Options for the U.S. to Approach India as a Fellow Superpower

Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, and United States Army. In addition to Divergent Options, he has been published in the Center for International Maritime Security, the Washington MonthlyMerion WestWisdom of CrowdsCharged AffairsBraver Angels, and more. He can be found on Twitter at @MDPurzycki, on Medium at https://mdpurzycki.medium.com/, and on Substack at The Non-Progressive Democrat.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Options for the U.S. to Approach India as a Fellow Superpower

Date Originally Written:  June 12, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  June 27, 2022.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes good relations between the United States and India, including respect for India as a fellow superpower, are vital for confronting challenges to U.S. interests, especially those presented by China. The author views India as a fellow superpower to the U.S. due to its population, gross domestic product, economic expansion in recent decades, military strength, and possession of nuclear weapons.

Background:  Across the early 21st century, the U.S. has developed closer political and security relations with India. The two countries participate in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“the Quad”)[1], a forum for coordinating security activities and holding joint military exercises[2], alongside U.S. allies Australia and Japan. In 2016, the U.S. designated India a Major Defense Partner (MDP), a status similar to that of Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA)[3].

Significance:  How Washington chooses to approach India will have extremely important implications for U.S. foreign policy, particularly U.S. efforts to confront and balance China. Respecting India as a fellow superpower will help the U.S. maximize the potential for positive bilateral relations.

Option #1:  The U.S. upgrades its MDP with India to a bilateral military alliance, placing India on the level of a fellow North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member.

Risk:  A formal U.S.-India alliance would frighten and anger China, seemingly confirming the fears of Chinese officials that the U.S. is seeking to surround it militarily. China would likely seek to increase its already close military and political ties with Russia[4]. Furthermore, if China believes it is about to be completely encircled geopolitically, it may believe it has a limited window of opportunity to bring Taiwan under its control, thus encouraging an invasion of the island.

This option would also frighten and anger Pakistan, a nuclear-armed state that has been a rival of India since their mutual independence from British rule in 1947. Although Pakistan is an MNNA of the U.S.[5], it is also a long-standing partner of China, a relationship motivated in large part by their shared rivalry with India[6]. Among other things, Pakistan may respond by refusing to cooperate with the U.S. in its approach to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.

Gain:  The prospect of two nuclear-armed states allied against China could make Beijing think twice about any aggressive move it made against the U.S. (either directly, or against a U.S. ally or partner like Japan or Taiwan) or against India (such as renewed border conflicts in the Himalayas)[7]. Option #1 would also mean that all of the U.S.’s fellow Quad members would be treaty allies[8][9], potentially turning the Quad into an Indo-Pacific equivalent of NATO. A formal alliance with the U.S. could also pull India away from Russia; the effects of India’s close relations with the Soviet Union, including in the area of arms sales, have lingered into the 21st century[10].

Option #2:  The U.S. tightens its security links to India short of a formal alliance, including efforts to build up India’s defense industrial base.

Risk:  Even without a formal alliance, any increase in U.S.-India defense cooperation will still worry China and Pakistan. Additionally, U.S. efforts to make India less dependent on foreign sources for its military equipment could irritate France, which sees increased defense exports to many countries, including India[11], as a key component of its security policy[12]. The diplomatic row in 2021 over Australia’s decision to cancel its purchase of French submarines in favor of U.S. vessels is a precedent the U.S. may want to avoid repeating[13].

Gain:  As well as deepening U.S.-India security cooperation, the U.S. building up India’s defense industry can decrease its reliance on Russia as a major provider of military equipment[14].

Option #3:  The U.S. Navy reactivates the First Fleet, and assigns a portion of the Indian Ocean as its area of responsibility.

Risk:  If the First Fleet takes waters away from the Seventh Fleet[15], it risks dividing the Indian and Pacific portions of U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. This division could complicate any comprehensive U.S. effort to balance and counter Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific region[16].

