Dr. Jacob Stoil is the Chair of Applied History at the Modern War Institute, Senior Fellow of the 40th ID Urban Warfare Center, and Trustee of the U.S. Commission on Military History. He has worked extensively in Israel and the Middle East including in support of Task Force Spartan. He has published multiple policy and academic articles which can be found in publication such as the International Journal of Military History, Wavell Room, and Modern War Institute. He can be followed on X as @JacobStoil.
Dr. Mary Elizabeth Walters is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies and Director of Military Theory at the Air Command and Staff College and Trustee for the Society for Military History. She can be found on X @mewalters101.
Dr. Nir Arielli is an Associate Professor of International History at the University of Leeds in the United Kingdom. He is a contributor to the regional foreign policy thinktank Mitvim. His key publications can be found here: https://ahc.leeds.ac.uk/history/staff/556/dr-nir-arielli. He can also be found on X @ArielliNir.
The views expressed in this article represent the personal views of the authors and are not necessarily the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force, the Department of the Army, Army University, the U.S. Military Academy, or the Air University. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any other group.
National Security Situation: Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack on Israel has caused a state of war between Israel and Hamas, which is ongoing as of this writing.
Date Originally Written: January 11, 2024.
Date Originally Published: January 29, 2024.
Author and / or Article Point of View: The authors of the article are academics with research specialties in the transitional aspects of conflicts, Middle Eastern security, irregular warfare, and peacekeeping. They have academic backgrounds in military history and experience working with multiple national militaries and government agencies. Since October 2023, they have researched options for postwar possibilities in Gaza. The authors argue that planning and implementation for the Stabilization Phase following the fighting, known as “Phase IV” in U.S. Military Joint Doctrine, will be critical for the future security and stability of the region.
Background: In 2005 Israel withdrew all its civilian and military personnel from Gaza. Since then, rocket and terror attacks have continued to be launched from the territory. As a result, Israel has placed significant restrictions on goods entering Gaza, while Egypt largely closed its border with Gaza. Additionally, Israel has launched several military operations into Gaza over the last 15 years. Recently, Israel pursued a policy of “quiet in return for quiet” and allowed Qatar to provide funding to Hamas, which has ruled Gaza since 2007[1]. On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a major attack across the border, murdering Israeli civilians, taking hundreds of hostages, and engaged in systematic rape[2]. In response, Israel invaded Gaza and has fought a multi-month campaign to destroy Hamas’s capability to operate from Gaza or launch major attacks on Israel. The operation has degraded Hamas, but also destroyed significant portions of Gaza, which now faces a humanitarian crisis. As the operation changes phases, it is necessary to plan for Phase IV.
Significance: The recent situation in Gaza has led to a cycle of violence costing thousands of lives over the last decade. The Hamas attack on October 7 and the subsequent war in Gaza have devastated both sides and have the potential to be game changing. Failing to establish a positive outcome from this war will cause a bleak future for Gaza, involving future rounds of violence between Israelis and Palestinians. The situation will likely worsen as both sides radicalize due to the escalating cycle of violence.
Option #1: Revitalizing the Palestinian Authority.
As Israeli operations in Gaza wind down, the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) enter Gaza and begin assuming security and policing responsibility. The international community continues to help, train, and mentor the PASF. Concurrently, the Palestinian Authority (PA) undergoes reforms and begins to assume governance roles in Gaza. International aid flows through the auspices of the PA to help it build legitimacy and capability. This option involves significant challenges as the PA lacks legitimacy both domestically and internationally, has little control over its current territory in the West Bank, and struggles with corruption. Additionally, the PASF will need to increase its ability to control Gaza. Finally, the PA has indicated it is unwilling to take control of Gaza on the back of Israeli tanks. However, elements of the U.S. government, as well as some U.S. partners, advocate for this option[3].
Risk: The main risk in Option #1 is that the PASF and PA do not prove up to the task or need more time to build capability than is available[4]. In 2007, Hamas defeated the PA and took over Gaza[5]. Another PA failure would not only potentially return Gaza to the control of terrorists or to a state of war, but perhaps be the final nail in the coffin for the PA. In the West Bank territories under PA governance, the PASF already struggles to exercise authority in its cities[6]. Following a failure in Gaza, it is unlikely there would be any trust in the PA for any future peace negotiations regarding Gaza or the West Bank. Moreover, it is possible that this instability in Gaza would spread to the West Bank, further damaging the PA’s already tenuous hold. Previously, members of the PASF have even participated in terror attacks[7]. Even if the PASF can create security, poor administration by the PA could lead to a similar result as if the PASF failed. Future terror attacks from Gaza could greatly radicalize the Israeli population and worsen future conflicts.
Gain: If the PA and PASF can manage then this option will allow Gaza to recover under Palestinian rule and speed forward the development of Palestinian self-government. Success here could build momentum and trust in the PA that would translate to the West Bank, boosting broader diplomatic efforts. This option also requires relatively little direct commitment from the international community and would allow the PA to leverage the United Nations (UN) and Nongovernmental Organization communities directly.
Option #2: Israeli Occupation.
Israeli forces conclude their military operations and transition to less intensive phases. They create buffer zones around key areas of the Gaza-Israel and Gaza-Egyptian border. These zones would be under Israeli military occupation and/or free fire zones. Alternatively, Israel returns to a version of the situation prior to its 2005 withdrawal, where it occupies ‘critical’ areas directly and operates militarily elsewhere in Gaza. Some residents of the towns and cities along the Gaza border that Hamas attacked on October 7 and elements within the Israeli government prefer this option[8]. The Israeli military and government have explicitly said they do not want a maximalist version of this option but would want freedom of action in Gaza and the potential for buffer zones[9].
