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Assessing the Impact of the Red Sea Crisis on the Rules Based International Order: Implications for the Indo-Pacific

Dr Estelle Denton-Townshend is a teaching fellow at the University of Waikato.  She holds a Masters and PhD in international politics and security, focusing on the Middle East.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing the Impact of the Red Sea Crisis on the Rules Based International Order: Implications for the Indo-Pacific

Date Originally Written:  April 1, 2024.

Date Originally Published:  April 22, 2024.

Article and / or Article Point of View:  The article is written from the point of view of the Indo-pacific countries towards the Red Sea Crisis and a perceived weakening of the rules based order.

Summary:  The rules-based international order is crucial to the Indo-Pacific states of Australia and New Zealand.  The strength of the rules-based order is tied to U.S. legitimacy and strength.  The Red Sea crisis disrupts a key trade route and weakens the U.S. on the world stage as the world tires of U.S. inaction to the Netanyahu Government’s attacks on Gaza and the blatant disregard of international humanitarian law. 

Text:  The Indo-Pacific is a key focus of Chinese and U.S. strategic rivalry. Currently, the U.S. security umbrella extends to important routes that serve the Indo-Pacific. However, there have been more than 60 Houthi attacks in the Red Sea since October  17, 2023[1], resulting  in ships diverting to the longer and more expensive route around the African coast and the Cape of Good Hope[2]. The average cargo cost per 40ft container has risen from $1,875 in December 2023, to $5,650 on January 16, 2024.  This price increase and the disruption to global supply chains is feeding into business costs, adding to the global economic headwinds trade is already facing[3][4]. Sparked by Houthi frustration with Israeli attacks in Gaza, the Red Sea crisis has highlighted the fragility of the region’s security[5] and vulnerability of globalised economies to shipping route security issues. 

The lessoning of U.S. military superiority[6] over the 2000s, and the diversification of non-Western alliances points to the emergence of a more multipolar order[7]. The world is heading away from the rules based international order and into a “more power based international system[8].”  This change has implications for how the Indo-Pacific maintains its security and trading links with Europe.  There are strategic vulnerabilities on the trade route to Europe; piracy in the Malacca Strait, the contested South China Sea, and the Red Sea route through the Suez Canal[9][10]. Until recently the main guarantor of access to these routes was provided by the Western established rules-based international order, backed by U.S. military and economic might.  The Red Sea is a particularly complicated case as  rivals are emboldened[11] by U.S. disengagement from the Middle East, and there has been an accompanying increase in non-Western engagement. Additionally, regional autonomy has grown in the face of what the IMF describes as “global geoeconomic fragmentation[12]”,  which is a “policy-driven reversal of global economic integration” and has been fueled by events such as the Gaza war, Ukraine war, Covid 19[13], and potentially by the rising impacts of climate change. 

This Red Sea, which links the security systems of the Indo-Pacific, Mediterranean, and the Middle East, looks likely to become increasingly militarised by a variety of actors.  Military bases are already held in the area by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), France, Italy, Japan, China, and the U.S.  Other strategic competitors in include Turkey,  Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Russia, the European Union, and India[14]. Many of the Red Sea states are highly vulnerable with internal security challenges and are in need of foreign investment to ensure economic growth. Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, and Djibouti are also amongst the top 10 source countries for refugees.    Additionally, the Sovereign Wealth Funds of the wealthy Gulf states, looking to diversify away from a reliance on fossil fuels, have emerged as key investors in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden in the post-covid global economic downturn.  Cooperation in the Red Sea between Global South[15] countries, alongside potential exploitation of the region’s weak states by the wealthy Global South actors gives the West less room for policy errors, including policies that leave a perception that the U.S. is callous with Global South lives.  

With the mighty sovereign wealth funds of China, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar investing in the Red Sea, the influence of the rules-based international order over the leadership of these unstable states is likely to become overlaid by the wishes of the foreign states with high engagement in the region. This battle for engagement in the region creates uncertainty around the shipping routes.  Australia and New Zealand, given that they are geographically isolated from the rest of the Global North, need to consider the U.S. capable of maintaining the global trading system and it’s routes, including the important Red Sea chokepoint. The U.S. led multinational Operation Prosperity Guardian, established to deter Houthi attacks on shipping, demonstrates that the U.S. is willing to deal with the symptoms of the Red Sea crisis. However, the U.S. seems  reluctant to confront a key underlying driver of the tensions. The U.S. needs to be adept at keeping allies, but also knowing which ones are becoming geopolitically expensive.   The Netanyahu government’s military action in Gaza as retaliation for the terrorist attack on Israel by Hamas on October 7, 2023 is increasingly seen as excessive, with the Gazan death toll reported at  31,600 by Gaza’s Health Ministry[16].  The U.S.’ defeated UN Security Council resolution for an “immediate and sustained ceasefire in Gaza[17]” and subsequent abstention from voting on the following successful ceasefire proposal[18], goes some way towards a tonal shift regarding this issue, but the rules-based international order has been damaged by the initial lack of resolve from the U.S. to rein in Israeli excesses. U.S. inaction leaves space available for China and the Global South leadership to advance the Arab and Islamic world’s demands, as outlined by Algeria’s Ambassador Amar Benjama; that Israel acknowledge responsibility for Gazan civilian deaths[19]. 

