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Assessment of the Threat Posed by the Turkish Cyber Army

Marita La Palm is a graduate student at American University where she focuses on terrorism, countering violent extremism, homeland security policy, and cyber domain activities.  She can be found on Twitter at maritalp.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group. 

Title:  Assessment of the Threat Posed by the Turkish Cyber Army

Date Originally Written:  March 25, 2018.

Date Originally Published:  April 9, 2018.

Summary:  Turkish-sympathetic hacker group, the Turkish Cyber Army, has changed tactics from seizing and defacing websites to a Twitter phishing campaign that has come remarkably close to the President of the United States.

Text:  The Turkish Cyber Army (Ay Yildiz Tim) attempted to compromise U.S. President Donald Trump’s Twitter account in January of 2018 as part of a systematic cyber attack accompanying the Turkish invasion of Syria.  They were not successful, but they did seize control of various well-known accounts and the operation is still in progress two months later.

Although the Turkish Cyber Army claims to date back to a 2002 foundation in New Zealand, it first appears in hacking annals on October 2, 2006.  Since then, the group has taken over vulnerable websites in Kenya, the European Union, and the United States[1].  As of the summer of 2017, the Turikish Cyber Army changed tactics to focus on Twitter phishing, where they used the compromised Twitter account of a trustworthy source to bait a target to surrender log-in credentials[2].  They do this by sending a direct message from a familiar account they control telling the desired victim to click on a link and enter their log-in information to a page that looks like Twitter but actually records their username and password.  Upon accessing the victim’s account, the hackers rapidly make pro-Turkish posts, download the message history, and send new phishing attacks through the new account, all within a few hours.  The Turkish Cyber Army claim to have downloaded the targets’ messages, apparently both for intelligence purposes and to embarrass the target by publicly releasing the messages[3].  Oddly enough, the group has yet to release the private messages they acquired in spite of their threats to do so.  The group is notable both for their beginner-level sophistication when compared to state hackers such as Fancy Bear and the way they broadcast every hack they make.

The first documented victim of the 2018 operation was Syed Akbaruddin, Indian Permanent Representative to the United Nations.  Before the attack on Akbaruddin, the hackers likely targeted Kurdish accounts in a similar manner[4].  Since these initial attacks, the Turkish Cyber Army moved steadily closer to accounts followed by President Trump and even managed to direct message him on Twitter[5].  In January 2018, they phished multiple well-known Western public figures such as television personality Greta van Susteren and the head of the World Economic Forum, Børge Brende.  It so happened that Greta and Eric Bolling, another victim, are two of the only 45 accounts followed by President Trump.  From Eric and Greta’s accounts, the hackers were able to send messages to Trump.  Two months later, the Turkish Cyber Army continued on Twitter, but now primarily with a focus on Indian accounts.  The group took over Air India’s Twitter account on March 15, 2018.  However, the aftereffects of their Western efforts can still be seen: on March 23, 2018 the Chief Content Officer of Time, Inc. and the President of Fortune, Alan Murray tweeted, “I was locked out of Twitter for a month after being hacked by the Turkish cyber army…” Meanwhile, the Turkish Cyber Army has a large and loud Twitter presence with very little regulation considering they operate as an openly criminal organization on the platform.

President Trump’s personal Twitter account was also a target for the Turkish Cyber Army.  This is not a secret account known only to a few.  President Trump’s account name is public, and his password is all that is needed to post unless he has set up two-factor authentication.  Trump uses his account to express his personal opinions, and since some of his tweets have had high shock value, a fake message intended to disrupt might go unquestioned.  It is fair to assume that multiple groups have gone at President Trump’s account with a password cracker without stopping since inauguration.  It is only a matter of time before a foreign intelligence service or other interested party manages to access President Trump’s direct messages, make provocative statements from his account that could threaten the financial sector or national security, and from there go on to access more sensitive information.  While the Turkish Cyber Army blasts their intrusion from the compromised accounts, more sophisticated hacking teams would be in and out without a word and might have already done so.  The most dangerous hackers would maintain that access for the day it is useful and unexpected.

