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Assessment of the Risk of a Nuclear Exchange with Russia: Is the U.S. Whistling Past the Nuclear Graveyard?

Neil Snyder is a U.S. Army Colonel.  The views expressed in this article are his own.  His research focuses on national security decision-making and civil-military relations. He earned a PhD in Political Science from Stanford University as a Goodpaster Scholar of the United States Army Strategic Plans and Policy Program (ASP3).  Follow him on Twitter @neilsny.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessment of the Risk of a Nuclear Exchange with Russia: Is the U.S. Whistling Past the Nuclear Graveyard?

Date Originally Written:  November 11, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  November 14, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that risk of a nuclear exchange in Ukraine is not solely due to Putin’s aggression. Instead, risk is a consequence of strategic interaction between the U.S. and Russia, meaning a consequence of both Putin’s actions and U.S. decision-making.

Summary:  There is uncertainty over how the U.S. might respond to Putin’s threats of nuclear weapon use in Ukraine, which raises curiosity about the sources of nuclear risk.  This risk includes three aspects of U.S. policymaking: presidential leadership, creativity and engagement of forward-thinking nuclear planners, and the flexibility of the bureaucracy in the face of crisis. The conclusion is that the U.S. may own some of the risk of a nuclear exchange over Ukraine.

Text:  Russian President Vladimir Putin has threatened to use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, prompting comparisons to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis[1]. Fortunately, Putin has recently issued statements tempering the threat[2], but the war in Ukraine is not over. Russia appears to be losing badly, suggesting Putin might play the one (nuclear) card he has left.  

Unfortunately, the risk of nuclear exchange over Ukraine is not widely understood because the public discourse has been confusing.  Some reporting suggests that Putin’s threats are real[3], but prominent commentators have also dismissed the threats[4]. There is also uncertainty over how the U.S. might respond to Russian nuclear aggression. U.S. Army General (Retired) David Petraeus recently argued that the U.S. would most likely respond to Russian nuclear action with a massive conventional response[5]. Even so, it is not clear how a massive conventional response would not trigger further escalation, given Russia’s already precarious strategic position.

One narrative is that Putin is singularly responsible for the current nuclear risk because of his blatant attempt at nuclear blackmail[6] and his “record of folly and recklessness[7].” Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is clearly a moral wrong and he precipitated the crisis, but the U.S. may nonetheless contribute to the risk of this crisis in unforeseen ways. A rigorous assessment requires considering both Putin’s aggression and how the U.S responds. 

Seventy years of U.S. nuclear planning for Russian, Chinese, North Korean, and terrorist-related contingencies has not prepared the U.S. well for the current crisis. Ukraine is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A Russian nuclear attack on Ukraine does not encumber the U.S. with the same obligations as an attack on a formal ally. It is not altogether clear how the U.S. should respond to an attack on a partner, especially if Russia employs low-yield weapons, performs a nuclear demonstration, or takes other actions lower on the so-called nuclear ladder[8]. 

This highly contingent situation motivates a closer look into the black box of U.S. nuclear response planning to see how the U.S.’s own nuclear structures might contribute to today’s risk. U.S. presidential leadership, policy advocacy (or lack thereof) by nuclear policy analysts, and the bureaucratic politics of the U.S. defense enterprise all affect how the U.S. has responded to prior nuclear crises. 

U.S. President John F. Kennedy’s management of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is perhaps the canonical example of presidential leadership amidst a nuclear crisis. Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision illustrates how Kennedy’s personal leadership was necessary to structure decision-making and tamp down escalation risk[9]. Kennedy challenged advisors’ assumptions, forced the Executive Committee or “ExComm” to generate alternatives to the escalatory options advisors initially favored, and expanded the bargaining range with Nikita Khrushchev, the Premier of the Soviet Union. Kennedy’s intrusive leadership during the crisis was necessary to reduce escalation risk over Cuba, following the model of the “unequal dialogue” advanced by Elliot Cohen[10]. 

However, Kennedy’s steady hand may be more the exception than the rule. Multiple presidents have taken the U.S. to the nuclear brink. President Dwight Eisenhower contemplated nuclear escalation in Korea. President Richard Nixon made multiple proposals to use nuclear weapons in Vietnam. Most recently, President Donald Trump threatened “Fire and Fury” against North Korea. As Keith Payne has observed, leaders have pursued “surprising goals and risked national security in ways…considered highly unlikely and even irrational at the time[11].”