International criticism of Government military action by a Western ally undermines the U.S. led rules-based international order. This criticism weakens the legitimacy of the U.S. to criticise China over the treatment of the Uyghurs, to criticise Russia over the lives lost in the Ukraine, and it further weakens the  UN’s Responsibility to Protect.  This criticism also weakens the legitimacy of the U.S.’ commitment to its own Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Preventions Act of 2018, and the accompanying Executive order 13729, A Comprehensive Approach to Atrocity Prevention and Response, which outlines that “preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest and core moral responsibility of the United States[20]”.   

In order to retain its leadership position in a world with increased levels of geoeconomic fragmentation, the U.S. needs to prove that it continues to play a key role in maintaining global order and stability, particularly through leadership of its allied states.  Selectively attempting to apply international rules and norms on non-aligned states and having a muted response to the instability caused by allies such as Israel, particularly in such a region in which instability can impact the world’s economy given its important shipping routes and fossil fuels, is likely to undermine the rules-based international order on which the Indo-Pacific depends for its security and international trade. Without the rules-based international order, Indo-Pacific states face increased coercion from more powerful states, such as China, which is the top trading partner of both New Zealand[21] and Australia[22].

 In an increasingly geoeconomic fragmented world, investment and economic engagement between states is increasingly driven by geopolitical alignment. This alignment should concern the U.S., given in the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific and the high levels of trade between Pacific states and China.  With economic challenges facing the globe such as recovering from the covid pandemic, the Chinese economic downturn, the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, shipping costs in the Red Sea, and increasing fiscal pressure from climate change impacts, states may become increasing reluctant or economically less able to stand up to key trading partners. With New Zealand officially in recession from March 21, 2024[23] and the Australian economy sitting at 0.2% growth[24],  if the rules-based international order is perceived as weakened these countries may start to feel very vulnerable to Chinese geoeconomic pressure. 

Endnotes:

[1] Congressional Research Service. (2024, March 12). Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea: Issues for Congress. Retrieved from Congress: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN12301

[2] Scarr, S., Arranz, A., Saul, J., Huang, H., & Chowdhury, J. (2024, February 3). Red Sea attacks: ow Houthi militants in Yemen are attacking ships in one of the world’s busiest maritime trade routes. Retrieved February 11, 2024, from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ISRAEL-PALESTINIANS/SHIPPING-ARMS/lgvdnngeyvo/

[3] Simpson, J. (2024, January 16). What impact have UK and US strikes had on Red Sea shipping disruption?Retrieved January 17, 2024, from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/16/what-impact-have-uk-and-us-strikes-had-on-red-sea-shipping-disruption

[4] Villa, M. (2024, February 1). Trade and Inflation: The Costs of the Red Sea Crisis. Retrieved February 11, 2024, from Italian Institute for International Political Studies: https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/trade-and-inflation-the-costs-of-the-red-sea-crisis-162429

[5] Italian Institute for the International Political Study. (2023, December 22). Houthis Churn the Waters of the Red Sea.Retrieved February 11, 2024, from Italian Institute for the International Political Study: https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/houthis-churn-the-waters-of-the-red-sea-158406

[6] Center on Military and Political Power. (N.D.). Retrieved February 24, 2024, from Center on Military and Political Power: https://www.fdd.org/projects/center-on-military-and-political-power/

[7] Araya, D. (2022, October 5). America’s Global Dominance Is Ending: What Comes Next? Retrieved February 11, 2024, from Centre for International Governance Innovation: https://www.cigionline.org/articles/americas-global-dominance-is-ending-what-comes-next/

[8] Gaal, N., Nilsson, L., Perea, J. R., Tucci, A., & Velazquez, B. (2023). Global Trade Fragmentation: An EU Perspective. Retrieved February 14, 2024, from European Commission: Economy Finance: https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-10/eb075_en.pdf

[9] Girardi, B., Van Hooft, P., & Cisco, G. (2023, November). What the Indo-Pacific means to Europe: Trade value, chokepoints and security risks. Retrieved February 11, 2024, from The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies: https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/What-the-Indo-Pacific-means-to-Europe-Trade-Value-Chokepoints-and-Security-Risks-HCSS-2023.pdf

[10] Panda, J. (2023, October). Indo-Pacific Security in 2030-35: Links in the Chain. Retrieved February 11, 2024, from Hague Centre for Strategic Studies: https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2023/10/01-SLOCS-Jagannath-Panda-Supply-Chains-Maritime-Choke-Points-and-Indo-Pacific-Security-in-2030-35-v6-SLOCS-1.pdf

[11] Center on Military and Political Power. (N.D.). Retrieved February 24, 2024, from Center on Military and Political Power: https://www.fdd.org/projects/center-on-military-and-political-power/

[12] IMF. (2023, January). Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the future of Multilateralism. Retrieved February 11, 2024, from IMG: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff-Discussion-Notes/Issues/2023/01/11/Geo-Economic-Fragmentation-and-the-Future-of-Multilateralism-527266

[13] Baba, C., Lan, T., Mineshima, A., Misch, F., Pinat, M., Shahmoradi, A., . . . Van Elkan, R. (2023, November 30). Geo-economic Fragmentation: What’s at stake for the EU. Retrieved from International Monetary Fund: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2023/11/29/Geoeconomic-Fragmentation-Whats-at-Stake-for-the-EU-541864

[14] Ashine, S. G. (2024). The new global superpower geo-strategic rivalry in the red sea and its implications for peace and security in the horn of Africa. Social Sciences & Humanities Open, Vol. 9, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssaho.2024.100834.

