Rocco P. Santurri III is a U.S. Army reservist with the United States Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. He is a published author and contributes regularly to the Center for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, the British Army’s think tank, as well as several other publications. His views are his own and do not represent the United States Government or his current or past employers. He can be found at https://www.linkedin.com/in/RoccoPSanturri3/. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.
Title: Assessing the Stalemate on the Korean Peninsula and its Implications for U.S. Interests
Date Originally Written: July 18, 2024.
Date Originally Published: August 5, 2024.
Author and / or Article Point of View: The author is a U.S. Army Civil Affairs reservist. He believes that continued stalemate on the Korean Peninsula, as opposed to war, peace, or reunification, best serves U.S. national interests in what the author deems the emerging Eurasian theatre.
Summary: The U.S. faces an increasingly complex environment in the Korean Theatre of Operations (KTO) while balancing support for Ukraine’s war against Russia. An enduring stalemate in the KTO best serves U.S. interests in the region; it sets conditions for the U.S. to counter People’s Republic of China (PRC) aggression, mitigate growing Russian influence, and deter an emboldened Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
Text: With the Global War on Terror relegated to history, the U.S. finds itself navigating an unhinged and anarchistic geopolitical world. The Rules-Based International Order (RBIO) continues to be challenged by an emerging multipolar environment notable for the rise of mid-level powers, non-state actors, and the emergence of two “blocs” reminiscent of pre-World War I. The emerging “Eurasia” theatre is certainly not immune to these centrifugal forces; tensions are running hot in the KTO, while the first continental war in Europe since 1945 shows no sign of ending. Furthermore, the recent “summit” between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Supreme Leader of North Korea Kim Jong-un and the strengthening of Pyongyang’s relations with Moscow adds complexity and increased peril to Washington’s pursuit of its interests[1].
With the PRC officially termed its “pacing threat,” the U.S. has made clear its priority of effort[2]. Consequently, the U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK) remains strong and shows signs of significant growth, while security cooperation with Japan, the United Kingdom, and Australia has expanded[3]. While U.S. support to the ROK aims to prevent DPRK aggression, the more existential threat to the U.S. and the ROK emanates not from Pyongyang but from Beijing, an inescapable reality given the meteoric rise of the PRC on the geopolitical scene. With that in mind, what possible scenario in the KTO best supports U.S. interests?
Seeming counter-intuitive on the surface, the ongoing stalemate, as opposed to war, peace, or reunification, best supports U.S. interests for a multitude of reasons, the primary being the threat posed by the PRC. Ongoing tensions between the ROK and an increasingly belligerent DPRK offer justification for the large U.S. military footprint on the Peninsula and the South China Sea. While these forces are officially emplaced to support the ROK, a more prescient purpose is deterring Chinese aggression in the region. The seemingly binary choices of peace or reunification makes it more difficult for any U.S. President to justify a large and expensive U.S. military presence in the ROK. Given the combat capabilities of the ROK, the DPRK, and their respective allies, all sides stand to suffer severe political, economic, and military consequences from a future conflict. While much of Korea lay in ruin after the Korean War from 1950-53[4], the massive increase in conventional military capabilities over the past 70 years ensures a more devastating conflict that now includes the risk of nuclear escalation. Conversely, continuing the stalemate substantiates the heightened American commitment to the region at a cost relatively minimal when compared to conflict. While peace on the Peninsula could incur American taxpayer vitriol at the cost of maintaining a force no longer needed, an enduring and tenuous stalemate demands a well-equipped American presence prepared to “fight tonight[5].”
Reunification is another component that Washington must consider vis-à-vis its interests. The cost of unification would be astronomical for most ROK citizens who are well aware of this massive burden. Polling in 2023 recorded the highest percentage of South Koreans opposed to reunification[6], with a principal reason being the associated costs[7]. Currently, the small number of DPRK defectors receive subsidies from the ROK government. Still, even this meager level of financial assistance is not unanimously supported by the ROK populace, a worrisome sign given the estimated trillions of U.S. Dollars (USD) needed for reunification. Absorbing the DPRK’s centrally planned economy with a poorly trained workforce and minimal market economics experience would be a Herculean effort for the ROK. Unsurprisingly, many South Koreans are content with their current economic status, which boasts an economy ranked 14th globally[9] with predictions of growth in 2024[10].
