Miguel Miranda is the founder of 21st Century Asian Arms Race. He frequently writes about modern weapons and the different conflicts being fought across the world today. He also runs the Twitter account @21aar_show to scrutinize arms fairs and military/security conferences. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.
Title: January 2024 Assessment of the Iranian Missile Arsenal and Regional Responses
Date Originally Written: January 16, 2024.
Date Originally Published: February 5, 2024.
Author and / or Article Point of View: The author believes that without understanding the elusive and ambiguous arms market, and the evolution of modern weapon systems, governments will be ill-prepared to address their effects.
Summary: With another Middle East crisis underway since the October 7, 2024 terrorist attacks by Hamas against southern Israel the U.S. is caught in a familiar grappling match with Iran and its proxies. The problem now is the Iran’s immense arsenal of precision weaponry is forcing escalating responses from the U.S. and its Allies and Partners.
Text: The early hours of January 15, 2024, saw Iranian missile salvos demolishing targets in Iraqi Kurdistan and Syria. The next day another wave hit western Pakistan as retaliation for the January 3, 2024, terror attacks in Kerman that killed 100 civilians[1]. This latest exercise from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) “rocket force” was justified in Iran’s view as retaliation against terrorists and Israeli-U.S. meddling. But the display of firepower was far from unprecedented. In fact, Iranian proxies in Iraq and Yemen have continued persistent attacks on shipping and infrastructure, which have gone on for months now. A bombardment of Al Asad/Al Assad airbase in Iraq on January 20, 2024, stands out after it left American service members with traumatic brain injuries[2].
The commonality in these incidents are the widespread and very reckless use of missiles. In an earlier assessment from six years ago this author grouped Iran’s missile program into three categories: the solid fuel, liquid fuel, and then medium-range models[3]. Today it is no longer an exaggeration to describe how missiles are pouring out of Iran and categorizing them is now a challenge[4]. The ballooning production volumes are so great it helps if these missiles are segregated into six groups. The first are road mobile ballistic missiles[5]. These are followed by anti-ship missiles, subsonic cruise missiles, attack drones, and large caliber rocket artillery[6]. A sixth category encompasses Iran’s fondness for portable missiles whose variety is now bewildering, however, lightweight munitions are not the focus of this assessment[7].
Examining Iranian advances with attack drones should suffice to illustrate the country’s success in organizing mass-production, whether for their own needs or a foreign client’s. Since at least July 2022, U.S. President Joseph Biden’s administration publicized warnings that Russia would soon deploy Iranian drones and ballistic missiles for its conquest of Ukraine[8]. Events revealed the former were the destructive and very cheap Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 (the differences are in their weight classes) one way attack drones and these were spotted as early as August that year[9]. As of December 2023 the air force of Ukraine eliminated more than 3,000 of both[10]. These numbers are one indicator of how large Iranian production for expendable attack drones is, even if the same production is shared with an end user like Russia. Today Iran has at least 15 different attack drones that function as missiles, including imitations of the Aerovironment Switchblade 300, the IAI Harpy, and lightweight air-launched cruise missiles named “Heydar-1/2[11].” There is no evidence Russia is fielding Iranian surface-to-surface tactical missiles in Ukraine but the Biden administration has warned such an eventuality can be expected[12].
Iran’s success at expanding missile production owes much to domestic policy and industrialization but these still rely on global supply chains. An investigation released last June by the German news channel DW explored the mysterious Chinese agent who organized a network of companies to help deliver ballistic missile parts to Iran[13]. Though portrayed as an “arms dealer” this individual, Li Fangwei a.k.a. Karl Lee, who is facing charges at a New York court never dealt with actual weapons and their transport[14]. His role was sourcing raw material, i.e. the propellant powders for missile engines, essential for ordnance production. Judging by the past 40 years this elaborate trans-national commerce was sanctions proof from end-to-end.
What allows Iran’s military to ramp up missile production year after year are the laboratories, manufacturing sites, and universities where assembly of missile airframes and parts are streamlined. It is useful to understand the two umbrella organizations overseeing these programs are the Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). Yet this simplified outlook is inadequate for measuring the IRGC’s own industrial footprint, like the Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organizations, and the dozens of companies involved with armaments production[15]. It is not surprising that Iran graduates more engineers than Japan and South Korea[16]. The country boasts a thriving professional class of specialists in aerospace engineering, civil engineering, electrical engineering, and mechanical engineering. There is no dearth of expertise in composite materials either. Iran has both the human talent and the manufacturing sector for accelerating its various missile programs and the results, as seen in arms deliveries to Yemen and Lebanon, are inarguable.
Recent developments in Iranian missile production show the IRGC’s newfound enthusiasm for “hypersonic” missiles. In reality, after the Fattah missile was unveiled in June 2023, it was clear the IRGC, with a complicit media providing hyperbolic coverage, had introduced an updated single stage ballistic missile that was meant to be carried on and launched from a truck[17]. The difference, however, was the Fattah boasted a separating maneuverable re-entry vehicle containing the warhead. Iranian engineers are fond of designing warheads and the vehicles that deliver them. A low-cost Iranian glider warhead now exists and other shapes have appeared on the IRGC’s missiles like on the solid fuel Ra’ad 500 and Haj Qassem missiles. Recently, the medium-range solid fuel Kheybar Shekan was seen in Yemen. The liquid fuel models such as the Ghadr and Sejjil also boast re-entry vehicles[18].