Gain:  Devoting a numbered fleet to the Indian Ocean[17] would signal a U.S. commitment to good relations with India, indicating that a good relationship is not merely an adjunct of Washington’s approach to China.

Option #4:  The U.S. defers to India as de facto hegemon of South Asia, intentionally putting U.S. interests in South Asia second to India’s.

Risk:  If the U.S. treats part of the world as India’s sphere of influence without any prioritization of U.S. interests there, it could set a dangerous precedent. This option would give rhetorical ammunition to Russia in its attempt to forcibly incorporate Ukraine (as well as potential attempts to bring other Eastern European countries into its sphere), and to China in its desire to gain control of Taiwan and expand its control in the South China Sea.

Encouraging India to see itself as rightfully dominant in its region could also make conflict between India and China more likely in locations where both powers have security interests, such as Afghanistan[18] and Tajikistan[19][20]. Option #4 would also run the risk of making Pakistan more anxious, and of curtailing U.S. efforts to fight Islamist extremism in Afghanistan.

Gain:  Deferring to India in South Asia would free up U.S. time, attention, and resources to protect its interests elsewhere, particularly interests related to competition with China in the Western Pacific, and with Russia in Eastern Europe. 

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendations:  None.


Endnotes:

[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Japan-Australia-India-U.S.(Quad) Leaders’ Meeting.” May 24, 2022. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1e_000402.html

[2] Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. “The Quad Conducts Malabar Naval Exercise.” The Diplomat, August 27, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/the-quad-conducts-malabar-naval-exercise/

[3] U.S. Department of State. “U.S. Security Cooperation With India.” January 20, 2021. https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-india.

[4] Kofman, Michael. “The Emperors League: Understanding Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation.” War on the Rocks, August 6, 2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/the-emperors-league-understanding-sino-russian-defense-cooperation/

[5] U.S. Department of State. “Major Non-NATO Ally Status.” January 20, 2021. https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/

[6] Khalid, Masood. “Pakistan-China Relations in a Changing Geopolitical Environment.” Institute of South Asian Studies, November 30, 2021. https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/pakistan-china-relations-in-a-changing-geopolitical-environment/

[7] Slater, Joanna. “Soldiers injured in fresh border skirmish between India and China.” Washington Post, January 25, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/india-china-clash-sikkim/2021/01/25/7d82883c-5edb-11eb-a177-7765f29a9524_story.html

[8] U.S. Department of State. “U.S. Relations With Japan.” January 20, 2020. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-japan/

[9] U.S. Department of State. “U.S. Relations With Australia.” June 9, 2022. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-australia/

[10] Sharma, Ashok. “India to boost arms output, fearing shortfall from Russia.” Associated Press, April 7, 2022. https://abc17news.com/news/2022/04/07/india-to-boost-arms-output-fearing-shortfall-from-russia/.

[11] Shiraishi, Togo and Moyuru Baba. “France and India partner on weapons tech in blow to Russia.” Nikkei Asia, May 6, 2022. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/France-and-India-partner-on-weapons-tech-in-blow-to-Russia.

[12] Mackenzie, Christina. “Here’s what’s behind France’s 72% jump in weapons exports.” Defense News, March 10, 2020. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/03/10/heres-whats-behind-frances-72-jump-in-weapons-exports/

[13] Willsher, Kim. “France recalls ambassadors to US and Australia after Aukus pact.” Guardian, September 17, 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/17/france-recalls-ambassadors-to-us-and-australia-after-aukus-pact

[14] Banerjee, Vasabjit and Benjamin Tkach. “Helping India Replace Russia in the Value Arms Market.” War on the Rocks, May 20, 2022. https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/helping-india-replace-russia-in-the-value-arms-market/

[15] “USN Fleets (2009).” Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:USN_Fleets_(2009).png

[16] White House. “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States.” February 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf

[17] Eckstein, Megan. “SECNAV Braithwaite Calls for New U.S. 1st Fleet Near Indian, Pacific Oceans.” USNI News, November 17, 2020. https://news.usni.org/2020/11/17/secnav-braithwaite-calls-for-new-u-s-1st-fleet-near-indian-pacific-oceans

