Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, and United States Army. In addition to Divergent Options, he has been published in the Center for Maritime Strategy, the Center for International Maritime Security, the Washington Monthly, Merion West, Wisdom of Crowds, Braver Angels, and more. He can be found on Twitter at @MDPurzycki, on Medium at https://mdpurzycki.medium.com/, and on Substack at The Non-Progressive Democrat. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.
Title: Assessing the Benefits of the U.S. Army Divesting in Armored Brigade Combat Teams and Investing in Security Force Assistance Brigades
Date Originally Written: June 26, 2023.
Date Originally Published: July 3, 2023.
Author and / or Article Point of View: The author believes that the demand signal for the U.S. Army to conduct Security Force Assistance is greater than the demand signal for it to employ Armored Brigade Combat Teams. The author also believes reducing the number of Armored Brigade Combat Teams, and increasing the number of Security Force Assistance Brigades, will make the United States Army better able to address 21st century threats at a time when recruiting faces strong challenges.
Summary: Russia’s loss of many of its tanks in Ukraine highlights the vulnerability of heavy armor in modern conflict. While tanks are still relevant, the U.S. Army may currently place too much emphasis on them. A greater reliance instead on advisors might help the U.S. protect its interests abroad with fewer personnel and less heavy equipment.
Text: The M1 Abrams has been the U.S. Army’s main battle tank since 1980[1]. While it was designed to repel an invasion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states by the Warsaw Pact, it first saw combat in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, where it proved highly effective against the Soviet-built tanks of the Iraqi army[2]. Today, the Abrams forms the core of the Army’s Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs), of which there are 11 in the Active Component and five in the National Guard[3].
For many years, however, defense experts have questioned whether the Abrams is well-suited to the conflicts the Army has fought, or is likely to fight, in the 21st century. In 2000, Keith B. Bickel of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments noted that the Abrams was too wide to fit through narrow streets in many villages in Kosovo[4], where U.S. troops were deployed in 1999 as part of a NATO peacekeeping mission. In 2002, James R. Blaker and Steven J. Nider of the Progressive Policy Institute, stressing the need for light infantry units to fight the War on Terror, called for shifting much of the Army’s heavy armor to reserve units[5]. Security expert and former Army paratroop officer Sean McFate advocated a similar shift of tanks to the National Guard in his 2019 book, The New Rules of War[6].
While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shown that armor is still relevant to 21st century, it does not necessarily follow that the U.S. needs a large number of ABCTs. A 2021 paper by Stacie Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser, and Jennie Matuschak of the Center for a New American Security, while it called for the U.S. Army to be ready to repel a Russian invasion of NATO, also called for “cannibalizing several brigade combat teams” to ensure the U.S. had sufficient equipment in Eastern Europe prepared to act quickly in the event of a Russian attack[7]. While this analysis considers heavy armor to still be important for the U.S. and NATO, one can infer from it that the Army can fulfill its mission in Eastern Europe with fewer ABCTs than it currently possesses.
Russia has lost approximately two-thirds of the tanks it has used in its invasion of Ukraine[8]. While this is in part due to the use of poor tactics by Russian commanders, such as the failure to employ combined arms, the tanks have proven vulnerable to such weapons as man-portable anti-tank systems (MANPATS) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)[9]. This provides another incentive for the U.S. to reconsider the role of the Abrams in the 21st century Army.
The U.S. also suffers from multiple challenges in military recruitment. More than three-quarters of Americans between the ages of 17 and 24 are ineligible for service, often due to obesity, drug and alcohol use, and other issues related to physical and mental health[10]. As early as 2012, Army Lieutenant General Mark Hertling described obesity as a national security concern[11]. Concerns about discrimination by commanders also hamper recruiting[12], as do worries about sexual harassment and assault within the military[13]. While each of these factors can and should be addressed for their own sake, they also provide an incentive for the Army to consider units that require fewer soldiers than an ABCT.
One such type of unit are the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs). Established in 2018, SFABs’ mission is to “conduct training, advising, assisting, enabling and accompanying operations with allied and partner nations”[14]. Each of the Army’s five current Active SFABs is regionally focused[15], giving it expertise in the cultures and security challenges of a particular part of the world. An SFAB includes approximately 800 soldiers[16], while an ABCT includes more than 4,000[17].
With fewer ABCTs, the U.S. can more readily provide Abrams tanks to allies and partners. The U.S. is currently providing Abrams to NATO ally Poland[18], as well as to Ukraine as it fights to repel Russia’s invasion[19]. Furthermore, with fewer U.S. brigades requiring tanks, more vehicles can be prepositioned in locations such as Poland[20] and South Korea[21], allowing the Army to rapidly respond to potential threats posed by the armies of Russia and North Korea.