The quantity of Iranian missiles produced today leaves the Middle East/West Asia region with a familiar dilemma from six years ago. Aside from Israel, whose military enjoys the advantage of layered anti-missile defenses and unwavering U.S. support, no country can foil Iranian missiles. Then as now, U.S. forces are at risk without anti-ballistic missile defenses reliant on ground-based AEGIS radars complemented by satellites and networked with THAAD sites. Other regional actors such as Turkey/Turkiye see the threat, and are shouldering the cost of domestic anti-missile defenses[19]. While the U.S. Navy’s carriers and destroyers can perform this role it confines them to small bodies of water where they can be attacked[20]. It is clear that neither containment nor sanctions work against Iranian proxies anymore. Tehran has shown it can deliver missile components and technology through novel methods and set up production in other countries, thereby broadening their threat.
Endnotes:
[1] Iran Press News Agency. (2024, January 4). ISIS claims responsibility for terrorist attack in Iran’s Kerman. Retrieved January 17, 2024, from https://iranpress.com/isis-claims-responsibility-for-terrorist-attack-in-iran-s-kerman
[2] CENTCOM. (2024, January 20). Iranian-backed militants attack Al-Assad Airbase Iraq. Retrieved January 21, 2024, from https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3651246/iranian-backed-militants-attack-al-assad-airbase-iraq/
[3] Miranda, M. (2022, February 3). Sejjil missiles cast a shadow over the Middle East. Retrieved January 17, 2024, from https://21stcenturyasianarmsrace.com/2022/02/03/sejjil-missiles-cast-a-shadow-over-the-middle-east/
[4] Grady, John. (2022, February 8). CENTCOM nominee Kurilla: Iran largest destabilizing factor in Middle East. Retrieved January 17, 2024, from https://news.usni.org/2022/02/08/centcom-nominee-kurilla-iran-largest-destabilizing-factor-in-middle-east
[5] Miranda, M. (2020, January 15). A useufl guide to Iranian ballistic missiles. Retrieved January 17, 2024, from https://21stcenturyasianarmsrace.com/2020/01/15/a-useful-guide-to-iranian-ballistic-missiles/
[6] Miranda, M. (2021, August 15). Iranian rocket artillery just got more dangerous. Retrieved January 17, 2024, from https://21stcenturyasianarmsrace.com/2021/08/15/iranian-rocket-artillery-just-got-more-dangerous/
[7] Miranda, M. (2022, April 30) Iran has another new air-to-ground missile. Retrieved January 17, 2024, from https://21stcenturyasianarmsrace.com/2022/04/30/iran-has-another-new-air-to-ground-missile/
[8] Miranda, M. (2022, October 2). Iranian combat drones have reached Europe. Retrieved January 17, 2024, from https://21stcenturyasianarmsrace.com/2022/10/02/iranian-combat-drones-have-reached-europe/
[9] Miranda, M. (2023, November 25). The drone index: AIO HESA Shahed-136. Retrieved January 17, 2024, from https://21stcenturyasianarmsrace.com/2023/11/25/the-drone-index-aio-hesa-shahed-136/
[10] Superville, Darlene. (2023, November 22). The White House is concerned Iran may provide ballistic missiles to Russia for use against Ukraine. Retrieved January 17, from https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-iran-ballistic-missiles-f14501f6f9a6401af7f8835b2ddd01cf
[11] Miranda, M. (2022, July 5). Iranian missiles come in all sizes. Retrieved January 17, 2024, from https://21stcenturyasianarmsrace.com/2022/07/05/iranian-missiles-come-in-all-sizes/
[12] FDD (2024, January 5). Russia acquires North Korean missiles, eyes Iranian missiles. Retrieved January 17, 2024, from https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/01/05/russia-acquires-north-korean-missiles-eyes-iranian-missiles/
[13] DW Documentary. (2023, June 30). The World’s Most Dangerous Arms Dealer. Retrieved January 17, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gqDCrdZVZnk
[14] Trans-nationional organized crime rewards program: Li Fangwei. Retrieved January 17, from https://www.state.gov/transnational-organized-crime-rewards-program-2/li-fangwei/
[15] IRGC research self-sufficiency organization. Retrieved January 17, 2024, from https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-irgc-research-self-sufficiency-jihad-organization
[16] Chatterjee, D. (2023, September 27). The top 10 countries that produce the most engineers. Retrieved January 17, 2024, from https://www.embibe.com/exams/top-10-countries-that-produce-the-most-engineers/
[17] Iran Press News Agency. (2023, June 13). ‘Fattah’ hypersonic missile; Iran’s defensive leap forward . Retrieved January 17, 2024, from https://iranpress.com/-fattah-hypersonic-missile-iran-s-defensive-leap-forward
[18] Iran Press News Agency. (2022, November 10). Top Commander: Iran succeeded in building hypersonic ballistic missile. Retrieved January 17, 2024, from https://iranpress.com/top-commander-iran-succeeded-in-building-hypersonic-ballistic-missile
[19] Miranda, M. (2022,October 7), The SiPER is almost ready. Retrieved January 17, 2024, from https://21stcenturyasianarmsrace.com/2022/10/07/the-siper-is-almost-ready/
[20] CENTCOM. (2024, January 19). USCENTCOM Destroys Three Houthi Terrorists’ Anti-Ship Missiles. Retrieved January 17, 2024, from https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3651182/uscentcom-destroys-three-houthi-terrorists-anti-ship-missiles/