It is very likely the U.S. would support reunification efforts. However, unlike potential European Union support to Ukraine post-conflict, the U.S. would not have considerable partner nation assistance in providing aid to the Koreas. With a $34 trillion debt[11], the U.S. is poorly positioned to unilaterally provide aid without exacerbating its increasingly dire and potentially existential financial condition. The world has taken note of U.S. debt and there are already nascent efforts to supplant the USD as the world’s reserve currency. The USD’s primacy has been a bedrock of U.S. foreign policy and the RBIO for decades. The U.S. has often used aid and sanctions as a highly effective carrot-and-stick approach to motivate friends and foes alike to support its interests, whether eagerly or grudgingly. The degradation or destruction of the USD’s foundational and international influence due to defaulting on debt obligations would be a cataclysmic event for the U.S. and the RBIO. Such a development would have far-reaching effects on U.S. foreign policy, its pursuit of national interests, and the anchoring force it provides to the current international order. Such events could be delayed, if not prevented, if the stalemate endures.
Dreams of reunification linger in the minds of many Koreans both North and South. These hopes have persisted despite actions taken by Kim Jong-un to constitutionally dismantle any remaining vestiges of reunification. Indeed, the rapprochement between the North and South that culminated in 2018 now seems like a very distant memory[12]. A potential second term as U.S. President for Donald Trump also does not bode well for unification aspirations. Unfortunately for Koreans yearning for a united peninsula, the harsh realities of geopolitics and national self-interest make war, peace, or reunification an undesirable end state for the major political players in the KTO. U.S. interests are not immune to these realities. The U.S. continues to benefit from the spoils of the Korean stalemate, knowing it would incur substantial costs for alternative scenarios. Reflecting a pragmatic, Realism-centric perspective that would make Thucydides and Hobbes beam, U.S. interests stand to be best served by keeping the KTO in a state of competition and occasional crisis that borders on, but never crosses into, conflict. In sum, the U.S. possesses some ability to do what it can, while the ROK suffers what it must. While the menu of ways forward is less than optimal, such is the reality for a stretched superpower descending into “empire after-glow” within the fragmenting RBIO it created.
Endnotes:
[1] Town, J. Sun Y. Minyoung Lee, R. Tatsumi, Y. (2024, June 21). Takeaways from the Putin-Kim Summit. Retrieved on July 15, 2024, from https://www.stimson.org/2024/takeaways-from-the-putin-kim-summit/
[2] Garamone, J. Official Talks DOD Policy Role in Chinese Pacing Threat, Integrated Deterrence. (2021, June 2). Retrieved on July 15, 2024, from https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2641068/official-talks-dod-policy-role-in-chinese-pacing-threat-integrated-deterrence/
[3] Associated Press. Amid North Korea, China Threats, US Pursues Partnerships with Asian Allies. (2024, June 29). Retrieved on July 15, 2024, from https://www.voanews.com/a/amid-north-korea-china-threats-us-pursues-partnerships-with-asian-allies/7678090.html
[4] Koh, B.C. (Spring 1993). The War’s Impact on the Korean Peninsula. The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, 2(1), 57-76. Retrieved on July 16, 2024, from https://www.jstor.org/stable/i23611487
[5] ABC News. (August 19, 2017). Flight Mission near North Korea Border Exhibits US Motto There: ‘Fight Tonight’. Retrieved on July 16, 2024, from https://abcnews.go.com/International/exclusive-flight-mission-north-korean-border-exhibits-us/story?id=49277874
[6] Yoon, L. (March 19, 2024). Opinion on the Necessity of Unification between South and North Korea from 2007 to 2023. Retrieved on July 16, 2024, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/706376/south-korea-necessity-of-korean-reunification/
Jung Min-ho. (November 8, 2023). Skepticism About Unification Grows Among South Koreans, Poll Shows. Retrieved on July 16, 2024, from https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/07/103_362825.html
[7] Eberstadt, Nicholas. (December 27, 2023). The Economics of a Korean Unification: Thinking the Unthinkable? Retrieved on July 16, 2024, from https://www.aei.org/research-products/speech/the-economics-of-a-korean-unification-thinking-the-unthinkable/
[8] Einhorn, M., Rich, T. (April 28, 1992). Majority of South Koreans Prefer Status Quo with North Korea, Survey Shows. Retrieved on July 16, 2024, from https://www.nknews.org/2022/04/majority-of-south-koreans-prefer-status-quo-with-north-korea-survey-shows/
[9] Herh, M. (April 30, 2024). South Korea Slides to 14th Place in GDP Rankings in 11 Year. Retrieved on July 17, 2024, from https://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=216158
[10] Korea Development Institute. (May 16, 2024). KDI Economic Outlook 2024-1st Half. Retrieved on July 17, 2024, from https://www.kdi.re.kr/eng/research/economy
[11] Ziady, H., Luhby, T. (January 3, 2024). US National Debt Hits Record $34 Trillion. Retrieved on July 17, 2024, from https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/03/economy/us-national-debt-34-trillion/index.html
[12] Hyunsu, Y. (January 18, 2024). North Korea’s Kim Calls for South to be Seen as “Primary Foe”, Warns of War. Retrieved on July 18, 2024, from https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-kim-calls-change-status-south-warns-war-2024-01-15/
