Assessment of North Korea’s Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons, and Small Arms

Sam Bocetta is a retired engineer who worked for over 35 years as an engineer specializing in electronic warfare and advanced computer systems.  Past projects include development of EWTR systems, Antifragile EW project and development of Chaff countermeasures.  Sam now teaches at Algonquin Community College in Ottawa, Canada as a part-time engineering professor and is the ASEAN affairs correspondent for Gun News Daily.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessment of North Korea’s Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons, and Small Arms

Date Originally Written:  August 25, 2017.

Date Originally Published:  October 2, 2017.

Summary:  Syria has repeatedly used chemical weapons for large-scale assaults on its own citizens.  North Korea has been instrumental in helping develop those weapons, despite numerous sanctions.  Without being put in check, North Korea’s current regime, led by Kim Jong Un, will likely continue this behavior.

Text:  A confidential report released by the United Nations (U.N.) in August of 2017 indicates that North Korea had sent two shipments, which were intercepted, to front companies for the Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC)[1].  The SSRC is known to handle Syria’s chemical weapons program.  These shipments violate sanctions placed on North Korea, and U.N. experts note that they are looking into reports about Syria and North Korea working together on chemical weapons, ballistic missiles and conventional arms.

One U.N. member state believes the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) has a contract with Syria and both intercepted shipments were part of that contract.  In 2009, the U.N. Security Council blacklisted KOMID under concerns that it was North Korea’s key arms dealer and exported supplies for conventional weapons and ballistic missiles.

This is just the latest example of North Korea’s ties to chemical weapons.  In February of this year, Kim Jong Nam, who is North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s half-brother, died in Malaysia[2].  Malaysian police called the death an assassination done using the nerve agent VX, which is part of the same chemical weapons family as sarin but considerably more deadly.  North Korea has denied any involvement in Kim Jong Nam’s death and attributes the death to a medical condition.  Many didn’t believe this denial, and the incident led to people calling for North Korea to be put back on the list for state sponsors of terrorism[3].  In April, the United States’ House of Representatives voted 394-1 in favor of putting Korea back on that list[4].

North Korea has continually crossed the line and ignored sanctions regarding its weapons programs and supplying weapons to other nations.  This puts the United States and its allies in a difficult position, as they can’t let North Korea operate unchecked, but they can’t trust the country’s current regime to comply with sanctions and agreements.

North Korea’s ties to Syria are particularly concerning.  Syria has used chemical weapons for years, and even though it made a deal with the United States and Russia in 2013 to destroy these weapons, it didn’t follow through.  There have been multiple uses of weaponized chlorine and sarin, a nerve agent, although the Syrian government has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing.

North Korea has made its support for Syria clear both publicly and privately.  In April 2017 Kim Jong Un sent a message of congratulations to Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, for the anniversary of the country’s ruling party[5].  This was the same time that Assad was using chemical weapons on his own people, killing 86, which prompted worldwide outrage and a missile strike by the United States on the Syrian airbase of Shayrat[6].

In addition to this public message, there have been several shipments from North Korea to Syria intercepted in recent years.  Contents have included ampoules, chemical suits, masks, and other supplies vital in developing chemical weapons.  North Korea has increased its assistance of Syria during the latter nation’s civil war by sending more chemical weapons, providing advice to the Syrian military and helping with the development of SCUD missiles, which can deliver chemical weapons[7].

Although Syria’s use of chemical weapons is appalling[8], it’s North Korea which is proliferating those weapons and others.  In 2007 North Korea was building a nuclear reactor in the Syrian desert.  The Israeli Air Force destroyed the reactor.  The desert where the reactor once was, as of this writing, is territory of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  Without the attack by Israel, ISIS might have possessed a nuclear reactor that was near completion.  And with the right help and ability to operate unchecked, it is easy to imagine ISIS trying to weaponize the reactor in some manner.

Yet even when the United States catches a North Korean weapons shipment, diplomatic issues can make it difficult to take any action.  That’s what happened in December 2002, when a North Korean ship, the So San, was stopped by anti-terrorist Spanish commandos after weeks of surveillance by the United States[9].  The ship had 15 SCUD missiles on it, which were hidden beneath sacks of cement, and it was on its way to Yemen[10].  In 2001, Yemen, known for harboring terrorists, agreed to stop getting weapons from North Korea.  When the So San was first stopped, the Yemeni government said it wasn’t involved in any transaction related to the ship.

Once the United States commandeered the vessel, Yemen changed its story, filing a diplomatic protest stating that it did purchase the missiles from North Korea as part of an old defense contract and that the United States needed to release the missiles.  It took hours of negotiating between Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was president of Yemen at the time, and both Secretary of State Colin Powell and Vice President Dick Cheney.  Saleh guaranteed that the missiles would only be used for Yemen’s defense and that the nation wouldn’t make any more deals with North Korea, and the United States released the ship.  The United States was developing a counterterrorism partnership with Yemen at that time, and there were few other options to keep the relationship on good terms, but this incident shows that catching North Korea’s weapons shipments is far from the only challenge.