While nothing immediately indicates that this group is a Turkish government organization, they are either supporters of the current government or work for it.  Both reporter Joseph Cox and the McAfee report claimed the group used Turkish code[6].  Almost a hundred actual or bot accounts have some identifier of the Turkish Cyber Army, none of which appear to be censored by Twitter.  Of particular interest in the group’s history are the attacks on Turkish political party Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi’s (CHP) deputy Eren Erdem’ın, alleging his connections with Fethullah Gulen and the 2006 and possible 2017 attempts to phish Kurdish activists[7].  The Turkish Cyber Army’s current operations occurred on the eve of massive Turkish political risk, as the events in Syria could have ended Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s career had they gone poorly. Not only did Turkey invade Syria in order to attack trained troops of its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally, the United States, but Turkish representatives had been banned from campaigning in parts of the European Union, and Turkish banks might face a multi-billion dollar fine thanks to the Reza Zarrab case[8].  Meanwhile, both Islamist and Kurdish insurgents appeared emboldened within the country[9].  Turkey had everything to lose, and a cyberattack, albeit not that sophisticated but conducted against high value targets, was a possibility while the United States appeared undecided as to whom to back — its proxy force or its NATO ally.  In the end, the United States has made efforts to reconcile diplomatically with Turkey since January, and Turkey has saved face.

Endnotes:

[1]  Ayyildiz Tim. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2018, from https://ayyildiz.org/; Turks ‘cyber-leger’ kaapt Nederlandse websites . (2006, October 2). Retrieved January 24, 2018, from https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2006/10/02/turks-cyber-leger-kaapt-nederlandse-websites-11203640-a1180482; Terry, N. (2013, August 12). Asbury park’s website taken over by hackers. McClatchy – Tribune Business News; Ministry of transport website hacked. (2014, March 5). AllAfrica.Com. 

[2] Turkish hackers target Sevan Nishanyan’s Twitter account. (2017, July 28). Armenpress News Agency.

[3] Beek, C., & Samani, R. (2018, January 24). Twitter Accounts of US Media Under Attack by Large Campaign. Retrieved January 24, 2018, from https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/twitter-accounts-of-us-media-under-attack-by-large-campaign/.

[4] #EfrinNotAlone. (2018, January 17). “News that people  @realDonaldTrump followers have been hacked by Turkish cyber army. TCA made an appearance a few days ago sending virus/clickey links to foreigners and my Kurdish/friends. The journalist who have had their accounts hacked in US have clicked the link.”  [Tweet]. https://twitter.com/la_Caki__/status/953572575602462720.

[5] Herreria, C. (2018, January 17). Hackers DM’d Donald Trump With Former Fox News Hosts’ Twitter Accounts. Retrieved March 25, 2018, from https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/eric-bolling-greta-van-susteren-twitter-hacked_us_5a5eb17de4b096ecfca88729

[6] Beek, C., & Samani, R. (2018, January 24). Twitter Accounts of US Media Under Attack by Large Campaign. Retrieved January 24, 2018, from https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/twitter-accounts-of-us-media-under-attack-by-large-campaign/; Joseph Cox. (2018, January 23). “Interestingly, the code of the phishing page is in… Turkish. “Hesabın var mı?”, or “Do you have an account?”.”  [Tweet]. https://twitter.com/josephfcox/status/955861462190383104.

[7] Ayyıldız Tim FETÖnün CHP bağlantısını deşifre etti. (2016, August 27). Retrieved January 24, 2018, from http://www.ensonhaber.com/ayyildiz-tim-fetonun-chp-baglantisini-desifre-etti-2016-08-28.html; Turks ‘cyber-leger’ kaapt Nederlandse websites . (2006, October 2). Retrieved January 24, 2018, from https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2006/10/02/turks-cyber-leger-kaapt-nederlandse-websites-11203640-a1180482.

[8] Turkey-backed FSA entered Afrin, Turkey shelling targets. (2018, January 21). BBC Monitoring Newsfile; Turkey blasts Germany, Netherlands for campaign bans. (2017, March 5). BBC Monitoring European; Zaman, A. (2017, December 07). Turkey probes US prosecutor in Zarrab trial twist. Retrieved January 24, 2018, from https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/11/turkey-probes-reza-zarrab-investigators.html.

[9] Moore, J. (2017, December 28). Hundreds of ISIS fighters are hiding in Turkey, increasing fears of attacks in Europe. Retrieved January 24, 2018, from http://www.newsweek.com/hundreds-isis-fighters-are-hiding-turkey-increasing-fears-europe-attacks-759877; Mandıracı, B. (2017, July 20). Turkey’s PKK Conflict Kills almost 3,000 in Two Years. Retrieved January 24, 2018, from https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/turkeys-pkk-conflict-kills-almost-3000-two-years.

