competing states [18].

Given the complexities of the situation in Syria and the myriad of competing interests, the U.S. needs to manage their role in the Syrian situation carefully if it is to avoid reinforcing the perception that the current rules-based order is selectively upheld. However, maintaining a clear stance is not going to be straight-forward. U.S. forces remaining in Syria and supporting the Kurdish SDF while a fellow NATO member takes steps against them whilst Israel deploys its troops and attacks enemies in Syria and in Lebanon, all points to a complex post-Assad scenario [19], [20], [21], [22]. Furthermore, the efforts of the UAE and Saudi Arabia to counterbalance against Türkiye’s growing role in the new Syria is another complication, as is the continued challenge of ISIS[23]. The stage is set for states to act in their own interests while disregarding international law and norms and possibly to the detriment of large swaths of populations in the region. With the UN Secretary General worrying that “more and more countries feel they can trample international law, violate the UN Charter, invade another country, lay waste to whole societies or utterly disregard the welfare of their own people,” Syria’s future carries significant weight [24].

Most states support the current rules-based order, but they want one that suits their interests. As described by Shaun Narine, the U.S. is asking states “to set aside their own interests to sustain an order that favours the West and in which Western states – in particular the U.S. – violate with impunity” [25]. However, in contrast to China and Russia, a key strength of U.S. soft power is that the U.S. does not have territorial disputes with neighbours, nor does it try to seize the territory of other states. This is significant given the key unifying principle at the UN is sovereign non-interference and the right to territorial integrity [26]. The Syrian situation should be seen as an opportunity to demonstrate American adherence to international norms. Through its actions, the U.S. and its allies have an opportunity to reinforce the value of the current rules-based order to other states. President Donald Trump’s recent statements, however, suggest a more conquest based foreign policy. His words implicate Panama and Denmark just as they enter the UN Security Council this year and chip away at this opportunity in unpredictable ways [27], [28], [29].

America’s allies depend on the rules-based order and look to alliances with the U.S. for security. As New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon states “We’re very invested in making sure we have a rules-based system, not a power-based system.” He continues, “irrespective of your size, we want countries to be able to navigate their way in the world through the international rules-based order” [30]. Trump’s statements point to a destabilizing approach to secure foreign strategic assets such as Greenland—rich in mineral resources—in the context of escalating geopolitical rivalry in the Artic [31], [32], [33].  This foreign policy approach may have far reaching implications on the perceptions of states regarding the rules-based order. The costs and benefits of this order will be weighed by many states as they carefully observe how the U.S. proceeds in Syria during this consequential period.

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Endnotes:

[1] Lamb, Kate, Marcos, Coral Murphy and Lowe, Yohannes. Middle East Crisis Live: Syria. The Guardian. [Online] 9 December 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/dec/08/syria-bashar-al-assad-damascus-rebels-latest-updates-live

[2] Lowe, Yohannes, et al. Syrian rebels say Bashar al-Assad has fled Damascus and claim to have captured capital – as it happened. The Guardian. [Online] 8 December 2024. Syrian rebels say Bashar al-Assad has fled Damascus and claim to have captured capital – as it happened. https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/dec/07/syria-rebels-reach-damascus-bashar-al-assad

[3] Barkey, Henri J. What Role Is Turkey Playing in Syria’s Civil War? Council on Foreign Relations. [Online] 6 December 2024. https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/what-role-turkey-playing-syrias-civil-war

[4] Shidore, Sarang. Winning the Majority: A New U.S. Bargain with the Global South. Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. [Online] 31 August 2023. https://quincyinst.org/research/winning-the-majority-a-new-u-s-bargain-with-the-global-south/#introduction

[5] Darnal, Aude, et al. The Impact of the U.S. Presidential Election on the Future of the International Order. Stimson. [Online] 15 August 2024. https://www.stimson.org/2024/the-impact-of-the-us-presidential-election-on-the-future-of-the-international-order/

[6] MENAFN. Erdogan declares that Turkey will interfere at ‘slightest risk’ of Syria splintering. MENAFN. [Online] 9 January 2025. https://menafn.com/1109072565/Erdogan-declares-that-Turkey-will-interfere-at-slightest-risk-of-Syria-splintering

[7] Apaydin, Samet. The Gradual Emergence of the Refugee Issue in Türkiye. Australian Institute of International Affairs. [Online] 18 July 2024. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-gradual-emergence-of-the-refugee-issue-in-turkiye/

[8] Karr, Liam. Africa File Special Edition: Syria’s Potential Impact on Russia’s Africa and Mediterranean Ambitions. Institure for the Study of War. [Online] 4 December 2024. https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-special-edition-syria%E2%80%99s-potential-impact-russia%E2%80%99s-africa-and-mediterranean

[9] ISW press. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 9, 2025. Institute for the Study of War. [Online] 9 January 2025. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2025

