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Assessment of the People’s Republic of China’s United Front Work Department, its Impact on Taiwan’s National Security, and Strategies to Combat Foreign Interference

Editor’s Note:  This article is part of our 2023 Writing Contest called The Taiwan Offensive, which took place from March 1, 2023 to July 31, 2023.  More information about the contest can be found by clicking here.

Heath Sloane is a research analyst based in London, UK, and Masters graduate of Peking University’s Yenching Academy. He has worked for the Middle East Media Research Institute where his research includes Chinese strategic affairs. His research on Chinese and China-Middle Eastern / North African affairs has been translated and published in several leading international affairs. He can be found on Twitter at @HeathSloane.

Title:  Assessment of the People’s Republic of China’s United Front Work Department, its Impact on Taiwan’s National Security, and Strategies to Combat Foreign Interference

Date Originally Written:  July 10, 2023.

Date Originally Published:  August 28, 2023.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) United Front Work Department’s (UFWD) interference in Taiwan constitutes a political warfare offensive. 

Summary:  The PRC’s UFWD threatens democracies, particularly Taiwan, by exploiting the openness inherent to democratic societies. The UFWD combines military and non-military tactics in its offensive against Taiwan’s institutions. Taiwan’s countermeasures include legislation, education, and a state-civil society collaboration. Unless democracies remain vigilant in their defense against foreign interference, the UFWD will continue to be effective.

Text:  The intricate tableau of global politics is marked by the fluctuating interplay of national interests, aspirations, and stratagems. One of the most prominent actors on this stage, the PRC, guided by General Secretary Xi Jinping, boasts an expansive and complex political infrastructure. Among its numerous political entities, the UFWD — an integral component of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) — emerges as an entity of particular concern due to its amalgamation of both military and non-military tactics[1]. The UFWD’s mode of operation poses a severe challenge to democratic nations across the globe, particularly those upholding the principles of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the cultivation of a dynamic civil society. 

The strength of the UFWD lies in its ability to exploit the inherent characteristics of democratic systems. Unlike the PRC’s command economy and authoritarian political structure, democratic nations embrace a liberal ethos that allows substantial latitude in civil society. This democratic openness becomes a significant point of exploitation for the UFWD[2]. Consequently, comprehending the inner workings, methodologies, and objectives of the UFWD is a critical requirement for the democratic world in crafting an effective and proportionate response.

Taiwan, due to its unique historical bonds and political interplay with the PRC, finds itself at the epicentre of the UFWD’s operations. This positioning transforms Taiwan into an invaluable case study in unravelling the dynamics of foreign interference and devising counter-interference measures. Accordingly, this extensive analysis endeavours to explore Taiwan’s responses to the UFWD’s activities, extrapolate the broader geopolitical implications, and offer viable countermeasures for the global democratic community.

Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the UFWD has metamorphosed from a predominantly domestic entity into an apparatus deeply embedded in the PRC’s foreign policy machinery[3]. This transformation is epitomised by the growth in the number of pro-CCP organisations operating in democratic nations worldwide, coupled with the escalating use of disinformation campaigns during critical political junctures. Such activities underscore the expanded global reach of the UFWD and highlight its potential to disrupt the democratic processes of various nations.

Yet, Taiwan has refused to be a mere spectator in the face of the UFWD’s interference. Taiwan’s Political Warfare Bureau, an institution harking back to Taiwan’s more authoritarian past, has effectively countered the UFWD’s aggressive manoeuvres[4]. Over the years, this bureau has undergone considerable reforms to better align with Taiwan’s democratic norms, values, and institutions. This transformation has strengthened its capabilities to protect Taiwan’s democratic institutions from the covert activities of the UFWD.

Education serves as the cornerstone of Taiwan’s defence against the UFWD. The educational initiatives, geared towards the dual objectives of demystifying the ideology and tactics that drive the UFWD’s operations, and proliferating awareness about these operations among the military and civilian populations, empower Taiwanese society with the knowledge and tools to recognise and resist UFWD interference. Given the multifarious nature of the UFWD’s operations — which include political donations, espionage, and the establishment of pro-CCP cultural and social organisations[5] — gaining an in-depth understanding of its diverse strategies is crucial for effecting a robust and sustained counteraction.

In conjunction with education, Taiwan’s Political Warfare Bureau has orchestrated a nationwide coordination of counter-interference initiatives. This broad-based network extends across the country’s civil society and national defence infrastructure, fostering an unprecedented level of collaboration between a wide array of national institutions. Regular briefings on UFWD activities, rigorous training programs, and the promotion of cross-institutional collaborations form the lynchpin of this response mechanism.

In the face of the UFWD’s interference, inaction or complacency could lead to dire consequences for Taiwan and democratic societies worldwide. The UFWD’s sophisticated tactics, flexibility, and adaptability make it a formidable adversary. In the absence of proactivity, the road may be paved for deeper and more disruptive infiltration into the political, social, and cultural landscapes of democracies. As such, the development of vigilant, comprehensive, and proactive countermeasures is of paramount importance[6].

Reflecting on Taiwan’s experiences and strategic responses, there is more that democratic nations could do to enhance democratic resilience against the UFWD. Democratic nations could delineate a clear legal definition for ‘foreign interference’ and incorporate this definition into the structural frameworks of relevant state institutions. This step will provide a solid legal foundation for counter-interference initiatives. Additionally, the concept of foreign interference could be integrated into national educational curricula, providing citizens with the necessary knowledge to identify and resist such activities. Finally, systematic training on identifying and countering foreign interference could be mandatory for all military personnel and staff within relevant state institutions.

Further, democracies could consider the establishment of a publicly-accessible monitoring centre, working in conjunction with national defence bodies, civil society organisations, and other institutions to identify, monitor, and publicise instances of foreign interference. The transparent and fact-based disclosure of individuals and organisations exposed to the UFWD will enable citizens and institutions within democracies to be responsive to malign elements in their midst.

The PRC’s UFWD poses a significant challenge to Taiwan’s national security and, more broadly, to democratic societies worldwide. Nonetheless, Taiwan’s experience in grappling with this entity offers a wealth of insights into devising effective counter-interference strategies. As the global geopolitical landscape continues to evolve, the UFWD’s reach continues to extend, necessitating democracies to remain vigilant, adaptable, and proactive in safeguarding their national security and democratic processes from foreign interference. The task ahead is daunting, but the stakes are high, and the preservation of democratic values and structures necessitates that no effort be spared.

Endnotes:

[1] Brady, A. M. (2015). Magic weapons: China’s political influence activities under Xi Jinping. Clingendael Institute, from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/magic-weapons-chinas-political-influence-activities-under-xi-jinping 

[2] Gill, B., & Schreer, B. (2018). Countering China’s “United Front”. The Washington Quarterly, 41(2), 155-170, from https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1485323 

[3] Suzuki, T. (2019). China’s United Front Work in the Xi Jinping era–institutional developments and activities. Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 8(1), 83-98, from https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1627714 

[4] Blanchette, J., Livingston, S., Glaser, B., & Kennedy, S. (2021). Protecting democracy in an age of disinformation: lessons from Taiwan.Blanchette, J., Livingston, S., Glaser, B., & Kennedy, S. (2021). Protecting democracy in an age of disinformation: lessons from Taiwan, from https://www.csis.org/analysis/protecting-democracy-age-disinformation-lessons-taiwan 

[5] Joske, A. (2022). Spies and Lies. Hardie Grant Publishing.

[6] Gershaneck, K. K. (2019). Under Attack: Recommendations for Victory in the PRC’s Political War to Destroy the ROC. 復興崗學報, (114), 1-40, from https://www.fhk.ndu.edu.tw/uploads/1562309764098tuX1wh0h.pdf 

2023 - Contest: The Taiwan Offensive Assessment Papers China (People's Republic of China) Heath Sloane Influence Operations Taiwan
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Assessing the People’s Republic of China’s Current and Future Offensive Operations Against the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the Context of China’s International Ambitions

Editor’s Note:  This article is part of our 2023 Writing Contest called The Taiwan Offensive, which took place from March 1, 2023 to July 31, 2023.  More information about the contest can be found by clicking here.

Elliot Pernula is a currently serving U.S. Army officer, assigned to the United States Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps.  The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing the People’s Republic of China’s Current and Future Offensive Operations Against the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the Context of China’s International Ambitions

Date Originally Written:  July 31, 2023. 

Date Originally Published:  August 21, 2023.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) poses a significant threat to the current world order and that the PRC is currently engaged in a deliberate and focused multi-front offensive operation against Taiwan.  This offensive will transition from measured and deliberate to dynamic and kinetic if/when the PRC assesses that an exploitable opportunity has developed.    

Summary:  The PRC is currently engaging in deliberate, strategically unified, and organizationally layered offensive operations against Taiwan.  If left unchecked, the PRC’s deliberate goal-based actions, national initiative, and conceptually aligned efforts will result in the termination of Taiwan’s independence.

Text:  The PRC’s current and future means and mode of conducting offensive operations against Taiwan may be viewed through the lens of the Chinese phrase: wei ji, or loosely translated, where danger lurks, opportunity awaits.  It is under this concept that the PRC is preparing to boldly strike against Taiwan as soon as circumstances are favorable, while concurrently hedging its goals for Taiwan against its international ambitions.

The PRC’s desired international end state is to be a world power, capable of projecting its influence without external constrains[1]. Subservient and corollary to this is the PRC’s operational end state: the “reunification” of Taiwan through the termination of Taiwan’s  ability to independently engage in international commerce, international negotiations, and internal political decision making[2].  While the PRC’s efforts to achieve control of Taiwan span the full spectrum of the instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME)), the PRC’s actions are premised on a fundamental informational precept: that any offensive operation taken against Taiwan must be projected to be a defensive operation taken to protect China’s own national sovereignty.  In that, the PRC is currently engaged in offensive informational operations that emphasize that it seeks to “reunify” with Taiwan, under the essential premise that there is only one China. 

The PRC’s mode of offensive operations center on the concurrent employment of all instruments of national power. To the PRC, a reunification achieved without ever engaging in military action through a de facto diplomatic blockade would be far superior to military operations; however, no instrument of national power exists in a vacuum. Thus, currently, the PRC has launched all instruments of national power against Taiwan with the goal of developing exploitable weaknesses.  To the PRC, this full spectrum offensive operation is a gamble on all four elements of DIME; if the PRC presses to heavily in any one area before conditions are ripe, then they may face a backlash from the international community that could hamper its long-term goals.  In essence, the PRC will seek to maintain a measured offensive of constant pressure across all instruments of power while watching for an exploitation point and concurrently remaining sensitive to the international community’s responses. 