[15] Heine, J. (2023). The Global South is on the rise – but what exactly is the Global South? Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/the-global-south-is-on-the-rise-but-what-exactly-is-the-global-south-207959

[16] Khadder, K., & Dahman, I. (2024, March 17). Gaza death toll exceeds 31,600, health ministry says. Retrieved from CNN: https://edition.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-03-17-24/h_52b8706a615460e042d7a6ca43059b80

[17] United Nations. (2024, March 22). Russia and China veto US resolution stating imperative of ‘immediate and sustained ceasefire, in Gaza. Retrieved from United Nations: https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147856

[18] Borger, J. (2024, March 25). Israel isolated as UN security council demands immediate ceasefire in Gaza.Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/25/un-gaza-ceasefire-vote

[19] United Nations. (2024, March). US Resolution would have given green light to ‘continuing bloodshed’: Algeria.Retrieved from United Nations: https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147856

[20] Department of State, USAID, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, US Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigations, Department of the Treasury. (2022). U.S Strategy to Anticipate, Prevent and Respond to Atrocities. Retrieved from U.S Department of State.

[21] Minstry of Foreign Affairs. (2022). China. Retrieved from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade: https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/asia/china/#:~:text=China%20remains%20New%20Zealand’s%20largest,the%20year%20ending%20December%202022).

[22] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (n.d.). Background Paper: The Australia-China Trade and Investment Relationship. Retrieved from Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/chafta/negotiations/Pages/background-paper-the-australia-china-trade-and-investment-relationship

[23] Beckford, G. (2024, March 21). New Zealand is in Recession: What you need to know. Retrieved from Radio New Zealand: https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/512347/new-zealand-is-in-a-recession-what-you-need-to-know

[24] Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2023, December). Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product. Retrieved from Australian Bureau of Statistics: https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/national-accounts/australian-national-accounts-national-income-expenditure-and-product/latest-release

Assessment Papers Dr Estelle Denton-Townshend Hamas Islamic State Variants Israel Maritime Red Sea
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The Options Remaining for Israel to Defeat Hamas

Dr. Jacob Stoil is the Chair of Applied History at the Modern War Institute, Senior Fellow of the 40th ID Urban Warfare Center, and Trustee of the U.S. Commission on Military History. He has worked extensively in Israel and the Middle East including in support of Task Force Spartan. He has published multiple policy and academic articles which can be found in publication such as the International Journal of Military History, Wavell Room, and MWI. He can be followed on X as @JacobStoil. 

The views expressed in this article represent the personal views of the author and are not necessarily the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, Army University, or the U.S. Military Academy.

Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any other group.

National Security Situation:   Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack on Israel has caused a state of war between Israel and Hamas, which is ongoing as of this writing. The war has reached an inflection point and Israel has distinct options on how to proceed.

Date Originally Written:   March 15, 2024.

Date Originally Published:  March 25, 2024.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author of the article is an academic with research specialties in Middle Eastern security and military history, irregular warfare, and military operations. He has an academic background in military history and experience working with multiple national militaries and government agencies. Since October 2023, he has researched the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas and taken part in discussion of tactics and operations. The author agrees with perspectives expressed by various senior U.S. Government officials that Hamas must be defeated.

Background:  Following the Hamas attacks and atrocities of October 7, 2023, Israel began an offensive into Gaza. The purpose of Israel’s campaign was threefold: gain the return of the hostages; prevent Gaza from being the launch pad for future major attacks like those of the 7th; and degrade Hamas to the point where it could neither govern Gaza in the future nor operate in a large-scale organized capacity. This last objective is most often summarized as destroying Hamas. The initial phase of the war went well for Israel, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) destroyed two out of Hamas’s five regional brigades and began operating in Khan Yunis against the third, which they have largely defeated. Hamas has concentrated the majority of its remaining Gazan leadership, hostages, and capabilities in Rafah and an invasion of Rafah was the next phase in the IDF plan[1]. However, Egypt has closed its border to Gazan refugees[2]. As a result of the ongoing war and the closed border, the humanitarian situation in Gaza has worsened. This humanitarian situation, combined with domestic pressure, has led the U.S. to warn Israel away from major ground operations in Rafah and to tell Israel to consider other options[3].

Significance:  With concentration of civilians in Rafah, the last remaining Hamas stronghold, and growing U.S. pressure, Israel’s ability to accomplish its goals is now under question. Failure to defeat of Hamas will potentially have far reaching consequences such as emboldening Hamas and other Iranian backed actors like Hezbollah to conduct further large-scale attacks.

Option #1:  Israel invades Rafah.

The shortest way for Israel to achieve its objectives is through Rafah. To achieve this efficiently Israel will need to bring more forces back into Gaza, possibly recalling reservists. This option allows Israel to finish off Hamas’s governing organization within Gaza and fully occupy the territory. If Israel were to succeed in this operation, they would also overrun many of the areas where Hamas is holding its remaining hostages[4]. Based on Hamas’s previous behavior, a successful Israeli offensive has the potential to bring Hamas to the negotiating table and may motivate them to trade hostages in exchange for a delay to the offensive[5]. Israel’s operations to date have demonstrated the military capability to successfully conduct the incursion and such an operation has significant popular support in Israel[6].