Risk: Occupation is contrary to the expressed wishes of the U.S. and much of the international community. As a result, this option could alienate Israel from its international partners. The maximalist version of this option would make a final status solution difficult as there would be domestic pressure to reestablish Jewish settlements in Gaza. The maximalist version would also greatly retard Gaza’s recovery and likely prolong the humanitarian crisis. This would leave the Palestinian population in Gaza vulnerable to the growth of transnational criminal organizations and violent extremist organizations who, as in other conflict zones, will exploit the gap in governance and slow pace of recovery[10]. Finally, Israel would likely face a continuing insurgency in populated areas, which would require maintaining a significant military presence.
Gain: This option will allow Israel to create security on its borders and prevent a repeat of the October 7 attacks. It will prevent Hamas or a successor organization from establishing control of Gaza. It freezes the situation in its current state, which may provide time for a negotiated solution or for the development of a more robust PA capability. It requires little to no direct involvement from the international community and may allow Palestinian governance in areas not under Israeli control.
Option #3: Multinational Force Deployments.
A multinational force (MNF) conducts a gradual phased deployment to Gaza, taking responsibility for areas as Israel withdraws from them. The force needs to have three separate missions under a single coordinating authority which will provide a unified direction for the three components: security, reconstruction/humanitarian aid, and governance. This architecture would allow countries to provide contributions to the mission that best suits their capabilities. The security mission would not only be responsible for internal security in Gaza, but also for preventing transborder threats to Israel. As such, this option needs robust capabilities and rules of engagement. The reconstruction mission provides initial emergency aid and then oversees the reconstruction and development of Gaza, preventing the diversion of aid to terrorist organizations. The governance mission provides initial governance functions to prevent a governance void and then oversees the development of local governance structures. All three missions would have stakeholder-agreed, conditions-based triggers to gradually transition individual tasks to the PA as the PA’s capability increases.
Risk: The MNF could fail before it begins if countries contribute inadequate forces with insufficiently robust capabilities and rules of engagement. This option could also fail if Israel does not perceive the countries involved as capable of guaranteeing security. The history of the region is littered with MNFs failing to uphold their mandates. Following the 2006 war, the UN force in Lebanon received a mandate to help remove Hezbollah from the Israeli-Lebanon border. So far, the force of over 10,000 personnel has failed to stop Hezbollah from launching daily attacks across the border with Israel, including from near UN positions[11]. If the MNF fails to provide security for Israel or stability for Palestinians, then regional faith in the international community will likely collapse. The PA and PASF might not reach the required level of capability to take over from the MNF, leading to open ended commitment for the international community. A complete failure of the MNF could lead to casualties among the force and resumption of hostilities in Gaza.
Gain: A properly constructed MNF can buy the time necessary for the PA and PASF to gain competency while also helping bring Israel security. A phased entry will allow the MNF to build trust and legitimacy. This option will maximize the ability to provide humanitarian, reconstruction, and development aid to Gaza and offers the fastest way to reestablish governance. A successful MNF will build momentum towards the creation of solutions for the more challenging and sensitive territory of the West Bank, while also mitigating many of the risks inherent in alternative solutions.
Other Comments: None.
Recommendation: None.
Endnotes:
[1] Keinon, H. (2018, August 15). “quiet for quiet” arrangement emerges between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/quiet-for-quiet-arrangement-emerges-between-israel-and-hamas-in-gaza-564982 and Liebermann, O., Schwartz, M., Dahman, I., & Najib, M. (2018, November 11). Suitcases of $15M in cash from Qatar Bring Relief for Gaza. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/11/middleeast/gaza-qatar-humanitarian-intl/index.html
[2] Gettleman, J., Schwartz, A., Sella, A., & Shaar-yashuv, A. (2023, December 28). “screams without words”: How Hamas Weaponized Sexual Violence on Oct. 7. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/28/world/middleeast/oct-7-attacks-hamas-israel-sexual-violence.html
[3] Magid, J. (2023, December 15). Sullivan says Palestinian Authority must be “revamped” before it … https://www.timesofisrael.com/sullivan-says-palestinian-authority-must-be-revamped-before-it-can-govern-gaza
[4] Harris, K. D. (2023, December 3). Remarks by vice president Harris on the conflict between Israel and Hamas. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/12/02/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-on-the-conflict-between-israel-and-hamas
[5] Guardian News and Media. (2007, June 15). Hamas takes control of Gaza. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jun/15/israel4
[6] TOI Staff. (2023, November 25). 2 men executed in West Bank for allegedly spying for Israel, as … https://www.timesofisrael.com/2-men-executed-in-west-bank-for-allegedly-spying-for-israel-as-mob-cheers
[7] Khoury, J., Cohen, G., & Efrati, I. (2016, January 31). Palestinian police officer opens fire near Israeli settlement, wounds three soldiers. Haaretz.com. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2016-01-31/ty-article/three-israelis-wounded-in-west-bank-shooting/0000017f-da77-d432-a77f-df7fb2f40000
[8] Lidor, C. (2024, January 8). Sderot mayor rejects government decision to bring residents back … https://www.timesofisrael.com/sderot-mayor-rejects-government-decision-to-bring-residents-back-on-february-4
[9] Sokol, S. (2024, January 10). Netanyahu: Let me be clear — Israel has no intention of displacing … https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-let-me-be-clear-israel-has-no-intention-of-displacing-gazas-population
[10] de Boer, J., & Bosetti, L. (n.d.). Examining the interactions between conflict and organized crime. Our World. https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/examining-the-interactions-between-conflict-and-organized-crime
[11] United Nations. (n.d.). UNIFIL peacekeeping. United Nations. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unifil
