Estelle Denton-Townshend has a PhD from the University of Waikato in New Zealand. She currently works at the University of Waikato where she is a teaching fellow. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature, nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.
Title: An Assessment on State Sponsorship, Drones and the Expanded Capabilities of Non-State Armed Groups
Date Originally Written: June 03, 2025
Date Originally Published: June 12, 2025
Author Point of View: The author believes that we face a fragmenting state system which is likely to feature the increased use of Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) in conflicts.
Summary: The fragmenting state system is likely to feature the increased use of NSAGs in armed conflicts. Drones expand the offensive capabilities available to NSAGs. This is amplified by how expensive it is for state militaries to counter even low-cost drone attacks. Therefore, it is likely that drones are likely to increase the appeal of NSAGs to state sponsors.
Text: The commercialisation of drones, and the provision of military drones by state sponsors, has given violent non-state armed groups (NSAG) the opportunity to field an Airforce of sorts. This clearly increases the military capabilities of non-state actors. For states this means that maintaining superiority in the ground air littoral space is increasingly a challenge. Even Israel, where air superiority is a significant defense pillar, this superiority has been harder to maintain [1]. This was evident when Hamas used drones to disable high-tech border sensors in the October 7 assault [2]. This is not the only loophole NSAGs can exploit, as conflict is increasingly shifting back towards non-traditional or irregular warfare threats which are not well met by conventional tactics [3].
The speed of modern conflict has outpaced the ability of large conventional forces, driving a move towards the deployment of “smaller, more enabled and autonomous groupings”, such as special operations units [4]. This shift towards mobile, smaller units is also reflected in the increased use of NSAGs and private military companies (PMCs) by states such as Russia and Iran. This increased use of small armed groups has also been accompanied by a shift in the weapon technologies available to them [3] [4] [5]. The low-cost and easy procurement of adaptable commercial drones puts them within the budgetary reach of NSAGs. This also potentially lowers the threshold of engaging in irregular war.
A future where NSAGs have increased military capabilities is one where states are potentially more tempted to sponsor them and engage in proxy warfare. And, as retired Army colonel Gianni Koskinas explains, we already know what that scenario looks like, with “Syria an absolute case study in proxy warfare”, with Russia, the United States, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey having sponsored proxy groups competing for power [6]. Earlier in the conflict, the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia also sponsored Syrian NSAGs [7]. As Petrosyan states, “the Syrian conflict has been the deadliest and most devastating conflict in terms of consequences” in the last two decades. The sponsorship of NSAGs spreads risk beyond their immediate conflict. The experience and connections developed in one conflict are transferred when NSAGs are employed by their state sponsors in other theatres. For example, Syrian mercenaries, experienced from war in Syria, were reported in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict [3].
Irregular warfare has a different time horizon than conventional war. As Jonathan Haggart states, the time horizon for irregular war can be decades, a lifetime, or even generations. In comparison, Western conventional war looks at missions and deployments of 6 months, maybe 18 months. The aim of a conventional military is victory, whereas the aim of irregular combatants is not to lose. During the War on Terror this was evident in the Middle East, where NSAGs relatively successfully sought to exhaust and demotivate their larger state adversaries over time. The regular supply of cheaper commercial drones supports the maintenance of long-term irregular warfare. This is potentially to the disadvantage of state actors [8] [9].
The Ukrainian defense forces are working to increasingly replace humans on the battlefield with machines such as drones, given they are outnumbered by the superior sized Russian forces [10]. Being outnumbered and out-resourced is a tactical problem that also exists for NSAGs. In order to preserve their human capital, and reduce psychological stress and fatigue impacting missions, NSAGs are also likely to decide that replacing humans on the battlefield with autonomous systems is a central aim [11].
Additionally, as Davis et. al. point out, the ability to operate across all domains, and a correspondingly greater ability to mitigate the ‘tyranny of distance” means that NSAGs can increasingly counter and strike back against larger adversaries [12]. For instance, drones give NSAGs the ability to explore and gain advanced understandings of their adversaries’ defence systems, and following on from this they can develop the operational scope to work around them. For instance, Hezbollah was suspected of not just sending drones into Northern Israel to hit air defense targets, or as diversions for other attacks, or as surveillance – but also to test Israeli detection systems, and to find where weaknesses exist [13].
In the Ukraine-Russia war both states are using cheap, small drones with shorter range and smaller payloads because they are harder to shoot down. With pressure on industrial output, the Ukrainian drones are often civilian drones adapted into weapons. These drones aren’t capable of defeating either side, but they do have a high enough rate of success to justify their use [14]. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has observed, “We’re learning a lot about what low-cost systems can do to high-cost systems that we have invested a great deal in” [15]. SOCOM Commander General Bryan P. Fenton clarifies; $10,000 military drones can shoot down $2 million missiles [16]. Drone defense is more expensive than drone offense [17].