Having accepted the fact that the PRC views the future termination of Taiwan’s independence as a non-negotiable outcome, the critical assessment then must turn to when and how the PRC will act by applying overwhelming force under any one or all of its instruments of national power in its four front gamble.  The PRC’s ability to employ maximum military capability will degrade eventually as the PRC’s population ages in the context of its failure to foster future population growth[3].  Essentially, the PRC’s population is aging and the military aged, combat capable population will decrease within the next decades. While this aging makes a near-term military option more attractive, the PRC is not able to independently defeat the Taiwanese military, engage in a global conflict against the United States and its potential responsive coalition members, and then meet its national goals of serving as a post-war superpower.  

The projected destruction that would be wrought in a international armed conflict (IAC) between the PRC and the United States[4] makes a direct military offensive against Taiwan unlikely, unless the international environment experiences a circumstance-shift that would make this option feasible. Critically, there are multiple scenarios that would likely trigger the PRC’s rapid employment of direct military action against Taiwan.  These scenarios include any United States’ military entanglement in another area of the world such that the PRC assesses that the United States is unable to muster the national will or resources needed to engage in a direct military confrontation with the PRC[5].  To that end, the PRC has employed a consistent emphasis on a one China perspective; this will serve to allow the PRC to characterize any future military conflict as a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) between the legitimate Chinese government and a secessionist faction. This NIAC characterization would likewise serve as the foundation to assert that any foreign direct involvement in support of Taiwan would place the PRC in a defensive status in a conflict that would have then transformed into a IAC. Likewise, there are multiple traplines that have been laid that may trigger an immediate, direct, and full spectrum offensive with the purpose of immediate “reunification,” such as any formal declaration of independence by Taiwan, direct foreign basing within Taiwan, offensive-capable military alignment with a foreign government, or dire economic internal PRC turmoil that would make internal societal unification against a common enemy (Taiwan) attractive.  

The PRC will, therefore continue to engage in unified offensive operations across all of its instruments of national power while it waits for a exploitation point.  Essentially, the PRC has one clear goal: to stand as an unencumbered world power; reunification with Taiwan is an essential brick in the road to achieve this goal. To that end, the PRC will develop redundant threat capabilities that will allow it to concurrently muster all instruments of national power against Taiwan with a goal of applying pressure and then exploiting any opportunity to achieve immediate reunification as well as to disincentivize intervention by the United States.  Thus, the PRC seeks to apply the methodical principles of the game of Go against both Taiwan and the United States with the hopes of a bloodless offensive, while holding onto the willingness to launch unified offensive operations if the conditions so warrant. In Go, one may gain a critical advantage by securing exterior blocking positions before moving against near opponent positions.  This strategy requires a player to both push far against an opponent while simultaneously strangling center and near opponent positions (i.e., securing positions in with a corner, side, then center order formula); yet, this strategy works when one spends the time to calculate an endgame scenario well in advance of striking against near-opponent pieces.  An early assault may foreclose future opportunities.  One must both block in the deep game, develop exploitation opportunities in the near game, and strike when one may win with power enough to take advantage incrementally developed initiative. 

Fundamentally, the United States’ options are limited.  The PRC’s goal is clear, its efforts unified, and its power regionally great.  The PRC has indicated that it will abolish Taiwanese independence.  This unified effort is contrasted with the United States’ apparent goal of simply maintaining the status quo; the United States will not have the ability to rally national will for the purposes of defending this undefined, poorly understood, and operationally difficult position.  Thus, the United States  will either deter the PRC until future circumstances prevent the PRC’s actions to reunify, or it will  align itself with Taiwan in such a way that the PRC’s reunification ambitions are quashed. However, such as during the Peloponnesian War, a goal-based, rising power has a near spiritual advantage when applying pressure against another great power whose goal is to mere defend the status quo. 

Endnotes:

[1] Buckley, C. (n.d.). China’s Leader Now Wields Formidable Power. Who Will Say No to Him? NY Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/23/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-loyalists.html

[2] Garcia, C., & Tian, Y. (n.d.). China’s Xi vows ‘reunification’ with Taiwan. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-says-reunification-with-taiwan-must-will-be-realised-2021-10-09/

[3] Chan, M. (n.d.). Chinese military faces challenge from falling fertility rate. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3135342/chinese-military-faces-challenge-falling-fertility-rate

[4] Stauffer, B. (n.d.). Freaking Out About a Potential War With China. Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/06/09/america-weapons-china-00100373

[5] Roush, T. (n.d.). Chinese Malware Could Cut Power To U.S. Military Bases, Businesses And Homes, Report Claims. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/tylerroush/2023/07/29/chinese-malware-could-cut-power-to-us-military-bases-businesses-and-homes-report-claims

2023 - Contest: The Taiwan Offensive Assessment Papers China (People's Republic of China) Elliot Pernula Offensive Operations Taiwan United States
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Examining Disaster Aid as Cover for a Chinese Fait Accompli Against Taiwan

Editor’s Note:  This article is part of our 2023 Writing Contest called The Taiwan Offensive, which took place from March 1, 2023 to July 31, 2023.  More information about the contest can be found by clicking here.

Michael A. Cappelli II is a U.S. Army All Source Intelligence Analyst that has a BA in Asian Studies and Political Science from Rice University. He has learned about Cross Strait issues from the perspectives of all parties involved through his studies in both mainland China and Taiwan., attendance of GIS Taiwan, and internship at the Baker Institute for Public Policy. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Examining Disaster Aid as Cover for a Chinese Fait Accompli Against Taiwan

Date Originally Written:  July 12, 2023.

Date Originally Published:  August 14, 2023. 

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is a member of the US military currently serving in the Indo-Pacific and draws on his experience in Cross Strait issues.

Summary:  China’s aggressive actions make the likelihood of conflict over Taiwan seem inevitable. However, it is possible that China may use Non-War Military Activities (NWMA) to unify with Taiwan[1]. In particular, China may use humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as cover for a fait accompli to gain territory in the Taiwan Strait after a natural disaster. 

Text:  Taiwan’s location in the western Pacific makes it a disaster-prone area. Typhoons, earthquakes, and tsunamis are of particular concern, with local sources indicating Taiwan ranks first in the world in natural disaster risk[2]. While a natural disaster, such as a typhoon, is hard to predict, the situation would provide excellent cover for Chinese NWMA. Climate change is expected to contribute to more extreme weather events in the region, and Taiwan’s geographic proximity to China makes humanitarian response an excellent guise for PLA action against Taiwanese controlled territory. 

A Chinese fait accompli disguised as humanitarian aid and disaster relief will likely take on a multidomain approach, with land, sea, air and cyber warfare entities working to take territory and disrupt an already overburdened Taiwanese disaster response. Damage to undersea communications cables near Taiwan’s Matsu Islands in spring 2023 indicates that China is practicing ways to disrupt communication between Taiwan and its outlying areas[3]. Even if China is unable to take Taiwan itself, outlying islands such as Kinmen and Penghu would provide strategic and symbolic gains for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The capture of Penghu would be especially beneficial to the PLA, giving Chinese forces territory halfway between the mainland and southern Taiwan to help secure supply lines, stage troops and weapons platforms, and extend anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) capabilities for a future invasion of Taiwan[4]. A Chinese fait accompli against outlying, Taiwanese territory would also present a good test of international reaction to Chinese military action against the Taiwan government. 

While a push on Taiwan itself through NWMA would be significantly more difficult, it is not outside the realm of possibility. China’s continued activities within Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), and major military exercises show the PLA is capable of launching air and naval units into the seas and airspace around Taiwan with the goal of not only taking Taiwan but also keeping outside military intervention at bay[5]. These regular, grey zone excursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ by the PLA would also make it more difficult to detect the difference between another PLA exercise and a legitimate PLA push on Taiwan.

To prepare for a possible Chinese fait accompli disguised as humanitarian aid and disaster relief, Taiwan will need to ensure it has resilient critical infrastructure. Taiwan’s ability to recover quickly from a natural disaster would lessen Chinese justification for NWMA and reduce the PLA’s window of opportunity to do so. This plan is not without risk. A focus on critical infrastructure in outlying territories may result in wasted resources, equipment, and specially trained personnel positioned in difficult to defend areas. In contrast, resiliency in Taiwan’s outlying islands may prove a deterrent to Chinese military action by creating a level of uncertainty in Chinese mission success. Even if China is not deterred, the PLA could miscalculate the forces need to take Taiwan’s outlying islands[6]. Such a miscalculation could result in a military disaster and force the PLA to over commit units to taking these outlying territories instead of Taiwan itself. This could provide Taiwan the opportunity to push back China, possibly with international support.

Taiwan could also improve civilian preparedness and disaster recovery. Traditionally, the Taiwanese military acts as the primary first responder to natural disasters[7]. Opportunity does exist to transition disaster response away from military units, especially with Taiwan working to boost civil defense preparedness amongst the general population in case of a war with China[8]. Private, civil defense preparation programs for civilians, with some emphasis on disaster relief, are also increasing in popularity[9]. There is risk involved with this strategy. Shifting natural disaster response away from the Taiwanese military may result in reduced disaster response efficiency. This may also prolong a natural disaster’s impact, increasing the very justification China would need to conduct a humanitarian aid and disaster relief based fait accompli.    

While a natural disaster is hard to predict, it could provide excellent cover for a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan disguised as humanitarian aid and disaster relief. Taiwan’s outlying areas could be highly susceptible to this type of Chinese NWMA. The Taiwanese government and people have not remained complacent to the threat of Chinese military action. During Taiwan’s 2023 Han Kuang military exercise, the Taiwanese military included its first military exercise to defend the country’s main airport in additional to regular air-raid and amphibious assault preparations[10]. Public polling in Taiwan as indicates an increased interest in defending the island, in particular after the Russian invasion of Ukraine[11]. Preparation however may not stop China if it feels conditions are in its favor to take Taiwan.

Endnotes:

[1] Bilms, K. (2022, January 26). Beyond War and Peace: The PLA’s “Non-War Military Activities” Concept. Retrieved from: https://mwi.usma.edu/beyond-war-and-peace-the-plas-non-war-military-activities-concept/. 

[2] Taoyuan Disaster Education Center. (2023, July 27). Natural Hazards. Retrieved from: https://tydec.tyfd.gov.tw/EN/About/Area/Area_A. 

