Options for the United States to Counter China’s Multi-Pronged Offensives in Taiwan

Editor’s Note:  This article is part of our 2023 Writing Contest called The Taiwan Offensive, which took place from March 1, 2023 to July 31, 2023.  More information about the contest can be found by clicking here.

Marshall McGurk is an officer in the United States Army and a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is on Twitter @MarshallMcGurk. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


National Security Situation:  Options for the United States to counter China’s multi-pronged offensives in Taiwan.

Date Originally Written:  July 5, 2023.

Date Originally Published:  August 7, 2023.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is an active-duty U.S. military officer who believes the U.S. policy on the Taiwan issue can move from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity. 

Background:  The People’s Republic of China (PRC) takes a multi-pronged approach to bring Taiwan under its banner. China’s president Xi Jinping publicly states that China’s leadership will “advance peaceful national reunification[1].” Senior PRC officials state their timeline of forced armed reunification is 2027, the PRC’s 78th anniversary[2]. The divergence of these statements provide flexibility to the PRC. Peaceful reunification may be preferred, but the PRC military is preparing for armed conflict, nonetheless. China’s economic belt and road initiative reaches global, across land and maritime domains, while their diplomatic and cultural arms aggressively push the narrative of PRC dominance[3]. The U.S. does not have official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, however it enjoys a “robust unofficial relationship,” which “[serves] as the impetus for expanding U.S. engagement with Taiwan[4].” U.S. relations with Taiwan are governed by the American Institute in Taiwan[5].

Significance:  The multi-pronged approach to challenging Taiwanese sovereignty is a national security issue because it presents Communist Chinese Party (CCP) imperial, revanchist designs in Asia. Should the CCP succeed in subjugating Taiwan, the impact will be felt across alliances and partnerships seeking to maintain free trade and economic relationship. The issue of China’s imperialist designs matters not just to the United States but to its allies and partners in North Asia, Southeast Asia, Oceania, and the Indian subcontinent.

Option #1:  The United States could indirectly counter the CCP’s multi-pronged approach through increased relationships between the United States and Taiwan in all aspects of national power. What the U.S. can do is maintain the one-China policy while simultaneously increasing its partnerships with Taiwan. The current President of Taiwan is a graduate of Cornell University. The U.S. could use this point to increase exchanges of students and experts across academia, public, and private sectors. There are military training events occurring between Taiwan and the United States[6]. The U.S. could develop a recurring exercise between Taiwan’s military for conventional, joint, and special operations forces. There are significant networks between Taiwanese and United States manufacturing, transportation, and free trade. The U.S. could increase the size and remit of the American Institute of Taiwan and provide the same openness to the Taiwanese. Refining and bolstering financial ties between the U.S. and Taiwan, as well as increasing ties with regional partners such as the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan is also possible. 

Risk:  Increased U.S. investment in Taiwan, even with the bounds of the one-China policy, could be seen as duplicitous and cause an escalation between the PRC, the U.S., and Taiwan. This option may lead to political stalemate or infighting within the U.S. Additionally, increased investment in Taiwan, in accordance with the one-China policy, may be perceived as curtailing or divesting of U.S. interests in other regions of Asia, thus alarming allies and partners. 

Gain:  Option #1 provides the U.S. with clarity within the bounds of the one-China policy and the Six Assurances[7]. It is a continuation of the larger status quo, but a refinement of U.S. actions. Option #1 provides a basic for dialogue and openings for cooperation, while mitigating misunderstandings.

Option #2:  The U.S. has the option to move away from the one-China policy and support Taiwanese independence. This includes modification or cancellation of the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances.

Risk:  Disavowing the one-China policy may prompt a PRC invasion of Taiwan. This risk can be mitigated by diplomatic negotiations and talks that could occur since U.S. policy will have changed. Second, it may be seen that disavowing the one-China principles limits options for the U.S. President in addressing the Taiwan issue. This risk can be addressed by labelling the one China policy as no longer tenable given the PRC’s inflammatory rhetoric and behavior. Furthermore, U.S. recognition of Taiwan provides increased opportunity for diplomatic relations with both countries. Option #2 opens opportunities for PRC dialogue within the U.S., however the policy will require changes agreed upon by the U.S. legislative and executive branches. U.S. politicians may see Option #2 as limited the options of future presidents, and thus may not refute the one-China policy.