Risk:  A major incursion into Rafah risks significant civilian harm. With the Egyptian border closed, the civilians of Gaza who fled the fighting elsewhere in the strip are concentrated in and around Rafah. While Israel may take steps to evacuate them, a significant civilian population will likely remain in harm’s way. Beyond the all too real threat of civilian casualties, U.S. President Joseph R. Biden has indicated that such an operation might be a red line for him[7]. Thus, a major incursion into Gaza could risk Israel’s relationship with its most important strategic partner. This, in and of itself, constitutes a significant risk as the U.S. provides critical supplies to Israel and protects it from potential harm, up to and including sanctions, in the United Nations (UN).

Gain:  An invasion of Rafah is the quickest way to end the war while achieving Israel’s objectives. It would allow Israel’s internally displaced persons to return to their homes in the south with a renewed feeling of safety. Paradoxically by shortening the war, this option could also minimize the suffering of the Palestinian population by allowing Gaza to transition to a post-war phase and reconstruction to begin. There are few other options that guarantee the destruction of Hamas as a robust and capable organization. Israel has previously eliminated Hamas leaders, but its organized military structure means that Hamas can replace its leadership[8]. Hamas’s capabilities reside in its formations. Destroying them is the surest path to achieving Israel’s objectives. No other option can guarantee this. A successful operation would also aid Israel in reestablishing deterrence. Dismantling Hamas in Gaza, regardless of the risk, would send a powerful message to other regional threats such as Hezbollah. This option would also change the risk calculus for any Iranian proxies interested in threatening the country.

Option #2:  Israel transitions to ‘Counterterrorism’ Operations.

This option has two variants. In the first, the IDF more or less maintains the status quo in Gaza, while creating room for some changes to improve the humanitarian situation. This keeps pressure on Hamas, provides more security to the southern Israeli communities, and gives Israel bargaining leverage. In the second variant Israel withdraws in whole or in part from part of Gaza, either unilaterally or as part of a temporary ceasefire, while maintaining a buffer zone on the Gaza border. In either case, whether without a ceasefire or following its expiration, Israel would continue to pursue dismantling Hamas through targeted strikes against its leadership, logistics, and critical operational nodes, while, at the same time, seeking the release or rescue of hostages. The IDF would do this by continuing raids throughout Gaza and limited operations in Rafah. Such operations would have a distinct benefit over larger operations in the international arena. There have been recent suggestions that the U.S. would accept the IDF conducting limited operations in Rafah to pursue high value targets and rescue hostages[9]. Eliminating Hamas leadership in Rafah alone, however, would be insufficient. Israel would have to continue to target Hamas’s critical infrastructure and command nodes, which would involve raids and airstrikes over a prolonged period of time – similar to the U.S. campaigns against Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State that have stretched over years. The population of Gaza would remain under threat as operations continued. In addition, much of the key leadership of Hamas lives abroad[10]. If Israel seeks to dismantle the organization, they will have to engage those targets as well. This option is further complicated by the fact that several Hamas leaders are resident in U.S. partners and allies such as Turkey and Qatar[11].  In past campaigns against terror organizations, Israel showed a willingness to conduct operations in such countries[12].

Risk:  The risk of failure is high in this option. Israel has removed significant numbers of Hamas senior leaders in the past and the organization has maintained itself due to its robust structure[13]. A failure in this case would allow Hamas to achieve its strategic goal of recovering and conducting further October 7th like attacks[14]. Additionally, the need to continue raids into Rafah and other areas of Gaza would effectively extend the war indefinitely. As demonstrated by the hostage rescue operation in Rafah in February 2024, these raids necessarily involve significant forces and potential for loss of life. As the war drags on, and Gazans continue to suffer, international pressure and domestic pressure in the U.S. could continue to build which could end even this reduced tempo of operations. Additionally, if the war is seen as inconclusive it could easily lose Israeli support as well. Finally, the need to expand operations to involve strikes in U.S. partners and allies conveys significant risk. Turkey, which shelters much of the Hamas leadership, is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization member. Carrying out operations in their sovereign territory could cause significant blowback.

Gain:  A ‘counterterrorism’ operation would allow Israel to continue to pursue Hamas in a manner that the U.S. has said is acceptable[15]. This option would help shore up a critical strategic partnership for Israel. In the past when Israel has successfully all but destroyed a terrorist group it has done so through this method. The example of the campaign against the Black September Organization is particularly relevant[16]. The global and indefinite nature of this option provides the most potential to completely destroy Hamas as an organization not just as the governing entity of Gaza. Knowing that hosting Hamas assets may put their countries at risk could also change the stance towards Hamas of countries like Qatar. In short, this option has the potential to achieve Israel’s objective while lowering the amount of forces Israel has to employ, lowering the human and logistical cost to Israel, and potentially sparing the Palestinian people in Gaza from the destruction and loss of life caused by a renewed ground offensive into Rafah.