 [3] Hsu, J. and Mok, C. (2023, May 31).  Taiwan’s island internet cutoff highlights infrastructure risks. Retrieved from: https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Taiwan-s-island-internet-cutoff-highlights-infrastructure-risks.  

[4] Chang, S. and Bailey, R. (2022, June 16). Control Without Invasion: Other Actions China Could Take Against Taiwan. Retrieved from: https://www.barrons.com/news/control-without-invasion-other-actions-china-could-take-against-taiwan-01655438409. 

[5] Blanchard, B. and Lee, Y. (2023, April 10). China ends Taiwan drills after practicing blockades, precision strikes. Retrieved from:  https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-following-chinas-taiwan-drills-with-great-interest-2023-04-10/. 

[6] Brimelow, B. (2022, December 28). Taiwan’s remote islands are on the frontline with China – sometimes only a few hundred yards from Chinese troops. Retrieved from:  https://www.businessinsider.com/taiwans-outlying-islands-are-on-the-frontline-with-china-2022-12. 

[7] Chiang, A. (2018). Taiwan’s Natural Disaster Response and Military – Civilian Partnerships. Global Taiwan Brief, 3 (10). Retrieved from: https://globaltaiwan.org/2018/05/taiwans-natural-disaster-response-and-military-civilian-partnerships/.

[8] Yeh, J. (2023, June 13). Military releases new civil defense handbook amid backlash. Retrieved from: https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202306130007. 

[9] Hsiao, R.  (2022). Taiwan’s Bottom-Up Approach to Civil Defense Preparedness. Global Taiwan Brief, 7 (10). Retrieved from:  https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/09/taiwans-bottom-up-approach-to-civil-defense-preparedness/. 

[10] CNA. (2023, July 27). Military Conducts first anti-takeover drills at Taoyuan. Taipei Times. Retrieved from: https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2023/07/27/2003803809. 

[11] Wu, C., Yeh, Y., Chen, F., and Wang, A. (2023, February 22). Why NGOs Are Boosting Support for the Self-Defense in Taiwan. Retrieved from: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-ngos-are-boosting-support-self-defense-taiwan-206240.  

2023 - Contest: The Taiwan Offensive Aid / Development / Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief Assessment Papers China (People's Republic of China) Major Events / Unforeseen Events / Black Swans Michael A. Cappelli II Taiwan
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Options for the United States to Counter China’s Multi-Pronged Offensives in Taiwan

Editor’s Note:  This article is part of our 2023 Writing Contest called The Taiwan Offensive, which took place from March 1, 2023 to July 31, 2023.  More information about the contest can be found by clicking here.

Marshall McGurk is an officer in the United States Army and a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is on Twitter @MarshallMcGurk. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation:  Options for the United States to counter China’s multi-pronged offensives in Taiwan.

Date Originally Written:  July 5, 2023.

Date Originally Published:  August 7, 2023.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is an active-duty U.S. military officer who believes the U.S. policy on the Taiwan issue can move from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity. 

Background:  The People’s Republic of China (PRC) takes a multi-pronged approach to bring Taiwan under its banner. China’s president Xi Jinping publicly states that China’s leadership will “advance peaceful national reunification[1].” Senior PRC officials state their timeline of forced armed reunification is 2027, the PRC’s 78th anniversary[2]. The divergence of these statements provide flexibility to the PRC. Peaceful reunification may be preferred, but the PRC military is preparing for armed conflict, nonetheless. China’s economic belt and road initiative reaches global, across land and maritime domains, while their diplomatic and cultural arms aggressively push the narrative of PRC dominance[3]. The U.S. does not have official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, however it enjoys a “robust unofficial relationship,” which “[serves] as the impetus for expanding U.S. engagement with Taiwan[4].” U.S. relations with Taiwan are governed by the American Institute in Taiwan[5].

Significance:  The multi-pronged approach to challenging Taiwanese sovereignty is a national security issue because it presents Communist Chinese Party (CCP) imperial, revanchist designs in Asia. Should the CCP succeed in subjugating Taiwan, the impact will be felt across alliances and partnerships seeking to maintain free trade and economic relationship. The issue of China’s imperialist designs matters not just to the United States but to its allies and partners in North Asia, Southeast Asia, Oceania, and the Indian subcontinent.

Option #1:  The United States could indirectly counter the CCP’s multi-pronged approach through increased relationships between the United States and Taiwan in all aspects of national power. What the U.S. can do is maintain the one-China policy while simultaneously increasing its partnerships with Taiwan. The current President of Taiwan is a graduate of Cornell University. The U.S. could use this point to increase exchanges of students and experts across academia, public, and private sectors. There are military training events occurring between Taiwan and the United States[6]. The U.S. could develop a recurring exercise between Taiwan’s military for conventional, joint, and special operations forces. There are significant networks between Taiwanese and United States manufacturing, transportation, and free trade. The U.S. could increase the size and remit of the American Institute of Taiwan and provide the same openness to the Taiwanese. Refining and bolstering financial ties between the U.S. and Taiwan, as well as increasing ties with regional partners such as the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan is also possible. 

Risk:  Increased U.S. investment in Taiwan, even with the bounds of the one-China policy, could be seen as duplicitous and cause an escalation between the PRC, the U.S., and Taiwan. This option may lead to political stalemate or infighting within the U.S. Additionally, increased investment in Taiwan, in accordance with the one-China policy, may be perceived as curtailing or divesting of U.S. interests in other regions of Asia, thus alarming allies and partners. 

Gain:  Option #1 provides the U.S. with clarity within the bounds of the one-China policy and the Six Assurances[7]. It is a continuation of the larger status quo, but a refinement of U.S. actions. Option #1 provides a basic for dialogue and openings for cooperation, while mitigating misunderstandings.

Option #2:  The U.S. has the option to move away from the one-China policy and support Taiwanese independence. This includes modification or cancellation of the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances.

Risk:  Disavowing the one-China policy may prompt a PRC invasion of Taiwan. This risk can be mitigated by diplomatic negotiations and talks that could occur since U.S. policy will have changed. Second, it may be seen that disavowing the one-China principles limits options for the U.S. President in addressing the Taiwan issue. This risk can be addressed by labelling the one China policy as no longer tenable given the PRC’s inflammatory rhetoric and behavior. Furthermore, U.S. recognition of Taiwan provides increased opportunity for diplomatic relations with both countries. Option #2 opens opportunities for PRC dialogue within the U.S., however the policy will require changes agreed upon by the U.S. legislative and executive branches. U.S. politicians may see Option #2 as limited the options of future presidents, and thus may not refute the one-China policy.

Gain:  There are three gains with this approach. First, this option moves the U.S. away from strategic ambiguity and towards strategic clarity. Strategic clarity provides allies and partners a touchstone of U.S. credibility and legitimacy. Second, all options can still be on the table for how the U.S. addresses PRC responses to the Taiwan issue—including cooperation—but disavowing the one-China Policy sets clear opposition to PRC revanchist schemes. Third, U.S. recognition of Taiwan may staunch the loss of its formal allies, which stands at 14 after the departure of Nicaragua in 2021[8].

Other Comments:  The U.S. government need not follow the whims of private companies or institutions who modify language, maps, or statements showing Taiwan as part of China. The PRC and the ruling-CCP have shown themselves to be bullies in the international community and appeasement of a bully provides no benefit. 

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] Sacks, D. (2021, July 6). What Xi Jinping’s major speech means for Taiwan. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-xi-jinpings-major-speech-means-taiwan

[2] Grossman, D. (2021, November 10). Taiwan is safe until at least 2027, but with one big caveat. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/11/taiwan-is-safe-until-at-least-2027-but-with-one-big.html 

[3] Nawrotkiewicz, J., & Martin, P. (2021, October 22). Understanding Chinese “Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy.” The National Bureau of Asian Research. other. Retrieved July 30, 2023

[4] U.S. Department of State. (2023, April 26). U.S. relations with Taiwan – united states department of state. U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/ 

[5] U.S. Citizen Services. American Institute in Taiwan. (2023, July 20). https://www.ait.org.tw/services/

[6] Liebermann, O. (2023, February 24). US plans to expand training of Taiwanese forces | CNN politics. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/23/politics/us-taiwan-forces-training/index.html

[7] Lawrence, Susan V. (2023, June 13). President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan (CRS Report No. IF11665) Retrieved from Congressional Research Service website: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11665

[8] Al Jazeera. (2021, December 10). After Nicaragua break, who are Taiwan’s remaining allies? News | Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/10/who-are-taiwan-diplomatic-allies 

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Assessing the People’s Republic of China’s Multiple Ongoing Offensives Against Taiwan

Editor’s Note:  This article is part of our 2023 Writing Contest called The Taiwan Offensive, which took place from March 1, 2023 to July 31, 2023.  More information about the contest can be found by clicking here.

Andrew Segal is a U.S. Marine Corps intelligence officer that has served in combat zones and multiple U.S. embassies in the Middle East and Africa. He has a M.A. in Business and Organizational Security Management from Webster University and a B.S.M in Accounting from Tulane University. Throughout his career, he has attended several Marine and joint training courses. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing the People’s Republic of China’s Multiple Ongoing Offensives Against Taiwan

Date Originally Written:  June 12, 2023.

Date Originally Published:  July 10, 2023.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is a military officer with experience serving overseas in combat zones and U.S. embassies. This article draws on author’s experience studying China’s irregular warfare efforts abroad.

Summary:  The People’s Republic of China has already begun shaping operations to “reunify” Taiwan, using diplomatic, information, and economic offensives. In the coming years, the PRC could take over Taiwan without ever having to use military action. 

Text:  While the United States government is focused on a military response to a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has already begun shaping operations for an offensive that could, if executed correctly, ”reunify” Taiwan without a shot being fired.

The PRC is focusing on economic, diplomatic, and information offensives against Taiwan that will likely happen concurrently and over an extended period rather than at a single moment. The objective of this offensive would be to inject several senior level pro-China, pro-reunification actors into the Taiwanese government, resulting in Taiwan rejoining the PRC.

To attack Taiwan economically, the PRC government could focus on Taiwan’s largest imports to the island: energy resources. Taiwan imports 98% of its energy resources to meet demand[1]. Although Taiwan has two nuclear reactors, the current Taiwan administration has a policy of phasing out nuclear power by 2025[2]. If China wanted to economically disrupt Taiwan’s energy supply, it could do so through diplomatic and paramilitary activities using its maritime militia. 