[10] Ramani, Samuel. The Illusion of Russian Security in Africa Has Been Shattered. Foreign Policy. [Online] 31 December 2024. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/12/31/russia-syria-africa-assad-security-military/

[11] Sutton, H.I. First Signs Russia Is Evacuating Navy Ships From Syria. Naval News. [Online] December 2024. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/12/first-sign-russian-navy-evacuating-naval-vessels-from-tartus-syria/

[12] Schwikowski, Martina. Russia’s influence in Africa may weaken after Assad’s fall. DW. [Online] 13 January 2025. https://www.dw.com/en/russias-influence-in-africa-may-weaken-after-assads-fall/a-71229827

[13] Al Jazeera. Syria and Ukraine seek ‘strategic partnerships’ as senior officials meet. Al Jazeera. [Online] 30 December 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/30/syria-and-ukraine-seek-strategic-partnerships-as-senior-officials-meet

[14] Heine, Jorge. Turkey’s BRICS Balancing Act. Foreign Policy. [Online] 23 October 2024. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/23/turkey-brics-application-summit-erdogan-gaza-ukraine-nonalignment/

[15] Takeyh, Ray. Will Iran Become More Dangerous After Assad’s Ouster in Syria? Council on Foreign Relations. [Online] 12 December 2024. https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/will-iran-become-more-dangerous-after-assads-ouster-syria

[16] Aydintasbas, Asli. Building BRICS: What Erdogan’s geopolitical gamble could mean for the West. European Council on Foreign Relations. [Online] 27 September 2024. https://ecfr.eu/article/building-brics-what-erdogans-geopolitical-gamble-could-mean-for-the-west/

[17] Bishara, Marwin. WATCH: Russia, Iran are as involved in crimes in Syria as US is in Israel’s crimes in Gaza, says Marwan Bishara. Al Jazeera. [Online] 9 December 2024. https://aje.io/rwjkou?update=3375688

[18] British Council . BRICS welcomes Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand. British Council . [Online] 1 November 2024. https://opportunities-insight.britishcouncil.org/short-articles/news/brics-welcomes-malaysia-indonesia-vietnam-and-thailand

[19] Sharawi, Ahmad. Expect Turkey To Be the Decisive Foreign Player in Post-Assad Syria. Foundation for Defense of Democracies . [Online] 17 December 2024. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/policy_briefs/2024/12/17/expect-turkey-to-be-the-decisive-foreign-player-in-post-assad-syria/

[20] Livni, Ephrat. Israel Conducts Raids in Syria Amid Accusations of Cease-Fire Violations. New York Times . [Online] 5 January 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/05/world/middleeast/israel-raids-syria.html

[21] Times of Israel Staff. IDF hits series of Hezbollah sites, accuses truce mechanism of failing to address threats. The Times of Israel. [Online] 13 January 2025. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-january-13-2025/

[22] Blandford, Michael. Can Lebanon’s new President stabilise a country in crisis? Atlantic Council. [Online] 9 Janaruy 2025. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/can-lebanons-new-president-stabilize-a-country-in-crisis/

[23]  Faucon, Benoit and Said, Summer. Arab States Race Turkey for Influence in New Syria. Wall Street Journal. [Online] 10 January 2025. https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/arab-states-race-turkey-for-influence-in-new-syria-cb33670b

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[25] Narine, Shaun. The problem of a “rules-based international order”: the significance of the non-Western world’s restrained response to the Russia-Ukraine war. Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 2023, Vol. 29, pp. 301-316

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[27] BBC. Trump threatens “very high” tariffs on Denmark over Greenland. BBC. [Online] 8 January 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4gzn48jwz2o

[28] Gedeon, Joseph. Trump refuses to rule out using military to take Panama Canal and Greenland. The Guardian. [Online] 7 January 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jan/07/trump-panama-canal-greenland

[29] Cecco, Leyland and Holmes, Oliver. ‘A snowball’s chance in hell’: Trudeau rejects Trump threat to annex Canada. The Guardian. [Online] 7 January 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/07/canada-politics-trump-tariffs-trudeau

[30] Williams, Rebecca Choong and Martin, Eric. Xi seizes role as global defender of free trade against Trump. BNN Bloomberg. [Online] 15 November 2024. https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/business/international/2024/11/16/xi-seizes-role-as-global-defender-of-free-trade-against-trump/

[31] Wolff, Stefan. Trump’s Greenland bid is really about control of the Arctic and the coming battle with China. The Conversation. [Online] 10 January 2025. https://theconversation.com/trumps-greenland-bid-is-really-about-control-of-the-arctic-and-the-coming-battle-with-china-246900

[32] Este, Jonathan. Putting Donald Trump’s plans for Greenland and the Panama canal into context. The Conversation. [Online] 10 January 2025. https://theconversation.com/putting-donald-trumps-plans-for-greenland-and-the-panama-canal-into-context-247037

[33] Davies, Maia. Greenland ready to work with US on defence, says PM. BBC. [Online] 14 January 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwyp4p1x10no