Peter Mitchell is a U.S. Army officer and instructor of strategy at West Point. He can be found on Twitter @peternmitchell and writes for the Modern War Institute. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.
National Security Situation: Commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is being threatened by piratical attacks. These attacks threaten U.S. interests.
Date Originally Written: January 2, 2024.
Date Originally Published: January 8, 2024.
Author and / or Article Point of View: The author is an instructor of strategy at West Point. This article is written from the point of view of the United States considering its maritime options in the Red Sea.
Background: The Bab-el-Mandeb Strait links the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Twelve percent of global trade and 30% of global container traffic traverses the Suez Canal each year. These figures represent over $1 trillion U.S. Dollars worth of cargo. Fifty ships traverse the Suez Canal on an average day. Over one billion tons of cargo were shipped through the Suez Canal in 2019, four times the tonnage transiting the Panama Canal during the same period[1].
Significance: Traffic continues to flow through the Suez Canal in spite of the imminent threat from Houthi corsairs and Somali pirates. A major successful attack however will turn off this trade route like a spigot and cause civilian merchants to seek a safer and less insurance-costly route around the Cape of Good Hope on the southern tip of Africa[2]. A container ship sailing from Guangzhou, China to Rotterdam in the Netherlands travels 10,000 nautical miles using the Suez Canal; this same voyage would be 13,500 nm around the Cape of Good Hope. Depending on the ship’s speed, this difference can mean 8 to 12 days of additional travel along the southern route[3]. American global power projection rests on maintaining free and open sea lanes. To ensure that trade is not throttled and future pirates in other vulnerable locations emboldened, these threats to shipping in the Red Sea must be addressed. Currently the U.S. Navy is building a multinational coalition to escort Suez Canal shipping under the name Operation Prosperity Guardian, but other options are available.
Option #1: The U.S. Navy executes Operation Prosperity Guardian with Allies and Partners.
Risk: Operation Prosperity Guardian participants are not as enthusiastic about this operation as the U.S. due to problematic associations with the Gaza War[4]. Notably, the only Middle Eastern country to participate in this current mission is Bahrain. The defensive scope of the operation also puts the participants in a reactive mode. While this reactive mode may address tactical level threats, it will not solve the long-term strategic problem by robbing the Houthis of their will to attack shipping. The operation is also limited in regional scope and does not address increasing piracy in the Straits of Malacca and Southwestern Pacific[5].
Gain: Option #1 is a safe option to execute, as it follows closely in the established multinational Horn of Africa escort mission that the United States has provided since 2009 via Operation Allied Protector and Operation Ocean Shield[6]. Low risk however, also entails low gain. In the two previously named operations, the pirates went to ground until the military escorts left for other missions, then resumed their deprecations[7].
Option #2: The U.S., Allies, and Partners encourage civilian shipping corporations to form collective security arrangements with each other, similar to the anti-piracy measures taken by trade leagues of the late medieval period such as the Hanseatic League[8]. Merchant ships would be empowered to take private security measures, arm their ships, and sail in convoy.
Risk: Option #2 will directly increase the cost of shipping which could be passed on to the consumer. Corporations could engage in cartel activity by refusing to engage in security agreements with smaller competitors to force them out of the market. The corporations also expose themselves to risk to public relations and legal suit if they kill pirates on the high seas, even in self-defense.
Gain: Option #2 reduces need for government-provided escorts. This option enables a quicker response to pirate threats since the merchant ships would be defending themselves. Option #2 is a proactive and durable counterpiracy outcome as even the most motivated pirate would hesitate before attacking a commercial ship armed with heavy machine guns.
Option #3: The U.S. and its Allies and Partners encourage China to build a bilateral escort for all merchant ships traveling from Europe to Asia. China should be motivated to do this as sixty percent of Chinese trade destined for Europe transits the Suez[9]. China is Europe’s largest trading partner, while exports to Europe make up 9% (top third) of all Chinese exports[10]. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is also eager to show its global projection ability.