Gain:  There are three gains with this approach. First, this option moves the U.S. away from strategic ambiguity and towards strategic clarity. Strategic clarity provides allies and partners a touchstone of U.S. credibility and legitimacy. Second, all options can still be on the table for how the U.S. addresses PRC responses to the Taiwan issue—including cooperation—but disavowing the one-China Policy sets clear opposition to PRC revanchist schemes. Third, U.S. recognition of Taiwan may staunch the loss of its formal allies, which stands at 14 after the departure of Nicaragua in 2021[8].

Other Comments:  The U.S. government need not follow the whims of private companies or institutions who modify language, maps, or statements showing Taiwan as part of China. The PRC and the ruling-CCP have shown themselves to be bullies in the international community and appeasement of a bully provides no benefit. 

Recommendation:  None.


Endnotes:

[1] Sacks, D. (2021, July 6). What Xi Jinpings major speech means for Taiwan. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-xi-jinpings-major-speech-means-taiwan

[2] Grossman, D. (2021, November 10). Taiwan is safe until at least 2027, but with one big caveat. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/11/taiwan-is-safe-until-at-least-2027-but-with-one-big.html 

[3] Nawrotkiewicz, J., & Martin, P. (2021, October 22). Understanding Chinese “Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy.” The National Bureau of Asian Research. other. Retrieved July 30, 2023

[4] U.S. Department of State. (2023, April 26). U.S. relations with Taiwan – united states department of state. U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/ 

[5] U.S. Citizen Services. American Institute in Taiwan. (2023, July 20). https://www.ait.org.tw/services/

[6] Liebermann, O. (2023, February 24). US plans to expand training of Taiwanese forces | CNN politics. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/23/politics/us-taiwan-forces-training/index.html

[7] Lawrence, Susan V. (2023, June 13). President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan (CRS Report No. IF11665) Retrieved from Congressional Research Service website: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11665

[8] Al Jazeera. (2021, December 10). After Nicaragua break, who are Taiwans remaining allies? News | Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/10/who-are-taiwan-diplomatic-allies 

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Options to Address the Risk from Elected Officials Concurrently in the National Guard or Reserves

Marshall McGurk serves in the United States Army and has deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. He presently works at the Joint Readiness Training Center as a Special Operations Forces Observer-Coach/Trainer. He can be found on Twitter @MarshallMcGurk and writes for the Havok Journal website. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


National Security Situation:  Elected Officials who concurrently serve in the National Guard or Reserves politicize the U.S. Armed Forces.

Date Originally Written:  January 13, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  January 31, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is an active duty U.S. Army Officer. The author believes in the responsibilities and duties of military service.  The article is written from the point of view that boundaries must be made or enforced to prevent politicization within the Armed Forces.

Background:  Currently, there are 14 members of the 117th Congress still serving in the Armed Forces of the United States. “Six House Members and one Senator are still serving in the reserves, and seven House Members are still serving in the National Guard[1].” Veteran candidates for political office and those serving while elected find themselves under increased scrutiny.  This scrutiny comes from a public with different opinions regarding the January 6, 2021 attempted insurrection at the U.S. Capitol Building in response to the 2020 election, a nation no longer at war in Iraq or Afghanistan, and a crippling global pandemic that has threatened the U.S. economy and national security.  Due to these events, numerous retired military officers from O-5 to General Officer/Flag Officer rank have publicly expressed their concerns for or against previous or current U.S. Presidents[2][3].

None of the options outlined hereafter prohibit non-partisan elected or appointed service allowed by Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 1344.10, “Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces.”

Significance:  In light of the background and the increasing airing of grievances, having elected officials serving concurrently in the military is a national security concern. The use of military uniforms, rank-based trappings, and influence in the electoral process is ripe for exploitation by foreign intelligence services. This situation sows seeds of division among military members, could negatively affect the trust that civilians and military members place in their elected officials, and could create undue influence of rank upon military members when the ballot is cast.

There is also a waning of civilian trust in the U.S. military. A November 2021 Reagan Foundation survey found only 45% of those surveyed had a great deal of confidence in the military institution[4]. Civilian trust in the military institution is vital for national defense. Serving while in elected office may lead to conflicts of interest while developing response options to foreign interference in U.S. elections.