[18] Adlakha, Hemant. “Will the China-Pakistan-Taliban troika in Afghanistan make India irrelevant?” Hindustan Times, January 18, 2022. https://www.hindustantimes.com/ht-insight/international-affairs/will-the-china-pakistan-taliban-troika-in-afghanistan-make-india-irrelevant-101642409043057.html

[19] Dutta, Sujan. “India renews interest in running its first foreign military base in Tajikistan.” Print, October 11, 2018. https://theprint.in/defence/india-renews-interest-in-running-its-first-foreign-military-base-in-tajikistan/132454/

[20] Shih, Gerry. “In Central Asia’s forbidding highlands, a quiet newcomer: Chinese troops.” Washington Post, February 18, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-central-asias-forbidding-highlands-a-quiet-newcomer-chinese-troops/2019/02/18/78d4a8d0-1e62-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html

Great Powers & Super Powers India Michael D. Purzycki Option Papers United States

Assessing the Benefits of India’s Frustrating Pragmatic Energy

Chandler Myers is an officer in the U.S. Air Force. He holds a BS in English from the Air Force Academy and a MA in international relations with a focus in cyber diplomacy from Norwich University. Chandler contributes to WAR ROOM, the U.S. Armys online national security journal. Divergent Optionscontent does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessing the Benefits of India’s Frustrating Pragmatic Energy 

Date Originally Written:  May 3, 2022.

Date Originally Published:  May 9, 2022. 

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that India’s position on the Russian invasion has proven that it can champion international institutions and norms while being ferociously aware of its limitations.

Summary:  India choosing to fully condemn or support the Russian invasion of Ukraine at the United Nations would have negative consequences. India needs Russian military equipment. At the same time, India’s geography requires continual dialogue with China to resolve territorial disputes. With chilling precision, India’s unmistakable neutral position suits their complex, globally-integrated interest.

Text:  Efforts to keep a sufferable neutral status as Moscow encourages ever-more horrific atrocities in Ukraine has raised important Western concerns on New Delhi’s position. India has, for good reason, abstained from every resolution at the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly on this matter[1]. Though this decision may look different with time, one can argue that New Dehli’s related position is improving its global status. India’s Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Damodardas Modi, recently speaking in Berlin, communicated: “we believe that no party can emerge victorious in this war.” He is right. But, that does not mean India cannot profit from Russia’s violence towards Ukraine. The Germany-India bilateral discussions on May 2, 2022, ended in documented agreements that supplement both country’s on-going sustainable development. The agreements cover wide ranging technical cooperation and German financial assistance in areas related to clean energy, sustainable urban development, climate adaptations, research and development, environmental protections, and so on[2]. Add to that, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz also invited PM Modi, for what will be India’s fourth annual consecutive appearance, as a guest to the G-7 summit in June. 

On the opposite end, India is likely enjoying discounted Russian crude oil amidst ordinary buyers closing their ports due to Moscow’s war. According to India’s Ministry of Commerce, in 2021 Russian imported oil only made up 2% of India’s total imports[3]. This 2% is an obvious small share compared to a recent report by Kpler, a commodities research company. Captured in a British Broadcasting Corporation article, Kpler reported a higher figure of contracted purchased quantity of Russian oil from India in months spanning March through June (of 2022) than all of 2021. From that data, one can opine that India is having less trouble than the U.S., United Kingdom (UK) , and European Union (EU), if any at all, contending with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. India will not plagiarize U.S., UK, and EU sanction decisions toward Russia as its decision lays elsewhere. 

Indian-Russo ties are well documented, most of which focus on defense. Stimson Center analysts estimated 85 percent of India’s military equipment is of Russian or Soviet origin[4]. Other estimates are figured as low as 45 percent[5]. Knowing this, India’s territorial disputes with Pakistan and China, who are allies of Russia, have intensified India’s views of its defense inventory. As recent as March 10, 2022, Pakistan claimed that a surface-to-surface missile shot from India into its Punjab province[6]. Additionally, Chinese and Indian counter claims over parts of the Kashmir region remain unchanged. Even with unresolved storied challenges, China and Russia have found a nation expected to be the most populous by 2030 seemingly on its side and they intend to take advantage. 

