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Assessing the U.S. Shift to Great Power Competition and the Risk from North Korea

Editor’s Note:  This article is part of our Civil Affairs Association and Divergent Options Writing Contest which took place from April 7, 2020 to July 7, 2020.  More information about the contest can be found by clicking here.

Richard McManamon is an U.S. Army Officer and a graduate student at the National Defense University. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not represent the official position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing the U.S. Shift to Great Power Competition and the Risk from North Korea

Date Originally Written:  July 3, 2020.

Date Originally Published:  August 31, 2020.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  Richard McManamon is an U.S. Army Officer and a graduate student at the National Defense University.

Summary:  U.S. President Donald Trump’s strategic shift towards Russia and China has de-prioritized North Korea. Following multiple summits between the two nations, minimal lasting progress has been made. As the U.S. shifts focus to great power competition, a comprehensive approach towards North Korea to protect U.S. interests will be of value.

Text:  Individual human factors, both behavioral and psychological, have played a critical role in countless global conflicts and the contemporary security environment is equally impacted by these factors. Following President Trump’s election, a new National Security Strategy (NSS) was published in 2017 that emphasized a shift from a counter-terrorism focused strategy to one that challenges near-peer threats from China and Russia. The Department of Defense implemented the NSS in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), where the document specifically labeled China “a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors” and highlighted Russia’s attempt to reshape the world through their authoritarian mode[1]l.

The NSS and NDS emphasizing Russia and China reduces focus on North Korea. President Trump’s relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has been highly volatile and the U.S. relationship with North Korea further destabilized as North Korea tested twenty-three rockets in 2017 alone[2]. Throughout 2017, President Trump expressed his feeling towards North Korea through multiple tweets, for example, labeling the North Korean ruler “Little Rocket Man[3].” Kim disregarded Trump’s emotionally driven responses and continued rocket testing, which escalated tensions even higher. As the situation escalated toward a breaking point, Trump and Kim met in 2018 and again in 2019. Furthermore, in June 2019 President Trump made a trip to the Korean peninsula for further nuclear negotiations, which marked the first time a U.S. sitting president entered North Korea[4].

Since 2017, both leaders applied various human factors that contributed to a bilateral relationship. Nevertheless, the promising start that followed multiple summits began to dramatically falter when North Korea conducted its first missile launch of 2020 on March 21st showcasing its desire to maintain its position in the global order[5]. The 2020 missile launch combined with new satellite imagery showing a possible expansion of a rocket launch facility signaled to the U.S. and other Western powers that North Korea is maintaining its hardened stance and attempting to portray an image of strength[6]. To Kim, the U.S. realignment of resources toward Russia and China may look like an opportunity. Moreover, this shift to China and Russia can provide enough space for North Korea to expand their rocket research and development. Further highlighting the North Korea challenge, a 2019 RAND report highlighted that North Korea is on a trajectory of nuclear development that has transformed it into a fundamentally different kind of strategic challenge[7].

While the U.S. transitions to China and Russia, it still maintains numerous sanctions on North Korea. For years the U.S. and United Nations Security Council have placed sanctions on the country ranging from export/import restrictions to economic restrictions[8]. The longer the sanctions are in place, the less effective they are. Furthermore, the continued U.S. use of sanctions can provide a false sense of security to the U.S. as it realigns its global strategy towards China and Russia. The U.S. prioritization of China and Russia allows North Korea to maintain its status within the global order without new pressure from western nations to promote change in governance.

President Trump has successfully communicated with Kim in the past by leveraging his attributes and finding common ground with the North Korean leader. While the complete dismantling of North Korea’s rocket and nuclear program may no longer be feasible, the U.S. can reestablish meaningful diplomatic relations with North Korea to influence Northern peninsula. This is not to suggest that if the U.S. were to extend an olive branch that North Korean missiles would be instantly dismantled. However, progress with North Korea can likely be increased through human interaction and an emotional connection versus harsher sanctions that may harm the population more than the senior leaders of the country. Lastly, the opportunity cost of the U.S. not meeting the challenge now is that inaction can embolden Kim Jong Un to develop a more capable missile program that threatens U.S. national interests and its allies globally.

As the U.S. continues a strategy shift to China and Russia, countries like North Korea are losing their much-needed prioritization within the U.S. government. While both China and Russia pose risks to U.S. interests, acknowledging such risk does not justify a neglect of other threats on the world stage. Small risks can quickly transition to substantial risks if not appropriately managed. The ramifications of not placing significant resources and attention on North Korea creates opportunities for Kim to exploit, with short and long-term costs for U.S. interests and regional security. President Trump has the tools to build a relationship with North Korea to achieve good governance and order. Moving forward, the U.S. can ensure a comprehensive strategy that effectively challenges China and Russia, but not at the cost of neglecting smaller countries. Such a strategy starts with increased diplomatic relations, revisits sanction negotiations with the input from key nations and lastly, works towards a manageable missile treaty with North Korea.

Endnotes:

[1] Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy (2018). Retrieved from https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

[2] Berlinger, J. (2017). North Korea’s missile tests: What you need to know. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/29/asia/north-korea-missile-tests/index.html

[3] Hirsh, M. (2019). Trump just gave North Korea more than it ever dreamed of. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/06/30/trump-has-already-given-north-korea-more-than-it-dreamed-of

[4] Ripley, W. (2019). Trump and Kim make history, but a longer and more difficult march lies ahead. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/30/asia/trump-kim-history/index.html

[5] Masterson, J. (2020). North Korea tests first missiles of 2020 . Retrieved from https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-04/news/north-korea-tests-first-missiles-2020

[6] Brumfiel, G. (2020). North Korea seen expanding rocket launch facility it once promised to dismantle. Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/2020/03/27/822661018/north-korea-seen-expanding-rocket-launch-facility-it-once-promised-to-dismantle

[7] Gian Gentile, Yvonne K. Crane, Dan Madden, Timothy M. Bonds, Bruce W. Bennett, Michael J. Mazarr, Andrew Scobell. (2019). Four problems on the Korean peninsula. Retrieved from https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL271.html

Schoff, J., & Lin, F. (2018). Making sense of UN sanctions on North Korea. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/interactive/north-korea-sanctions

2020 - Contest: Civil Affairs Association Writing Contest Assessment Papers Civil Affairs Association North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) Policy and Strategy Richard McManamon United States
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Assessing North Korea’s Cyber Evolution

Ali Crawford has an M.A. from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce where she focused on diplomacy, intelligence, cyber policy, and cyber warfare.  She tweets at @ali_craw.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing North Korea’s Cyber Evolution

Date Originally Written:  September 17, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  November 25, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that the international community’s focus on addressing North Korea’s nuclear capability sets the conditions whereby their cyber capabilities can evolve unchecked.

Summary:  Despite displaying a growing and capable cadre of cyber warriors, North Korean cyber prowess has been overshadowed by threats of nuclear proliferation. While North Korea remains extremely isolated from the global community, it has conducted increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks over a short span of time. In a relatively short period of time, North Korea has cultivated a cyber acumen worth recognizing as threatening as its nuclear program.

Text:  As the internet quickly expanded across the globe and changed the nature of business and communication, Western nations capitalized on its capabilities. Authoritarian regimes felt threatened by the internet’s potential for damaging the regime’s power structure. In the 1990s, Kim Jong-il, father of current North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, restricted internet access, usage, and technology in his country[1]. Eventually, Kim Jong-il’s attitude shifted after recognizing the potential benefits of the internet. The North likely received assistance from China and the Soviet Union to begin training a rudimentary cyber corps during the 80s and 90s[2]. Cyber was and still is reserved explicitly for military or state leadership use.

The expansion of North Korea’s cyber program continued under Kim Jong-un, who today seeks to project military might by displays of a capable nuclear program. But Kim Jong-un, who possesses a degree in computer science, also understood the potential for cultivating cyber power. For North Korea, cyber is not just an asymmetrical medium of warfare, but also a method of surveillance, intelligence-gathering, and circumventing sanctions[3]. Within the last decade, North Korea has demonstrated an impressive understanding and application of offensive cyber competence. Several experts and reports estimate North Korean cyber forces range from 1,800 to upwards of 6,000 professionals[4]. Internet access is reportedly routed through China, which lends added difficulty to attribution but provides a measure of defense[5]. North Korea is largely disconnected from the rest of the world and maintains a rudimentary internet infrastructure[6]. The disconnect between the state and the internet leaves a significantly small and less vulnerable attack surface for other nations to exploit. 

Little information is available regarding the internal structure of North Korea’s cyber forces. What is thought to be known suggests an organizational hierarchy that operates with some autonomy to achieve designated mission priorities. Bureau 121, No. 91 Office, and Lab 110 report to North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB)[7]. Each reportedly operate internally and externally from Pyongyang. Bureau 121’s main activities include intelligence gathering and coordinating offensive cyber operations. Lab 110 engages in technical reconnaissance, such as network infiltration and malware implantation. No. 91 Office is believed to orchestrate hacking operations. Other offices situated under Bureau 121 or the RGB likely exist and are devoted entirely to information warfare and propaganda campaigns[8]. 

In the spring of 2013, a wave of cyber attacks struck South Korea. A new group called Dark Seoul emerged from North Korea armed with sophisticated code and procedures. South Korean banks and broadcasting companies were among the first institutions to endure the attacks beginning in March. In May, the South Korean financial sector was paralyzed by sophisticated malware. Later in June, marking the 63rd anniversary of the beginning of the Korean War, various South Korean government websites were taken offline by Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Although Dark Seoul had been working discreetly since 2009, its successful attacks against major South Korean institutions prompted security researchers to more seriously consider the North Koreans as perpetrators[9]. The various attacks against financial institutions would be a prequel to the massive cyber financial heists the North would eventually manage, possibly making South Korea a testing ground for North Korea’s code and malware vehicles.

North Korea’s breach of Sony Pictures in 2014 catapulted the reclusive regime to international cyber infamy. Members of an organization calling themselves the Guardians of Peace stole nearly 40 gigabytes of sensitive data from Sony Pictures, uploaded damaging information online, and left behind a bizarre image of a red skeleton on employees’ desktop computers[10]. This was the first major occurrence of a nation-state attacking a United States corporation in retribution for something seemingly innocuous. While the Sony hack was an example of how vague rules for conducting cyber war and crime differ between nations, the attack  was more importantly North Korea’s first true display of cyber power. Sony executives felt compelled to respond and sought counsel from the U.S. government. The government was hesitant to let a private company respond to an attack led by the military apparatus of a foreign adversary. Instead, President Barack Obama publicly named North Korea as the perpetrator and vaguely hinted at a potential U.S. response, becoming the first U.S. president to do so.