This year, 2023, the PRC government increased its economic and diplomatic engagement with Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) member countries Saudi Arabia and Iran, brokering the reinstatement of diplomatic relations between the two countries[3]. The PRC continues to engage with other OPEC member countries at senior levels of those governments[4]. The PRC could use its strengthened diplomatic influence to request, either overtly or covertly, that these OPEC member countries reduce their sales of oil to Taiwan, eventually requesting that OPEC cease to allow Taiwan to purchase petroleum. This lack of petroleum flow would immediately throw Taiwan’s economy into turmoil. 

For any countries that continue to sell energy resources to Taiwan, the PRC could use its maritime militia fleet to block those ships from accessing Taiwan. The PRC fishing vessels could be used to disrupt shipping lanes which would impose costs on companies delivering resources to Taiwan. Companies would likely determine that it is too costly to continue importing products to Taiwan. These gray-zone operations would likely draw condemnation from the U.S. government. In response, the PRC government could use diplomatic pressure through its Belt Road Initiative (BRI) relationships to reduce international condemnation of the maritime militia’s actions. The PRC government will convey the diplomatic message that this is a regional issue and countries should stay out of regional conflicts, as the PRC has done in BRI countries.

The PRC’s economic offensive against Taiwan’s energy resources would be accompanied by an information campaign to influence the world’s opinion of Taiwan and to influence Taiwanese citizens’ opinion against their government. The PRC government would likely accompany the diplomatic effort to reduce energy imports by emphasizing that PRC does not seek to affect global markets; the PRC would likely amplify the talking points about Taiwan being a rogue nation. The PRC would also influence Taiwanese citizens against their government while promoting Chinese ability to keep shipping lanes open and maintain its energy resources for one of the largest populations in the world. 

The PRC’s informational offensive would be further aided through control of undersea communications. In March 2023, the PRC demonstrated its ability to cut undersea cables to Taiwanese islands[5]; this action was generally underreported with no overt diplomatic response by the U.S. government. This cable cutting is further evidence of the shaping operation by the PRC government: the PRC is using the undersea cable disruptions to test the international response, and level of international condemnation of its disruptions. PRC cyber activities could disrupt the Taiwanese government from promoting a positive, coherent message to its own citizens, thus appearing unable to meet the needs of the average Taiwanese citizen. Covert Chinese cyber offensives could be used to affect Taiwan’s critical infrastructure, which will further denigrate Taiwanese citizens’ opinions of their government, and its ability to provide key services.

These gray-zone campaigns, combined with increased economic turmoil through disruption of energy resources, could ultimately result in Taiwanese citizens protesting their current government. The PRC injection of pro-China messaging could ultimately bring forth Taiwanese politicians that promise strong relations with China, like the relationship China maintains with Hong Kong. If these things happened, the PRC’s takeover of Taiwan would be inevitable and accomplished without firing a shot.

There are actions that Taiwan could take today to combat these economic, diplomatic and information offensives by the PRC. First, Taiwan could adopt a strategy of mutually assured destruction in the event of major disruptions to Taiwan’s economy due to outside influences by China or other countries. China and the rest of the world are dependent on Taiwan’s semiconductor production. The Taiwanese government could implement a policy that if they are attacked economically, they will reduce semiconductor exports to offending countries, including China. 

Second, Taiwan’s Navy could increase its patrols of sea lines of communications with a stated policy of detaining, prosecuting, and destroying any vessels or crews that disrupt Taiwan’s infrastructure. Undersea cables and energy resource imports are strategic assets, and the PRC needs to understand the consequences to disruption to Taiwan. Third, Taiwan’s government can redouble its efforts of strengthening/building diplomatic relations with countries around the world. As the PRC’s selfish policies become less popular in certain countries, and countries realize their substantial debt to the PRC, Taiwan can find a way to establish diplomatic relations and trade partnerships. These expanded relations will make it harder for countries to ignore Taiwan diplomatically when Taiwan and the U.S. condemn China’s offensives at the United Nations.

China has already begun shaping operations for an economic, diplomatic, and informational campaign against Taiwan. Based on the minimal response to date by the Taiwanese government, U.S government, or the rest of the world, it is increasingly likely that China will take over Taiwan in a matter of years, under the noses of the whole world.

Endnotes:

[1] U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2016, December). Taiwan. Retrieved from https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/TWN

[2] Deusterberg, T., Fu, A. (2022, September 13). Taiwan Needs US Help on Energy Security. RealClearEnergy. Retrieved from https://www.realclearenergy.org/articles/2022/09/13/taiwan_needs_us_help_on_energy_security_853093.html

[3] Gallagher, A., Hamasaeed, S., Nada, G. (2023, March 1). What You Need to Know about China’s Saudi-Iran Deal. United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/what-you-need-know-about-chinas-saudi-iran-deal

[4] Bruno, G. (2022, December 27). Middle East Needs a More Nuanced Taiwan Policy. The Arab Weekly. Retrieved from https://www.thearabweekly.com/middle-east-needs-more-nuanced-taiwan-policy

[5] McCurry, J. (2023, June 9) How Taiwan’s Submarine Internet Cables Could be a Major Weakness. Vice. Retrieved from https://www.vice.com/en/article/bvj8x3/taiwan-internet-cables-matsu-china

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Assessing the People’s Republic of China’s Current Multi-Decade Offensive Against Taiwan

Editor’s Note:  This article is part of our 2023 Writing Contest called The Taiwan Offensive, which took place from March 1, 2023 to July 31, 2023.  More information about the contest can be found by clicking here.

David Degenhardt is a Major in the United States Army who has previously deployed to Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. He currently works at Headquarters, Department of the Army G-1 as a Diversity Planner.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing the People’s Republic of China’s Current Multi-Decade Offensive Against Taiwan

Date Originally Written:  May 15, 2023.

Date Originally Published:  May 28, 2023.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is an active-duty U.S. military officer who believes that self-determination is a legal right and a key principle of international law. 

Summary:  The People’s Republic of China has been engaged in an offensive again Taiwan using all four instruments of national power for decades. This offensive is intended to isolate Taiwan, increase dependence on China, control the narrative on Taiwan’s status, and weaken Taiwan’s military. Counteracting this offensive requires Taiwan to recognize this reality and respond to each element of China’s strategy.

Text:  Current speculation on the possibility of armed conflict between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan does not address the reality that the PRC has been engaged in an ongoing offensive for decades across all elements of national power. The goal of the PRC’s strategy is to isolate Taiwan from other nations, increase Taiwan’s dependence on China, control the narrative on Taiwan’s independence, and weaken Taiwan in preparation for direct military action. Rush Doshi described the basic form of this strategy as a multi-pronged methodology to place China at the center of a new global order using political, economic, and military instruments[1]. For Taiwan to respond successfully, it must also consider information as an element of national power and respond to all levels of China’s offensive. Because China has been engaging in a complex offensive toward Taiwan for some time, a military invasion of Taiwan would be the culmination of China’s offensive rather than the beginning.

Beginning with the political instrument of national power, China has used diplomatic pressure over the last five decades to reduce the number of countries officially recognizing Taiwan from 56 to 13[2]. Much of the pressure that China applies to accomplish these changes in diplomatic recognition depends on the economic instrument of national power, using continued access to Chinese markets or direct payoffs of development funds as in the case of the Solomon Islands[3]. Although effective, analysts observe that this coercion is motivating some countries to push back by drawing closer to Taiwan and making joint statements about defending the island from invasion[4]. Aside from the obvious response of strengthening relationships with remaining allies, Taiwan could also pursue agreements with those allies to conduct pass-through trade to maintain access to markets in countries China has pressured into compliance.

In addition to using the economic instrument to support its diplomatic efforts, China is also attempting to intertwine its economy with Taiwan’s. According to the Foreign Policy Research Institute this policy is intended to encourage economic dependence, cultivate pro-China factions, and restrict Taiwan’s pursuit of independence and democracy[5]. While some Chinese corporations are nominally independent, under President Xi Jinping the Chinese government has increased pressure on corporations to act in service of government aims or acquired corporations as state-owned enterprises[6]. Even when the Chinese government is not directing corporate engagement in Taiwan, it exercises its authority to permit or encourages these activities. Despite China’s efforts, the Heritage Foundation recently found that changes in U.S. policy and other factors are causing the interdependence of the two economies to grow more slowly or even reverse in some sectors[7]. Taiwan could continue to support businesses driving this trend and consider additional measures such as tax breaks and preference in government contracts for companies that move investment and production facilities out of China.

Turning to the information instrument, China’s uses information efforts to support the other three instruments by influencing foreign and local perception of Taiwan. Doshi describes China’s information strategy as an attempt “to shape public opinion… for political purposes,” citing efforts to intimidate journalists using libel laws and harassment campaigns as well as an incident where a major Taiwanese media company began publishing pro-China stories after a businessman tied to China purchased it in 2008[8]. China has also attempted to leverage United Nations Resolution 2758, which recognized the PRC as the government of China, to push the message that Taiwan is an inseparable element of Chinese territory[9]. Building on this message the PRC claims that the entirety of the Taiwan Strait lies within its territory, making free use of the channel a threat to Chinese sovereignty[10]. Shaping the narrative about Taiwan helps China to delegitimizes the Taiwanese government and lays the groundwork to claim future military action as an internal security matter. To fight these efforts Taiwan might continue to push for de facto and real recognition of its status as an autonomous government through international agreements and high-profile visits of foreign government representatives.

Finally, China has already begun using the military instrument of national power in its offensive against Taiwan through increasingly frequent incursions into Taiwanese air space. China sent planes into Taiwan’s airspace more than 1,700 times in 2022 and more than 600 times in the first four months of 2023[11]. Taiwan is effectively forced to respond to these incursions because not responding would accept China’s right to enter Taiwan’s airspace and run the risk of allowing China to achieve surprise in an actual invasion. Each response degrades Taiwan’s military equipment and incurs maintenance costs, rising into the hundreds of thousands of dollars due to the flight hour cost of Taiwan’s F-16 fleet[12][13]. These incursions also provide valuable intelligence to Chinese forces concerning how quickly the Taiwanese military can detect and respond to their presence. By normalizing activities around Taiwan, China can also increase complacency and blunt response speed in the event of an invasion. Although Taiwan must logically respond to each incursion, Taiwanese forces could intentionally alter their response patterns and speed to create uncertainty about the real state of their military’s capabilities. 