Assessment Papers Cyberspace Marita La Palm Trump (U.S. President) Turkey
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Assessment of the Trump Administration’s Communications with the “Muslim World”

Jason Criss Howk conducted defense, intelligence, diplomatic, and education missions for the U.S. Government focusing on Afghanistan and Muslim cultures for 23 years.  He now teaches, writes, and speaks nationally to decrease anti-religious bigotry.  He shares a variety of information on Twitter @jason_c_howk and at dispatchesFromPinehurst.com. His award-winning book is The Qur’an: A Chronological Modern English Interpretation.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessment of the Trump Administration’s Communications with the “Muslim World”

Date Originally Written:  December 10, 2017.

Date Originally Published:  December 18, 2017.

Summary:  Fear of Muslims is irrational. Prohibiting a discussion of Islam’s relationship to modern terrorist groups is too. The continuing success of terror recruiting reveals their ideology is a center of gravity, but you cannot shoot an ideology. You have to expose its flaws and turn people against it. One must use the correct terminology when you speak or it empowers terrorists. This is where the Trump Administration has taken 3-steps forward but 1-step back.

Text:  Fear of Muslims is irrational.  Prohibiting a discussion of Islam’s relationship to modern terrorism is too.  President George W. Bush took America into a War on Terrorism[1], President Barack Obama shifted to countering violent extremism[2].  Both stated correctly that America was not at war with Islam.  While acknowledging the importance of countering a terrorist’s ideology[3], neither slowed the spread of violent radical Islamist or khawarij ideologies used to recruit.  Not talking about Islam and its relationship to terrorism has likely contributed to increasing bigotry against Muslims and damaged America’s ability to decrease recruiting.

The number of nations plagued by terrorists has increased, despite America’s excellence at hunting terrorists.  The continuing success of recruiting hints that their ideology is the likely center of gravity.  You cannot shoot or “drone”[4] an ideology.  You have to understand it, expose its flaws, argue about it, and turn people against it thus ensuring the world understands that violent radical Islamism (separate from the religion of Islam) is a failed political ideology causing death and destruction is critical.

Incorrect terminology further empowers mankind’s enemy.  Here the Trump Administration has improved since the campaign yet occasionally stumbles.   President Trump should listen to his advisors that have operated in the “Muslim World,” listen to solid Muslim allies, and only use precise language that helps Muslims to separate violent radicals from society.  President Trump loses ground when he echoes false experts or bigots that push him to use “alpha-male” language that sounds tough, but makes it more difficult for Muslims to stanch the bloodshed.

Not all terrorists are Muslim and not all Muslims are terrorists; only ignorant people believe otherwise.  So, put the straw-man argument aside that says explaining the role of Islam in modern terrorist propaganda will cause anti-Muslim hatred.  The majority of the deadliest terrorists think they are the most pious Muslims in the world.  Their first murder victims were likely Muslims that they deemed “not Muslim enough for them;” (an old khawarij concept).  Most terrorism victims since 2001 were Muslim. It’s illogical not talk about Islam in relation to modern terrorism.

I have spent almost three years leading talks about the religion of Islam, the political ideology of Islamism, and the khawarij or “violent radical Islamist” ideology used by terrorists.  A few things were made clear to me–often angrily.  First, the American people never felt Bush or Obama understood the enemy.  Second, they felt that neither was able to explain a logical strategy for victory.  Finally, audiences felt the Presidents failed them by not talking about how Islam, Islamism, and terrorist ideologies are connected and disconnected.  Americans felt the Presidents believed their citizens were too stupid to have a discussion about Islam.

Instead of civilly talking about Islam and how terrorists can use some parts of the Qur’an to attract fighters to their cause, previous presidents presented straw-man arguments about why they should or would not discuss Islam.  At my discussions, it takes 45 minutes for people who have never studied Islam to grasp this entire concept.  After Bush and Obama, a third president cannot underestimate the intelligence and curiosity of the American people.

If the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia can talk about extreme interpretations of Islam[5] and its relationship to many terrorist groups, and the King of Jordan can succinctly label our enemy as Khawarij[6] using terminology from Islam’s history, the American President can have a straightforward conversation about the topic.