Cyber crime also provides alternative financing for the regime’s agenda. In February 2016, employees at the Bank of Bangladesh were struggling to recover a large sum of money that had been transferred to accounts in the Philippines and Sri Lanka. The fraudulent transactions totaled $81 million USD[11]. Using Bangladesh Bank employee credentials, the attackers targeted the bank’s SWIFT account. SWIFT is an international money transfer system used by financial institutions to transfer large sums of money. After-action analysis revealed the malware had been implanted a month prior and shared similarities with the malware used to infiltrate and exploit Sony in 2014[12]. The Bangladesh Bank heist was intensively planned and researched, which lent credence to the North’s growing cyber acumen. As of 2019, North Korea has accumulated an estimated $2 billion USD exclusively from cyber crime[13]. Security assessments indicate the Sony attack, the Bangladesh Bank hack, and the WannaCry attacks are related which lends some understanding to how North Korean cyber groups operate. In 2018, the United States filed criminal charges against a North Korean man for all three cyber crimes as part of a grander strategy for deterrence[14].

Finally, it is important to consider how North Korea’s cyber warfare tactics and strategies will evolve. North Korea has already proven to be a capable financial cyber crime actor, but how would its agencies perform in full-scale warfare? In terms of numbers, the North Korean military is one of the largest conventional forces in the world despite operating with rudimentary technology[15]. Studies suggest that while the North may confidently rely on its nuclear program to win a conventional war, it is unlikely that North Korea would be able to sustain its forces in long-term war[16]. North Korea would need to promptly engage in asymmetric warfare to disorient enemy forces to gain a technological advantage while continuously attempting to attack enemy systems to disrupt crucial communications. The regime could conduct several cyber operations against its adversaries, deny responsibility, then use the wrongful attribution as grounds for a kinetic response. North Korea has threatened military action in the past after being hit with additional sanctions[17]. 

Despite North Korea’s display of a growing and expansive cyber warfare infrastructure coupled with a sophisticated history of cyber attacks, the international community remains largely concerned with the regime’s often unpredictable approach to nuclear and missile testing. With the international community focused elsewhere, North Korea’s cyber program continues to grow unchecked. It remains to be seen if someday the international community will diplomatically engage North Korea regarding their cyber program with the same intensity as their nuclear program.

Endnotes:

[1] David E. Sanger, The Perfect Weapon, Crown Publishing, 2018, p. 127

[2] The Perfect Weapon, p.127-128; and Eleanor Albert, Council on Foreign Relations: North Korea’s Military Capabilities, 25 July 2019, retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-military-capabilities

[3] David Sanger, David Kirkpatrick, Nicole Perloth, New York Times: The World Once Laughed at North Korean Cyberpower. No more, 15 October 2017, retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/15/world/asia/north-korea-hacking-cyber-sony.html

[4] Ibid; and 1st Lt. Scott J. Tosi, Military Review: North Korean Cyber Support to Combat Operations, July/August 2017, retrieved from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20170831_TOSI_North_Korean_Cyber.pdf

[5] 1st Lt. Scott J. Tosi

[6] David Sanger, David Kirkpatrick, Nicole Perloth

[7] 1st Lt. Scott J. Tosi; and Kong Ji Young, Lim Jong In, and Kim Kyoung Gon, NATO CCDCOE:The All-Purpose Sword: North Korea’s Cyber Operations and Strategies, 2019, retrieved from https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_08_The-All-Purpose-Sword.pdf

[8] Ibid.

[9] Symantec Security Response, Four Years of DarkSeoul Cyberattacks Against South Korea Continue on Anniversary of Korean War, 26 June 2013, retrieved from https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war; and Kong Ji Young, Lim Jong In, and Kim Kyoung Gon, NATO CCDCOE Publications, The All-Purpose Sword: North Korea’s Cyber Operations and Strategy, 2019, retrieved from https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_08_The-All-Purpose-Sword.pdf

[10] Kim Zetter, Wired: Sony Got Hacked Hard: What We Know and Don’t Know So Far, 3 December 2014, retrieved from https://www.wired.com/2014/12/sony-hack-what-we-know/

[11] Kim Zetter, Wired: That Insane, $81M Bangladesh Bank Heist? Here’s What We Know, 17 May 2016, retrieved from https://www.wired.com/2016/05/insane-81m-bangladesh-bank-heist-heres-know/

[12] Ibid.

[13] Michelle Nichols, Reuters: North Korea took $2 billion in cyberattacks to fund weapons program: U.N. report, 5 August 2019, retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-cyber-un/north-korea-took-2-billion-in-cyberattacks-to-fund-weapons-program-u-n-report-idUSKCN1UV1ZX

[14] Christopher Bing and Sarah Lynch, Reuters: U.S. charges North Korean hacker in Sony, WannaCry cyberattacks, 6 September 2018, retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-northkorea-sony/u-s-charges-north-korean-hacker-in-sony-wannacry-cyberattacks-idUSKCN1LM20W

[15] Eleanor Albert, Council on Foreign Relations, What Are North Korea’s Military Capabilities?, 25 July 2019, retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-military-capabilities

[16] 1st Lt. Scott J. Tosi, Military Review: North Korean Cyber Support to Combat Operations, July/August 2017, retrieved from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20170831_TOSI_North_Korean_Cyber.pdf

[17] Jack Kim and Ju-min Park, Reuters:Cyber-attack on South Korea may not have come from China after all, 22 March 2013, retrieved from  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-korea/cyber-attack-on-south-korea-may-not-have-come-from-china-after-all-regulator-idUSBRE92L07120130322

 

 

Assessment Papers Cyberspace North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea)
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Alternative Futures: An Assessment of Ongoing North Korean Troop Rotations to Finland

Mr. Jason Hansa is a retired U.S. Army officer that served in Germany, Korea, and CONUS, with two deployments each to OIF and OEF. He currently works as a military contractor at CASCOM on Fort Lee, Virginia. His twitter address is @HauptmannHansa. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Alternative Futures: An Assessment of Ongoing North Korean Troop Rotations to Finland

Date Originally Written:  July 12, 2018.

Date Originally Published:  September 24, 2018.

Summary:  Finland is a fiercely independent country that has suffered the yoke of Russian occupation twice in its short history as a sovereign nation.  Unaligned with but reluctant to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Finland is very concerned of their vulnerability to a sudden Russian annexation attempt.  In this alternative future, Finland arrived at an out-of-the-box solution, to accept North Korean troops deploying to its border with Russia.

Text:  Mr. President, as we enter 2025 Finland stands ready to welcome the arrival of the fifth rotational North Korean infantry division since we formalized our mutual defense treaty in 2020.  As you recall, five years ago, we were in a very difficult situation.  Russian invaded the Ukraine to seize the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and was rotating units through Syria to both gain deployment experience and test new equipment or doctrine under combat conditions.  NATO saw the weaknesses of their Baltic flank and began stationing troops and conducting rotational operations to shore up the defense of their member states.

It is no secret Russia craves warm-water access ports, and our lack of membership in NATO put us at risk of a Russian annexation.  Our nation is still young but proud, achieving independence in the nineteenth century from Sweden that lead to almost immediate occupation by the Russians.  Independence in the twentieth century led to reoccupation in World War 2 and a failure to prepare may well have invited Moscow to occupy us again.

Five years ago, our military strength was approximately 32,000 military members on active duty, with 23,500 of them in the Army.  Our nation has compulsorily conscription and maintains a robust reservist infrastructure, with approximately 900,000 personnel available under full mobilization.  The danger to our nation—then and now—lies in a sudden Russian offensive.  If the Russians strike before we can fully mobilize, our nation is at risk of a quick overrun[1].

The mutual defense treaty of 2020 recognized we are one of the few nations with semi-open diplomatic channels to North Korea, a famously isolationist nation who, at that time, were looking to expand trade around the world.  North Korea had promised to make good on debts they owe us from the 1970s—ones we long ago wrote off—hoping proof of fiscal responsibility would lead to global investment and the lifting of sanctions[2].

In 2020 we moved carefully, knowing that others would react with surprise, anger, and possibly disgust if we struck a formal agreement with North Korea.  It took months of quiet diplomacy with our Nordic partners and NATO neighbors ahead of the announcement for them to understand our reasoning.  We understood that we would also receive “guilt by association,” and possibly even get blamed for “not doing more” during any North Korean-created diplomatic incident.

We knew that with the North Koreans being an isolationist regime, who treated their citizens with brutality, any treaty would result in our citizens demanding immediate and real humanitarian reform in the North Korean political re-education work camps.  We prepared for that reaction, working with the North Korean embassy on what to do once the agreement became public.

The gains were worth the risks.  Militarily, the size of our ground combat forces almost doubled with the deployment of a North Korean division to our border with Russia.  With over twenty-five divisions in the North Korea People’s Army and over 5 million reservists, North Korea assumes very little risk to the defense of their nation, and can maintain rotations in Finland for decades without repeating units[3].  The presence of our North Korean friends forces the Russian Army to increase the size of any potential invasion force, an action that would not go unnoticed by intelligence agencies and give us time to mobilize.  There’s an expression gaining in popularity that Finland and North Korea are two nations only separated by one country, and it’s accurate.  In the event of a Russian invasion of North Korea, our mutual defense treaty ensures Russia must worry about war on a second front – the border they share with North Korea.

The most dangerous phase of the treaty negotiations were the months between announcing it and receiving the final North Korean reinforcements: we were concerned that tensions with Russia could spark the very invasion we were hoping to avoid.  However, our gambit took the world so completely by surprise that Russia didn’t have time to do more than issue a sputtering, angry speech at the United Nations.  Since then, the North Korean deployments have gone off smoothly, leaving their equipment in-place and simply rotating the 10,000 personnel annually.

As we expected, our people demanded humanitarian changes, and the North Koreans opened their borders to us.  It was at first a very grudging admission by North Korea, the nation leery of putting their past on display to the world.  But our persistence enabled access to their now-shuttered political prisons and we provided blankets and food by the container-full during that first, harsh winter.  The North Koreans eventually agreed to our offers of asylum to their prisoners, and we moved the last of them to our nation eighteen months ago.  This mutually benefited both nations, as they showed progress to the world in shutting down their gulags, while we received an infusion of fresh blood into our nation.  We gained thousands of refugees willing to work hard for their new home and—on a side note—helping arrest our declining birth-rate[4].

Accepting the North Korean prisoners was the catalyst for the significant changes we are now seeing in that nation.  It was inevitable, the rotation of divisions through our lands showing the North Korean troops a world outside their borders and sparking the desire for a better life back home.  But our cultural influences have been wildly successful, the North Koreans laying down the initial plans to slowly convert their monolithic realm into something akin to the British model, a democracy with the Kim family as symbolic royalty.  Their introversion is turning into a fierce independence that matches ours in a kinship they’ve never had before; they are asking for our help in economic and legal domains, assistance our populace has eagerly given back.

I must point out that our economic sector isn’t completely reaching out to the North Koreans for altruistic reasons.  While our tourism industry and globally renowned businesses did lose sales in the first couple years because of our political decision, they worked overtime to show investors that our nation did not lose our values in reaching such an accord.  Now, our businesses and banks are eagerly investing in North Korea, taking advantage of an untapped labor market next-door to over one-billion Chinese consumers.