U.S. Presidents’ personal management style, experiences[12], and heuristics affect U.S. nuclear risk during crises[13]. Even “ideal” presidents have limits because they are human. Kahneman and Tversky’s seminal work illustrates that all decision-makers suffer from debilitating cognitive biases[14]. The late Robert Jervis argued that leaders’ misperceptions could increase the probability of nuclear conflict in some situations[15]. All of the preceding suggests taking a close look at how the White House and the National Security Council is weathering the current crisis in Ukraine. Unfortunately for the public, presidents’ deliberations over sensitive national security matters are normally done behind a wall of secrecy (which, ironically, could be another source of risk). 

Even clear-eyed U.S. presidents rely on the options developed by the national security bureaucracy. Those nuclear response options (or the lack thereof) have frequently been a source of risk for escalation. Fred Kaplan’s remarkable book on the ebbs and flows of U.S. nuclear policy reveals that, throughout U.S. nuclear history, true progress and reform of nuclear plans depended on the actions of a small number of enterprising defense intellectuals who challenged assumptions and led change[16]. Entrepreneurial defense experts are key to the risk equation during nuclear crises because, as Tom Nichols recently pointed out, the “military and the nuclear establishment are resistant to change[17].” Without experts’ advocacy and influence from within the national security bureaucracy, U.S. presidents are likely to have fewer and less suitable response options.  

Furthermore, a Russian nuclear attack on Ukraine does not map cleanly to the kinds of situations nuclear planners have historically focused on. As Scott Sagan has observed, the defense establishment often relies on rigid plans[18]. It should not surprise readers that the defense establishment relies on standard operating procedures instead of doing the hard work to chart a new course.  And today’s crisis in Ukraine exists within the rich context of the U.S. Defense Department’s ongoing operations, activities, and investments. Skepticism that this vast U.S. national security enterprise has the organizational agility to adapt quickly in the face of a dynamic crisis like the situation in Ukraine is healthy. That lack of strategic agility is evident today, as routine exercises have been identified as a source of increasing risk[19].

Each of these U.S.-internal sources of risk causes concern because if a Russian nuclear attack in Ukraine is a frightening, then the thought of a nuclear exchange between Russia and the U.S. is altogether more terrifying. Deterrence seems to be holding but, as Colin Gray famously argued, there is “no objectively correct answer” to questions of nuclear risk[20].  Assessing nuclear risk is extremely difficult[21]. Putin clearly deserves blame for provoking the crisis and, though there is no moral equivalency between Putin’s actions and potential U.S. responses, U.S. policymakers would gain from remaining strategically humble and assess themselves as source of risk, too. 

Endnotes:

[1] “Russia’s Lavrov Needles Biden over Cuban Missile Crisis and Ukraine,” Reuters, October 30, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-lavrov-needles-biden-over-cuban-missile-crisis-ukraine-2022-10-30/.

[2] “Putin Says ‘no Need’ for Using Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine,” PBS NewsHour, October 27, 2022, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/vladimir-putin-rules-out-using-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine.

[3] Helene Cooper, Julian E. Barnes, and Eric Schmitt, “Russian Military Leaders Discussed Use of Nuclear Weapons, U.S. Officials Say,” The New York Times, November 2, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/02/us/politics/russia-ukraine-nuclear-weapons.html.

[4] Greg Myre, “How Likely Is a Russian Nuclear Strike in Ukraine?,” NPR, October 4, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/10/04/1126680868/putin-raises-the-specter-of-using-nuclear-weapons-in-his-war-with-ukraine; Timothy Snyder, “How Does the Russo-Ukrainian War End?,” Thinking About… (blog), October 5, 2022, https://snyder.substack.com/p/how-does-the-russo-ukrainian-war.

[5] Olafimihan Oshin, “Petraeus Predicts US Would Lead NATO Response to ‘Take out’ Russian Forces If Putin Uses Nuclear Weapon,” The Hill, October 2, 2022, https://thehill.com/homenews/sunday-talk-shows/3671100-petraeus-predicts-us-would-lead-nato-response-to-take-out-russian-forces-if-putin-uses-nuclear-weapon/.

[6] Andriy Zagorodnyuk, “Bowing to Putin’s Nuclear Blackmail Will Make Nuclear War More Likely,” Atlantic Council (blog), October 18, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/bowing-to-putins-nuclear-blackmail-will-make-nuclear-war-far-more-likely/.

[7] “Putin Threatens Nuclear War. The West Must Deter Disaster.,” Washington Post, October 3, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/10/03/putin-nuclear-war-ukraine-deter/.