Before Russia’s February 24, 2022, invasion of Ukraine, the world saw numerous Western diplomats and heads of state meet with Kremlin leadership in hopes to reverse Moscow’s hardening language and military buildup. In Ukraine, the same and different leaders continue to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to offer symbolic and material support. As the war lengthens, similar leaders from the West have met with counterparts in India to deepen cooperation. Before Modi’s trip to European countries that include Germany, Denmark, and France in May 2022, he met with European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, in April. The specific details of the two-day meeting have yet to be uncovered, however, both parties signaled strengthening economic and technology cooperation with the creation of a new Trade and Technology Council[7]. India’s pragmatic stance is also seeing benefits from deeper security cooperation between it and the United Kingdom[8]. 

New Dehli’s position has also attracted Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi. In a meeting between him and his Indian counterpart, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Wang sought a cooling relationship between the two countries. Quoted in a Reuters article, Wang explained, “The two sides should … put the differences on the boundary issue in an appropriate position in bilateral relations, and adhere to the correct development direction of bilateral relations[9].”

The diplomatic atmosphere is not confined to governments meeting with one another either. The Hoover Institution, a conservative think tank based in the U.S., has decided to use this opportunity to launch a new series, “India’s Opportunities in the 2020s[10].” It is without question that—for now—interest in India is finding enlarged footing by all sides.

Prime Minister Modi’s ethical scorecard has been declining long before Russia’s recent invasion. India voting at the United Nations to condemn or show full support of the Russian invasion of Ukraine would likely result in serious consequences for India. Rather than choose between the stated options, Modi has found, with exceptional clarity, the sweet spot. As frustrating it is for the United States, China wants to normalize relations with India. And in the same vein, Western countries want to deepen cooperation in areas like security, clean energy, and technology as Russian oil is on the cheap. Even with domestic troubles abound, Modi has cushioned criticism from abroad and elevated India’s attractiveness onto the world stage.  


Endnotes: 

[1] Mohan, C. “For India, Putin’s War Starts to Look like a Gift”. Foreign Policy, March 30, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/30/india-ukraine-russia-war-china-oil-geopolitics/ 

[2] News On Air. “India and Germany to launch an Indo-German Partnership for Green and Sustainable Development”. 3 May, 2022. https://newsonair.com/2022/05/03/india-and-germany-to-launch-an-indo-german-partnership-for-green-and-sustainable-development/

[3] Menon, Shruti. “Ukraine crisis: Why India is buying more Russian oil”. BBC News, 26 April 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-60783874 

[4] O’Donnell, F. and Vasudeva, A. “Between a Rock and Hard Place: India’s Stance on the Russia-Ukraine Crisis”. Stimson Center, 4 March 2022. https://www.stimson.org/2022/between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-indias-stance-on-the-russia-ukraine-crisis/ 

[5] Tharoor, S. “Modi’s Big Mistake How Neutrality on Ukraine Weakens India”. 27 April, 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2022-04-27/modis-big-mistake 

[6] Associated Press. “Military says unarmed missile from India ends up in Pakistan”. 10 March, 2022. https://apnews.com/article/india-new-delhi-pakistan01cb6d4d7ce5d8aee98cd6135615712c 

[7] Kijewski, L. “EU and India vow to ramp up cooperation with new Trade and Technology Council”. 25 April, 2022. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-and-india-vow-to-ramp-up-cooperation-with-new-trade-and-technology-council/ 

[8] Parkin, B. and Parker, G. Boris Johnson set to offer Narendra Modi increased UK-India defence co-operation”. 21 April, 2022. https://www.ft.com/content/7cd277bd-d17c-426e-9d63-addcb5405523 