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] Jacob Stoil and John Spencer. “The Road to Ceasefire Leads Through the Refah Offensive.” Newsweek, Mar 11, 2024 https://www.newsweek.com/road-ceasefire-leads-through-rafah-offensive-opinion-1878137 

[2] Myre, G., & Batrawy, A. (2024, February 26). Why Egypt won’t allow vulnerable Palestinians across its border. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2024/02/26/1232826942/rafah-gaza-palestinians-egypt-border 

[3] “Biden Warns Netanyahu an Assault on Rafah would Cross a Red Line.” Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/biden-warns-netanyahu-an-assault-on-rafah-would-cross-red-line-c78677ba  

[4] Bob, Y. J. (n.d.). IDF finds no hostages in Khan Yunis: Where is Hamas Hiding Them?. The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com. https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-788164 

[5] Jacob Stoil and John Spencer. “The Road to Ceasefire Leads Through the Refah Offensive.” Newsweek, Mar 11, 2024 https://www.newsweek.com/road-ceasefire-leads-through-rafah-offensive-opinion-1878137

[6] Times of Israel. (n.d.-b). Poll: 75% of Jewish Israelis back Rafah Operation | the times of … https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/poll-75-of-jewish-israelis-back-rafah-operation/   

[7] “Biden Warns Netanyahu an Assault on Rafah would Cross a Red Line.” Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/biden-warns-netanyahu-an-assault-on-rafah-would-cross-red-line-c78677ba  

[8] Ahmed Jabari: The Ruthless Terror Chief whose Bloody End was Only … (n.d.-a). https://www.timesofisrael.com/ahmad-jabari-1960-2012/; Bennet, J. (2004, March 22). Leader of Hamas killed by missile in Israeli strike. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/22/world/leader-of-hamas-killed-by-missile-in-israeli-strike.html; Guardian News and Media. (2004, April 18). Israeli missile attack kills new Hamas chief. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/18/israel 

[9] US would support limited, pinpoint IDF op against high-value targets … (n.d.-d). https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-would-support-limited-pinpoint-idf-op-against-high-value-targets-in-rafah-report/  

[10] 8 Hamas, “Islamic Jihad” leaders leave Gaza to live abroad. Awsat. (n.d.). https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3414056/8-hamas-islamic-jihad-leaders-leave-gaza-live-abroad  

[11] Robbins, E. (2024, January 13). While Gazans suffer, Hamas leaders live in luxury . FDD. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/01/13/while-gazans-suffer-hamas-leaders-live-in-luxury/  

[12] France 24. (2022, September 2). “Wrath of God”: Israel’s Response to 1972 Munich Massacre. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220902-wrath-of-god-israel-s-response-to-1972-munich-massacre  

[13] NBC Universal News Group. (n.d.). Israel has a long track record of assassinating its enemies. Will it work against Hamas?. NBCNews.com. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israel-mossad-assassinates-enemies-munich-olympics-hamas-rcna132908  

[14] Middle East Media Research Institute. (2023, November 1). Hamas official Ghazi Hamad: We will repeat the October 7 attack, Time and again, until Israel is annihilated; we are victims – everything we do is justified. MEMRI. https://www.memri.org/reports/hamas-official-ghazi-hamad-we-will-repeat-october-7-attack-time-and-again-until-israel 

[15] The US privately told Israel the kind of Rafah campaign it … (n.d.-c). https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/13/us-would-back-a-limited-military-campaign-in-rafah-00146827 

[16] France 24. (2022, September 2). “Wrath of God”: Israel’s Response to 1972 Munich Massacre. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220902-wrath-of-god-israel-s-response-to-1972-munich-massacre  

Dr. Jacob Stoil Hamas Israel Option Papers Violent Extremism
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Options for a Post-War Future for Gaza


Dr. Jacob Stoil is the Chair of Applied History at the Modern War Institute, Senior Fellow of the 40th ID Urban Warfare Center, and Trustee of the U.S. Commission on Military History. He has worked extensively in Israel and the Middle East including in support of Task Force Spartan. He has published multiple policy and academic articles which can be found in publication such as the International Journal of Military History, Wavell Room, and Modern War Institute. He can be followed on X as @JacobStoil. 

Dr. Mary Elizabeth Walters is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies and Director of Military Theory at the Air Command and Staff College and Trustee for the Society for Military History. She can be found on X @mewalters101. 

Dr. Nir Arielli is an Associate Professor of International History at the University of Leeds in the United Kingdom. He is a contributor to the regional foreign policy thinktank Mitvim. His key publications can be found here: https://ahc.leeds.ac.uk/history/staff/556/dr-nir-arielli. He can also be found on X @ArielliNir. 

The views expressed in this article represent the personal views of the authors and are not necessarily the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force, the Department of the Army, Army University, the U.S. Military Academy, or the Air University.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any other group.

National Security Situation:  Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack on Israel has caused a state of war between Israel and Hamas, which is ongoing as of this writing.

Date Originally Written:  January 11, 2024.

Date Originally Published:  January 29, 2024. 

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The authors of the article are academics with research specialties in the transitional aspects of conflicts, Middle Eastern security, irregular warfare, and peacekeeping. They have academic backgrounds in military history and experience working with multiple national militaries and government agencies. Since October 2023, they have researched options for postwar possibilities in Gaza. The authors argue that planning and implementation for the Stabilization Phase following the fighting, known as “Phase IV” in U.S. Military Joint Doctrine, will be critical for the future security and stability of the region.

Background:  In 2005 Israel withdrew all its civilian and military personnel from Gaza. Since then, rocket and terror attacks have continued to be launched from the territory. As a result, Israel has placed significant restrictions on goods entering Gaza, while Egypt largely closed its border with Gaza. Additionally, Israel has launched several military operations into Gaza over the last 15 years. Recently, Israel pursued a policy of “quiet in return for quiet” and allowed Qatar to provide funding to Hamas, which has ruled Gaza since 2007[1]. On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a major attack across the border, murdering Israeli civilians, taking hundreds of hostages, and engaged in systematic rape[2]. In response, Israel invaded Gaza and has fought a multi-month campaign to destroy Hamas’s capability to operate from Gaza or launch major attacks on Israel. The operation has degraded Hamas, but also destroyed significant portions of Gaza, which now faces a humanitarian crisis. As the operation changes phases, it is necessary to plan for Phase IV.