[8] Michael Fitzsimmons, “The False Allure of Escalation Dominance,” War on the Rocks (blog), November 16, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/false-allure-escalation-dominance/; Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960).

[9] Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Longman, 1999).

[10] Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command (New York, NY: Free Press, 2002).

[11] Keith B. Payne, “The Great Divide in US Deterrence Thought,” Strategic Studies Quarterly Summer (2020): 16–48.

[12] Michael C. Horowitz and Allan C. Stam, “How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders,” International Organization 68, no. 3 (2014): 527–59.

[13] Elizabeth N. Saunders, Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).

[14] Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011).

[15] Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[16] Fred Kaplan, The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2020).

[17] Tom Nichols, “The Nuclear Question America Never Answers,” The Atlantic, November 1, 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/11/biden-nuclear-posture-review-2022/671949/.

[18] Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Norton, 2003).

[19] Kate Hudson, “NATO, Russia War Games Are Making Nuclear Risks Worse,” Al Jazeera, October 24, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/10/24/biden-is-making-putins-nuclear-threat-worse.

[20] Colin Gray, Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 2.

[21] Amy J. Nelson and Alexander H. Montgomery, “How Not to Estimate the Likelihood of Nuclear War,” Brookings (blog), October 19, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/10/19/how-not-to-estimate-the-likelihood-of-nuclear-war/.

 

Assessment Papers Neil Snyder Nuclear Issues Russia Ukraine
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Options to Manage the Kingdom of Saudia Arabia’s Nuclear Ambitions

Joshua Urness is an officer in the United States Army who has served both in combat and strategic studies roles.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group. 

National Security Situation:  In a notional future the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) Defense Ministry leadership are strongly advocating for initiating a domestic nuclear weapons development program and have begun discussing the issue at King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy.

Date Originally Written:  January 14, 2018.

Date Originally Published:  March 26, 2018.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article is written from the point of view of a non-proliferation and arms control professional working in the U.S. government. This professional was asked to provide recommendations to members of the national security council on how to dissuade the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from pursuing nuclear weapons.

Background:  This background, though containing some facts, is based on the above described notional situation. Key drivers for the KSA on the issue are anticipation of the expiration of the Iranian Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action within 10-15 years and persistent adversarial relations with Iran; likely attributable to continued Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps activity throughout the Gulf Cooperation Council region. This adversarial activity includes perceived Iranian support of Houthi Rebels, by proxy, in Yemen, a force that frequently fires ballistic missiles into KSA territory and has destabilized the KSA’s southern border region.

For this notional scenario we assume that the KSA:

– is a member of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has actively supported the establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East (as recently as May, 2017[1]).

– does not currently possess the technological, intellectual or infrastructural capability necessary to produce fissile material or a nuclear weapon[2].

– has been working to develop a domestic nuclear energy program.

– possesses nuclear weapon capable delivery vehicles which were purchased in 2007 from China (DF-21 ballistic missile variants) and has spent substantial resources developing its Strategic Missile Force[3].

– recently published a plan for state-level economic reformation (“Vision 2030”[4]).

– signed a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. in 2008 on nuclear energy cooperation, an objective also discussed with France[5].

– has illicit agreements with states such as Pakistan for “off the shelf” nuclear weapons capabilities based on the known fact that the KSA funded work by A.Q. Khan[6].

Significance:  This situation matters to the United States because of the following U.S. national security interests:

– Prevent the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction (National Security Strategy, 2017)

– “Checking Iran’s malign influence while strengthening regional friends and allies” (Defense Posture Statement, 2017) and, therefore, the security of trade within and through the Middle East.

– Support of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the NPT 2020 review.

– Support of weapons of mass destruction free zones and, therefore, the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East.

Option #1:  The U.S. focuses on influencing KSA key stakeholder and future king, Crowned Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, to neutralize proponents of nuclear weapons development by supporting his keystone political platform, “Vision 2030.”

“Vision 2030” is an extremely ambitious and aggressive plan that is heavily reliant on both foreign direct investment[7] and non-native intellectual contribution to domestic institutional development. The U.S. could assist the KSA in providing both in a manner that emphasizes domestic nuclear energy and deemphasizes the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Mohammed Bin Salman, author of the plan, is expected to accede the throne soon (to ensure the passing of power under supervision of the current king), and already exercises significant authority regarding the KSA’s future and will be the primary stakeholder in all major decisions.

Risk:  This option accepts that the KSA develops a domestic nuclear energy program which may require more than customary monitoring to determine if this program will become dual-use for nuclear weapons development.