In closing, I assess that our mutual-defense agreement with North Korea has succeeded.  Not only has it helped prevent an invasion by Russia, it has let our people help the needy of another nation, let our businesses expand into a new market, and has allowed our nation to maintain and display our values while guiding another onto the path of recovery.

Endnotes:

[1] European Defense Information, Finnish Defense Forces. Retrieved 14 June 2018.  http://www.armedforces.co.uk/Europeandefence/edcountries/countryfinland.htm

[2] Yle, (2017, April 30). North Korea owes Finland millions in decades-old debt. Retrieved 14 June 2018. https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/north_korea_owes_finland_millions_in_decades-old_debt/9588973

[3] Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, (May 1997). North Korea Country Handbook, page 122.

[4] Smith, L. (2017, September 20). Finland’s birth rate plummets to its lowest level in nearly 150 years. Retrieved 12 July 2018. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/finland-birth-rate-drop-lowest-level-150-years-children-welfare-state-annika-saarikko-a7957166.html

Assessment Papers Finland Jason Hansa North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) Russia
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Alternative Futures: U.S. Options for a Chinese Invasion of North Korea (Part 3 of 3)

(Editor’s Note:  This Options Paper is part of our Alternatives Future Call for Papers and examines an invasion of North Korea by the People’s Republic of China from the point of view of North Korea, South Korea, and the United States.  We hope you have enjoyed all three articles and many thanks to Jason Hansa for choosing to write for Divergent Options!) 
Mr. Jason Hansa is a retired U.S. Army officer that served in Germany, Korea, and CONUS, with two deployments each to OIF and OEF. He currently works as a military contractor at CASCOM on Fort Lee, Virginia. His twitter address is @HauptmannHansa. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation:  In an alternative future the People’s Republic of China invades North Korea.

Date Originally Written:  June 14, 2018.

Date Originally Published:  September 10, 2018.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article is written from the point of view of the U.S. Secretary of Defense personally briefing the President of the United States regarding a potential Chinese invasion into North Korea, circa 2020.

Background:  The U.S. has a complicated relationship with China.  This complicated relationship spans the nineteenth century to now, including the turn of the twentieth century when the U.S. Army fought alongside allied nations inside Beijing proper to defeat the Boxer rebellion[1].

As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has grown in power and strength, so have their ambitions.  They have worked to seal the South China Sea from the surrounding nations; they have conducted incursions into Bhutan and engaged with dangerous stand-offs with the Indian Army; they have repeatedly provoked incidents with the Japanese government off the Japanese Senkaku islands[2][3][4].

Against the U.S., the PRC has hacked our systems and stolen intelligence, intercepted our aircraft, and shadowed our fleets.  China is not a friend to the U.S. or to the world at large[5][6][7].

During the Korean War in 1950, as U.S. forces—with our South Korean and United Nations (UN) allies—neared victory, the Chinese attacked across the Yalu River, stretching out the war and quadrupling our casualties[8].

While the North Koreans in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are also not a U.S. friend, relations with them have improved while our relations with the PRC simultaneously fell.  Our relationship with the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south has never been stronger: we have stood shoulder to shoulder with them for seventy years, and their troops fought alongside ours in Vietnam and Afghanistan.  The South Koreans support territorial claims by the North Koreans, thus it’s a near certainty they will see an invasion of the North by the Chineseas as invasion against all of Korea.

Significance:  Our satellites confirm the movement of three Chinese Army Groups towards the North Korean border.  At best, the Chinese plan to invade the Northern provinces, seizing the majority of the North Korean nuclear launch sites and giving themselves a port on the Sea of Japan.  At worst, the Chinese will invade to where North Korea narrows near Kaechon, giving themselves the best possible defensive line upon which to absorb the almost guaranteed combined DPRK and ROK counterattack.  We estimate DPRK forces are currently outnumbered approximately three-to-one.

Option #1:  The U.S. remains neutral.

Risk:  This option maintains our currently relationship with China, and technically is in accordance with the original UN charter and our defense treaties.  If we are not asked to participate, we lose nothing; but if the ROK asks for our assistance and we remain neutral, our allies around the world will question our commitment to their defense.

Gain:  Staying neutral allows us the best possible positioning to advocate for a peaceful ending to hostilities.  Neutrality also allows our nation the opportunity to provide humanitarian aid and assistance, and as war depresses all belligerent economies, our economy will likely strengthen as international investors look for a safe haven for funds.

Option #2:  The U.S. ally with the ROK, but ground forces do not proceed north of the DMZ.

Risk:  For decades, our motto for troops stationed in Korea has been “Katchi Kapshida, ‘We go forward together’.”  If we are asked but decline to fight inside North Korea alongside our long-time South Korean allies, it may bring turmoil and resentment at the diplomatic and military levels.  The PRC may see it as a show of weakness, and push back against us in every domain using a global hybrid warfare approach.

Gain:  Option #2 would preserve our forces from the hard infantry fight that will certainly define this war, while also upholding our treaty obligations to the letter.  We could use our robust logistic commands to support the ROK from within their borders, and every air wing or brigade we send to defend their land is another unit they can free up to deploy north, hopefully bringing the war to a quicker conclusion.

Option #3:  The U.S. fights alongside the ROK across the entire peninsula.

Risk:  North Korea is a near-continuous mountainous range, and the fighting would be akin to a war among the Colorado Rockies.  This will be an infantry war, fought squad by squad, mountaintop to mountaintop.  This is the sort of war that, despite advancements in medical technology, evacuation procedures, and body armor, will chew units up at a rate not seen since at least the Vietnam War.  We will receive thousands of U.S. casualties, a wave of fallen that will initially overwhelm U.S. social media and traditional news outlets, and probably tens-of-thousands of injured who our Department of Veterans Affairs will treat for the rest of their lives.

Also worth noting is that North Korean propaganda for decades told stories of the barbaric, dangerous U.S. troops and prepared every town to defend themselves from our forces.  Even with the permission of the North Korean government, moving forward of the DMZ would bring with it risks the ROK solders are unlikely to face.  We would face a determined foe to our front and have uncertain lines of supply.

Gain:  Fighting alongside our ROK allies proves on the world stage that the U.S. will not sidestep treaty obligations because it may prove bloody.  We have put the credibility of the United States on-line since World War 2, and occasionally, we have to pay with coin and blood to remind the world that freedom is not free.  Fighting alongside the ROK in North Korea also ensures a U.S. voice in post-war negotiations.

Option #4:  The U.S. fights China worldwide.

Risk:  Thermonuclear war.  That is the risk of this option, there is no way to sugarcoat it.  The PRC has left themselves vulnerable at installations around the world, locations we could strike with impunity via carrier groups or U.S.-based bombers.  More than the previous options, this option risks throwing the Chinese on the defensive so overwhelmingly they will strike back with the biggest weapon in their arsenal.  U.S. casualties would be in the millions from the opening nuclear strikes, with millions more in the post-blast environment.  While we would also gain our measure of vengeance and eliminate millions of Chinese, the ensuing “nuclear autumn” or full-on “nuclear winter” would drop international crops by 10-20%, driving worldwide famines and economic collapse.  Short-term instant gains must be balanced with an equally intense diplomatic push by uninvolved nations to keep the war conventional.

Gain:  Quick and easy victories across the globe with a bloody stalemate in the North Korean mountains may push the Chinese to quickly accept a cease-fire and return to the pre-conflict borders.  A well-run media campaign focusing on the numbers of PRC casualties to one-child families across the world may help push the Chinese citizens to overthrow the government and sue for peace before nuclear weapons are used.

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] Encyclopedia Britannica. Boxer Rebellion. Retrieved 15 June 2018. https://www.britannica.com/event/Boxer-Rebellion 

[2] Guardian, (2018, May 19) China lands nuclear strike-capable bombers on South China Sea islands. Retrieved 15 June 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/19/china-says-air-force-lands-bombers-on-south-china-sea-islands

[3] Panda, A. (2017, October 22). The Doklam Standoff Between India and China is far from over. Retrieved 14 June 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/the-doklam-standoff-between-india-and-china-is-far-from-over/ 

[4] Graham-Harrison, E. (2017, February 4). Islands on the frontline of a new global flashpoint: China v japan. Retrieved 15 June 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/05/china-v-japan-new-global-flashpoint-senkaku-islands-ishigaki

[5] Nakashima, E. and Sonne, P. (2018, June 8). China hacked a Navy contractor and secured a trove of highly sensitive data on submarine warfare. Retrieved 15 June 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/china-hacked-a-navy-contractor-and-secured-a-trove-of-highly-sensitive-data-on-submarine-warfare/2018/06/08/6cc396fa-68e6-11e8-bea7-c8eb28bc52b1_story.html

[6] Ali., I. (2017, July 24) Chinese jets intercept U.S. surveillance plane: U.S. officials. Retrieved 15 June 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-military-idUSKBN1A91QE 

[7] Kubo, N. (2016, June 14) China spy ship shadows U.S., Japanese, Indian naval drill in Western Pacific. Retrieved 15 June 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pacific-exercises-idUSKCN0Z10B8 

[8] Stewart, R. The Korean War: The Chinese Intervention. Archived 2011, Retrieved 14 June 2018. https://web.archive.org/web/20111203234437/http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/kw-chinter/chinter.htm

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Assessment of North Korean Strategy in Preparation for High Level Diplomacy in September 2018

David Maxwell is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation For Defense of Democracies focusing on Korea and East Asian security.  He is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel with five tours in Korea.  He tweets @DavidMaxwell161 and blogs at the Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessment of North Korean Strategy in Preparation for High Level Diplomacy in September 2018

Date Originally Written:  September 4, 2018.

Date Originally Published:  September 7, 2018.

Summary:  The only way the U.S. will see an end to the nuclear program, threats, and crimes against humanity committed by the North Korean mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime is through unification and the establishment of a United Republic of Korea (UROK).  The UROK would be secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people.

Text:  For Kim Jong-un, the Panmunjom Declaration and Singapore joint statement to denuclearize the Korean peninsula are like contracts that specify the precise sequences in which negotiations and action should proceed:

1.  Declare an end to the Korean civil war

2.  Reduce and then end sanctions

3.  Denuclearize South Korea (i.e. end the Republic of Korea (ROK) / U.S. alliance, remove U.S. troops from the peninsula, and remove the U.S. nuclear umbrella over the ROK and Japan)

4.  After completing all of the above, begin negotiation on how to dismantle the North’s nuclear program[1]

The September 2018 summit in Pyongyang between South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un could set the conditions to end the Korean civil war at the United Nations General Assembly meeting at the end of the month.  While there is disagreement among Korean analysts as to North Korea’s true intent, North Korean actions are best viewed through the lens of the Kim family regime’s decades-old strategy.  This strategy wants to ensure the survival of the Kim family regime, unify the peninsula via subversion, coercion, and use of force to guarantee regime survival, and to split the ROK / U.S. alliance to expel U.S. forces from the peninsula.  Additionally, Kim wants SALT/START-like talks in which the North is co-equal to the U.S. like the Soviets were – but Kim will likely settle for Pakistan-like acceptance.