Xi Jinping has stated that China’s goal is reunification with Taiwan, whether that goal is accomplished peacefully or through force[14]. The PRC’s all-instrument offensive against Taiwan is aligned with these principles, allowing for multiple methods to achieve China’s goal while allowing for a military solution. A sufficiently isolated Taiwan might accept a diplomatic agreement with China, pressured by economic concerns as it loses access to markets. Increasing economic interdependence and influence operations could shift public perception to support pro-China political factions in Taiwan. If China resorts to force, international acceptance of China’s narrative on Taiwan’s status would limit the support Taiwan receives from abroad. An actual invasion of Taiwan following China’s ongoing incursion campaign would face worn down defenders whose response times and patterns are well known and incorporated into China’s plans. Taiwanese hopes of defeating such a comprehensive campaign require acknowledging the complexity of the threat and responding in an equally comprehensive manner.

Endnotes:

[1] Doshi, R. (2021, August 2). The long game: China’s grand strategy to displace American order. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/essay/the-long-game-chinas-grand-strategy-to-displace-american-order/.

[2] Cheung, E. (2023, March 26). Honduras establishes diplomatic ties with China, severs them with Taiwan. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/25/asia/honduras-cuts-diplomatic-ties-with-taiwan-intl-hnk/index.html.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Herscovitch, B. (2022, July 5). China’s efforts to isolate and intimidate Taiwan are pushing U.S. allies closer. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/07/05/chinas-efforts-to-isolate-and-intimidate-taiwan-are-pushing-u-s-allies-closer/.

[5] Chang, C. C., & Yang, A. H. (2020). Weaponized interdependence: China’s economic statecraft and social penetration against Taiwan. Orbis, 64(2), 312–333. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2020.02.002.

[6] Wakabayashi, D., Che, C., & Fu, C. (2022, October 17). In Xi’s China, the business of business is state-controlled. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/17/business/china-xi-jinping-business-economy.html.

[7] Chiang, M. H. (2023, March 23). Taiwan’s economy is breaking away from China’s. The Heritage Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/taiwans-economy-breaking-away-chinas.

[8] Doshi, R. (2020, January 9). China steps up its information war in Taiwan. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-01-09/china-steps-its-information-war-taiwan.

[9] Drun, J. & Glaser, B. S. (2022, March 24). The distortion of UN resolution 2758 and limits on Taiwan’s access to the United Nations. The German Marshall Fund of the United States. https://www.gmfus.org/news/distortion-un-resolution-2758-and-limits-taiwans-access-united-nations. 

[10] Liu, Z. (2022, June 13). China insists it has sovereign rights over Taiwan Strait. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3181554/china-insists-it-has-full-sovereign-rights-over-taiwan-strait.

[11] Brown, G.C. & Lewis, B. (2023, May 7) Taiwan ADIZ violations. Retrieved May 7,  2023 from https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit#gid=2015900050. 

[12] Government Accountability Office. (2022, November 10) GAO-23-106217: Weapon Sustainment, pg. 232. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-106217. 

[13] Chung, L. (2021, September 7) Taiwan’s air force budget reveals the high cost of China’s aggressive military flights around the island. South China Morning Post. https://www.businessinsider.com/taiwan-air-force-budget-reveals-cost-of-china-military-flights-2021-9. 

[14] Tian, Y. L. & Blanchard, B. (2022, October 16) China will never renounce right to use force over Taiwan, Xi says. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/xi-china-will-never-renounce-right-use-force-over-taiwan-2022-10-16/.

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Options for Taiwan’s Response to a Conventional Missile Strike by the People’s Republic of China

Editor’s Note:  This article is part of our 2023 Writing Contest called The Taiwan Offensive, which took place from March 1, 2023 to July 31, 2023.  More information about the contest can be found by clicking here.

Thomas J. Shattuck is the Global Order Program Manager at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House, a member of Foreign Policy for America’s NextGen Foreign Policy Initiative and the Pacific Forum’s Young Leaders Program, as well as a Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute and Foreign Policy Research Institute. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation:  The People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducts a conventional missile strike against a military air base in central Taiwan.

Date Originally Written:  May 9, 2023.

Date Originally Published:  May 22, 2023.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The article is written from the point of view of Taiwan towards the PRC.

Background:  In response to the election of the Democratic Progressive Party’s candidate as President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 2032, the leadership in Beijing decides that peaceful unification is no longer possible and that steps must be taken to remind Taiwan of where they stand. The PRC’s People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force conducts a conventional missile strike on Ching Chuan Kang Air Base in Taichung, Taiwan. The attack results in the destruction of the air base and two wings of F-16 fighters, and the death of 200 military personnel and 50 civilians.

Significance:  Beijing ordered the missile strike to remind the Taiwanese public of the power of the Chinese military and the immense destruction of an all-out invasion. The PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the attack was conducted to thwart the “expansion of Taiwan independence separatists” and warns that progress must be made on peaceful unification or additional strikes “will once and for all quash the Taiwan independence movement and achieve the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation.” Taipei promises to retaliate to this breach of sovereignty and to defend every inch of its territory against Chinese military attacks.

The strike is viewed as the first step toward an invasion of Taiwan as it is the first time since the Cold War that PRC forces attacked Taiwan. The United States and its regional allies and partners worry that additional missile strikes will occur, causing Taipei respond to these military incursions and escalating the situation into a war. Washington sends additional carrier strike groups to the region, and Japan prepares its southern islands for war. Estimates put the global economic costs of a cross-Strait war at a figure of at least $2 trillion[1]. Conflict in the Taiwan Strait would test U.S. resolve to protect a longstanding partner, put regional allies at risk, and decimate the global economy.

Option #1:  Taipei conducts a missile strike against Shuimen Air Base in Fujian Province, PRC. 

Risk:  Ordering a retaliatory strike on a Chinese military base will escalate the already tense situation. Such a response could result in Beijing launching additional strikes throughout Taiwan. By fearing to look weak in the face of a Taiwanese challenge, Beijing may not limit its response to military bases and could consider striking cities in Taiwan as it views attacks on the “Chinese Mainland” as off limits in cross-Strait provocations. Beyond escalatory strikes throughout Taiwan, Taipei would risk the safety and freedom of Taiwanese citizens living in China. A military response aimed at mainland China would allow Beijing justify a number of responses, including a military blockade and seizure of Taiwan’s islands in the South China Sea, and paint Taiwan as the escalatory actor internationally. PRC military leaders would undoubtedly pressure the Chinese Communist Party leaders at Zhongnanhai to destroy the Taiwanese military as punishment. Beijing would not allow any retaliation by Taiwan to go unpunished as it would provide the Chinese military with further justification to diminish Taiwan’s sovereignty and destroy additional military assets and infrastructure.

Gain:  By launching a retaliatory military strike against Shuimen Air Base, Taipei demonstrates to not only Beijing but also to the rest of the international community, particularly the United States and its allies, that it is willing to respond to Chinese provocations and will not sit by idly as China attacks Taiwan’s sovereignty. Option #1 is a wake-up call for Beijing, whose leadership believed that Taipei would not respond in-kind to its initial strike. The tit-for-tat strikes point to stronger-than-expected resolve in Taiwan, especially as the people of Taiwan rally to defend their country against a stronger enemy.

Option #2:  Taipei uses its newly commissioned submarines to sink the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning, which is participating in a military exercise in the Western Pacific, but does not take credit for, or acknowledge its role in, the attack.

Risk:  Sinking China’s first aircraft carrier runs the risk of the People’s Liberation Army – Navy (PLAN) initiating a blockade of Taiwan to prevent further attacks against Chinese vessels. Demonstrating such a weakness in the PLAN could result in over-compensation by China in asserting control and sovereignty in the Taiwan Strait. By not taking credit for the surprise sinking of the Liaoning, Taipei risks looking weak domestically by not forcefully (and publicly) retaliating against China. Non-acknowledgment also provides space for Beijing to claim domestically that the exercise’s purpose was to simulate the destruction of an aircraft carrier and to retire the now-obsolete Liaoning.

Gain:  The submarine attack avoids the controversy and risk of attacking the mainland, which would assuredly result in significant reprisals, and provides Taiwan with plausible deniability regarding who sunk the vessel. Taipei’s strike on the Liaoning demonstrates weaknesses of the PLAN, which was not able to successfully defend one of its carriers against a perceived weaker and less sophisticated enemy, causing leadership in China to question the chances of success of a military invasion of Taiwan. Option #2 also exhibits the power and ability of Taiwan’s long-doubted indigenous military capabilities. The successful sinking of the Liaoning reinvigorates Taiwan’s military, which had been suffering from low morale for years. Due to the difficulty in accrediting the perpetrator of the attack, Taipei limits Beijing’s ability to further retaliate in Taiwan.

Other Comments:   Washington privately warns Taipei that any retaliation outside of a limited strike would result in the U.S. military not providing any assistance in the event of further escalation into full-fledged war.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] Vest, C., Kratz, A., & Goujon, R. (2022, December 13). The global economic disruptions from a taiwan conflict. Rhodium Group. https://rhg.com/research/taiwan-economic-disruptions/. 

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Assessing the Role of China’s Aircraft Carriers in a Taiwan Invasion

Michael G. Gallagher is an American expatriate and independent researcher living in Seoul, South Korea, with his Korean wife. He has MA and Ph.D. degrees in International Relations from the University of Miami in Coral, Gables, Florida.  Prior to residing in South Korea, he has lived in Mainland China and Hong Kong.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing the Role of China’s Aircraft Carriers in a Taiwan Invasion

Date Originally Written:  June 1, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  July 11, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that China in its present form poses a grave threat to the United States and its allies and that insufficient attention-at least in public- has been paid to certain aspects of Chinese military planning. This inattention may be the result of the U.S. Navy’s (USN) projecting its views of aircraft carrier strength onto its view of China.

Summary:  Despite the publicity China’s carrier force has received in the press, the huge ships, as impressive as they are, may only play a secondary role in Chinese naval operations during a Taiwan invasion. The function of China’s carrier force will be to clean up any remaining opposition after Chinese forces decisively defeat the U.S. and Japanese fleets using a blizzard of cyberattack and missile barrages.

Text:  China’s aircraft carriers have been in the news over the last few months.  The Liaoning and its escorts conducted exercises in the South China Sea May of this year[1].  China’s second carrier and its first domestically built one, the Shandong, was recently spotted with several drones on its flight deck[2]. Meanwhile, the Chinese have just launched a third carrier, the Fujian,  and planning for a fourth carrier, possibly nuclear-powered, is in the works[3]. There is even discussion of six People’s Liberation Army – Navy (PLAN) carrier groups by 2035[4].