Significance:  The recent situation in Gaza has led to a cycle of violence costing thousands of lives over the last decade. The Hamas attack on October 7 and the subsequent war in Gaza have devastated both sides and have the potential to be game changing. Failing to establish a positive outcome from this war will cause a bleak future for Gaza, involving future rounds of violence between Israelis and Palestinians. The situation will likely worsen as both sides radicalize due to the escalating cycle of violence.

Option #1:  Revitalizing the Palestinian Authority.

As Israeli operations in Gaza wind down, the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) enter Gaza and begin assuming security and policing responsibility. The international community continues to help, train, and mentor the PASF. Concurrently, the Palestinian Authority (PA) undergoes reforms and begins to assume governance roles in Gaza. International aid flows through the auspices of the PA to help it build legitimacy and capability. This option involves significant challenges as the PA lacks legitimacy both domestically and internationally, has little control over its current territory in the West Bank, and struggles with corruption. Additionally, the PASF will need to increase its ability to control Gaza. Finally, the PA has indicated it is unwilling to take control of Gaza on the back of Israeli tanks. However, elements of the U.S. government, as well as some U.S. partners, advocate for this option[3].

Risk:  The main risk in Option #1 is that the PASF and PA do not prove up to the task or need more time to build capability than is available[4]. In 2007, Hamas defeated the PA and took over Gaza[5]. Another PA failure would not only potentially return Gaza to the control of terrorists or to a state of war, but perhaps be the final nail in the coffin for the PA. In the West Bank territories under PA governance, the PASF already struggles to exercise authority in its cities[6]. Following a failure in Gaza, it is unlikely there would be any trust in the PA for any future peace negotiations regarding Gaza or the West Bank. Moreover, it is possible that this instability in Gaza would spread to the West Bank, further damaging the PA’s already tenuous hold. Previously, members of the PASF have even participated in terror attacks[7]. Even if the PASF can create security, poor administration by the PA could lead to a similar result as if the PASF failed. Future terror attacks from Gaza could greatly radicalize the Israeli population and worsen future conflicts.

Gain:  If the PA and PASF can manage then this option will allow Gaza to recover under Palestinian rule and speed forward the development of Palestinian self-government. Success here could build momentum and trust in the PA that would translate to the West Bank, boosting broader diplomatic efforts. This option also requires relatively little direct commitment from the international community and would allow the PA to leverage the United Nations (UN) and Nongovernmental Organization communities directly.

Option #2:  Israeli Occupation.

Israeli forces conclude their military operations and transition to less intensive phases. They create buffer zones around key areas of the Gaza-Israel and Gaza-Egyptian border. These zones would be under Israeli military occupation and/or free fire zones. Alternatively, Israel returns to a version of the situation prior to its 2005 withdrawal, where it occupies ‘critical’ areas directly and operates militarily elsewhere in Gaza. Some residents of the towns and cities along the Gaza border that Hamas attacked on October 7 and elements within the Israeli government prefer this option[8]. The Israeli military and government have explicitly said they do not want a maximalist version of this option but would want freedom of action in Gaza and the potential for buffer zones[9].

Risk:  Occupation is contrary to the expressed wishes of the U.S. and much of the international community. As a result, this option could alienate Israel from its international partners. The maximalist version of this option would make a final status solution difficult as there would be domestic pressure to reestablish Jewish settlements in Gaza. The maximalist version would also greatly retard Gaza’s recovery and likely prolong the humanitarian crisis. This would leave the Palestinian population in Gaza vulnerable to the growth of transnational criminal organizations and violent extremist organizations who, as in other conflict zones, will exploit the gap in governance and slow pace of recovery[10]. Finally, Israel would likely face a continuing insurgency in populated areas, which would require maintaining a significant military presence. 

Gain:  This option will allow Israel to create security on its borders and prevent a repeat of the October 7 attacks. It will prevent Hamas or a successor organization from establishing control of Gaza. It freezes the situation in its current state, which may provide time for a negotiated solution or for the development of a more robust PA capability. It requires little to no direct involvement from the international community and may allow Palestinian governance in areas not under Israeli control.

Option #3:  Multinational Force Deployments.

A multinational force (MNF) conducts a gradual phased deployment to Gaza, taking responsibility for areas as Israel withdraws from them. The force needs to have three separate missions under a single coordinating authority which will provide a unified direction for the three components: security, reconstruction/humanitarian aid, and governance. This architecture would allow countries to provide contributions to the mission that best suits their capabilities. The security mission would not only be responsible for internal security in Gaza, but also for preventing transborder threats to Israel. As such, this option needs robust capabilities and rules of engagement. The reconstruction mission provides initial emergency aid and then oversees the reconstruction and development of Gaza, preventing the diversion of aid to terrorist organizations. The governance mission provides initial governance functions to prevent a governance void and then oversees the development of local governance structures. All three missions would have stakeholder-agreed, conditions-based triggers to gradually transition individual tasks to the PA as the PA’s capability increases.