While U.S. President Donald Trump moved past the last administration’s unofficial policy of strategic patience and now conducts unconventional[2], experimental[3], and top-down diplomacy, it is necessary to consider the full scope of the Korea problem, not just the nuclear issue.  U.S. policy towards North Korea and the U.S. / ROK alliance is based on answers to the following:

1.  What does the U.S. want to achieve in Korea?

2.  What is the acceptable and durable political arrangement than will protect, serve, and advance U.S. and ROK / U.S. alliance interests on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia?

3.  Does the U.S. believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned Pyongyang’s seven decades-old strategy of subversion, coercion, and the use of force to achieve northern domination of a unified peninsula in order to ensure the survival of the Kim family regime?

4.  Does the U.S. believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the objective of splitting the ROK / U.S. alliance to get U.S. forces off the peninsula?  In short, has he abandoned his “divide and conquer” strategy: divide the ROK / U.S. alliance and conquer the South[4]?

While pursuing high-level nuclear diplomacy, the U.S. and ROK will keep in mind the entire spectrum of existing threats (The Big 5) and potential surprises that can affect negotiations.

1.  War – The U.S. and ROK must deter, and if attacked, defend, fight, and win because miscalculation or a deliberate decision by Kim could occur at any time.

2.  Regime Collapse – The U.S. and ROK must prepare for this very real possibility and understand it could lead to war; both war and regime collapse could result in resistance to unification within the North.

3.  Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity (Gulags, external forced labor, etc.) –Oppression of the population keeps the Kim regime in power and it uses slave labor to do everything from overseas work to mining uranium for the nuclear program.  Furthermore, U.S. / ROK focus on human rights is a threat to the Kim family regime because this undermines domestic legitimacy – and most importantly, addressing this issue is a moral imperative.

4.  Asymmetric Threats – North Korean asymmetric threats include provocations to gain political and economic concessions, coercion through its nuclear and missile programs, cyber-attacks, special operations activities, and global illicit activities such as those conducted by North Korea’s Department 39.  All of these asymmetric threats keep the regime in power, support blackmail diplomacy, and provide capabilities to counter alliance strengths across the spectrum of conflict.  These asymmetric threats also facilitate resistance following a potential regime collapse.

5.  Unification – The biggest challenge since the division of the peninsula is the fundamental reason for the North-South conflict.  Unification is also the solution to the Korea question.  Note that President Trump in the June 30, 2017 joint statement supported the ROK’s leading role in fostering an environment for peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula[5].

While the focus is naturally on North Korea’s nuclear and missile program, the conventional threat from the North remains significant.  Seventy percent of its 1.2 million-man army is offensively postured between the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and Pyongyang.  The northern artillery in deeply buried and hardened targets poses a dangerous threat to a millions of Koreans in and around Seoul[6].  Since the Moon-Kim and Trump-Kim summits in April and June 2018 respectively, there has been no reduction in these forces and no confidence-building measures from the North Korean side.

While maintaining its aggressive conventional posture, Pyongyang is also pushing for a peace treaty to remove the justification for U.S. forces on the peninsula, as ROK presidential adviser Moon Chung-in wrote in April 2018[7].  However, the legal basis for U.S. presence lies in the ROK / U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953, which makes no mention of North Korea or the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and exists to defend both nations from threats in the Pacific Region[8].  As such, the treaty would remain valid even if Seoul and Pyongyang were technically at peace.

It is the ROK / U.S. alliance and presence of U.S. forces that has deterred hostilities on the peninsula.  As long as there is a conventional and nuclear threat from the North, the ROK / U.S. alliance is required for deterrence.  Based upon this need for a U.S. deterrent, the North’s desire for the removal of U.S. troops must be treated with deep skepticism.

The challenge for the ROK, the U.S., regional powers, and the international community is how to get from the current state of armistice and temporary cessation of hostilities to unification.  While peaceful unification would be ideal, the most likely path will involve some level of conflict ranging from war to internal civil conflict and potentially horrendous human suffering in the northern part of Korea.  The ROK and its friends and allies face an extraordinary security challenge because of the “Big Five.” War, regime collapse, and the north’s nuclear and missile programs pose an existential threat to the ROK.  Finally, although some advocate that the U.S. should keep the human rights as a separate issue; it is a moral imperative to work to relieve the suffering of the Korean people who live in the worst sustained human rights conditions in modern history.

Endnotes:

[1]  David Maxwell. “Three Simple Things the Trump-Kim Summit Could—and Should—Achieve.” Quartz. https://qz.com/1300494/three-simple-things-the-trump-kim-summit-could-and-should-achieve/ (September 4, 2018).

[2]  James Jay Carafano. July 17, 2018. “Donald Trump and the Age of Unconventional Diplomacy.” The National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/donald-trump-and-age-unconventional-diplomacy-26011 (August 10, 2018)

[3]  Patrick M. Cronin, Kristine Lee. 2018. “Don’t Rush to a Peace Treaty on North Korea.” The National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/dont-rush-peace-treaty-north-korea-26936 (August 3, 2018).

[4]  Ibid., Maxwell

[5]  “Joint Statement between the United States and the Republic of Korea.” The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-united-states-republic-korea/ (September 4, 2018).

[6]  “Defense Intelligence Agency: Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2017 A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.” https://media.defense.gov/2018/May/22/2001920587/-1/-1/1/REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-DEMOCRATIC-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-KOREA-2017.PDF

[7]  Moon, Chung-in. 2018. “A Real Path to Peace on the Korean peninsula.” Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-04-30/real-path-peace-korean- peninsula (August 6, 2018).

[8]  “Avalon Project – Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea; October 1, 1953.” http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp (August 6, 2018).

Assessment Papers David Maxwell North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) South Korea (Republic of Korea) United States
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Alternative Futures: South Korea Options for a Chinese Invasion of North Korea (Part 2 of 3)

(Editor’s Note:  This Options Paper is part of our Alternatives Future Call for Papers and examines an invasion of North Korea by the People’s Republic of China from the point of view of North Korea, South Korea, and the United States.  We hope you enjoy all three articles over the coming weeks and many thanks to Jason Hansa for choosing to write for Divergent Options!) 
Mr. Jason Hansa is a retired U.S. Army officer that served in Germany, Korea, and CONUS, with two deployments each to OIF and OEF. He currently works as a military contractor at CASCOM on Fort Lee, Virginia. His twitter address is @HauptmannHansa. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation:  In an alternative future the People’s Republic of China invades North Korea.

Date Originally Written:  June 12, 2018.

Date Originally Published:  September 3, 2018.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article is written from the point of view of the South Korean defense minister personally briefing the South Korean President regarding a potential Chinese invasion of North Korea, circa 2020.

Background:  Our nation has a complicated relationship with China, stretching back centuries.  Our geographic location has made the peninsula the battlefield of choice for Chinese and Japanese invaders, going as far back as the double Manchu invasions of the seventeenth century, the Japanese invasions of the sixteenth century, and even skirmishes against Chinese states during our three-kingdoms period in the seventh century[1].

More recently and in living memory, the Chinese Army swarmed across the Yalu River in 1950, extending the war and inflicting tens of thousands of additional casualties upon our forces.  Had the Chinese not intervened, the war would have ended with our nation forming a new unified democracy with the North, not a land with a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and a never-ending war[2].

The Chinese have made no secret of their desire to expand at the cost of smaller nations.  Indeed, what the world calls the “South China Sea,” they internally refer to as the South Chinese Sea, a difference in terminology they point to as a misunderstanding.  But in politics and in war, words have meanings, and their meaning is clear.

Finally, while we have had periods of improved and degraded relationships with our wayward cousins in North Korea, we have always supported their territorial claims on the global stage, as they have supported ours.  Because we long for the day our nations reunite, on the international stage, both of our nations often speak with one voice.  Mount Baeku has, for centuries, been either wholly Korean or shared with our Chinese neighbors; the thought of it entirely under the rule of the Chinese due to a pending invasion is a disturbing one[3].

Significance:  Our intelligence agencies have confirmed the Chinese activation of three Army Groups on the North Korean border.  These groups have already begun preparatory movements and logistical staging, and have not issued the standard “only an exercise” proclamations.  It is clear their intent is to claim (at a minimum) the Paeku thumb, and most likely the entire ladle-handle of provinces stretching from Kimcheak north to the Russian Border.  North Korean forces are outnumbered approximately three-to-one.

Option #1:  We remain neutral as the Chinese invade North Korea.

Risk:  This option maintains our current relationship with China and North Korea.  This solution has several risks: if China wins and captures the northern provinces, they may be loath to ever return them; if the North Korean state survives the attack, they might feel betrayed by our lack of assistance, delaying peaceful integration.  If the North Korean regime collapses, we may see hundreds of thousands, possibly millions of refugees streaming across the DMZ that we will have to care for.  And, not least of all, a threatened North Korean regime may use nuclear weapons in a last-ditch effort to defend itself.  This use of nuclear weapons will no doubt bring about a vicious retaliation and devastate their land and risk effecting us as well.

Gain:  If the Chinese are able to topple North Korea, then it’s possible the remnants of the North Korean state would be equitable to peaceful reunification with our nation.  We could then, after absorbing the Northern provinces, pursue a peaceful diplomatic solution with the Chinese to return to an ante bellum border.  Our economy, untroubled by war, would be ready to integrate the provinces or care for refugees if necessary.  Finally, if the North Korea regime survived, our military would stand ready to defend against any vengeful tantrums.

Option #2:  We attack the North Koreans and knock them out of the war.

Risk:  This is an unpalatable solution, but as defense minister, I would be remiss in my duty if I didn’t mention it. 

Launching a strike into North Korea once they are fully engaged fighting the Chinese brings about several risks.  The first risk is that most of our planning and simulations are for defensive wars, or—at most—counterstriking into North Korea after degrading their artillery, air force, and supply lines.  Even engaged against the Chinese, it is unlikely the North Koreans will or can move their currently emplaced heavy artillery, which is aimed towards us.  In essence, we will be attacking into the teeth of a prepared enemy.

Our forces will also not be seen as liberators, avengers, or brothers by the North Koreans, but as vultures looking to finish off an opponent already weakened by the Chinese.  Our own people would not look kindly upon our nation launching a war of aggression, and the world at large will question if we’d made a secret treaty with the Chinese.

Finally, it is an open question if a desperate North Korea would launch nuclear warheads at us, the Chinese, or both.

Gain:  Striking the North Koreans while they are engaged fighting the Chinese means they will fight a two-front war and won’t have a depth of reserves to draw upon.  Their forces may be more inclined to surrender to us than to the foreign Chinese, and striking into the country will surely bring the Chinese pause as they will not want to engage us, and we can seek to liberate as much of the North as we could, as fast as possible, diplomatically leaving us in a better post-war situation.