Traditional reasons for building aircraft carriers includes sea control, showing the flag, having a mobile airfield that you and only you control, and the sheer prestige of having a large carrier force. However, none of these reasons cancel out the fact that aircraft carriers are an increasingly vulnerable weapons system that is already over 100 years old. The first full-fledged carrier was a converted battlecruiser, the  Royal Navy’s HMS Furious. The Furious entered service during World War I in 1917[5]. The first specifically designed carrier was the Japanese Hosho, launched in 1921[6].

Apart from its carrier force, China has expended enormous resources since the mid-1990s on capabilities that are specifically designed to sink the USN’s nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and wrest control of the waters of the Western Pacific from the United States and its allies. To achieve this strategic end, the PLAN has acquired an impressive arsenal of land-based ballistic missiles like the DF-21 land-based anti-ship ballistic missile and the DF-26 “Guam Killers” Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, which also has an anti-ship mode, H-6 medium-range bombers armed with ship-killing cruise missiles, a 79 boat strong submarine force, and numerous frigates and destroyers armed with anti-ship missiles[7][8][9][10]. 

If any assault against Taiwan is delayed until the late 2020s, China’s emerging hypersonic capability will likely play a significant role in in its attack plans. Mounted on  either  JL-2 or JL-3 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles or land-based weapons like the DF-26 Medium Range Ballistic Missile and the longer-range DF-41 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), nonnuclear hypersonic glide vehicles using kinetic energy impacts would devastate Anderson Air Force Base on Guam, Pearl Harbor, and the U.S. Navy’s huge Pacific Fleet base at San Diego[11][12][13].

Non-nuclear hypersonic warheads mounted on ICBMs could even strike high-value civilian targets in the U.S. like Boeing’s huge Everett, Washington factory. These weapons would be doubly effective if they could be deployed as Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles. This potentially revolutionary advance was hinted at during China’s July 2021 hypersonic weapon test when the glide vehicle, mounted on a ballistic missile, may have released an extra payload while in flight[14].

Current U.S. Anti-Ballistic Missile systems like THAAD, Patriot-3 and the US Navy’s family of Standard missiles would have limited effectiveness against such weapons. And that gap in defensive capability may not be filled until around 2030[15].

The PLAN’s strong anti-carrier posture, when combined with the fiscal reality that it is less expensive to use a missile than put a carrier at risk, points to China’s carriers playing a clean-up role in a Taiwan invasion scenario.  This scenario would begin with a blizzard of cyberattack and missile barrages, accompanied by wave after wave of cruise and ballistic missile strikes against American and Japanese bases on Guam, Okinawa and elsewhere. PLAN carriers would then sink any remaining hostile warships and force the smaller nations of Southeast Asia, plus Australia and New Zealand, to bend their knee to Beijing[16].

Still, even if China scored huge gains early in any conflict over Taiwan, the stealthy U.S. and Japanese submarine fleets could cripple any Chinese naval campaign.  Chinese planners may assume that any enemy submarines at sea when the war began would be cut off from repair and resupply and would eventually wither on the vine.  This may be a valid assumption if the Chinese plans do involve strikes on U.S. home ports and possibly parts of U.S. industrial infrastructure.  However, until these U.S. and Japanese submarine forces run out of food, fuel, or munitions, they are still a threat.

Taiwan, the target of China’s violent, high velocity, high-technology assault, would almost certainly be forced to surrender. With Taiwan’s two potential saviors, the U.S. and Japanese fleets, having carriers resting on the bottom of the Pacific, the island democracy would be cut off from all possible aid by an impenetrable Chinese naval blockade.  Messy amphibious assaults against contested beaches would not be necessary.

China’s carrier force may wind up playing the same role the US Navy’s fast battleships did in the Pacific during World War Two. Those powerful warships, once the queens of battle, found themselves relegated to back up roles, providing fire support for amphibious landings and using their formidable antiaircraft batteries to help defend the now dominant carriers from air attack[17].

Endnotes:

[1] D, M. (2022, May 23). Chinese Carrier Group now operating in the East China Sea. USNI.org. Retrieved July 6, 2022, from https://news.usni.org/2022/05/23/chinese-carrier-strike-group-now-operating-in-east-china-sea

[2] A, W. (2022, June 3). Drones included in Refit for China’s second aircraft carrier Shandong. South China Morning Post. Retrieved July 6, 2022, from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3180265/drones-included-refit-chinas-second-aircraft-carrier-shandong

[3] K, M & D, R.(2022, June 17). China launches hi-tech aircraft carrier in naval milestone. Retrieved July 6, 2022, AP News. from https://apnews.com/article/beijing-china-shanghai-government-and-politics-6ce51d1901b3a5658cc9ef7e62b65000

[4] World’s biggest Naval Power: Can China Develop Six Aircraft Carriers By 2035 & Challenge Its Arch-Rival USA Eurasian Times Desk. (2021, December 23). Retrieved July 6, 2022 from https://eurasiantimes.com/worlds-biggest-naval-power-can-china-develop-six-aircraft-carriers-by-2035-challenge-its-arch-rival-usa/

[5] History’s First Aircraft Carrier. Naval Encylopedia.com. (2021). Retrieved June 26, 2022 from https://naval-encyclopedia.com/ww1/uk/hms-furious-1917.php

[6] The Hosho, world’s first purpose built aircraft carrier. Naval Encylopedia.com. (2021). Retrieved June 26, 2022 from https://naval-encyclopedia.com/ww2/japan/hosho.php

[7] DF-21 (CSS-5). Missile Threat: CSIS Missile Defense Project (2022, March 28). Retrieved July 6, 2022 from https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-21/

[8] DF-26. Missile Threat: CSIS Missile Defense Project (2021, August 6) Retrieved July 6, 2022 from https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/dong-feng-26-df-26/

[9] Hanyang H-6 Medium Bomber. Military-Today.com. (2022).  Retrieved July 6, 2022 from http://www.military-today.com/aircraft/h6k.htm

[10] 2022 China Military Strength. Globalfirepower.com. (2022).. Retrieved July 6, 2022 from https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=china

[11] Missiles of China. Missile Threat: CSIS Missile Defense Project. (2021, April 12). Retrieved July 6, 2022 from https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/

[12] Missiles of China.  Missile Threat: CSIS Missile Defense Project. (2021, April 12). Retrieved July 6, 2022 from https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/

[13] DF-41 (Dongfeng-41/CSS-X-20). Missile Threat: CSIS Missile Defense Project. (2021, July 31). Retrieved July, 6 from https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-41/

[14] N, T, R &, T, T, J. (2021, November 3). China’s Hypersonic Mystery Weapon Released Its Own Payload And Nobody Knows Why (Updated). The War Zone. Retrieved July 6, 2022 from https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43242/chinas-hypersonic-mystery-weapon-released-its-own-payload-and-nobody-knows-why

[15] A, E. (2022, May 23). Just getting started: Too early to say when hypersonic interceptor will go live. Breaking Defense. Retrieved July 6, 2022 from https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/just-getting-started-too-early-to-say-when-hypersonic-interceptor-will-go-live/

[16] S,R.( 2021, June 21). China’s Third Aircraft Carrier is Aimed at a Post-US Asia. Foreign Policy. Retrieved July 6, 2022 from https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/21/china-third-aircraft-carrier-fujian/

[17] F,R.(2020, July 13). Rethinking the Technological Story of the Pacific Theater of the Second World War. The Diplomat. Retrieved July 9, 2022 from https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/rethinking-the-technological-story-of-the-pacific-theater-of-the-second-world-war/

 

Assessment Papers China (People's Republic of China) Major Regional Contingency Maritime Michael G. Gallagher Taiwan
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Options for Taiwan to Better Compete with China

Editor’s Note:  This article is part of our Below Threshold Competition: China writing contest which took place from May 1, 2020 to July 31, 2020.  More information about the contest can be found by clicking here.

Thomas J. Shattuck is a Research Associate in the Asia Program and the Managing Editor at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Mr. Shattuck was a member of the 2019 class of scholars at the Global Taiwan Institute, receiving the Taiwan Scholarship. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation:  Taiwan requires options to better compete with China in international organizations below the threshold of conflict.

Date Originally Written:  July 24, 2020.

Date Originally Published:  October 14, 2020.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is a research associate at a non-partisan foreign policy think tank.

Background:  One of the key national security priorities of the People’s Republic of China is to force Taiwan into unification. Part of that strategy is to limit Taiwan’s ability to participate fully in the international community, specifically in international organizations in which Taiwan is not a full member[1]. Such pressure would be removed upon China-Taiwan unification.

Significance:  In light of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the full participation and cooperation of the entire international community is needed to understand best practices in limiting the spread of the virus. The pandemic has shown the importance of public and global health for a country’s national security. Taiwan’s exclusion from the May 2020 United Nations (UN) World Health Assembly—after dual campaigns by major international players in support of Taiwan’s observership bid and by China to keep Taiwan out—demonstrates the danger and limitations of excluding certain states based on their geopolitical situation[2]. Taiwan is prevented from learning important information or receiving key data in a timely fashion. Also, it is more difficult for Taiwan to share its expertise in stopping the virus’ spread, something that Taipei has succeeded at doing despite its limitations[3]. The spread of viruses endangers the entire world, and political maneuvering by Beijing has damaged the global response effort.

Option #1:  Taipei works with like-minded nations, particularly the United States, to develop a new, non-UN-membership-based international entity, initially focused on health issues with a plan for expansion into other areas.

Risk:  There are two primary risks to such an endeavor. The first risk is the possibility that Beijing will pressure nations into not participating. By threatening various economic or political repercussions, leaders in China have been able to stop Taiwan from expanding its international participation. Such a campaign would likely occur in light of any effort by Taipei to work around current Beijing-imposed limitations. If such a new entity does not receive enough international buy-in, then Taipei risks getting embarrassed for failing to garner support. Second, Beijing would likely direct even greater backlash at Taipei for attempting to challenge it internationally. This could include more assertive military exercises in the Taiwan Strait.

Gain:  Successfully establishing a new international entity would demonstrate that Taipei does not have to live within Beijing-imposed boundaries. As the recent COVID-19 example has shown, Taiwan has much to contribute internationally, but international organizations and members will quickly revert to Beijing’s stance when it comes to Taiwan. It was Taipei that first sounded the alarm regarding the potential danger of COVID-19[4]. Without those confines, Taiwan would be able to showcase its COVID-19 success story and teach other nations its best public health practices. It also would be able to receive information in a timelier fashion. Taiwan’s international participation would no longer be limited by the current status of cross-Strait relations and could be further integrated into the international community. Such an effort would complement the Trump administration’s desire to form some sort of “alliance of democracies” to meet the China challenge[5].