Risk: Option #3 would require a carefully crafted intelligence sharing program to allow for coordination without over or under sharing information. Chinese hawks could interpret this offer as the U.S. attempting to gather intelligence about the PLAN’s capabilities and limitations. The U.S. Navy (USN) would have limited control over how China uses force in its counter-piracy rules of engagement. While Option #3 could garner tactical success, naval cooperation does not necessarily mean better strategic relations between the U.S. and China. Additionally, other Western Pacific countries with significant maritime interests such as Japan might not be excited by this option and require diplomatic engagement.
Gain: Option #3 would be the first major bilateral cooperation between the USN and the PLAN on a significant maritime policing operation. This option could set precedent for future cooperation between the USN and the PLAN in the Strait of Malacca or elsewhere. Bilateral arrangements are easier to make and keep up than complex multilateral agreements with over ten countries such as Operation Prosperity Guardian. China is increasingly seen as an ‘honest broker’ in the Middle East. This bilateral operation could encourage Iran to decrease aid to the Houthis for fear of disrupting Tehran’s relationship with Beijing[11].
Option #4: The French decisively dealt with the longstanding (over seven centuries) issue of the Barbary corsairs operating with impunity from the North African coast by taking the fight directly to the pirates. The Houthis and Somalis operate from ports and hidden coves along the coast. A unilateral or multilateral force could systematically eliminate these pirate bases of operation and destroy all unauthorized ships, docks, and havens on either side of the Red Sea all the way through the Bab el-Mandeb. Troops then would need to be stationed in a semi-permanent colonial status to ensure compliance from the locals.
Risk: Option #4 risks ruining the livelihoods of law-abiding fishermen and merchants along with the smugglers and pirates. Despair would inevitably drive more people into piracy and terrorism. This option does little to address the threat of anti-ship missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles launched from the Yemeni hinterland. This option could cause extreme public relations friction as the violence it causes is posted on social media worldwide. If undertaken by the United States, the shrinking U.S. military incurs risk to its force as it is already stretched thin by other global commitments.
Gain: Option #4 proves a drastic (and expensive) solution that would have significant long-lasting results. This option provides a dramatic display of political will by the country that fields the unilateral or multilateral force that destroys the pirate basing.
Other Comments: None.
Recommendation: None.
Endnotes:
[1] Panama Canal Annual Report, 2019 https://pancanal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/2019-AnnualReport-Rev02.pdf
[2] “Suez disruption: a new inflation risk on the horizon.” Reuters. Accessed January 2, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/suez-disruption-new-inflation-risk-horizon-2023-12-19/.
[3] “The Importance of the Suez Canal to Global Trade,” New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade, April 18, 2021, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trade/MFAT-Market-reports/The-Importance-of-the-Suez-Canal-to-Global-Trade-18-April-2021.pdf
[4] Phil Stewart, “US allies reluctant on Red Sea task force,” Reuters, accessed January 3, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-allies-reluctant-red-sea-task-force-2023-12-28/.
[5] Dean Crossley, “Malacca and Singapore Straits – Increase of Piracy,” West of England P&I, last modified March 2, 2023, https://www.westpandi.com/news-and-resources/news/march-2023/malacca-and-singapore-straits-increase-of-piracy-i/.
[6] NATO, “Operation Ocean Shield, https://web.archive.org/web/20150702050518/http://www.manw.nato.int/page_operation_ocean_shield.aspx
[7] “Live Piracy Map,” ICC Commercial Crime Services, https://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map
[8] Ernst Danenell, “The Policy of the German Hanseatic League Respecting the Mercantile Marine.” The American Historical Review 15, no. 1 (1909): 47–53. https://doi.org/10.2307/1835424.
[9] “China’s Growing Maritime Presence in Egypt’s Ports and the Suez Canal.” Middle East Institute. November 3, 2023. https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinas-growing-maritime-presence-egypts-ports-and-suez-canal.
[10] “China-EU – International Trade in Goods Statistics – Statistics Explained.” European Commission. Accessed January 2, 2024. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=China-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics.
[11] Nectar Gan, “China Wants to Be a Peace Broker in the Middle East. How Has It Responded to the Israel-Gaza War?,” CNN, last modified October 11, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/11/china/china-response-israel-hamas-war-intl-hnk/index.html.