Option #3:  We—alone—join the war alongside the north.

Risk:  Our Northern cousins have always agreed and supported our territorial claims on the global stage, as we have supported theirs.  No matter our differences, we are Korean and stand united against outsiders.  An invasion of their territory is an invasion of Korea.

A risk in using only our brave and proud forces to assist the North is we would lose one of our most vital military assets: our technologically advanced allies.  The defense of our nation has always been an integrated one, so to leave our allies behind the DMZ as we travel north to fight as we have never trained is a risky proposition.

Gain:  This option gains the diplomatic ability to claim this is a Korean-only situation, allowing our allies to work behind the scenes for diplomatic solutions.  This option would also not preclude our allies from enacting their defensive obligations to us: we can turn more forces to the offense if our skies are still protected by the United States Air Force.  On the ground, the terrain of North Korea is mountainous and unforgiving.  It will be an infantry war, one we are well equipped to fight, but also a quagmire our allies will be wary of participating in.  Finally, fighting side-by-side with only our cousins puts us in the best position to control the post-war reunification negotiations.

Option #4:  We, and our allies, join the war alongside the north.

Risk:  Accepting allied assistance north of the DMZ—outside of medical, humanitarian, and possibly logistical—brings with it a number of risks.  First, this option must meet with North Korean approval, or the people of North Korea themselves might rise up against the very troops hoping to save them from invasion.  Second, a wider war could bring the global economy into a crises and expand—possibly even into a nuclear conflagration—as the forces of the U.S. and China begin worldwide skirmishing.  It is no secret the Chinese strategic weaknesses are nowhere near the peninsula, so it’s a forgone conclusion the Americans would attack anywhere they found an opportunity.  A wider war could expand quickly and with grave consequence to the world.  Finally, a wider war brings with it more voices to the table; the post-war reunification discussion would not be wholly Korean one.

Gain:  The Americans, and others, would strike the Chinese around the globe and deep inside China itself, ensuring their populace felt the pinch of the war.  If managed properly, this might not only bring about a quicker end to the invasion, but maybe even spark a popular uprising that would overthrow the Chinese communist.

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] New World Encyclopedia (2018, January 10). History of Korea, Retrieved 14 June 2018. http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/History_of_Korea 

[2] Stewart, R. The Korean War: The Chinese Intervention. Archived 2011, Retrieved 14 June 2018. https://web.archive.org/web/20111203234437/http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/kw-chinter/chinter.htm 

[3] New York Times, (2016, September 27). For South Koreans, a long detour to their holy mountain. Retrieved 14 June 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/27/world/asia/korea-china-baekdu-changbaishan.html

China (People's Republic of China) Jason Hansa North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) Option Papers South Korea (Republic of Korea)
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Alternative Futures: North Korea Options for a Chinese Invasion (Part 1 of 3)

(Editor’s Note:  This Options Paper is part of our Alternatives Future Call for Papers and examines an invasion of North Korea by the People’s Republic of China from the point of view of North Korea, South Korea, and the United States.  We hope you enjoy all three articles over the coming weeks and many thanks to Jason Hansa for choosing to write for Divergent Options!) 
Mr. Jason Hansa is a retired U.S. Army officer that served in Germany, Korea, and CONUS, with two deployments each to OIF and OEF. He currently works as a military contractor at CASCOM on Fort Lee, Virginia. His twitter address is @HauptmannHansa. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation:  In an alternative future the People’s Republic of China invades North Korea.

Date Originally Written:  June 10, 2018.

Date Originally Published:  August 27, 2018.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article is written from the point of view of the North Korean Defense Minister personally briefing his Supreme Leader regarding a potential Chinese invasion, circa 2020.

Background:  Our nation, in truth, owes our existence to our allies in China for their assistance in our most desperate hour in our war to liberate our Southern Comrades.  For this reason, many of our nuclear research and weapons storage facilities were placed within 160 kilometers of their border, to use the Chinese radar and anti-air umbrellas as additional deterrents to American adventurism.

However, our friendship with China has slowly deteriorated, often because they have not always agreed with our decisions when dealing with the U.S. and our Southern Comrades.

Moreover, since our efforts to begin improving relationships with our Southern Comrades, the U.S., and the outside world began during the 2018 Winter Olympics, our relationship with China has soured quickly.  It is also not a secret that the Chinese have welcomed and supported our existence as a buffer state between their borders and that of our ambitious Southern Comrades and their U.S. allies.

The Chinese have long desired a port on the Sea of Japan, and they have spent time and money improving the route between their mostly Korean population of Jillian province and our port-city of Rasan.  We have long-standing agreements allowing them to access our ports with little-to-no customs interference, and they fear that unification will sever their access[1].

Finally, the Chinese have been moving to consolidate territory they consider to be theirs, rightfully or not, as a means to push their dominance onto other nations.  The Chinese have entered into territorial disputes with the Japanese, our Southern Comrades, the Vietnamese, and the Indians[2].  The Chinese have long argued that Mount Baektu, the spiritual homeland of our nation, belongs to them; however, maps and treaties for centuries have either split the mountain down the middle, or made it wholly ours[3][4].  On this, our Southern Comrades agree: the mountain must not be wholly consumed in a Chinese land grab.

Significance:  Our intelligence agencies have determined the Chinese have activated the three Army Groups on our border and intend to invade within the next 48 to 72 hours.  Their goals are to seize our nuclear facilities and many of our northern provinces, most likely from Mount Paektu east to the Sea of Japan.  With most of our forces either aligned towards the south or beginning to stand down in conjunction with peace talks, we are outnumbered approximately three-to-one.

Option #1:  We fight alone.

Risk:  This is a high risk answer because we do not have enough forces in place at this time, and our transportation infrastructure will be the logical first targets in the opening moments of the war.  Our fighter jets, though we have many of them, are antiquated compared to the Chinese air forces.  We do have an advantage in geography: Beijing is close, within our missile range across the Yellow Sea.

Tactically, we would order our forces to hold as long as possible while we brought our southern army groups to bear.  We have the advantages of interior lines, more troops, a populace that is willing to bear any sacrifice against invaders, and incredibly defensible terrain.  We would have to gamble that our Southern comrades would not strike at the same time across the demilitarized zone.

However, if our nuclear launch facilities were in danger of getting overrun by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), there might be a very real choice in which we must “use-them-or-lose-them” concerning our nuclear weapons.  Millions of Chinese are in range of our weapons, including their capital, but the reprisals would be fierce, our nation as we know it would most likely not survive.

Gain:  We would show the world that our nation is strong and unconquerable, provided we won.  There is a significant chance we would not be able to move our forces in time and would have to concede our northern provinces, though our nation as a whole would survive.

Option #2:  We ask only our Southern Comrades and long-time allies for assistance.

Risk:  Our Southern Comrades have always agreed and supported our territorial claims on the global stage, as we have supported theirs.  No matter our differences, we are all Korean, and stand united against outsiders.  Asking for their support would add their technologically advanced forces to our order of battle, thousands of well-trained and motivated infantrymen plus their supporting forces, and a transportation network stretching from Busan to Rasan.  Asking our international allies—such as Sweden—for diplomatic support would put pressure on China both internationally and economically, and would be a way for our nation to gain global support for our cause and condemnation of China’s activities without their active military participation.

However, there would be no return to a pre-war status quo, no chance of our nation surviving independently.  Asking for assistance and allowing the military forces of the south into our nation and fighting side-by-side as one Korea means that, once the war is over, we would reunite as one Korea.  Finally, it can be safely assumed our Southern Comrades will not allow us to use our nuclear weapons against China, no matter what the cost.

Gain:  This option gains us the military of the South without allowing in the U.S. or other allies, maintaining the pretense of a Korea-only problem.  This allows nations that might not feel comfortable fully siding with us an option to save face by aligning with our allies and conducting diplomatic and economic battle with China while remaining out of the active conflict.  Finally, fighting side-by-side with only our Southern Comrades puts us in the best position to ensure both the survival of our regime leadership and bargain for our people as we reunite with the south after the war.

Option #3:  We ask assistance from any who offer.

Risk:  It is likely assured our Southern Comrades would immediately join with us to fend off an invasion.  It is trickier to know the actions of the Americans, among others.  The Americans would have the most to lose fighting a war with China, their biggest creditor and a major trading partner.  But it could also be offered the Americans have the most to gain, a war against China as a possible means of clearing their debt.

As problematic as accepting U.S. assistance may be, there could be other nations that bring with them a host of issues.  Our people would be loath to accept Japanese military assistance, though they have technological capabilities on par with the U.S. and China.  Accepting Russian help once again puts us in their debt, and they always demand repayments in some form or another.  We may be unwilling to pay the costs of Russian assistance down the road.

Finally, accepting outside assistance means our post-war reintegration will be shaped by nations outside of Korea.  These outside nations desire a unified Korea to meet their needs, which is not necessarily the nation we are meant to be.

Gain:  The Americans, and others, would bring with them the capability of expanding the war, striking the Chinese around the globe, and attacking their supply lines, ensuring that the Chinese populace felt the pinch of the war, not only the PLA.  This global striking would probably dramatically shorten the war and reduce casualties among our brave fighting divisions.  Additionally, the U.S. could rally the world to our cause, bringing with them military, diplomatic, humanitarian, and economic aid.

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] AP (2012, August 22) NKorea’s economic zone remains under construction. Retrieved 14 June 2018. https://web.archive.org/web/20120823065244/http://www.thestate.com/2012/08/22/2408642/nkoreas-economic-zone-remains.html#.WyLBFWYUnxh

[2] Panda, A. (2017, October 22). The Doklam Standoff Between India and China is far from over. Retrieved 14 June 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/the-doklam-standoff-between-india-and-china-is-far-from-over/

[3] Lych, O. (2006, July 31) China seeks U.N. Title to Mt. Beakdu. Retrieved 14 June 2018. http://english.donga.com/List/3/all/26/248734/1

[4] New York Times, (2016, September 27). For South Koreans, a long detour to their holy mountain. Retrieved 14 June 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/27/world/asia/korea-china-baekdu-changbaishan.html

China (People's Republic of China) Jason Hansa North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) Option Papers South Korea (Republic of Korea)
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Assessment of North Korea’s Illicit Trafficking Activities

Paul Rexton Kan is professor of National Security Studies and former Henry L. Stimson Chair of Military Studies at the U.S. Army War College.  His most recent book is “Drug Trafficking and International Security” (Rowman and Littlefield, 2016).  In February 2011, he served as the Senior Visiting Counternarcotics Adviser at NATO Headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan.  He can be found on Twitter at @DPRKan.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessment of North Korea’s Illicit Trafficking Activities

Date Originally Written:  October 12, 2017.

Date Originally Published:  October 30, 2017.

Summary:  As the United Nations and member states have increased the number and variety of sanctions on North Korea for its missile launches and nuclear tests, the regime of Kim Jong Un will likely increase its reliance on illicit international activities to earn hard currency.  The international community must be prepared to respond in kind.