Option #2:  Taiwan relaunches its bid for membership in the UN so that it could become a full member of all UN-affiliated international organizations and ones that require statehood for membership.

Risk:  Any attempt by Taipei to join the United Nations will be stopped by Beijing. The vote would fail in the same way that Taiwan’s bids for guest or observer status in international organizations have since 2016. Depending on the form that such a bid takes (i.e., independence referendum for establishment of the “Republic of Taiwan”), the bid could have catastrophic effects, i.e., Chinese military action against Taiwan or an invasion. If such a move is conducted similarly to past attempts, then it would cause Beijing to lash out in a ways below the threshold of war—perhaps more intense forms of aggression that have become regularized since 2016[6].

Gain:  Even though a UN membership bid would fail, it would once again place Taiwan’s confusing geopolitical status in the limelight. Taiwan’s international plight receives sympathetic news coverage in democratic nations, and forcing countries to vote for the record on where it stands on this issue could spark new conversations about a country’s relationship with Taiwan. With increasingly assertive and aggressive actions by Beijing on various fronts, launching a UN membership bid could help Taipei enhance ties with current “friends” or find new ones because how China treats Taiwan would be given even greater focus across the world. The current international spotlight on China’s behavior at home and abroad may lead to countries working to strengthen relations with Taiwan. Positive outcomes are possible even if the membership bid fails.

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] Dreyer, J. T. (2018, August 13). The Big Squeeze: Beijing’s Anaconda Strategy to Force Taiwan to Surrender. Foreign Policy Research Institute. https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/08/the-big-squeeze-beijings-anaconda-strategy-to-force-taiwan-to-surrender

[2] Tan, H. (2020, May 19). Taiwan ‘disappointed and angry’ about being excluded from WHO meeting, says it is developing its own coronavirus vaccine. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/19/taiwan-says-it-is-disappointed-and-angry-being-excluded-from-who-meeting.html

[3] Griffiths, J. (2020, April 5). Taiwan’s coronavirus response is among the best globally. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/04/asia/taiwan-coronavirus-response-who-intl-hnk/index.html

[4] Watt, L. (2020, May 19). Taiwan Says It Tried to Warn the World About Coronavirus. Here’s What It Really Knew and When. Time. https://time.com/5826025/taiwan-who-trump-coronavirus-covid19

[5] Pompeo, M. (2020, July 23). Communist China and the Free World’s Future. U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/communist-china-and-the-free-worlds-future

[6] Taiwan says China sending planes near island almost daily. (2020, July 22). Associated Press. https://apnews.com/2126b0fbdf2b7d2e6a5a77c464aeb7b1

2020 - Contest: PRC Below Threshold Writing Contest Below Established Threshold Activities (BETA) China (People's Republic of China) Option Papers Taiwan Thomas J. Shattuck
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Alternative Future: The Perils of Trading Artificial Intelligence for Analysis in the U.S. Intelligence Community

John J. Borek served as a strategic intelligence analyst for the U.S. Army and later as a civilian intelligence analyst in the U.S. Intelligence Community.  He is currently an adjunct professor at Grand Canyon University where he teaches courses in governance and public policy. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Alternative Future: The Perils of Trading Artificial Intelligence for Analysis in the U.S. Intelligence Community

Date Originally Written:  June 12, 2020.

Date Originally Published:  August 12, 2020.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The article is written from the point of view of a U.S. Congressional inquiry excerpt into an intelligence failure and the loss of Taiwan to China in 2035.

Summary:  The growing reliance on Artificial Intelligence (AI) to provide situational awareness and predictive analysis within the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) resulted in an opportunity for China to execute a deception plan.  This successful deception plan resulted in the sudden and complete loss of Taiwan’s independence in 2035.

Text:  The U.S. transition away from humans performing intelligence analysis to the use of AI was an inevitable progression as the amount of data collected for analysis reached levels humans could not hope to manage[1] while machine learning and artificial neural networks developed simultaneously to the level they could match, if not outperform, human reasoning[2]. The integration of data scientists with analytic teams, which began in 2020, resulted in the attrition of of both regional and functional analysts and the transformation of the duties of those remaining to that of editor and briefer[3][4].

Initial successes in the transition led to increasing trust and complacency. The “Black Box” program demonstrated its first major success in identifying terrorist networks and forecasting terrorist actions fusing social media, network analysis, and clandestine collection; culminating in the successful preemption of the 2024 Freedom Tower attack. Moving beyond tactical successes, by 2026 Black Box was successfully analyzing climatological data, historical migration trends, and social behavior models to correctly forecast the sub-Saharan African drought and resulting instability, allowing the State Department to build a coalition of concerned nations and respond proactively to the event, mitigating human suffering and unrest.

The cost advantages and successes large and small resulted in the IC transitioning from a community of 17 coordinating analytic centers into a group of user agencies. In 2028, despite the concerns of this Committee, all analysis was centralized at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence under Black Box. Testimony at the time indicated that there was no longer any need for competitive or agency specific analysis, the algorithms of Black Box considered all likely possibilities more thoroughly and efficiently than human analysts could. Beginning that Fiscal Year the data scientists of the different agencies of the IC accessed Black Box for the analysis their decision makers needed. Also that year the coordination process for National intelligence Estimates and Intelligence Community Assessments was eliminated; as the intelligence and analysis was uniform across all agencies of government there was no longer any need for contentious, drawn out analytic sessions which only delayed delivery of the analysis to policy makers.

Regarding the current situation in the Pacific, there was never a doubt that China sought unification under its own terms with Taiwan, and the buildup and modernization of Chinese forces over the last several decades caused concern within both the U.S. and Taiwan governments[5]. This committee could find no fault with the priority that China had been given within the National Intelligence Priorities Framework. The roots of this intelligence failure lie in the IC inability to factor the possibility of deception into the algorithms of the Black Box program[6].

AI relies on machine learning, and it was well known that machines could learn biases based on the data that they were given and their algorithms[7][8]. Given the Chinese lead in AI development and applications, and their experience in using AI it to manage people and their perceptions[9][10], the Committee believes that the IC should have anticipated the potential for the virtual grooming of Black Box. As a result of this intelligence postmortem, we now know that four years before the loss of Taiwan the People’s Republic of China began their deception operation in earnest through the piecemeal release of false plans and strategy through multiple open and clandestine sources. As reported in the National Intelligence Estimate published just 6 months before the attack, China’s military modernization and procurement plan “confirmed” to Black Box that China was preparing to invade and reunify with Taiwan using overwhelming conventional military forces in 2043 to commemorate the 150th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s birth.

What was hidden from Black Box and the IC, was that China was also embarking on a parallel plan of adapting the lessons learned from Russia’s invasions of Georgia and the Ukraine. Using their own AI systems, China rehearsed and perfected a plan to use previously infiltrated special operations forces, airborne and heliborne forces, information warfare, and other asymmetric tactics to overcome Taiwan’s military superiority and geographic advantage. Individual training of these small units went unnoticed and was categorized as unremarkable and routine.

Three months prior to the October 2035 attack we now know that North Korea, at China’s request, began a series of escalating provocations in the Sea of Japan which alerted Black Box to a potential crisis and diverted U.S. military and diplomatic resources. At the same time, biometric tracking and media surveillance of key personalities in Taiwan that were previously identified as being crucial to a defense of the island was stepped up, allowing for their quick elimination by Chinese Special Operations Forces (SOF).

While we can’t determine with certainty when the first Chinese SOF infiltrated Taiwan, we know that by October 20, 2035 their forces were in place and Operation Homecoming received the final go-ahead from the Chinese President. The asymmetric tactics combined with limited precision kinetic strikes and the inability of the U.S. to respond due to their preoccupation 1,300 miles away resulted in a surprisingly quick collapse of Taiwanese resistance. Within five days enough conventional forces had been ferried to the island to secure China’s hold on it and make any attempt to liberate it untenable.

Unlike our 9/11 report which found that human analysts were unable to “connect the dots” of the information they had[11], we find that Black Box connected the dots too well. Deception is successful when it can either increase the “noise,” making it difficult to determine what is happening; or conversely by increasing the confidence in a wrong assessment[12]. Without community coordination or competing analysis provided by seasoned professional analysts, the assessment Black Box presented to policy makers was a perfect example of the latter.

Endnotes:

[1] Barnett, J. (2019, August 21). AI is breathing new life into the intelligence community. Fedscoop. Retrieved from https://www.fedscoop.com/artificial-intelligence-in-the-spying

[2] Silver, D., et al. (2016). Mastering the game of GO with deep neural networks and tree search. Nature, 529, 484-489. Retrieved from https://www.nature.com/articles/nature16961

[3] Gartin. G. W. (2019). The future of analysis. Studies in Intelligence, 63(2). Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-63-no-2/Future-of-Analysis.html

[4] Symon, P. B., & Tarapore, A. (2015, October 1). Defense intelligence in the age of big data. Joint Force Quarterly 79. Retrieved from https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/621113/defense-intelligence-analysis-in-the-age-of-big-data

[5] Office of the Secretary of Defense. (2019). Annual report to Congress: Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2019. Retrieved from https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

[6] Knight, W. (2019). Tainted data can teach algorithms the wrong lessons. Wired. Retrieved from https://www.wired.com/story/tainted-data-teach-algorithms-wrong-lessons

[7] Boghani, P. (2019). Artificial intelligence can be biased. Here’s what you should know. PBS / Frontline Retrieved from https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/artificial-intelligence-algorithmic-bias-what-you-should-know

[8] Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S., & Kirchner, L. (2016). Machine bias. ProPublica. Retrieved from https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing

[9] Fanning, D., & Docherty, N. (2019). In the age of AI. PBS / Frontline. Retrieved from https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/in-the-age-of-ai

[10] Westerheide, F. (2020). China – the first artificial intelligence superpower. Forbes. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2020/01/14/china-artificial-intelligence-superpower/#794c7a52f053

[11] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. (2004). The 9/11 Commission report. Retrieved from https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Exec.htm

[12] Betts, R. K. (1980). Surprise despite warning: Why sudden attacks succeed. Political Science Quarterly 95(4), 551-572. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2150604.pdf

Alternative Futures / Alternative Histories / Counterfactuals Artificial Intelligence / Machine Learning / Human-Machine Teaming Assessment Papers China (People's Republic of China) Information and Intelligence John J. Borek Taiwan
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Options for the People’s Republic of China following the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996

Captain Robert N. Hein is a career Surface Warfare Officer in the U.S. Navy.  He previously commanded the USS Gettysburg (CG-64) and the USS Nitze (DDG-94).  He can be found on Twitter @the_sailor_dog.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.  

“Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence, supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting, thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans.”  -Sun Tzu  

National Security Situation:  The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is vying to establish itself as the Asian Hegemon.  What caused this rapid shift in the PRC’s foreign Policy?  Why, after decades of growth, where the PRC was ascribed the long view, has it rapidly accelerated military growth, reorganization, and a diplomatic and economic expansion across the world stage in a scale not seen since Zheng He’s voyages of the 15th century?

Date Originally Written:  February 2, 2017.

Date Originally Published:  April 3, 2017.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article is taken from the point of view of the PRC toward the U.S in the two decades following the third Taiwan Straight crisis of 1996.

Background:  In 1995, Taiwan’s president visited the U.S. to attend his graduate school reunion at Cornell.  His visit, coupled with the U.S. sale of F-16s to Taiwan, incensed the PRC at what they viewed as possible changes in the U.S. and Taiwan view of the One China Policy.  The PRC commenced a series of missile tests near Taiwan.  The U.S. responded by sending two aircraft carriers to the vicinity of the Strait of Taiwan[1].  The PRC realized they could do little to respond to U.S. actions and needed a way to ensure they never experienced this humiliation again.

Significance:  The law of unintended consequences often applies to national security.  While U.S. action in 1996 was a clear demonstration of U.S. resolve, the PRC’s response has been to pursue a series of actions to reduce and possibly prevent the ability of the U.S. to influence events in Asia.

Option #1:  After viewing the U.S. way of war against Serbia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, whereby the U.S. consistently pushes its aircraft carriers close to the coast and launches strike fighters and tomahawk land attack missiles against targets ashore, the PRC must find a way to extend its borders out to sea into the ocean.  This can be accomplished by placing relatively cheap long-range anti-ship missile batteries along the shore, increasing the number of ships and submarines in the People’s Liberation Army Navy and, in a bold stroke, build islands in the South China Sea (SCS), and claim the surrounding waters as historical boundaries of the PRC.

Risk:  There is a real danger that the U.S. will react to the build-up of PRC forces and rebuild its navy to maintain global influence.  Previous U.S. administrations justified naval build ups to counter the Soviet threat however, by keeping activities below the threshold of armed conflict, we believe the U.S. will not be able to convince its public of the need for a large military buildup, especially following the years of conflict the U.S. has recently experience in the Middle East.  While Asian nations could turn to the U.S. out of fear, this can be mitigated through strong economic measures.  Asian nations may also attempt to challenge the PRC in the international courts, but the lack of enforcement measures in the international system removes this a real concern.

Gain:  Option #1 will prevent U.S. access to the waters they need to block the PRC from maneuvering against Taiwan.  Due to the proliferation of short-range fighters, and the lack of anti-surface capability of many U.S. warships, the ability of the U.S. to offer a timely response to a forcible re-unification of Taiwan could be prevented.

Option #2:  When we look back to Sun Tzu, and realize the best course of action is to attack the enemy’s strategy, we must determine what other strategy the enemy could impose.  While Option #1 will be effective in countering the U.S. ability to easily execute its traditional means of bombardment from the sea, another option is available to the U.S.; the long-range containment strategy used against the Soviet Union could possibly be executed with a long-range blockade.  By focusing on key choke points such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab Al-Mandeb from the Red Sea, an adversary could block much-needed commodities such as oil and rare earth elements needed in the PRC defense industry.  Just as the PRC invoked the historical nine-dash line to establish autonomy in the SCS, revitalizing the historical one belt one road to connect Asia to Europe and Africa will easily stop any means of isolating or containing the PRC.  By continuing investment throughout the world, especially in economically disenfranchised areas, the PRC can prevent the types of alliances used by the U.S. during the Cold War to isolate the Soviet Union.

Risk:  If the PRC moves out too quickly, it spreads itself too thin internationally, and risks alienating the very countries with whom it hopes to partner.  The drain on resources over time will become increasingly difficult.  The PRC’s ability to be a free rider on U.S. security will winnow as other countries will expect the same from the PRC.

Gain:  The PRC establishes itself as a both a regional hegemon, and a global power.  The PRC asserts influence over the global economy and geopolitics to rival the U.S. in a multi-polar world.  Option #2 removes the ability of the U.S. to polarize the eastern hemisphere against the PRC.

Other Comments:  Through a rapid economic development program centered on an export economy in a globalizing world, the PRC has embarked on a multitude of options, covering the diplomatic, informational, military and economic spectrum.  It has employed both above options, which have caused the world to react, often favorably to the PRC.  The question for the PRC now is how to maintain the momentum, solidify their role in a changing world order, and not show their hand too quickly lest they implode.  The question for the U.S. is whether it will continue to pursue the U.S. way of war that has been studied so ably by the PRC, or pursue other options as it both cooperates and competes with the PRC on a rapidly evolving world stage.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1]  Ross, Robert, International Security, Vol 25, No 2 (Fall 2000) p 87 The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation

Bob Hein China (People's Republic of China) Containment Deterrence Option Papers South China Sea Taiwan
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South China Sea Options: The Road to Taiwan

“The Black Swan” is an officer and a strategist in the U.S. Army.  He has deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.  He has been a company commander, and served at the battalion, brigade, division, and Army Command (ACOM) level staffs.  The opinions expressed are his alone, and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, organization, or group.

National Security Situation:  The Republic of China (Taiwan) exists in a singular position in world affairs.  Taiwan is viewed as a breakaway province by the communist People’s Republic of China (PRC), who controls the Chinese mainland.  However, Taiwan possesses its own government, economy, and institutions, and its nominal independence has been assured by the United States (U.S.) since 1949.  However, the PRC views any move toward actual independence as casus belli under its “One China” policy, which has been in place for decades.  Recognition or even acknowledgement of Taiwanese positions is a veritable geopolitical and diplomatic taboo.

The recent election of Donald Trump as president of the United States (POTUS) potentially undermines the previous order that has been in place since the Nixon Administration.  Campaigning as a change agent, and one to defy convention, President Trump has suggested the U.S. rethink the “One China” policy.  POTUS’ reception of overtures from Taiwan and hard rhetoric towards the PRC brings the question of Taiwan’s status and future to the forefront of geopolitics once again.

Date Originally Written:  January 28, 2017.

Date Originally Published:  March 16, 2017.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article is written from the point of view of Taiwan towards PRC claims in the South China Sea (SCS).

Background:  The communist victory during the Chinese Civil War caused the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-Shek, with 2 million of its supporters, to flee from the Chinese mainland to the island of Taiwan.  The gradual transition of the island to a democratic form of government, its industrialized, capitalist economy, and its reliance on western benefactors for defense established it as a bulwark of western influence in Asia.  As a result of Cold War rivalries and competing ideologies, the independence of Taiwan has been assured in all but name for more than 65 years by the U.S.  A series of crises, most recently in 1996, demonstrated the inability of the PRC to project military force against Taiwan, and the willingness of the U.S. to ensure Taiwan’s independence.  Today, though the PRC is internationally recognized as the government of China, and the “One China” policy is a globally accepted norm, Taiwan still maintains de facto independence.

Events since the onset of the 21st century have caused the balance of power to shift ever more in favor towards the PRC.  Impressive military expansion and diplomatic initiatives on the part of the PRC have emboldened it to challenge U.S. hegemony in Asia, and defy United Nations (UN) mandates.  The most overt of these initiatives has been the PRC’s assertion of sovereignty over the SCS, and the seeming unwillingness of the international community to overtly challenge PRC claims, beyond referring them to legal arbitration.  The emerging policies of the newly elected POTUS may further exacerbate the situation in the SCS, even as they may provide opportunities to assure the continued independence of Taiwan.

Significance:  Taiwan is a democracy, with a dynamic capitalist economy.  It has diplomatic and military ties to the U.S., and other countries, through arms sales and informal partnerships.  It is strategically positioned along major oceanic trade routes from Southwest Asia to Japan and South Korea.  The issue of Taiwanese independence is a global flash point due to PRC adherence to the “One China” policy.  If the U.S. were to abandon Taiwan, it would effectively terminate the notional independence of the island, and end any hopes of preventing the PRC from becoming the regional hegemon.

Option #1:  Taiwan rejects all PRC claims to the SCS, beyond its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and supports the rulings of the UN Permanent Court of Arbitration, with the goal of gaining international support, especially from the new U.S. administration.

Risk:  The PRC maintains sovereignty over all Chinese affairs.  Such an act would undoubtedly result in a forceful response from the PRC.  The PRC may move militarily to isolate Taiwan and/or attempt to force a change in government through any means necessary.  Depending on the perceived international response, the PRC may resort to war in order to conquer Taiwan.

Gain:  Taiwan must break its diplomatic isolation if it is to survive as an independent state.  This means currying favor with the UN, regional powers such as Japan and South Korea, and other regional nations such as Vietnam and the Philippines.  Moreover, given the new POTUS’ perceived willingness to break from the “One China” policy, there is a chance to induce greater commitment from the U.S. by ensuring Taiwan’s policies match those of the U.S.

Option #2:  Taiwan maintains the status quo and adheres to the “One China” policy, even in the face of tough U.S. rhetoric.

Risk:  If the PRC’s ambitions are not curbed, the status quo will no longer be enough for PRC leaders.  The creation and subsequent defense of artificial islands in the SCS is a relatively low risk activity.  If the response of the international community is found wanting, then it will only embolden the PRC to seek bigger game.  The ultimate conquest of Taiwan, while by no means an easy task, is a logical step in fulfilling the PRC’s regional ambitions.  Conversely, standing with the PRC may infuriate the new POTUS, and result in the withdrawal of U.S. support.

Gain:  The PRC has successfully integrated other economic and governmental systems into its own system before, under the “One Party, Two Systems” policy.  While this led to a loss of political freedom for Macau and Hong Kong, the two former enclaves still maintain their capitalist systems, and enjoy very high standards of living.  Furthermore, Taiwan is culturally and economically closer to the PRC than to any other nation.

Other Comments:  Any conflict between the PRC and Taiwan would be devastating to the island.  The PRC is simply too large and too close.  However, Taiwan has been nominally independent for more than 65 years.  Its people are the descendants of the generations that fought the communists, and stood firm during the Cold War, events that are still in living memory.  Independence from the mainland is the legacy of the island, and is worth fighting for.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

None.

China (People's Republic of China) Option Papers South China Sea Taiwan The Black Swan