America’s terminology should not drive a wedge between the U.S. and our Muslim allies.  Our language should help Muslims drive a wedge between the khawarij butchers and possible recruits and supporters of this deadly cause.

America can’t use words that help our enemy by complementing murderers or lumping them in with hundreds of millions of peaceful Muslims.

Violent radical Islamists want to be called mujahedeen, jihadis, and Muslims.  The word jihad in the Qur’an means to struggle or strive nobly with all your person and wealth in the way of God.  A parallel in Catholicism is the system of sainthood.  Only the most selfless Catholics following God’s path to help others are sainted.  Similarly, in a religious sense, only the best among Muslims should be called mujahedeen (jihadis) which means someone who has performed true jihad.  The word is only used about 14 times in the Qur’an and should be returned to its religious context and taken away from butchers and human rights abusers.  You can’t make jihad into a negative term in a religious sense; so, don’t use it at all.

Instead, insult and brand these violent radical Islamists.  Use the term butcher, murderer, terrorist, khawarij, violent Islamist, loser, Islamist ideologue, distorter or corruptor of Islam, people ignorant of the Qur’an, disgraces, or betrayers of God.

Don’t call violent radical Islamists Muslims or use any negative modifiers in front of the word Islam or Muslim.  These corruptors have left Islam and should be a disgrace to their families.  “Islam” and “Muslims” are both positive words in the Islamic world.  Attaching “Radical” to it is often viewed to mean the entire religion or all Muslims are radical and therefore evil.

Every generation of violent radical Islamist butchers seems to form faster, become more radicalized, kill more gruesomely, and think they are more pious.  The world must stop this trend.

President Trump (obviously not an Islamic scholar) has asked his team and America’s allies to talk clearly about extreme interpretations of the Qur’an and the ideology used by our enemies.  His Riyadh speech[7] was pointed, and by mostly using correct terminology, supported a change[8] that is already underway[9] in the Muslim world.  Start this same discussion in America and ensure that violent radical Islamists and the people who sponsor and provide top-cover for the modern-day Khawarij are exposed and shut down.  Help decrease bigotry towards Muslims.

The world should applaud organizations like this Kuwaiti business[10] that honestly confronted those who purposely misinterpret the Qur’an to justify murder.  All governments should be this brave and clear.

Education won’t end terrorism, but it will impact the long-term fight against Islamist inspired terrorists.  No problem ever improved by refusing to fully examine it and honestly talk about it.

Endnotes:

[1] U.S. Government (2003, February) National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism, retrieved December 11, 2017,  https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf

[2] U.S. Government (2011, June) National Strategy for Counterterrorism, retrieved December 11, 2017, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf

[3] U.S. Government (2006, September) National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism, retrieved December 11, 2017, https://fas.org/irp/threat/nsct2006.pdf

[4] Friedersdorf, Conor (2016, December 23) Obama’s Weak Defense of His Record on Drone Killings, retrieved December 11, 2017 https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/president-obamas-weak-defense-of-his-record-on-drone-strikes/511454/

[5] Chulov, Martin (2017, October 24) I will return Saudi Arabia to moderate Islam, says crown prince, retrieved December 11, 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/i-will-return-saudi-arabia-moderate-islam-crown-prince

[6] Jordan Times (2015, June 11) Nothing treats Islam with more contempt than Khawarij actions — King, retrieved December 11, 2017 http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/nothing-treats-islam-more-contempt-khawarij-actions-—-king

[7] U.S. Government (2017, May) President Trump’s Speech in Riyadh Saudi Arabia, retrieved December 11, 2017 https://dispatchesfrompinehurst.com/2017/05/22/howks-notes-of-president-trumps-speech-in-saudi-arabia/

[8] Bergen, Peter (2017 September 27) Saudi women driving a sign bigger change is coming, retrieved December 11, 2017 http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/27/opinions/symbolism-of-saudi-women-driving/index.html

[9] IRNA, (2017 October 29) Iranian woman appointed first ever no. 2 at Oil Ministry, retrieved December 11, 2017 http://www.irna.ir/en/News/82712122

[10] Zain Mobile (2017 May 26) Anti-Terrorism Video for Ramadan 2017, retrieved December 11, 2017 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U49nOBFv508

Assessment Papers Jason Criss Howk Trump (U.S. President) United States Violent Extremism
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Assessment of the Search for Security in the Eastern Baltic

Jeremiah Cushman is a senior analyst at Military Periscope, where he writes about weapons.  He holds an M.A. in European and Eurasian Studies from the George Washington University.  He can be found on Twitter @jdcushman.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessment of the Search for Security in the Eastern Baltic

Date Originally Written:  July 15, 2017.