Gain:  This option demonstrates public U.S. support for key allies sustainable economic development in a manner that obscures specific intentions of policy and  will benefit the U.S. economy in long run because of increased ties to development.

Option #2:  The U.S. enhances its current security guarantee and cooperation by expanding the types of weapon systems/services delivered to the KSA and making rapid initial delivery of key systems, which will provide public regional assurance of commitment.

Recent weapons agreement with the KSA totaling $110 billion (bn) U.S. dollars ($350 bn over 10 years) does not include long-range stand-off weapons (land, air or sea) capable of counter-battery fire that could reach Iran. The agreements do include air defense systems (Patriot, THAAD) in limited numbers. This option would expand the current weapons agreement to include such stand-off weapons and increases in air defense systems. This option also emphasizes rapid delivery of equipment currently available to satisfy urgency of KSA military leaders. Expanding service packages with equipment would require forward stationing of U.S. service members in the KSA to train, maintain and develop technical institutional knowledge of new systems, further promoting STEM initiatives of “Vision 2030.”

Risk:  This option only passively addresses KSA nuclear weapon development discussions as it seeks to address insecurity by attempting to conventionally deter Iran.

Gain:  The U.S. Department of Defense is currently seeking acquisition of long-range munitions in significant numbers and funding from this expanded agreement could be used to jump-start production. Rapid delivery would reinforce commitment to all allies in the region.

Other Comments:  Option #1 maximizes benefits for both parties, better than other options. While U.S. national interests are supported in the region, the U.S. will also benefit economically from partnerships built out of acknowledgment and support of the KSA’s effort to achieve “Vision 2030.” Option #1 will also demonstrate U.S. engagement in the region’s key interests and political/economic initiatives. Discussions of nuclear weapons development will be decisively dealt with in a non-public manner; an issue that, if handled publicly, could cause concern in other regional states.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] “United Nations PaperSmart – Secretariat – UNODA – NPT – First Session (NPT) – Documents.” Accessed September 22, 2017. http://papersmart.unmeetings.org/secretariat/unoda/npt/2017-first-session-of-the-preparatory-committee/documents/

[2] “Will Saudi Arabia Acquire Nuclear Weapons? | NTI.” Accessed September 22, 2017. http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/will-saudi-acquire-nuclear-weapons/

[3] “Why Did Saudi Arabia Buy Chinese Missiles?” Foreign Policy. Accessed September 22, 2017. https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/30/why-did-saudi-arabia-buy-chinese-missiles/

[4] “Saudi Vision 2030.” Accessed September 22, 2017. http://vision2030.gov.sa/en

[5] Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs. “U.S.-Saudi Arabia Memorandum of Understanding on Nuclear Energy Cooperation,” May 16, 2008. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/may/104961.htm

[6] Sanger, David E. “Saudi Arabia Promises to Match Iran in Nuclear Capability.” The New York Times, May 13, 2015, sec. Middle East. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-promises-to-match-iran-in-nuclear-capability.html

[7] “Goals | Saudi Vision 2030.” Accessed September 22, 2017. http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/goals

Capacity / Capability Enhancement Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons Joshua Urness Nuclear Issues Option Papers Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)
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United States’ Options to North Korea Missile Development

Mike Dyer is a research assistant at a Washington-based international policy think tank.  He can be found on twitter @mikeysdyer.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation:  United States’ Options in response to North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile developments.

Date Originally Written:  July 22, 2017.

Date Originally Published:  July 31, 2017.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article is written from the point of view of a senior defense/foreign policy advisor to the Trump Administration.

Background:  After decades of development, for the first time in the history of the Korean conflict, North Korea is nearing the capability to hold U.S. population centers on the continental United States at risk with a small nuclear weapon[1].  Nearing this inflection point requires a reexamination of U.S. policy vis-a-vis Northeast Asia.

Significance:  If North Korea’s Kim regime believes it has an effective deterrent against the United States, it may become emboldened to pursue more provocative and dangerous polices.  Such brinkmanship could lead to disaster.  This new fact threatens U.S. extended deterrence commitments to both Japan and South Korea (Republic of Korea (ROK)), depending on the Trump Administration’s policy response.  The Kim regime, while rational, is certainly volatile, and engages in behaviors well outside of international norms.

Option #1:  The United States accepts the reality of North Korea as a nuclear power while maintaining demands for denuclearization.  This option may require adjustments to U.S. defense posture, namely the reintroduction of tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula or the expansion of the ballistic missile defense programs.