[9] Das, K. and Miglani, S. “Chinese minister seeks normal India ties, Delhi says ease border tension first”. 25 March, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinese-foreign-minister-see-indian-counterpart-surprise-meeting-2022-03-25/ 

[10] Hoover Institution. “India’s Opportunities in the 2020s”. 17 May, 2022. https://www.hoover.org/events/indias-opportunities-2020s 

Assessment Papers Chandler Myers China (People's Republic of China) India Russia Ukraine United Nations

An Assessment of Capability Gaps that Contribute to Fighting Below the Threshold of War

Shri is from India. The views expressed and suggestions made in the article are solely of the author in his personal capacity and do not have any official endorsement. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  An Assessment of Capability Gaps that Contribute to Fighting Below the Threshold of War

Date Originally Written:  August 9, 2021.

Date Originally Published:  August 30, 2021.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The article analyses a current situation playing out in a very important part of the world which is a nuclear flashpoint as well.  While the reader can likely guess which countries the author is referring to, indirect references are used to appeal to the audiences living this situation day-to-day.

Summary:  Fighting below the threshold of war happens only due to inadequacies of the stronger power.  These inadequacies may be based in law, policy, doctrine, political preferences, and corruption.  Unless these inadequacies are addressed, stronger powers will dilute their true combat capability by acting as police forces either locally, regionally, or globally.

Text:  The countries of IN and PK have over seven decades of animosity between them. In the 1970s, PK was comprehensively defeated during a war with IN and in the process, lost almost half of its territory. Thereafter, based on experience PK gained as Country UA’s proxy in the fight against Country RU in Country AF, PK realised in its fight against IN, direct war is not the way ahead.  This realisation started something different in which PK waged a conflict below the threshold of war against Country IN by simply harboring, arming, and supporting terrorists. PK, where the military is the de-facto ruler, acts as a client state of Country CN, another adversary of IN, and all three possess nuclear weapons.

It is now three decades since PK began to carry out nefarious activities against IN. In other words, PK prevails over IN below the threshold of war and keeps IN tied down through a low cost and low risk method. This success is despite the fact that IN is larger than PK in every possible metric – economy, territory, armed forces, population etc. PK is taking advantage of some inherent weaknesses and capability gaps of IN and is prevailing.

IN’s capability gaps begin with it still believing in outdated definitions of war, and therefore believing that only armed forces fight wars, and is waiting for PK’s Armed Forces to start one. PK is not obliging IN, knowing well that PK cannot win. IN, not wanting to be labeled as an aggressor, is not waging war on PK, little realizing that IN has been under attack for many decades. A doctrinal change by IN could perhaps settle matters regarding what constitutes aggression and what will be IN’s response. This doctrinal change would amply warn PK and, if PK did not change its behavior, the change would give IN the required casus belli. Threshold of war is not something that has been defined by nature as each country decides according to each unique circumstance. In 1914, assassination of a sovereign led to the First World War[1]. Without an adjustment to current below threshold realities, IN will not get the better of PK. 

IN’s armed forces have been engaged in counterinsurgency operations against PK sponsored terrorists for several decades. This fight without end continues due to an undefined military end-state. The armed forces of a country is it’s last resort and therefore it should not be distracted from it’s main role of war-fighting.  PK understands this well and therefore does everything possible to tie down IN’s armed forces in operations below the threshold of war, which are essentially policing duties. Establishing an end state allowing the military to exit counterinsurgency operations and return to preparing for war is perhaps the only thing that will deter PK from continuing what it does below the threshold of war. Many in IN’s armed forces talk about the United States’ two decade long engagement in Afghanistan to justify IN’s continued presence in counterinsurgency operations. It is worth noting that the United States sent in its armed forces to Afghanistan because its police, perhaps as potent as some armies, have no global mandate. Moreover, while the US always had the luxury of pulling out, as it subsequently did[2], IN doesn’t.