Text:  In an effort to pressure the regime of Kim Jong Un to end its ballistic and nuclear programs, the international community is pursuing a wide-range of sanctions against North Korea.  The newest round of United Nations (UN) sanctions contained in Security Council Resolutions 2371 and 2375 passed in August and September of this year are aimed at the heart of North Korea’s ability to trade with the larger world and earn hard currency for its economy.  In keeping with the UN sanctions, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has reduced its oil trade with North Korea and has ordered all North Korean businesses operating in the PRC to close by the spring of 2018.  Meanwhile, in addition to the UN sanctions, U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order in September that allows the U.S. Department of Treasury to sanction specific individuals and entities that engage in assisting North Korean textiles, fishing, information technology and manufacturing industries.

All of the recent sanctions seek to inflict sufficient economic pain on the Kim regime so that it will relent in its pursuit of improved missile and nuclear capabilities.  However, past economic sanctions have proven to be largely ineffective in changing North Korean behavior due to the regime’s ability to rely on illicit trade to finance itself.

The Kim dynasty has a long-running history of undertaking illicit trafficking activities to earn hard currency for the regime.  In fact, the nation’s founder, Kim Il Sung, created an entire government bureaucracy dedicated to pursuing criminal schemes for illicit profit.  Central Committee Bureau 39 of the Korean Workers’ Party was established in 1974 to reduce the country’s dependence on massive Soviet subsidies [1]. Also known as Office #39, this shadowy bureaucracy has proven essential for the North Korean government’s ability to weather economic hardships.  Office #39 has allowed North Korea to survive exceptionally perilous moments of potential state instability such as the collapse of its Soviet benefactor in 1991, the famines in the early 2000s and the dozens of international sanctions programs all the while giving the regime enough economic vitality to pursue nuclear weapons and ballistic programs.

The activities of Office #39 include narcotics manufacturing and distribution, currency and cigarette counterfeiting, arms trafficking, automobile smuggling and money laundering.  These illicit activities have earned billions of dollars for the Kim regime [2]. North Korean government personnel from the military and diplomatic corps carry out these criminal schemes abroad while using dummy companies to deposit launder proceeds through banks in China, Italy, Russia, and Africa[3].  Demonstrating the wide-ranging criminal network of Office #39, they have reportedly made arrangements with the Russian mafia to help the Kim regime launder its funds through the Russian embassy in Pyongyang [4]

Office #39 is also referred to as “Kim’s Cashbox”[5] and has been used to pay for the inducements that keep the North Korean elites mollified with the hereditary communist regime.  Consistent with any totalitarian dictatorship is the ability to control the economy, especially for national leaders who rule by force.  Central to the Kim dynasty’s ability to control its totalitarian regime is a “court economy,” akin to that practiced by an absolute monarch.  To prevent coups over the three generations of Kims, Office #39 has provided the funds to reward the regime’s military, government and party elites; as well as the regime’s security agents.  Such a court economy, resting on the illegal operations of Office #39, thereby promotes internal regime stability.

In addition to undergirding internal regime stability, Office #39 acts to promote North Korea’s external security by financing the weapons’ programs of the regime.  This nexus between illicit finances and sophisticated weapons programs appears to have become tighter under the leadership of Kim Jong Un.  In September 2016, the North Korean military’s organization for owning and running overseas companies, Office #38, was merged with Office #39, now operating only as Office Number 39 [6]. An expert on North Korea believes this merger indicates a growing desire to create a more efficient illicit funding stream to achieve two goals: 1) accelerate the regime’s ballistic missile and nuclear considerable advances; 2) feed even more money into Kim’s court economy as a way to strengthen his possible shaky grasp on leadership [7].

If the United States along with other members of the international community seek to bring maximum economic pressure against North Korea, it will also have to tackle the illicit overseas activities of Office #39.  The U.S. and others have previously coordinated their responses to North Korea’s criminal operations with some success [8].  The Proliferation Security Initiative initiated by the George W. Bush Administration demonstrated that regional cooperation can work to put pressure on Pyongyang’s arms trafficking.  Better coordination of these pressuring activities, through the use of fusion centers and ensuring the inclusion of law enforcement organizations, could enhance their impact.

The time appears right to tackle North Korea’s illicit activities.  North Korea’s recent provocative actions have increased the level of alarm among key regional players, providing a greater impetus for cooperation.  In addition, several North Korean officials posted overseas and who colluded with Office #39 have defected in recent months, taking with them not only vast sums of money, but information about the regime’s illicit financial activities [9] that regional players could use to stymie the regime.  North Korea is not a nation-state that is simply misbehaving. North Korea engages in criminality not as a matter of choice, but of necessity.  Finding new ways combat its illicit international activities will be challenging, but policy-makers must adapt their approaches to bring maximum pressure upon an increasingly bellicose regime.

Endnotes:

[1] Eberstadt, N. (2004).  The persistence of North Korea. Policy Review, Retrieved October 13, 2017, from https://www.hoover.org/research/persistence-north-korea

[2] Kan, P. R., Bechtol, B. E., Jr., & Collins, R. M. (2010). Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea’s Illicit International Activities. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College.

[3] A. G. (2013, September 16). Q&A: High Level Defector on North Korean Trade. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved October 6, 2017, from http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/09/16/qa-high-level-defector-on-north-korean-trade/

[4] Kim Jong Un’s Secret Billions. (2013, March 12). Chosun Ilbo. Retrieved October 12, 2017, from http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/03/12/2013031201144.html

[5] Kim, K. (2007). The Dollarization of the North Korean Economcy. Tongit Yongu (Unification Research), 11(9), 11-34. (In Korean)

[6] N. Korea Combines 2 Units Managing Leader’s Coffers in One: Seoul. (2016, September 29). Yonhap . Retrieved October 3, 2017, from http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/09/485_215017.html

[7] Author interview with Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr. on 4 October 2017.

[8] Asher, D. L. (2011). Pressuring Kim Jong-Il: The North Korean Illicit Activities Initiative, 2001-2006 (pp. 25-52, Publication). Washington, DC: Center for New American Security.

[9] Yi, W. (2016, August 21). N. Korea’s Leader Secret Funds Coming to Light. Korea Times. Retrieved October 2, 2017, from http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/08/485_212381.html

Assessment Papers Illicit Trafficking Activities North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) Paul Rexton Kan
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Assessment of North Korea’s Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons, and Small Arms

Sam Bocetta is a retired engineer who worked for over 35 years as an engineer specializing in electronic warfare and advanced computer systems.  Past projects include development of EWTR systems, Antifragile EW project and development of Chaff countermeasures.  Sam now teaches at Algonquin Community College in Ottawa, Canada as a part-time engineering professor and is the ASEAN affairs correspondent for Gun News Daily and is a part-time cybersecurity coordinator at AsignMywriter.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessment of North Korea’s Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons, and Small Arms

Date Originally Written:  August 25, 2017.

Date Originally Published:  October 2, 2017.

Summary:  Syria has repeatedly used chemical weapons for large-scale assaults on its own citizens.  North Korea has been instrumental in helping develop those weapons, despite numerous sanctions.  Without being put in check, North Korea’s current regime, led by Kim Jong Un, will likely continue this behavior.

Text:  A confidential report released by the United Nations (U.N.) in August of 2017 indicates that North Korea had sent two shipments, which were intercepted, to front companies for the Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC)[1].  The SSRC is known to handle Syria’s chemical weapons program.  These shipments violate sanctions placed on North Korea, and U.N. experts note that they are looking into reports about Syria and North Korea working together on chemical weapons, ballistic missiles and conventional arms.

One U.N. member state believes the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) has a contract with Syria and both intercepted shipments were part of that contract.  In 2009, the U.N. Security Council blacklisted KOMID under concerns that it was North Korea’s key arms dealer and exported supplies for conventional weapons and ballistic missiles.

This is just the latest example of North Korea’s ties to chemical weapons.  In February of this year, Kim Jong Nam, who is North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s half-brother, died in Malaysia[2].  Malaysian police called the death an assassination done using the nerve agent VX, which is part of the same chemical weapons family as sarin but considerably more deadly.  North Korea has denied any involvement in Kim Jong Nam’s death and attributes the death to a medical condition.  Many didn’t believe this denial, and the incident led to people calling for North Korea to be put back on the list for state sponsors of terrorism[3].  In April, the United States’ House of Representatives voted 394-1 in favor of putting Korea back on that list[4].

North Korea has continually crossed the line and ignored sanctions regarding its weapons programs and supplying weapons to other nations.  This puts the United States and its allies in a difficult position, as they can’t let North Korea operate unchecked, but they can’t trust the country’s current regime to comply with sanctions and agreements.

North Korea’s ties to Syria are particularly concerning.  Syria has used chemical weapons for years, and even though it made a deal with the United States and Russia in 2013 to destroy these weapons, it didn’t follow through.  There have been multiple uses of weaponized chlorine and sarin, a nerve agent, although the Syrian government has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing.

North Korea has made its support for Syria clear both publicly and privately.  In April 2017 Kim Jong Un sent a message of congratulations to Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, for the anniversary of the country’s ruling party[5].  This was the same time that Assad was using chemical weapons on his own people, killing 86, which prompted worldwide outrage and a missile strike by the United States on the Syrian airbase of Shayrat[6].

In addition to this public message, there have been several shipments from North Korea to Syria intercepted in recent years.  Contents have included ampoules, chemical suits, masks, and other supplies vital in developing chemical weapons.  North Korea has increased its assistance of Syria during the latter nation’s civil war by sending more chemical weapons, providing advice to the Syrian military and helping with the development of SCUD missiles, which can deliver chemical weapons[7].

Although Syria’s use of chemical weapons is appalling[8], it’s North Korea which is proliferating those weapons and others.  In 2007 North Korea was building a nuclear reactor in the Syrian desert.  The Israeli Air Force destroyed the reactor.  The desert where the reactor once was, as of this writing, is territory of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  Without the attack by Israel, ISIS might have possessed a nuclear reactor that was near completion.  And with the right help and ability to operate unchecked, it is easy to imagine ISIS trying to weaponize the reactor in some manner.

Yet even when the United States catches a North Korean weapons shipment, diplomatic issues can make it difficult to take any action.  That’s what happened in December 2002, when a North Korean ship, the So San, was stopped by anti-terrorist Spanish commandos after weeks of surveillance by the United States[9].  The ship had 15 SCUD missiles on it, which were hidden beneath sacks of cement, and it was on its way to Yemen[10].  In 2001, Yemen, known for harboring terrorists, agreed to stop getting weapons from North Korea.  When the So San was first stopped, the Yemeni government said it wasn’t involved in any transaction related to the ship.