The drones that operate in the “low sky” layer are accessible to NSAGs, and suit their small mobile unit structure [13]. Drones can now scatter landmines on supply roads, and interceptor drones take out enemy surveillance drones. Adding an Improvised Explosive Device (IED), an IED release mechanism, signal and sensor equipment can shift a “FPV platform to a kamikaze drone; a bomber, an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) system; or a relay node” [10]. A key concern is not just how these expanded capabilities may impact the choices and options available to NSAG, but also how this could impact state choices. As Alessandro Arduino points out in relation to the use of drones by PMCs, “We already have boots the ground, meaning an army for hire… So the next step will be to have an air force for hire” [17]. Drones increase the capability of NSAGs, making them tactically more useful for their state sponsors.
Endnotes:
[1] Ortal, E., & Kochav, R. (2024, August 11). To defend Israel, rearrange the sky. BESA Center Perspectives Paper(2292). Retrieved from https://besacenter.org/to-defend-israel-rearrange-the-sky/
[2] Kochavi, H. (2024, December 15). Asymmetrical Warfare: A Game-Changer that Demands Simple and Effective Solutions. Retrieved from Sentrycs: https://sentrycs.com/the-counter-drone-blog/asymmetrical-warfare-a-game-changer-in-modern-conflict/#:~:text=Asymmetrical%20warfare%20is%20characterized%20by,insurgents%2C%20guerrillas%2C%20or%20terrorists
[3] Petrosyan, M. (2024). The Role of Non-State Actors in Modern Warfare: The Case of Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 26(2), 149-163. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2023.2233364
[4] Tucker, P. (2025, May 19). Special operations are becoming the Pentagon’s future ‘normal’. Retrieved from Defense Oneq: https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2025/05/special-operations-are-becoming-pentagons-future-normal/405410/
[5] Giustozzi, A. (2025, April 30). Competing Allies: How Russia and Iran jousted for influence over the Syrian Armed Forces in 2015 – 2024. Retrieved from The Russia Program: The George Washington University: https://therussiaprogram.org/competing_allies
[6] Tucker, P. (2025, April 30). Experts see rise of powerful non-state armed groups as US retreats from global stage. Retrieved from Defense One: https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2025/04/experts-see-rise-powerful-non-state-groups-us-retreats-global-stage/404971/
[7] Khatib, L. (2019, July). Syria, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 46(3), 385-403. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48541312
[8] Struzinski, F., & McClenon, J. (2025, January 11). Theory vs. Practice: What is Irregular War?: Guests Jonathan Haggart and Shandor Fabian. Retrieved from Irregular Warfare Initiative: https://irregularwarfare.org/podcasts/theory-vs-practice-what-is-irregular-war/
[9] Pulaski, H. C. (2024, November-December). Redefining Irregular Warfare. Military Review, 94-106. Retrieved from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/Nov-Dec-2024/Redefining-IW/Redefining-IW-UA.pdf
[10] Bondar, K. (2025). Ukraine’s Future Vision and Current Capabilities for Waging AI-Enabled Autonomous Warfare. CSIS, March. Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraines-future-vision-and-current-capabilities-waging-ai-enabled-autonomous-warfare
[11] Tech Force in UA. (2025). Mission and Goals. Retrieved from Tech Force in UA: https://techforce.in.ua/en/
[12] Davies, Z. S., Gac, F., Rager, C., Reiner, P., & Snow, J. (2024). The Coin of the Realm: The Future of Technology and Insurgency. In P. Singer, Strategic Latency Unleashed: The Role of Technology in Revisionist Global Forces and the Implications of Special Operations Forces (pp. 250-269). Center for Global Security Research.
[13] Ortal, E. (2024, August 8). The Secret War behind the Exchanges of Fire in the North. Retrieved from The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies: https://besacenter.org/the-secret-war-behind-the-exchanges-of-fire-in-the-north/
[14] Hecht, E. (2024, January). The Ukraine War after 2 years: Initial Military Lessons. Retrieved from The Jerusalem Tribune: https://static.jstribune.com/hecht-the-ukraine-war-after-two-years/
[15] Hegseth, P. (2025). Hegseth Q&A after Town Hall. Retrieved from The Rev Blog: https://www.rev.com/transcripts/hegseth-q-a-after-town-hall
[16] Lopez, C. T. (2025, April 9). Socom: Changing Operational Demands Requires Acquisition Changes. Retrieved from U.S. Department of Defense: https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4150954/socom-changing-operational-demands-requires-acquisition-changes/
[17] Brahimi, A. (2024, December 3). Air Force for hire. Retrieved from Atlantic Council : https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/podcast/air-force-for-hire/