IN is also ineffective below the threshold of war because fighting below the threshold is a comfortable place to be in- no national mobilization, limited death and destruction, life and fighting goes on hand in hand. There would always be many interest groups apart from the IN Armed Forces that have a stake in the fight. While the IN Armed Forces get brass, budget allocations, and a disproportionate say in matters otherwise in the realm of governance, others who benefit include the Military Industrial Complex (about whom U.S. President Eisenhower had warned five decades ago[3]), war contractors and also politicians, most of whom thrive on divisive agendas. History illustrates that whenever a country has resolved to finish a fight, it happened – Sri Lanka being the best example[4]. So next time when any country thinks of finishing the fight, it is good to know who are directly and indirectly benefiting from the fight continuing.

Sun Tzu has said that, “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” Present day militaries have wrapped this very thought in many definitions and names to include grey zone warfare, hybrid warfare etc. However, war is war.  PK added its own touch by trying to subdue IN, taking advantage of IN’s inhibitions, and some weaknesses, by fighting, albeit below the threshold of war. Until IN wakes up to PK, and demonstrates that IN is ready for a major war with PK, IN will continue to be stuck in the quagmire of fighting below the threshold of war.


Endnotes:

[1] Greenspan, J. (2014, June 26). The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. History.com. https://www.history.com/news/the-assassination-of-archduke-franz-ferdinand

[2] The United States Government. (2021, July 8). Remarks by President Biden on the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/07/08/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-drawdown-of-u-s-forces-in-afghanistan/

[3] Farewell address by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 17, 1961; Final TV Talk 1/17/61 (1), Box 38, Speech Series, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953-61, Eisenhower Library; National Archives and Records Administration. https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/farewell-address/1961-01-17-press-release.pdf

[4] Layton, P. (2015, April 9). How sri lanka won the war. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/how-sri-lanka-won-the-war/

Assessment Papers Below Established Threshold Activities (BETA) India Pakistan Shri

Assessing a Situation where the Mission is a Headline

Samir Srivastava is serving in the Indian Armed Forces. The views expressed and suggestions made in the article are solely of the author in his personal capacity and do not have any official endorsement.  Divergent Opinions’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessing a Situation where the Mission is a Headline

Date Originally Written:  July 5, 2021.

Date Originally Published:  July 26, 2021.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is serving with the Indian Armed Forces.   The article is written from the point of view of India in its prevailing environment.

Summary:  While headlines in news media describe the outcome of military operations, in this information age, the world could now be heading towards a situation where military operations are the outcome of a desired headline.  In situations like this, goals can be achieved by taking into assured success, the target audience, connectivity in a retaliatory context, verifiability, and deniability.

Text:  When nations fight each other, there will be news media headlines. Through various mediums and platforms, headline(s) will travel to everyone – the belligerents, their allies/supporters and also neutral parties. Conflict will be presented as a series of headlines culminating in one headline that describes the final outcome. Thus, when operations happen, headlines also happen. Yet to be considered is when  an operation  is planned and executed to make a headline happen.

In nation versus nation conflict, the days of large scale wars are certainly not over, but as trends suggest these will be more of an exception rather than rule. The future war in all likelihood will be fought at a level without a formal war declaration and quite localised. The world has seen wars where each side endeavours to prevail upon the adversary’s bodies and materiel, but already greater emphasis is being laid on prevailing upon the enemy’s mind. In that case, a decision will be required regarding what objective is being pursued – attrition, territory or just a headline.

Today, a military operation is more often than not planned at the strategic level and executed at a tactical level. This model is likely to become a norm because if a strategic outcome is achievable through a standalone tactical action, there is no reason to let the fight get bigger and more costly in terms of blood and treasure. The Balakote Airstrike[1] by the Indian Air Force is a case in point. It has been over two years since that strike took place but there is nothing to show a change in Pakistan’s attitude, which continues to harbour terrorists on its soil who would very well be plotting the next strike on India. However, what has endured is the headlines of February 26-28, 2019, which carried different messages for different people and one for Pakistan as well.