Risk:  The MNF could fail before it begins if countries contribute inadequate forces with insufficiently robust capabilities and rules of engagement. This option could also fail if Israel does not perceive the countries involved as capable of guaranteeing security. The history of the region is littered with MNFs failing to uphold their mandates. Following the 2006 war, the UN force in Lebanon received a mandate to help remove Hezbollah from the Israeli-Lebanon border. So far, the force of over 10,000 personnel has failed to stop Hezbollah from launching daily attacks across the border with Israel, including from near UN positions[11]. If the MNF fails to provide security for Israel or stability for Palestinians, then regional faith in the international community will likely collapse. The PA and PASF might not reach the required level of capability to take over from the MNF, leading to open ended commitment for the international community. A complete failure of the MNF could lead to casualties among the force and resumption of hostilities in Gaza.

Gain:  A properly constructed MNF can buy the time necessary for the PA and PASF to gain competency while also helping bring Israel security. A phased entry will allow the MNF to build trust and legitimacy. This option will maximize the ability to provide humanitarian, reconstruction, and development aid to Gaza and offers the fastest way to reestablish governance. A successful MNF will build momentum towards the creation of solutions for the more challenging and sensitive territory of the West Bank, while also mitigating many of the risks inherent in alternative solutions.

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] Keinon, H. (2018, August 15). “quiet for quiet” arrangement emerges between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/quiet-for-quiet-arrangement-emerges-between-israel-and-hamas-in-gaza-564982 and Liebermann, O., Schwartz, M., Dahman, I., & Najib, M. (2018, November 11). Suitcases of $15M in cash from Qatar Bring Relief for Gaza. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/11/middleeast/gaza-qatar-humanitarian-intl/index.html

[2] Gettleman, J., Schwartz, A., Sella, A., & Shaar-yashuv, A. (2023, December 28). “screams without words”: How Hamas Weaponized Sexual Violence on Oct. 7. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/28/world/middleeast/oct-7-attacks-hamas-israel-sexual-violence.html

[3] Magid, J. (2023, December 15). Sullivan says Palestinian Authority must be “revamped” before it … https://www.timesofisrael.com/sullivan-says-palestinian-authority-must-be-revamped-before-it-can-govern-gaza

[4] Harris, K. D. (2023, December 3). Remarks by vice president Harris on the conflict between Israel and Hamas. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/12/02/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-on-the-conflict-between-israel-and-hamas

[5] Guardian News and Media. (2007, June 15). Hamas takes control of Gaza. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jun/15/israel4

[6] TOI Staff. (2023, November 25). 2 men executed in West Bank for allegedly spying for Israel, as … https://www.timesofisrael.com/2-men-executed-in-west-bank-for-allegedly-spying-for-israel-as-mob-cheers

[7] Khoury, J., Cohen, G., & Efrati, I. (2016, January 31). Palestinian police officer opens fire near Israeli settlement, wounds three soldiers. Haaretz.com. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2016-01-31/ty-article/three-israelis-wounded-in-west-bank-shooting/0000017f-da77-d432-a77f-df7fb2f40000

[8] Lidor, C. (2024, January 8). Sderot mayor rejects government decision to bring residents back … https://www.timesofisrael.com/sderot-mayor-rejects-government-decision-to-bring-residents-back-on-february-4

[9] Sokol, S. (2024, January 10). Netanyahu: Let me be clear — Israel has no intention of displacing … https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-let-me-be-clear-israel-has-no-intention-of-displacing-gazas-population

[10] de Boer, J., & Bosetti, L. (n.d.). Examining the interactions between conflict and organized crime. Our World. https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/examining-the-interactions-between-conflict-and-organized-crime

[11] United Nations. (n.d.). UNIFIL peacekeeping. United Nations. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unifil

Dr. Jacob Stoil Dr. Mary Elizabeth Walters Dr. Nir Arielli Hamas Israel Option Papers
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Hamas Policy Options Amidst Regional & Internal Change

Miguel Galsim is a final year student completing a double Bachelor of International Relations/Middle Eastern and Central Asian Studies at the Australian National University, with an academic interest in non-state violence.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation:  The Hamas Organisation’s purportedly softened political principles and its reshuffling of senior leadership figures has left the group fraught between a path towards further moderation and a road of continued, even elevated, violence.

Date Originally Written:  May 19, 2017

Date Originally Published:  June 12, 2017.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This options paper is written from the perspective of a senior policymaker within Hamas providing options to the political leadership of the movement.

Background:  On May 1, 2017, Hamas released a document of “General Principles and Policies[1]” that displayed an apparent toning-down of Hamas’ long criticised dogmatism, evident in its original 1988 charter.  The document is bereft of references to the Muslim Brotherhood, instead refers to Hamas’ enemies as Zionists and not Jews, and while not recognising Israel, outlines its recognition of a de-facto Palestinian state along the 1967 borders.  It is widely believed that the document is a device to bring Hamas out of the diplomatic cold.

At the same time, Hamas elected former Prime Minister of Gaza Ismail Haniyeh to head its political bureau on May 6, replacing the highly pragmatic and externally focused Khaled Mashal who was barred by internal regulations from running for another term.  It is also worth noting that prior to the release of the General Principles and Policies and the election of Haniyeh, in February Yahya Sinwar, a military figurehead and former Hamas counterintelligence chief, was elected to become Gaza’s Prime Minister.  Sinwar has 22 years of imprisonment experience under Israel.  Both Haniyeh and Sinwar are insiders in Hamas[2] – having extensive grassroots experience, particularly in Gaza – and have strong links with the military wing, the latter more staunchly.

Compounding Hamas’ internal shifts, regional unrest has deprived Hamas of its traditional backers in Syria and Iran[3], and the return of an anti-Islamist leadership in Egypt has imperilled Hamas supply chains into Gaza and hardened an already difficult border for civilians living under Hamas government.