Once the United States commandeered the vessel, Yemen changed its story, filing a diplomatic protest stating that it did purchase the missiles from North Korea as part of an old defense contract and that the United States needed to release the missiles.  It took hours of negotiating between Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was president of Yemen at the time, and both Secretary of State Colin Powell and Vice President Dick Cheney.  Saleh guaranteed that the missiles would only be used for Yemen’s defense and that the nation wouldn’t make any more deals with North Korea, and the United States released the ship.  The United States was developing a counterterrorism partnership with Yemen at that time, and there were few other options to keep the relationship on good terms, but this incident shows that catching North Korea’s weapons shipments is far from the only challenge.

Efforts to halt the spread of chemical and nuclear weapons by North Korea may lead to destabilizing the current regime.  Although there are worries that this destabilization will lead to loose Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the evidence suggests that the spread of WMD is even more likely under Kim Jong Un’s rule.  Sanctions and more thorough inspections of North Korea’s shipments may help here, but it will require that the United States takes a hard-line on any weapons shipments originating from North Korea, and doesn’t allow them simply for diplomatic reasons.

Other approaches may involve penalizing ports that aren’t inspecting shipments thoroughly and flagging those states that reflag ships from North Korea to conceal their country of origin.  Although this could work, it will take time.  It’s all a matter of determining whether the risk is greater with a more aggressive stance towards North Korea or allowing them to continue proliferating weapons.

Endnotes:

[1] Nichols, M. (2017, August 21). North Korea shipments to Syria chemical arms agency intercepted: U.N. report. Retrieved August 25, 2017, from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-syria-un-idUSKCN1B12G2

[2] Heifetz, J. and Perry, J. (2017, February 28). What is VX nerve agent, and what could North Korea do with it? Retrieved August 25, 2017, from http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/23/world/vx-nerve-agent/index.html

[3] Stanton, J. (2017, February 24). N. Korea just killed a guy with one of the WMDs that caused us to invade Iraq … in a crowded airport terminal, in a friendly nation. Retrieved August 25, 2017, from http://freekorea.us/2017/02/24/n-korea-just-killed-a-guy-with-one-of-the-wmds-that-caused-us-to-invade-iraq-in-a-crowded-airport-terminal-in-a-friendly-nation/

[4] Marcos, C. (2017, April 3). House votes to move toward designating North Korea as state sponsor of terror. Retrieved August 25, 2017, from http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/327106-house-votes-to-move-toward-designating-north-korea-as-state-sponsor

[5] Stanton, J. (2017, April 7). If Assad is the murderer of Idlib, Kim Jong-un was an accessory. Retrieved August 25, 2017, from http://freekorea.us/2017/04/07/if-assad-is-the-murderer-or-idlib-kim-jong-un-was-an-accessory/

[6] Brook, T.V. and Korte, G. (2017, April 6). U.S. launches cruise missile strike on Syria after chemical weapons attack. Retrieved August 25, 2017, from https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/04/06/us-launches-cruise-missile-strike-syria-after-chemical-weapons-attack/100142330/

[7] Tribune, W. (2013, August 26). Reports: Cash-strapped N. Korea ‘stepped up’ chemical weapons shipments to Syria. Retrieved August 25, 2017, from http://www.worldtribune.com/archives/reports-cash-strapped-n-korea-stepped-up-chemical-weapons-shipments-to-syria/

[8] Stanton, J. (2017, August 22). Latest cases of chemical proliferation remind us why Kim Jong-Un must go. Retrieved August 25, 2017, from http://freekorea.us/2017/08/22/latest-cases-of-chemical-proliferation-remind-us-why-kim-jong-un-must-go

[9] Lathem, N. (2002, December 12). Korean SCUDs Can Skedaddle; Yemen Gets to Keep Missiles by Promising ‘Defense Only’. Retrieved August 28, 2017, from http://nypost.com/2002/12/12/korean-scuds-can-skedaddle-yemen-gets-to-keep-missiles-by-promising-defense-only/

[10] Goodman, A. (2002, December 12). U.S. lets Scud ship sail to Yemen. Retrieved August 28, 2017, from http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/12/11/us.missile.ship/

Arms Control Assessment Papers Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) Sam Bocetta United States
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U.S. Options for Basing Forces to Deter North Korea

Mark Loncar is retired from the United States Air Force and is a graduate of the Defense Intelligence College, now called National Intelligence University.  He served in South Korea for 23 months.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation:  The U.S. faces a growing existential Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threat from North Korea’s nuclear weapons development program.

Date Originally Written: August 1, 2017.

Date Originally Published:  September 18, 2017.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article is written from the point of view of a U.S. foreign policy advisor.

Background:  North Korea recently tested another ballistic missile, the second major test in a month, as part of a nuclear weapons program that, if brought to fruition, could threaten the U.S.  Policymakers in the U.S. are understandably reticent because of the serious threat that North Korea may respond with aggressive military action against South Korea and bring the U.S. into another Korean conflict.

The U.S. security commitment to its South Korea ally has not been in doubt since the Korean War started in 1950.  However, the positioning of U.S. forces in South Korea has been debated, and over the years, the number of U.S. troops has decreased from the mid-30 thousands before the North Korean nuclear program started in the 1990s to around 28,000 today.  Amid the present North Korean nuclear challenge, it is time to reexamine the utility of keeping U.S. forces in South Korea.

Significance:  The Korean peninsula is no longer the center of gravity in any hostilities between North Korea and the U.S. as North Korea’s ICBM capability, according to media reports, could reach Honolulu, Anchorage, and Seattle.  U.S. policy must adapt to this drastic expansion of the threat in order to end the impasse that characterizes U.S. dealings with the North Korean ICBM challenge.  In expanding his nuclear capability to ICBMs, North Korean President Kim Jong-un has turned what was a Korean peninsula-centric issue into more of an eyeball-to-eyeball existential threat to the U.S..

Option #1:  U.S. forces remain positioned in South Korea.

Risk:  U.S. policy options concerning the North Korean nuclear program will continue to be limited due to the risk of war to South Korea.  The presence of U.S. forces in South Korea preserves the status quo, but does not move the U.S. closer to a solution to the North Korean nuclear challenge.  Having U.S. forces in South Korea also complicates U.S. – South Korea relations and gives South Korea leverage in how the U.S. should respond to the North Korean nuclear issue, further constraining U.S. freedom of movement to respond to North Korea.

Gain:  The presence of U.S. forces in South Korea signals U.S. resolve in the Korean Conflict through a sharing of risk with South Korean allies.  This option maintains a U.S. capability to respond quickly and forcibly to North Korean conventional incursions and other hostile actions against South Korea.

Option #2:  U.S. forces redeploy from South Korea to present cleaner options for dealing with North Korean nuclear weapons threat.  The policy would relocate U.S. forces from South Korea to Japan and other countries and bases in the region.  A continued U.S. military presence near the Korean peninsula will help to reassure South Korea and Japan that the long-time security commitments will abide.  The redeployment would also represent a continuation of major U.S. conventional capability in the area to counter any North Korean conventional aggression.

Risk:  Perception of outright appeasement by U.S. allies.  How could the U.S. proceed with redeployment of forces from South Korea without communicating to friends and adversaries that it would be engaging in all-out appeasement of the North Korean regime and surrendering important U.S. and allied interests in Northern Asia to the People’s Republic of China (PRC)?

Gain:  The removal of U.S. forces from South Korea would be a major inducement for North Korea to scrap its nuclear weapons program or for the PRC to pressure it to do so.  Indeed, North Korea’s paranoia concerning U.S. – South Korea intentions toward its regime could be significantly pacified by moving U.S. forces off the Korean peninsula.  At the same time, the stakes would be raised for Kim Jong-un and his PRC benefactors to change behavior on terms attractive to all parties—agreeing to a peaceful denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and a reduced threat of war on the peninsula.

Second, removing the threat to U.S. forces on the peninsula would present less cumbersome options for the U.S. with respect to the North Korean nuclear weapons challenge, especially concerns about war on the Korean peninsula.  The U.S. would also be less constrained in deciding to preempt or respond directly to North Korean nuclear aggression.  This is the real capability of such a redeploying U.S. forces from South Korea.  North Korea and the PRC would be on notice that if North Korea continued its nuclear weapons ICBM development after a redeployment of U.S. forces off the Korean peninsula, the regime’s action may be met with the gravest of responses.

Third, this option would deny North Korea a pretext for attacking South Korea should the U.S. strike Kim Jong-un’s nuclear facilities.  Such a U.S. strike on North Korean nuclear facilities would come only after a U.S. redeployment from the peninsula and the North Korean regime’s obstinate refusal to scrap its nuclear weapons program.  In this security construct, any North Korean attack below the 38th parallel in retaliation for a U.S. strike on North Korean nuclear facilities would likely elicit the immediate destruction of the North Korean state.

Other Comments:  An opportunity is in reach to have a return to the status quo without a Korean peninsula-centric relationship.  This relationship would be more North Korea-South Korea focused, with the U.S. and the PRC overseeing the relationship.  The U.S. would no longer be in the middle of the mix with its own forces physically present in South Korea.  It may not be the best the U.S. could hope for – that would be a democratic government in North Korea if not an eventual unification of North and South Korea.  However, a U.S. redeployment to incentivize peninsula denuclearization and present cleaner options concerning North Korea’s nuclear weapons program may be a more viable alternative than accepting and having to deter a North Korean global ICBM capability, or to fight another war on the Korean peninsula.  In the end, by removing U.S. forces from South Korea, friend and foe should understand that if North Korea refuses to scrap its nuclear weapons capability, it will be the North Korean regime alone against the overwhelming power of the U.S..

Endnotes:

None.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons China (People's Republic of China) Mark Loncar North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) Option Papers South Korea (Republic of Korea) United States
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United States’ Options to North Korea Missile Development

Mike Dyer is a research assistant at a Washington-based international policy think tank.  He can be found on twitter @mikeysdyer.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation:  United States’ Options in response to North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile developments.

Date Originally Written:  July 22, 2017.

Date Originally Published:  July 31, 2017.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article is written from the point of view of a senior defense/foreign policy advisor to the Trump Administration.

Background:  After decades of development, for the first time in the history of the Korean conflict, North Korea is nearing the capability to hold U.S. population centers on the continental United States at risk with a small nuclear weapon[1].  Nearing this inflection point requires a reexamination of U.S. policy vis-a-vis Northeast Asia.

Significance:  If North Korea’s Kim regime believes it has an effective deterrent against the United States, it may become emboldened to pursue more provocative and dangerous polices.  Such brinkmanship could lead to disaster.  This new fact threatens U.S. extended deterrence commitments to both Japan and South Korea (Republic of Korea (ROK)), depending on the Trump Administration’s policy response.  The Kim regime, while rational, is certainly volatile, and engages in behaviors well outside of international norms.

Option #1:  The United States accepts the reality of North Korea as a nuclear power while maintaining demands for denuclearization.  This option may require adjustments to U.S. defense posture, namely the reintroduction of tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula or the expansion of the ballistic missile defense programs.