Unlike propaganda where a story is made out of nothing, if the mission is to make a headline, then that particular operation will have taken place on ground.  In this context, Headline Selection and Target Selection are two sides of the same coin but the former is the driving force.  Beyond this, success is enhanced by taking into account the probability of success, the target audience, connectivity in a retaliatory context, verifiability and deniability.  

Without assured success, the outcome will be a mismatch between the desired headline and  target selection. Taking an example from movies, in the 1997 film  “Tomorrow Never Dies[2],” the entire plot focuses on  the protagonist, Agent 007,  spoiling antagonist Carver’s scheme of creating headlines to be beamed by his media network. Once a shot is fired or ordnance dropped, there will be a headline and it is best to make sure it is the desired one.

Regarding the target audience, it is not necessary that an event gains the interest of the masses. The recipient population may be receptive, non-receptive or simply indifferent.  A headline focused on  the largest receptive group who can further propagate it has the best chance of success. 

If the operation is carried out in a retaliatory context,  it is best to connect  the enemy action and friendly reaction. For example, while cyber-attacks or economic sanctions may be an apt response to an armed attack, the likelihood of achieving the desired headline is enhanced if there is something connecting the two- action and reaction.

The headline will have much more impact if the event and its effects can be easily verified, preferably by neutral agencies and individuals. A perfect headline would be that which an under resourced freelance journalist can easily report. To that end, targets in inaccessible locations or at places that don’t strike a chord with the intended audience will be of little use. No amount of satellite photos can match one reporter on ground.   

The headline cannot lend itself to any possibility of denial because even a feeble denial can lead to credibility being questioned. It therefore goes without saying that choice of target and mode of attack should be such. During U.S. Operation NEPTUNE SPEAR[3], the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbotabad, Pakistan,  the first sliver of publicly available information was a tweet by someone nearby. This tweet could have very well closed any avenue for denial by Pakistan or Al Qaeda.

A well thought out headline can be the start point when planning an operation or even a campaign. This vision of a headline however needs different thinking tempered with a lot of imagination and creativity. Pre-planned headlines, understanding the expertise of journalists and having platforms at the ready can be of value.      

Every field commander, division and above should have some pre-planned headlines to speak of that their organization can create if given the opportunity. These headlines include both national headlines flowing out of the higher commander’s intent, and local headlines that are more focused on the immediate engagement area.

There is benefit to be gained from the expertise of journalists – both Indian and Foreign. Their practical experience will be invaluable when deciding on the correct headline and pinpointing a target audience. Journalists are already seen in war zones and media rooms as reporters, and getting them into the operations room as planners is worthy of consideration.

An array of reporters, platforms amd mediums can be kept ready to carry the desired headline far and wide. Freelance journalists in foreign countries coupled with internet will be a potent combination. In addition, the military’s public information organization cannot succeed in this new reality without restructuring.

Every battle in military history has name of some commander(s) attached to it. Hannibal crossing the Alps, U.S. General George S. Patton’s exploits during Battle of the Bulge, and then Indian Colonel Desmond Hayde in the Battle of Dograi. The day is not far when some field commander will etch his or her name in history fighting the Battle of the Headline or, more apt, the Battle for the Headline.      


Endnotes:

[1] BBC. (2019, February 26). Balakot: Indian air strikes target militants in Pakistan. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47366718.

[2] IMDb.com. (1997, December 19). Tomorrow Never Dies. IMDb. https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120347.

[3] Olson, P. (2011, August 11). Man Inadvertently Live Tweets Osama Bin Laden Raid. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2011/05/02/man-inadvertently-live-tweets-osama-bin-laden-raid.

Assessment Papers India Influence Operations Information and Intelligence Samir Srivastava Social Media

Assessing How India’s ‘Fourth Arm of Defence’ Decreased the United States’ Munitions

Michael Lima, D.B.A., is an Ammunition Warrant Officer and has served 21 years in the United States military.  He can be found on Twitter @Mike_k_Lima and provides pro bono consulting in munitions and explosives safety on MikeLimaConsulting.org.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature, nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessing How India’s ‘Fourth Arm of Defence’ Decreased the United States’ Munitions

Date Originally Written:  April 16, 2020.