Date Originally Published:  August 14, 2017.

Summary:  For much of the last 800 years, the natives of the Baltic States and Finland were ruled by others, whether Baltic Germans, Swedes, Russians or Hitler’s Germany.  History shows these countries that, to retain independence, they must be willing and able to fight for it, and possibly join collective security organizations.

Text:  Lithuania existed as an independent nation prior to 1918, in contrast to Estonia, Latvia and Finland.  In 1385, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania joined with the Kingdom of Poland via a dynastic marriage.  Although not specifically made for security purposes, the result was a great Central European power that eventually spread from the Baltic to the Black Sea.  This was, however, an unstable union, with divergent interests between the Lithuanian and Polish halves.  (Poland ultimately became the dominant power.)  Efforts were made to strengthen the union, culminating with the establishment of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1569.  The commonwealth eventually succumbed to its own weaknesses and the machinations of neighboring powers, Austria, Prussia and Russia, which divided it among themselves in the partitions of 1772, 1790 and 1795.  If ultimately unsuccessful, the commonwealth nevertheless provided security for the Lithuanians for centuries.

Upon gaining independence in 1918, the Baltic States struggled to navigate their security environment.  For the most part, they sought refuge in the collective security arrangements of the League of Nations.  Different threat perceptions, a territorial dispute over Vilnius between Lithuania and Poland, and the maneuvers of the Germans and Soviets hindered trilateral defense efforts.  A proposed four-way alliance among Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Poland foundered on Finnish reservations.  Helsinki elected to focus on a Scandinavian orientation.  Estonia and Latvia managed to conclude a defense alliance in 1923.

The Soviet Union saw Baltic cooperation as a threat and worked to undermine it.  The Baltic States concluded their own treaty of cooperation and friendship in 1934, although little came from it.  Non-aggression pacts signed with Moscow and Berlin came to nought and the three nations were occupied by Soviet forces in 1940 and annexed.  While Finland fought for its independence and survived World War II, Baltic failures to prepare, and the overwhelming strength of the Soviet and German states that opposed them, ended their initial experiment with independence.

Finland was able to maintain its independence during and after World War II, fighting the Soviet Union twice in the Winter War of 1939-1940 and the Continuation War of 1941-1944.  The Finnish state was saved, though it lost the Karelia region to the Soviets.  Viewing Moscow as a direct threat, Helsinki allied with the Nazi regime as Berlin prepared its own attack on the Soviet Union.  The Finnish government took pains to portray its own war as separate from that of Germany’s, without much success.

At the end of the war, Finland was left with an 830-mile border with Russia and a difficult position between its preferred partners in the democratic West and the Soviet Union.  Moscow was able to dictate terms as the Finnish war effort collapsed in 1944 along with the fortunes of its German allies.  In 1948, the Finnish government concluded a mutual assistance treaty with Moscow, including military obligations to come to the Soviet Union’s assistance in the event of an attack by Germany or its allies, or an attack from Finnish territory.  The goal was to maintain independence and reduce the chance of conflict in Northern Europe.

By resolving Moscow’s security concerns, Finland was able to pursue trade with Western countries and play an active role in détente during the 1970s.  The Nordic country benefited from trade with its eastern neighbor, while holding off Soviet efforts to tighten military relations.  While this “Finlandization” policy ensured the nation’s sovereignty during the Cold War, it came at a cost to Finland’s freedom of action.  Habits formed over those decades continue to influence national policy, including hindering those who might prefer new security arrangements in light of Russia’s increasingly aggressive posture.

The Baltic States declared their independence from the Soviet Union in 1990.  Remembering the lessons of 1940, they immediately focused on trilateral cooperation and integration with European security organizations to secure their freedom.  Their security bodies focused on developing modern, capable forces on the Western model with the object of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).  These goals were achieved in 2004.  NATO’s Article 5 pledge that an attack on one is an attack on all is seen as the cornerstone of Baltic security.  Accordingly, all three countries recognize the United States as their most important security partner.  The Baltic States also pursue regional cooperation with their Nordic neighbors.  These multilateral cooperation efforts have, in some cases, detracted from trilateral endeavors. Small countries have limited resources.