Risk:  First, the most salient risk the United States would face is relying on deterrence against a regime for which it lacks an acute understanding.  Relying on deterrence to keep the peace on the Korean peninsula is risky because the Kim regime derives power and legitimacy from propping up the United States and others as an aggressive enemy.

Second, even if the United States does nothing, the Kim regime would still be incentivized to provoke the United States and the ROK if only for domestic reasons.

Third, as previously mentioned, North Korea could work to weaken U.S. extended deterrence commitments by credibly threatening the U.S. homeland.  The United States could work to reduce this risk by demonstrating the effectiveness of its missile defense shield.

Gain:  This option does not risk conflict in the near to medium terms, thus it continues to “kick the can down the road.”  This policy trades tactical and operational risk for increased strategic risk over the long-term.  Otherwise, this option gains nothing.

Option #2:  The United States conducts a pre-emptive strike on North Korea’s known nuclear and ballistic missile sites.

Risk:  First, this option risks large-scale retaliation against the ROK and Japan and the U.S. forces stationed there.  There is a significant chance a military strike would miss known or hidden weapons sites or leave North Korea with the capability to deliver a conventional counter strike[2].

Second, a military strike on North Korean nuclear sites is likely to cause an environmental and humanitarian disaster to some degree.  This could result in unnecessary civilian loss of life, increased pan-Korean nationalism at the expense of the U.S.-ROK alliance, and generally loss of support for U.S. leadership/presence in the region.  The illicit transfer of unaccounted for nuclear materiel could also result.

Gain:  If a strike were successful, the Kim regime would effectively be disarmed.  Such a blow to North Korea could lead to a coup against the Kim regime or to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) intervening to stabilize the situation.

Option #3:  The United States increases economic sanctions on the regime to either bring North Korea to the negotiating table or cause the regime to collapse.  This option is not possible without increased support from the PRC a because of its importance to the North Korean economy.

Risk:  First, sanctions need years to take full effect.  During this time, North Korea’s capabilities could grow and the regime would have opportunity to degrade the situation in its favor.

Second, it is unknown what the Kim regime would do if faced with collapse and loss of power.  Some North Korean interlocutors have made the point that North Korea did not build its nuclear weapons only to watch them go unused as the regime collapses.

Third, the regime values security, prestige, and power over a growing economy, it has effective control over its people and they are discouraged from speaking out against the regime even in private.

Gain:  If successful, sanctions have the potential to accomplish U.S. objectives without risking conflict.  Given the Kim regime’s hierarchy of values however, this option is unlikely to work.

Option #4:  The United States and the ROK negotiate a peace treaty with North Korea.  This option accepts the reality of North Korea’s newfound nuclear capability and gives up on past demands for complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the North’s nuclear program prior to peace negotiations.

Risk:  First, for a durable peace to exist between the United States and North Korea, both sides would have to reach a mutually acceptable political solution, this may mean both North Korea and the ROK giving up on their objectives for reunification—something both states are unwilling to do.  Durable peace would also require security for all concerned and trust that does not currently exist.

Second, negotiating peace without denuclearization would weaken the nuclear nonproliferation regime and cause allies to lose faith in United States’ security commitments.  This option could result in greater nuclear proliferation across Northeast Asia.

Gain:  The gain is limited by the risk of failure, but a peaceful Korean peninsula would benefit regional security and ease the burden on U.S. defense commitments.

Option #5:  The United States undermines the Kim regime by encouraging the flow of information into and out of North Korea.  The United States works with the PRC and ROK to encourage the further development of independent (black) markets in North Korea at the expense of regime control on civil life.

Risk:  First, this policy would require years to fully carry out, allowing North Korea to expand its weapons program in the meantime.

Second, this policy may just raise the quality of life of the North Korean people and expand the regime’s tax base while not convincing the people to push-back against the regime.

Third, as previously mentioned, destabilizing the regime raises the risks of conflict.

Gain:  If successful, this policy could chance the character and policies of the North Korean regime, ultimately leading to peace and reconciliation.

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1]  Ackerman, S., & Jacobs, B. (2017). US commander not confident North Korea will refrain from nuclear assault. the Guardian. Retrieved 22 July 2017, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/26/north-korea-nuclear-attack-south-korea-us-navy

[2]  Your Bibliography: Peters, R. (2017). A New Approach to Eliminating North Korean Weapons of Mass Destruction Is Needed. Washington: The U.S. Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS. Retrieved from http://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/NKIP-Peters-WMDE-062017.pdf  Also see, Bennett, B. (2013). Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse. Rand Corporation.

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People’s Republic of China Options Toward North Korea

Paul Butchard is a graduate student in the Department of War Studies at Kings College London in the United Kingdom, where he is pursuing his master’s degree in Intelligence and International Security.  He also holds a bachelor’s degree in International Relations and Politics.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation:  Options for the foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) toward North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK).

Date Originally Written:  July, 15, 2017.

Date Originally Published:  July 24, 2017.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article is written from the perspective of foreign policy advisor to the PRC government.

Background:  Since January 2016, the DPRK has conducted two nuclear weapons tests and ten missile tests.  Such actions, coupled with increasingly bombastic rhetoric, displays a more aggressive posture for the DPRK than previous years[1].

Significance:  For the PRC, their relationship with the DPRK is a regional policy issue and a central element of PRC-United States relations.  President Xi Jinping is forging an outgoing, “Striving for Achievement” foreign policy for the PRC[2].  Simultaneously, the PRC has displayed more public disapproval of Pyongyang’s destabilising behaviour than previous years[3].  The course of action the PRC adopts towards the DPRK will play a major role in the relationship between Beijing and Washington in years to come, influencing events globally.

Option #1:  The PRC maintains/increases military, economic and diplomatic aid to the DPRK.  This option sees the PRC continuing or building upon its current course of action, providing vast military and economic aid and diplomatic protection to bring the DPRK’s behaviour in line with the PRC’s wishes.

Risk:  The PRC risks appeasing the DPRK, encouraging it to continue along its current path, one that is increasingly casting the PRC as a suzerain unable to rein in a vassal state, to the casual observer.  The DPRK would view such action as capitulation and an acknowledgment by Beijing that Pyongyang cannot be penalised for actions and policies even when they harm the PRC’s interests[4].  The DPRK is conscious of its strategic importance to Beijing and able to take PRC aid without granting concessions.  The PRC risks escalating confrontation with the United States if the latter perceives the PRC as unwilling to act or enabling the DPRK’s current destabilising behaviour, a possibility given recent remarks by President Trump[5].

Gain:  This option enables the PRC to sustain the DPRK regime, avoiding a humanitarian crisis on its border because of regime collapse, maintaining the tense but peaceful status quo.  The PRC avoids being labelled a United States puppet as the DPRK has previously implied[6].  United States’ sanctions related to the DPRK have so far been limited to private companies and individuals, not the PRC government[7].  This option thus avoids igniting military, diplomatic or economic confrontations with the United States.

Option #2:  The PRC decreases/ceases military, economic and diplomatic aid to the DPRK.  This option sees the PRC ‘sanction’ the DPRK by reducing or halting military, economic or diplomatic aid to alter its behaviour to suit PRC preferences.

Risk:  This option risks the collapse of the DPRK regime due to the PRC being its main economic trading partner.  The PRC also risks economic self-harm due to the vast natural resources it imports from the DPRK[8].  The collapse of the DPRK brings unparalleled security concerns for the PRC from uncontrolled nuclear materials and mass immigration to the potential of a United States ally on its border.

Gain:  By reducing aid the PRC would be acting against the DPRK’s unpredictable actions, potentially slowing its development of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), increasing its international standing, a cornerstone of President Xi’s foreign policy.  Such action would be seen favourably by the Trump administration increasing the likelihood of favourable trade deals or relative acquiescence to PRC actions in the South China Sea.

Option #3:  Regime change.  This option would see the PRC pursue regime change within the DPRK by means of supporting a coup d’état or palace coup of some description rather than overt military action of its own.

Risk:  The DPRK government and society revolves fully around the Kim dynasty, the removal of the deity that is Kim Jong Un and the Kim lineage risks the total collapse of the state.  There is no clear successor to Kim due to the autocratic nature of the DPRK and any successor would likely be considered a PRC puppet and usurper.  Subsequent destabilisation would result in the aforementioned humanitarian and security crisis’ posing a grave national security threat to the PRC.  Such action would be logistically and strategically difficult to accomplish, requiring multiple sections of the DPRK military and governmental apparatus being coordinated by a vast human intelligence network operated by the PRC.  As such, and due to pervasive North Korean surveillance even of its elites, a coup risks discovery long before execution.  United States and South Korean forces may see any attempt at regime change as an opportunity to launch their own military offensive or as evidence of PRC expansionism and a threat to the South.

Gain:  Replacing Kim Jong Un could lead to increased stability for the PRC’s regional development objectives.  The PRC could avoid total DPRK state collapse due to external pressure and avert the potential national security threats to the PRC mainland.  This option also raises the possibility of enhancing United States-PRC relations, buying the PRC the aforementioned political capital.  A new DPRK regime, allied with the PRC, that tempers its actions toward the United States, also raises the possibility of the removal of the United States’ Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defence system from South Korea, which the PRC views as a national security threat.  This option also presents the potential for the reduction of United States troop numbers in South Korea due to increased stability and a reduced threat from the DPRK.

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] Council on Foreign Relations, (2017) North Korea Crisis. Retrieved July 13, 2017 from https://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/conflict/north-korea-crisis

[2] Yan, X. (2014). From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement. The Chinese Journal of International Politics,7(2), 153-184.

[3] Perlez, J. (2017, February 24). China and North Korea Reveal Sudden, and Deep, Cracks in Their Friendship. Retrieved July 14, 2017, from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/world/asia/china-north-korea-relations-kim-jong-un.html

[4] Pei, M. (2017, March 14). North Korea: What Is China Thinking? Retrieved July 14, 2017, from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/03/china-north-korea-kim-jong-un-nuclear-beijing-pyongyang-thaad/519348/

[5] Weaver, M., Haas, B., & McCurry, J. (2017, April 03). Trump says US will act alone on North Korea if China fails to help. Retrieved July 14, 2017, from https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/02/donald-trump-north-korea-china

[6] Sang-hun, C. (2017, February 23). North Korea Accuses China of ‘Mean Behavior’ After It Tightens Sanctions. Retrieved July 14, 2017, from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/world/asia/north-korea-china.html

[7] Aleem, Z. (2017, June 29). Why Trump just slapped new sanctions on Chinese banks. Retrieved July 14, 2017, from https://www.vox.com/world/2017/6/29/15894844/trump-sanctions-china-north-korea-bank

[8] Perlez, J., & Huang, Y. (2017, April 13). China Says Its Trade With North Korea Has Increased. Retrieved July 14, 2017, from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/world/asia/china-north-korea-trade-coal-nuclear.html 

[9] Reuters. (2017, February 28). China reacts with anger, threats after South Korean missile defense decision. Retrieved July 15, 2017, from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-thaad-china-idUSKBN16709W

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