Training partner forces to end conflicts, or to prevent them before they occur, makes it less likely that the U.S. will see a need to deploy its own troops to conflict zones. At a time when the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have soured most Americans on extended overseas deployments of U.S. troops, American leaders and policymakers will need options for maintaining stability in contentious regions that do not involve large-scale deployments of ground forces. Increasing the number of SFABs, in tandem with reducing the Army’s emphasis on heavy armor, provides one such option.
Endnotes:
[1] First Division Museum. “M1 Abrams Tank.” https://www.fdmuseum.org/exhibit/m1-abrams-tank/
[2] Hollings, Alex. “How American Abrams Tanks Devastated Russian Tanks in Iraq.” Sandboxx, March 22, 2023. https://www.sandboxx.us/blog/how-american-abrams-tanks-devastated-russian-tanks-in-iraq/
[3] Congressional Research Service. “Defense Primer: Organization of U.S. Ground Forces.” November 21, 2022. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF10571.pdf
[4] Bickel, Keith B. “Buying Smart.” Blueprint Magazine, January 1, 2000. https://www.ndol.org/ndol_ci_kaid_124_subid_159_contentid_1129.html
[5] Blaker, James R. and Steven J. Nider. “Time to Transform.” Blueprint Magazine, January 16, 2002. https://web.archive.org/web/20070212194620/http://www.dlc.org/ndol_ci.cfm?kaid=124&subid=159&contentid=250033
[6] McFate, Sean. The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder. New York, HarperCollins, 2019, page 39. https://www.amazon.com/New-Rules-War-Victory-Disorder/dp/0062843583
[7] Pettyjohn, Stacie, Becca Wasser, and Jennie Matuschak. “Risky Business Future Strategy and Force Options for the Defense Department.” Center for a New American Security, July 2021. https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/RiskyBusiness_Budget22_Web.pdf?mtime=20210720095157&focal=none
[8] Saballa, Joe. “Russia Has Lost Two-Thirds of Tanks in Ukraine: Intel.” Defense Post, June 1, 2023. https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/06/01/russia-lost-tanks-ukraine/
[9] Imperial War Museums. “Why have Russian tanks struggled in Ukraine?” https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/why-have-russian-tanks-struggled-in-ukraine
[10] Novelly, Thomas. “Even More Young Americans Are Unfit to Serve, a New Study Finds. Here’s Why.” Military.com, September 28, 2022. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2022/09/28/new-pentagon-study-shows-77-of-young-americans-are-ineligible-military-service.html
[11] “Obesity is a National Security Issue: Lieutenant General Mark Hertling at TEDxMidAtlantic 2012.” December 6, 2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sWN13pKVp9s
[12] Skove, Sam. “As Army Launches Recruiting Drive in Cities, One Recruiter Lays Out the Challenges.” Defense One, May 17, 2023. https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/05/army-launches-recruiting-drive-cities-one-recruiter-lays-out-challenges/386435/
[13] Seck, Hope Hodge. “Female Army enlistments down after Vanessa Guillen’s death, data shows.” Army Times, June 13, 2023. https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2023/06/13/female-army-enlistments-down-after-vanessa-guillens-death-data-shows/#:~:text=In%20terms%20of%20female%20representation,has%20yet%20to%20fully%20recover
[14] U.S. Army. “Security Force Assistance Brigades.” https://www.army.mil/sfab
[15] Congressional Research Service. “Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs).” March 23, 2023. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF10675.pdf
[16] Association of the United States Army. “The U.S. Army’s Security Force Assistance Triad: Security Force Assistance Brigades, Special Forces and the State Partnership Program.” October 3, 2022. https://www.ausa.org/publications/us-armys-security-force-assistance-triad-security-force-assistance-brigades-special
[17] Congressional Research Service. “Defense Primer: Organization of U.S. Ground Forces.” November 21, 2022. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF10571.pdf
[18] Associated Press. “Poland signs deal to buy 2nd batch of Abrams tanks.” January 4, 2023. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/01/04/poland-signs-deal-to-buy-2nd-batch-of-us-abrams-tanks/
[19] Baldor, Lolita C. and Tara Copp. “US Abrams tanks for training Ukrainian forces arrive in Germany ahead of schedule.” Associated Press, May 11, 2023. https://apnews.com/article/abrams-tanks-ukraine-war-training-russia-62a21f24f4769044b3fcade518e5b44e
[20] U.S. Department of State. “U.S. Security Cooperation With Poland.” October 31, 2022. https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-poland/
[21] Winkie, Davis. “Army will no longer rotate tank units to Korea — but the tanks are staying.” Army Times, July 1, 2022. https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2022/07/01/army-will-no-longer-rotate-tank-units-to-korea-but-the-tanks-are-staying/