Accession to NATO and the EU, which has its own security mechanisms, seemed to resolve the security concerns of the Baltic States.  However, the election of Donald Trump in the U.S. has led to uncertainty about the wisdom of relying on Washington.  Trump has threatened to assist only those NATO members who meet the alliance’s defense spending goals and his commitment to Article 5 appears uncertain, despite efforts from other administration officials to reinforce American support for the Baltic allies.  Trump’s apparent ties to Russia cause additional discomfort in the region.

Officially, the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania emphasize the continued importance of security ties with the U.S. and a belief that Trump will live up to Washington’s NATO commitments should it become necessary.  So far, U.S. and NATO activities in the Baltic region have been unchanged from the previous administration, with multinational battalion task groups active in all three countries.

As for Finland, it has eschewed its former relationship with Moscow in favor of closer security relations with NATO and the U.S., and strengthened ties with neighboring Sweden.  Helsinki still sees a strong national defense capability as vital for its security.  NATO membership remains politically challenging, although Finland potentially benefits from E.U. mutual assistance mechanisms.

The lessons of history for this region are simple.  To retain independence, one must first be willing and able to fight for it.  States as small as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania must additionally find allies to bolster their own defense efforts.  If one cannot be a great power, joining a great power organization, such as NATO, is the next best thing.

Endnotes:

[1]  Kirby, David. (1998). Northern Europe In The Early Modern Period: The Baltic World 1492-1772. New York, NY: Addison Wesley Longman.

[2]  Kirby, David. (1998). The Baltic World 1772-1993: Europe’s Northern Periphery in an Age of Change. New York, NY: Addison Wesley Longman.

[3]  Kasekamp, Andres. (2010). A History of the Baltic States. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

[4]  Plakans, Andrejs. (2011). A Concise History of the Baltic States. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Aggression Assessment Papers Baltics Estonia European Union Finland Jeremiah Cushman Latvia Lithuania North Atlantic Treaty Organization Russia Trump (U.S. President) United States
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America First Foreign Policy in the South China Sea

Captain Geoffrey Gage, U.S. Navy, is a Federal Executive Fellow at The Brookings Institution Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in Washington, DC.  The views expressed by the author are his own and do not reflect those of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Navy.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, organization, or group.

National Security Situation:  People’s Republic of China (PRC) land reclamation and coercive maritime activity in the South China Sea (SCS) contradicts international law and threatens U.S. national interests while a nascent U.S. foreign policy and other strategic challenges limit U.S. options.

Date Originally Written:  February 10, 2017.

Date Originally Published:  April 10, 2017.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that current U.S. foreign policy, though limited in detail, provides a starting point for addressing the security situation in the SCS.

Background:  Among the competing claims in the SCS, the PRC considers most of the SCS sovereign territory.  Recent PRC maritime interference, land reclamation and fortification in the SCS constitute the most assertive claims and, despite international condemnation, have achieved de facto control of new territory.  More broadly, in dealing with SCS and other international relations issues, the PRC prefers bi-lateral problem solving in search of “win-win” outcomes, while prizing clout that derives from participation in multi-lateral fora, military exercises, and summit meetings[1].

Nascent U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration, labeled “America First,” prioritizes defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and rebuilding the military.  “Embracing diplomacy” is a stated intention while better trade deals for the U.S. are a constant theme[2].  Administration statements and actions have generally supported these priorities, though the President’s fiscal year 2017 budget suggests fewer fiscal resources for diplomacy.  In the near term this adds up to an economy of force: military operations focused in the Middle East, managing security commitments elsewhere in order to rebuild readiness, and forging advantageous trade deals.

Significance:  The security situation in the SCS threatens regional stability and the security of sea lanes.  The SCS is the maritime crossroads for trillions of dollars in trade between globally dispersed producers and consumers.  The SCS is also important for U.S. naval forces operating between the Pacific and Indian Oceans in support of regional alliance commitments and, more generally, maintaining freedom of the seas[3].

The SCS is not a vital national interest for the U.S.  The SCS is not as critical to U.S. national security as the prospect of North Korean nuclear armed intercontinental ballistic missiles.  Nevertheless, the security situation in the SCS is very important to the U.S. because of its alliance commitments and the potential for military conflict, indirect economic harm, and degradation of international norms.

