Kevin Maguire is an Army Reserve Civil Affairs officer currently serving with 351 Civil Affairs Command. He holds a master’s degree from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) and works as a Corporate Security Director. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature, nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.
National Security Situation: Options for Reorganizing Information-centric Organizations for Future Operations
Date Originally Written: March 23, 2025
Date Originally Published: April 3, 2025
Background: Information is a critical component of modern US doctrine and forms a part of future operating concepts for the Department of Defense (DoD). The DoD has grown Informational capabilities, operations, and activities significantly by drawing on experiences from conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, counter-ISIS operations, as well as observations of the ongoing Ukraine conflict [1]. Numerous Information Forces were created, reorganized, and expanded to meet new threats in such areas as Cyber Operations, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Information Operations, and others. This expansion included the creation of commands such as Information Operations Command and US Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), as well as the growth of existing information-related components such as the US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) and Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Until recently, DoD personnel and organizations were nominating new units to create an advantage in future information environments, ranging from stability-related Civil Affairs Task Forces to Army Corps-level information detachments [2] [3].
However, recent policy decisions from the Trump administration to streamline and downsize US government organizations could impact Information Forces [4]. Further, the administration has reoriented or reduced government activities in the information space, such as standing down offensive DoD cyber operations against Russia and curtailing cyber initiatives to combat misinformation [5] [6]. Administration officials such as Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have criticized the DoD’s bureaucratic practices and suggested that large numbers of general-level officers might be the issue [7]. Because of their potential impacts on the operating environment, many information forces are led by general officers and, therefore, they could become targets of future cuts.
Significance: While the Trump administration pursues its policies to reform and reorganize the federal government, threats posed by near-peer competitors, non-state groups, and others must still be addressed. Numerous DoD components took deliberate steps to adapt formations and contend with these threats; and these organizational, institutional, and doctrinal changes should be retained. The DoD should take steps to ensure that nascent information-related capabilities endure beyond the modern political environment.
Option 1: Reorganize US-based information-related units with an emphasis on preserving lower-level formations.
Description: For this option, the DoD consolidates information forces into fewer major commands and structures. 3-star level and above commands are eliminated or consolidated while O-6-level or below formations are maintained. This option would reduce the number of general officers —a stated priority of the administration—as well as create efficiencies in administrative functions such as personnel or logistics [8].
Risks: While this option aligns with the incoming administration’s priorities, consolidation requires a reorganization of high echelons of Information Forces (such as USACAPOC, CYBERCOM, and 1st Information Operations Command) and will result in the loss of critical personnel. Reorganization can create conflict and competition between formations with different operating principles and cultures. Despite the current administration’s actions, congressional authorization for a significant reorganization will be required and is likely to face opposition from both political parties.
Gain: This policy option ensures formations are aligned with the administration’s priorities while preserving information capabilities and personnel for future conflicts. It also reduces the impact on lower-level formations at the Brigade level and below, minimizing disruption to personnel, organizations, and capabilities. It also ensures only minimal changes to doctrine and training are required.
Option 2: DoD information-related formations subsume other US government agency portfolios and initiatives subject to Reductions in Force (RIF).
Description: In this option, information forces are left in place and subsume the responsibility of other government agencies undergoing RIF activities. Civil Affairs units, for example, could manage portfolios held by USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) as the function supports OFDA by doctrine. Or, for example, Cyber Command could assume the homeland protection responsibilities of the Cyber Security and Infrastructure Agency (CISA). In some cases, federal civilian employees at risk of RIFs could transfer to DoD information forces to manage programs similar to their former positions. This transfer of responsibility would also ensure high-level information commands can be maintained to oversee the expanded DoD portfolio.
Risks: In many cases, US law expressly prohibits the US military from assuming certain functions of other agencies. Transferring these responsibilities to the Department of Defense (DoD) would necessitate extensive legal review and congressional approval. Additionally, civilian and international actors, such as NGOs, have strict rules governing their interactions with military or security forces, and transferring civilian functions to the DoD would complicate mutual efforts. Even with civilian augmentees, the DoD will likely have to retrain personnel and reprioritize resources to manage these programs or projects.
Gain: This option retains information forces, especially at higher echelons, while also preserving other government functions. It could also provide closer Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) cooperation in a future conflict, reduce interagency or interdepartmental conflict, and expand information-related activities with the added personnel and expertise.
Option 3: Convert some informational capabilities, operations, and activities to the private sector
Description: In this option, some informational capabilities, operations and activities are assumed by private sector personnel and organizations, with DoD formations overseeing these contracts. Some informational forces are downsized, and activities performed by uniformed or DoD civilians shift to contract personnel. DoD personnel are retained in some formations to manage priorities, update doctrine, and provide oversight.
Risks: This option is also constrained by federal law and congressional approval to shift functions to private organizations. The DoD contracting process can create delays, and in some cases may be too expensive or complicated to be undertaken. Lower-echelon organizations could be cut in favor of retaining higher commands, which conflicts with the administration’s priorities. Political opposition to a reduction in military personnel is also likely. Additionally, contract companies face business risks which may degrade continuity in the event that a business loses a contract or undergoes restructuring.
Gain: Many private sector organizations already perform information operations and activities for the US government, such as cyber security. Specific functions and roles could be converted to a private sector organization, effectively reducing the administrative burden on commands while also retaining personnel in inherently governmental positions. Contractors also benefit from an ability to focus on operational requirements since they are unburdened by the requirements imposed on uniformed personnel by the military services.
Other comments: None
Recommendations: None
Endnotes:
[1] Magnuson, S. (2022, February 11). U.S. Still Playing Catch Up in Information Operations. National Defense. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/2/11/still-playing-catch-up-in-information-operations#
[2] Todd, R., & Schafer, R. (2024). Civil Affairs Task Force: Conducting Stability Operations in the Division’s Rear Area During the Offense. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). https://www.army.mil/article/277237/civil_affairs_task_force
[3] Pomerleau, M. (2023, March 31). Army considering theater information advantage detachments. Defense Scoop. https://defensescoop.com/2023/03/31/army-considering-theater-information-advantage-detachments/
[4] Hegseth, P. (2025, February 7). Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth Town Hall at the Pentagon [Transcript]. https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4060651/secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-town-hall-at-the-pentagon/
[5] Baldor, L., & Klepper, D. (2025, March 4). Hegseth orders suspension of Pentagon’s offensive cyberoperations against Russia. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/cyber-command-russia-putin-trump-hegseth-c46ef1396e3980071cab81c27e0c0236
[6] Swenson, A., & Cassidy, C. (2025, February 16). Dismantling of federal efforts to monitor election interference creates opening for foreign meddling. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/trump-election-security-fbi-cisa-foreign-interference-98f1e17c8a6d5923db945a27f06458e7
[7] Hegseth, P. (2025, February 7). Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth Town Hall at the Pentagon [Transcript]. https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4060651/secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-town-hall-at-the-pentagon/
[8] Timotija, F. (2025, February 20). Hegseth’s proposed Pentagon cuts, firing of generals: What to know. The Hill. https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5156006-hegseth-defense-budget-cuts-what-to-know/