Efforts to halt the spread of chemical and nuclear weapons by North Korea may lead to destabilizing the current regime.  Although there are worries that this destabilization will lead to loose Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the evidence suggests that the spread of WMD is even more likely under Kim Jong Un’s rule.  Sanctions and more thorough inspections of North Korea’s shipments may help here, but it will require that the United States takes a hard-line on any weapons shipments originating from North Korea, and doesn’t allow them simply for diplomatic reasons.

Other approaches may involve penalizing ports that aren’t inspecting shipments thoroughly and flagging those states that reflag ships from North Korea to conceal their country of origin.  Although this could work, it will take time.  It’s all a matter of determining whether the risk is greater with a more aggressive stance towards North Korea or allowing them to continue proliferating weapons.


Endnotes:

[1] Nichols, M. (2017, August 21). North Korea shipments to Syria chemical arms agency intercepted: U.N. report. Retrieved August 25, 2017, from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-syria-un-idUSKCN1B12G2

[2] Heifetz, J. and Perry, J. (2017, February 28). What is VX nerve agent, and what could North Korea do with it? Retrieved August 25, 2017, from http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/23/world/vx-nerve-agent/index.html

[3] Stanton, J. (2017, February 24). N. Korea just killed a guy with one of the WMDs that caused us to invade Iraq … in a crowded airport terminal, in a friendly nation. Retrieved August 25, 2017, from http://freekorea.us/2017/02/24/n-korea-just-killed-a-guy-with-one-of-the-wmds-that-caused-us-to-invade-iraq-in-a-crowded-airport-terminal-in-a-friendly-nation/

[4] Marcos, C. (2017, April 3). House votes to move toward designating North Korea as state sponsor of terror. Retrieved August 25, 2017, from http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/327106-house-votes-to-move-toward-designating-north-korea-as-state-sponsor

[5] Stanton, J. (2017, April 7). If Assad is the murderer of Idlib, Kim Jong-un was an accessory. Retrieved August 25, 2017, from http://freekorea.us/2017/04/07/if-assad-is-the-murderer-or-idlib-kim-jong-un-was-an-accessory/

[6] Brook, T.V. and Korte, G. (2017, April 6). U.S. launches cruise missile strike on Syria after chemical weapons attack. Retrieved August 25, 2017, from https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/04/06/us-launches-cruise-missile-strike-syria-after-chemical-weapons-attack/100142330/

[7] Tribune, W. (2013, August 26). Reports: Cash-strapped N. Korea ‘stepped up’ chemical weapons shipments to Syria. Retrieved August 25, 2017, from http://www.worldtribune.com/archives/reports-cash-strapped-n-korea-stepped-up-chemical-weapons-shipments-to-syria/

[8] Stanton, J. (2017, August 22). Latest cases of chemical proliferation remind us why Kim Jong-Un must go. Retrieved August 25, 2017, from http://freekorea.us/2017/08/22/latest-cases-of-chemical-proliferation-remind-us-why-kim-jong-un-must-go

[9] Lathem, N. (2002, December 12). Korean SCUDs Can Skedaddle; Yemen Gets to Keep Missiles by Promising ‘Defense Only’. Retrieved August 28, 2017, from http://nypost.com/2002/12/12/korean-scuds-can-skedaddle-yemen-gets-to-keep-missiles-by-promising-defense-only/

[10] Goodman, A. (2002, December 12). U.S. lets Scud ship sail to Yemen. Retrieved August 28, 2017, from http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/12/11/us.missile.ship/

Arms Control Assessment Papers North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) Sam Bocetta United States Weapons of Mass Destruction

Trump Administration Options Towards Iran

Ted Martin has a keen interest in Iranian affairs and has spent time in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Divergent Options content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of  any government, any organization, or any group.


National Security Situation:  Iran, sanctions, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) / United Nations (UN) Resolution 2231(2015)[1].

Date Originally Written:  March 27, 2017.

Date Originally Published:  May 8, 2017.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  Author has spent time in Iraq and Afghanistan as a member of the U.S. Military.  He has also studied Iran and Hezbollah since 2000.  This article is written as advice to a U.S. decision maker.

Background:  Despite the negotiation of the JCPOA, Iran is still a U.S. foreign policy concern.  Iran occupies a strategic position, able to block the export of oil through the Persian Gulf at the narrow Strait of Hormuz, and able to strike the Arab countries that produce that oil.  Iran has long had aspirations of regional hegemony and employed destabilizing proxy forces to further its ends in the region.  Iran’s continued belligerent behavior and the recent U.S. election of President Donald Trump beg a re-assessment of U.S. options.