The PRC view of the “South Sea” as a vital national interest explains, though does not excuse, their actions.  In addition to vital trade flows, the SCS offers an extension of PRC military capability.  What’s more, Communist Party of China (CPC) legitimacy derives in part from SCS adventurism.  In advance of this year’s 19th CPC Congress, even the status quo gains in the SCS may be sufficient for the party—and President Xi—to claim success and retain tight control.

The April 2017 U.S.-PRC summit will likely focus on basic relationship building, North Korea and trade.  The SCS security situation, if left unaddressed, could be construed as tacit U.S. acceptance.  A reasonable near-term objective may be to maintain the status quo.  Given emerging “America First” foreign policy priorities, U.S. SCS options are captured in two distinct categories, Indirect and Direct.

Option #1:  Indirect Approach.  Leverage issues outside of the SCS to influence the PRC in the SCS.  For example, tie the conditions of trade agreements to PRC actions in the SCS.  Another option is greater U.S. patience on North Korea in exchange for the PRC’s cooperation in the SCS.  A less fraught military option would be to exclude the PRC from participation in combined exercises such as Rim of the Pacific subject to better behavior in the SCS.  This approach hinges on the U.S. “ask,” ranging from maintenance of the status quo to reversal of the PRC’s SCS island reclamation and fortification.

Risk:  Linking largely disparate issues may confuse U.S. priorities and further complicate relations with the PRC.  Option #1, in the case of North Korea, could be perceived by South Korea as a sell-out for a less important issue, creating acrimony between allies and further destabilizing the situation on the Korean peninsula.  Similarly, if the PRC perceives its position in the SCS as an existential one, it may refuse to “give” on trade agreements, sparking a trade war.

Gain:  Option #1 effectively makes the SCS more important to the U.S. from the PRC’s perspective.  Success of this option depends on limited objectives and reasonable demands.  If executed deftly, these indirect levers to stabilize the situation in the SCS could yield progress across a range of mutually important Asia-Pacific challenges while keeping the issue safely on the back burner.

Option #2:  Direct Approach. Focus efforts in the SCS region.  Sustain the long-standing policy of routine military presence, including U.S. Navy freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) near the contested land features.  Conducting FONOPs and other military operations in the region is an obvious lever, with the option to adjust the frequency and nature of those measures, including land-based exercises with local allied and partner nations.  Drawing “red lines” against further island reclamation or fortification is a logical consideration given past administration statements.  Targeted economic sanctions on PRC entities supporting SCS activities is another lever.  A novel and riskier measure would be to abandon U.S. neutrality with respect to claims in the SCS and endorse a solution—one that might include certain PRC claims.  Finally, the U.S. could tie maintenance of the One China policy to the security situation in the SCS—a direct measure because Taiwan is an SCS claimant whose nationalist forbearers conceived of the nine-dashed line[4].

Risk:  Option #2 presents an array of risks, not least being a military confrontation that could undermine broader U.S. strategic priorities.  In particular, drawing red lines in the SCS would dramatically increase the risk of confrontation, as would linking the One China policy to SCS issues.  Mitigating the risk of a direct approach is done through incremental steps that are mindful of the broader regional situation.

Gain:  Option #2 is unambiguous and reinforces U.S. commitment and resolve on the key issues of freedom of navigation, territorial integrity and treaty obligations.  The direct approach also contains the issue to the SCS, de-linking the matter from higher-priority issues facing the U.S. and the PRC.

Other Comments:  As the new U.S. administration develops a comprehensive national security strategy, foreign challenges and crises will not wait.  Every “environmental monitoring station,” surface-to-air missile site and high seas harassment in the international waters of the SCS constitutes a “win-lose” in the Sino-American relationship.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1]  Foreign Ministry of PRC. (2017). China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805)

[2]  Trump, Donald J., President. (2017). America first foreign policy. https://www.whitehouse.gov/america-first-foreign-policy

[3]  Mission of the U.S. Navy. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/organization/org-top.asp

[4]  Fisher, M. (2012, November 26). Here’s the Chinese passport map that’s infuriating much of Asia. Retrieved April 08, 2017, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2012/11/26/heres-the-chinese-passport-map-thats-infuriating-much-of-asia/

 

China (People's Republic of China) Geoffrey Gage Option Papers South China Sea Trump (U.S. President) United States