Significance:  Such a complex situation, buffeted by the potentially countervailing forces of ideological moderation and an insider-oriented shift, creates an uncertain future for Hamas as Gaza’s Islamic-nationalist militant group.  With Hamas insiders now in charge, Gaza becomes a more prominent reference point for strategic thinking.  Accordingly, facing an increasingly dissatisfied populace weary from siege, attempting to preserve its popular support, and also looking to fill the cavities left by a hostile Egypt and a distracted Syria and Iran, Hamas’ next strategic choices will be crucial for its success in pursuing its goals, and at the very least, surviving as a movement.

Option #1:  Hamas allows military imperatives to drive its broader strategic thinking, resulting in a potential escalation of violent operations.

This option would be a conceivable outcome of the election of Sinwar and Haniyeh who, while following in their predecessor’s pragmatic footsteps, nonetheless have better military ties due to their experiences in Gaza.

Risk:  This option would be inflexible and incognizant of the external factors fuelling grievances within their controlled territory.  Increased attacks on Israel would invite disastrous Israeli offensives on Gaza and substantial damage to the group’s own assets, as Hamas has learned to expect.  This would result not only in an immediate danger to Gaza’s populace, but a tightened economic blockade.  A militaristic mindset would also render Hamas even more isolated from global diplomatic support and hostile to Egyptian interests – a subsequent thinning of material and financial resources into Gaza would be the likely result.  These factors would consequently worsen the humanitarian situation in Gaza, withering Hamas’ popular support base.  Simultaneously, increased Hamas violence would give Fatah extended pretexts to dismantle Hamas cells in the West Bank.

Gain:  Emphasising its military needs would help Hamas retain the leadership of violent resistance against Israel and sustain its main differentiator from its rivals in Fatah who renounced armed resistance in 1993.  For certain sectors of the population, militancy would be a pull factor towards the group.  Enhanced coercive capabilities would also assist Hamas’ crackdown on hostile Salafi elements in Gaza and, if not applied haphazardly, act as deterrence against hostile manoeuvres from Fatah and Israel.  Additionally, a focus on military capacity could potentially reinvigorate Hamas’ relationship with Iran as the military wing’s traditional patron[4], as well as a provider of armaments.

Option #2:  Hamas pursues a course of broader political moderation and resorts only to limited, targeted applications of violence.

Given the publication of Hamas’ new political document, the path of moderation is also a viable option.  Haniyeh may be open to pragmatic change, despite his commitment to resistance[5], given the hard lessons he would have learnt first-hand from conflagrations in Gaza.  This should not be taken as disarmament, however – such a move would be disastrous for Hamas’ popularity, territorial control, and deterrence abilities.  Furthermore, it cannot be considered an option as heightened discontent within the military wing would simply endanger the integrity of the entire Organisation.

Risk:  Political compromise may widen rifts between the moderates and conservatives within Hamas, with champion hardliner Mahmoud al-Zahar already stating to the public that the new platform was an “extension” and not a “replacement” of the original, maximalist charter[6].  A more restrained Hamas could also result in external criticisms of Hamas’ failure to carry the banner of resistance, and may inspire a shift in some grassroots support towards more radical elements in Gaza.  Traditional partners in Syria and Iran may also become more estranged.

Gain:  The clear benefit of moderation is its potential to open regional and global diplomatic channels.  Doing so keeps Hamas open to a wider array of policy options and could lead to the future easing of terrorist classifications in some countries, thereby alleviating constraints on its financial flows.  Additionally, an eased political position may boost public appreciation for Hamas’ efforts by alleviating the blockade of Gaza from Israel and Egypt, and giving Israel fewer reasons to launch high-intensity offensives on Gaza.  Concurrently, opting for more surgical military operations – particularly given Sinwar’s sophisticated understanding of Israel, his ability to act with moderation, and the potential that he will work sanguinely with the politburo[7] – would retain Hamas’ coercive edge while not instigating another round of heavy fighting.

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendations:  None.

Endnotes:

[1]  The Islamic Resistance Movement “Hamas”. (2017, May 1). A Document of General Principles and Policies. http://hamas.ps/en/post/678/a-document-of-general-principles-and-policies

[2]  See Ghassan Khatib’s comments in Mitnick, J & Abualouf, R. (2017, May 6). Hamas selects popular Gaza politician Ismail Haniyeh as its new leader. Los Angeles Times, http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-hamas-leader-haniyeh-20170506-story.html

[3]  Uthman, T. (2013, March 4). Hamas and the Arab Spring: Arguments on gains and losses (Arabic). Namaa Center for Research and Studies, http://nama-center.com/ActivitieDatials.aspx?id=223

[4]  Mounir, S. (2017, April 23). The predicament of regional options for Hamas after the victory of Yahya Sinwar (Arabic). Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, http://acpss.ahram.org.eg/News/16285.aspx

[5]  Author unknown. (2017, April 30). Haniyeh: Two important merits are coming (Arabic). Shasha News, https://www.shasha.ps/news/263298.html

[6]  Author unknown. (2017, May 17). The new document splitting Hamas from the inside (Arabic). Al-Arab, http://bit.ly/2rvj7El

[7]  Caspit, B. (2017, February 15). Why some in Israel are wary of Hamas’ new Gaza boss. Al-Monitor, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/02/israel-gaza-new-hamas-leader-yahya-sinwar-security.html

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