Significance:  The JCPOA was negotiated by the previous administration under President Barack Obama and has been subject to harsh criticism by the new administration under President Trump.  Iran has recently engaged in provocative behavior by conducting new ballistic missile tests[2].  Although these new ballistic missile tests do not violate the JCPOA, these actions suggest Iran may test the limits of the JCPOA and the Trump administration[2].  As a counter-point to any hard-line the Trump administration may take against Iran, many European companies are already renewing business and banking contacts with the regime[3].  There is little interest in canceling the JCPOA in Europe, and without European support, it would be nearly impossible to re-impose effective sanctions[8].

Option #1:  The U.S. treats Iran as a pariah and continues to work to isolate Iran from the international system.  This assumes that isolation, as a punishment that negatively impacts the Iranian people, will serve to pull Iran back into the fold of acceptable behavior.

Risk:  Iran developed ties with other states on the margins such as Russia and the People’s Republic of China that helped to sustain it during 30 years of sanctions[4][5].  Iran has become proficient at working behind the scenes and using proxies and can mitigate some of the impacts of sanctions and continue its attempts to influence its neighbors[6].  It is unlikely that Europe will willingly join in another round of sanctions if the U.S. decides to renew them[8].  The U.S.’s likely only remaining option would be military action with few international partners.

Gain:  With Option #1, the U.S. will continue to keep local allies in the region who despise Iran such as Saudi Arabia and other Arab states happy[7].  The enduring threat of sanctions and the forced isolation of Iran by the U.S. will maintain the balance of power in the region cultivated over the last twenty years and is an important consideration.  A shunned Iran may make U.S. allies in the region stronger.

Option #2:  The U.S. allows Iran to continue to integrate into the international system.  This assumes that the closer Iran comes to the rest of the world, the less likely it will be to lash out and the more vulnerable it will be to economic or diplomatic pressure.

Risk:  Iran gains legitimacy by being allowed to rejoin the economic and political systems of the world.  Iran would also gain the ability to access items needed for its nuclear program on the international market.  Iran has blustered about closing the Gulf to oil transit before.  However, Iran has never done so, even during its war with Iraq, as such a move would hurt its own oil exports[7].  Closing the Persian Gulf at the straits of Hormuz is still a risk, even if mitigated by Iran’s increased dependence on the world.  Saudi Arabia would oppose Option #2 in the strongest possible terms, and it may seriously damage U.S. formal relations with them[9].

Gain:  Iran in the international community would find itself the beneficiary of access to the international banking system to enable oil exports and other civil export and import rules that would benefit its civil and military population.  As a member of the international community, Iran may find it harder to justify proxies such as Hezbollah.  The U.S. has long hoped to influence Iran to become more moderate and this may further that goal.

Other Comments:  The proxy war between Iran and the allies of Saudi Arabia has involved the U.S and is currently raging in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen[6][9].  Both the U.S. and Iran are likely to continue to fight using proxies in other countries, and the potential to involve the U.S. in more regional conflicts is high.  Iran’s nuclear ambitions are a central part of this problem and finding a solution is important.  Iran may also consider keeping the region chaotic to distract the U.S. and Europe to benefit its purposes.

Recommendation:  None.


Endnotes:

[1]  United Nations. (2015) Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/

[2]  Kenyon, P. (2017 February 3). Did Iran’s ballistic missile test violate a U.N. resolution? National Public Radio. Retrieved from: http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/02/03/ 513229839/did-irans-ballistic-missile-test-violate-a-u-n-resolution

[3]  Arnold, M. (2016 April 3). Europe’s banks begin tentative return to Iran. Financial Times. Retrieved from: https://www.ft.com/content/75dc8d7e-f830-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132

[4]  Katz, M.N. (2010). Iran primer: Iran and Russia. Public Broadcasting System. Retrieved from: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/10/iran-primer-iran-and-russia.html

[5]  Takeyh, R., & Maloney, S. (2011). The self-limiting success of Iran sanctions. International affairs 87 (6) pp. 1297-1312. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01037.x

[6]  Fisher, M. (2016, November 19). How the Iranian-Saudi proxy struggle tore apart the Middle East. The New York Times. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/world/middleeast/iran-saudi-proxy-war.html

[7]  Glaser, C.L. & Kelanic, R.A. (2017 January/February). Getting out of the gulf. Foreign Affairs 96(1).

[8]  Alkhalisi, Z. (2016, November 10). Trump could hit Iran with sanctions — but Europe would scream. CNN Money. Retrieved from: http://money.cnn.com/2016/11/10/news/economy/trump-iran-sanctions/

[9]  Morris, L. & Naylor, H. (2015 July 14). Arab states fear nuclear deal with give Iran a bigger regional role. The Washington Post. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/arab-states-fear-dangerous-iranian-nuclear-deal-will-shake-up-region/2015/07/14/96d68ff3-7fce-4bf5-9170-6bcc9dfe46aa_story.html

Arms Control Economic Factors Iran Option Papers Ted Martin Treaties and Agreements