Option #1:  DoD Requires Elected Military Members to Enter the Individual Ready Reserve

The Department of Defense could create regulations that place elected military members or those appointed to partisan national positions in the Individual Ready Reserve, without pay, benefits, or activation, for the duration of their elected service. The strictures of DoDD 1344.10 remain in place, allowing the elected official to state their military affiliation, while also confirming the primacy of their elected position. 

Risk:  Elected officials maintaining military affiliation through the little-known Individual Ready Reserve may lead to confusion within the electorate about roles and responsibilities of their elected officials. This may also trigger conflict of interest concerns if language in the legislation does not prohibit activation of concurrently serving officials for overseas or Defense Support of Civil Authorities missions. 

Gain:  Option #1 would allow for a possible win-win-win for military members seeking elected office, for the Legislative Branch, and for the Department of Defense. Elected officials could maintain affiliation to a trusted and respected institution, and the Legislative Branch and electorate would not endure their Representatives and Senators deploying to dangerous missions outside of their legislative duties.

Option #2:  DoD Prohibits Military Members from Seeking Elected Office

Another option is for the Department of Defense to modify DoDD 1344.10, “Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces[5],” so military members are prohibited from seeking elected office entirely. Those seeking state or national elected office would have to agree to an honorable discharges or retirement from military service before declaring candidacy. This option includes all services, components, military occupational specialties, and functional areas.

Risk:  Option #2 would remove a historical precedent of concurrent service in the Legislative and Executive Branches of government going back to the founding of the United States and the Continental Congress. An adjustment to this precedent would spark debate in the Department of Defense, the greater Executive Branch, the Legislative branches, as well as debate in the public sphere by those wishing to maintain the status quo.  

Gain:  Option #2 reinforces the non-partisan nature of the United States Armed Forces in accordance with the spirit and intent of DoDD 1344.10.

Option #3:  Congress Bars Members from Reserve or National Guard Membership

One option is for Congress to pass legislation barring national elected officials or those appointed to partisan national positions from serving in the Reserve or National Guard. The newly elected or appointed official must resign or retire from their military position prior to their inauguration. There is historical precedent for this option as President Dwight D. Eisenhower resigned his military commission in 1952 prior to his presidency[6].

Risk:  This change in legislation would only affect those elected to national office.  This means states would have to make their own choices about whether or not to change their legislation. Human Resource departments within the Armed Forces may not be prepared to process resignations or retirements of elected officials currently serving.

Gain: The gain from option #3 is a removal of risk, a removal of misinformation and disinformation opportunities, and a clear delineation of military and civil responsibilities.

Other Comments:  All three options would require DoDD 1344.10 to be re-written, coordinated, adjudicated, and its new version approved by the Secretary of Defense.

Recommendation:  None.


Endnotes:

[1] Congress.gov. (2022, January 3). Membership of the 117 Congress: A profile. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved January 15, 2022 from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46705 

[2] Open letter from retired generals and admirals. Flag Officers 4 America. (2021, May). Retrieved January 15, 2022, from https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/fb7c7bd8-097d-4e2f-8f12-3442d151b57d/downloads/2021%20Open%20Letter%20from%20Retired%20Generals%20and%20Adm.pdf?ver=1620643005025 

[3] Eaton, P. D., Taguba, A. M., & Anderson, S. M. (2022, January 6). Opinion | 3 retired generals: The military must prepare now for a 2024 insurrection. The Washington Post. Retrieved January 15, 2022, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/12/17/eaton-taguba-anderson-generals-military/ 

[4] Beacon Research (2021, November) U.S. National Survey Of Defense Attitudes On Behalf Of The Ronald Reagan Foundation Final Topline Results Retrieved January 15, 2022 from https://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/Reagan%20Foundation%20-%20November%202021%20Survey%20-%20Topline%20Results.pdf 

[5] FVAP.gov  (2008, February 19) Department of Defense Directive Number 1344.10. Department of Defense. Retrieved January 15, 2022 from https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/134410p.pdf   

[6] U.S. Department of the Interior. (n.d.). Eisenhower Military Chronology. National Parks Service. Retrieved January 16, 2022, from https://www.nps.gov/features/eise/jrranger/chronomil1.htm 

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