Risk:  First, the most salient risk the United States would face is relying on deterrence against a regime for which it lacks an acute understanding.  Relying on deterrence to keep the peace on the Korean peninsula is risky because the Kim regime derives power and legitimacy from propping up the United States and others as an aggressive enemy.

Second, even if the United States does nothing, the Kim regime would still be incentivized to provoke the United States and the ROK if only for domestic reasons.

Third, as previously mentioned, North Korea could work to weaken U.S. extended deterrence commitments by credibly threatening the U.S. homeland.  The United States could work to reduce this risk by demonstrating the effectiveness of its missile defense shield.

Gain:  This option does not risk conflict in the near to medium terms, thus it continues to “kick the can down the road.”  This policy trades tactical and operational risk for increased strategic risk over the long-term.  Otherwise, this option gains nothing.

Option #2:  The United States conducts a pre-emptive strike on North Korea’s known nuclear and ballistic missile sites.

Risk:  First, this option risks large-scale retaliation against the ROK and Japan and the U.S. forces stationed there.  There is a significant chance a military strike would miss known or hidden weapons sites or leave North Korea with the capability to deliver a conventional counter strike[2].

Second, a military strike on North Korean nuclear sites is likely to cause an environmental and humanitarian disaster to some degree.  This could result in unnecessary civilian loss of life, increased pan-Korean nationalism at the expense of the U.S.-ROK alliance, and generally loss of support for U.S. leadership/presence in the region.  The illicit transfer of unaccounted for nuclear materiel could also result.

Gain:  If a strike were successful, the Kim regime would effectively be disarmed.  Such a blow to North Korea could lead to a coup against the Kim regime or to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) intervening to stabilize the situation.

Option #3:  The United States increases economic sanctions on the regime to either bring North Korea to the negotiating table or cause the regime to collapse.  This option is not possible without increased support from the PRC a because of its importance to the North Korean economy.

Risk:  First, sanctions need years to take full effect.  During this time, North Korea’s capabilities could grow and the regime would have opportunity to degrade the situation in its favor.

Second, it is unknown what the Kim regime would do if faced with collapse and loss of power.  Some North Korean interlocutors have made the point that North Korea did not build its nuclear weapons only to watch them go unused as the regime collapses.

Third, the regime values security, prestige, and power over a growing economy, it has effective control over its people and they are discouraged from speaking out against the regime even in private.

Gain:  If successful, sanctions have the potential to accomplish U.S. objectives without risking conflict.  Given the Kim regime’s hierarchy of values however, this option is unlikely to work.

Option #4:  The United States and the ROK negotiate a peace treaty with North Korea.  This option accepts the reality of North Korea’s newfound nuclear capability and gives up on past demands for complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the North’s nuclear program prior to peace negotiations.

Risk:  First, for a durable peace to exist between the United States and North Korea, both sides would have to reach a mutually acceptable political solution, this may mean both North Korea and the ROK giving up on their objectives for reunification—something both states are unwilling to do.  Durable peace would also require security for all concerned and trust that does not currently exist.

Second, negotiating peace without denuclearization would weaken the nuclear nonproliferation regime and cause allies to lose faith in United States’ security commitments.  This option could result in greater nuclear proliferation across Northeast Asia.

Gain:  The gain is limited by the risk of failure, but a peaceful Korean peninsula would benefit regional security and ease the burden on U.S. defense commitments.

Option #5:  The United States undermines the Kim regime by encouraging the flow of information into and out of North Korea.  The United States works with the PRC and ROK to encourage the further development of independent (black) markets in North Korea at the expense of regime control on civil life.

Risk:  First, this policy would require years to fully carry out, allowing North Korea to expand its weapons program in the meantime.

Second, this policy may just raise the quality of life of the North Korean people and expand the regime’s tax base while not convincing the people to push-back against the regime.

Third, as previously mentioned, destabilizing the regime raises the risks of conflict.

Gain:  If successful, this policy could chance the character and policies of the North Korean regime, ultimately leading to peace and reconciliation.

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1]  Ackerman, S., & Jacobs, B. (2017). US commander not confident North Korea will refrain from nuclear assault. the Guardian. Retrieved 22 July 2017, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/26/north-korea-nuclear-attack-south-korea-us-navy

[2]  Your Bibliography: Peters, R. (2017). A New Approach to Eliminating North Korean Weapons of Mass Destruction Is Needed. Washington: The U.S. Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS. Retrieved from http://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/NKIP-Peters-WMDE-062017.pdf  Also see, Bennett, B. (2013). Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse. Rand Corporation.

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