Date Originally Published:  June 1, 2020.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes in India’s growing military-industrial complex. The article’s point of view is from India towards the United States’ defense security cooperation programs.

Summary:  India has a growing military-industrial complex that includes state-owned enterprises, and has been less reliant on the United States and Russia for munitions production. This complex simultaneously builds political ties with other nations and builds partners and allies in the world. Surround by hostile nations and increasing its industrial base, India increased its internal strength and therefore its influence.

Text:  Mohandas Gandhi said that “Democracy necessarily means a conflict of will and ideas, involving sometimes a war of the knife between different ideas.” He is one of India’s most famous leaders who believed in non-violence, and successfully lead independence from the British without using a gun.

When the discussion of a nation’s industrial base for arms production comes around, three countries come to mind, the United States, China, and Russia. One country that is not associated with arms production in the world stage is the Republic of India. But in 2017, Indian companies ranked in the Top 100 categorized by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute as an emerging producer nation[1]. The achievement in production was due to a combination of defense production facilities and state-owned enterprises. The ‘Make in India’ nation-building initiative has transformed India into a global manufacturing hub[2]. India has shown the ability to produce and export at an international level, but its efforts are concentrated towards internal ordnance production known as its ‘Fourth Arm of Defence.’

At the heart of the Indian ordnance production is the Ordnance Factory Board, under the direction of the Department of Defence Production. This government organization is responsible for vertical integration of munitions with 41 factories, nine training institutes, three regional marketing centers, and four regional Controllers of Safety[3]. The board is one of the oldest and dates to the 1775 colonial period, with the East India Company of England and British authorities’ establishment of Board of Ordnance[4]. Along with the defense facilitates, additional facilities are run by state-owned enterprises such as Hindusthan Aeronautics Limited, Bharat Electronics Limited, and Bharat Dynamics Limited. These enterprises make up most of India’s arms production. With this amount of production, it is difficult to understand why India needs the United States’ armament.

The United States is the second-largest arms supplier to India, and Russia being the first[5]. Through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the United States supports India with major aircraft programs such as AH-64E Apaches and C-17 Globemaster III[6], and sales of armament as the AGM-84L Harpoon Block II air-launched missiles[7]. The Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation of Russia assists India with larger weapon systems such as the T-90S tanks[8] and Russian S-400 surface to air missile systems[9]. The Indian government, with an impressive military-industrial complex, does not yet have the same capabilities as its two leading importers. The Republic of India does a balancing act of building relationships with both the United States and the Russian government while having contested borders with China. Also, of note politically is India’s near war with its main rival Pakistan over the Jammu and Kashmir region[10]. These circumstances have driven India to be independent and less reliant on external support.

The United States arms exports to India decreased by 51%, and Russian arms exports to India were reduced by 47% between the periods of 2010–14 and 2015–19. [11] The ability for India to have major ownership of the supply chain of the military-industrial complex, allows India to produce munitions systems comparable to the United States and Russia. This, in turn, brings about the success required to decrease import sales from both countries. Between 2010–14 and 2015–19, India’s overall arms imports decreased by 32%, which aligns with their stated objective to produce their own major arms, but still have plans for the imports of major systems[12].

Even with an overall decrease in imports, India continues to increase arms imports from other major powers like Israel and France by 175 and 71%, respectively, in the same time frame. Simultaneously reducing dependency on world superpowers and building political ties with other strategic and critical partners throughout the geopolitical spectrum. Additionally, India managed to have an increase of 426% of arms to smaller countries such as Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Mauritius[13]. Showing the capability of their industrial complex to produce and export.

The United States and India have a partnership based on shared values, including democratic principles, and the U.S. supports India’s emergence as a leading global power to ensure regional peace in the Indo-Pacific[14]. With the acknowledgment of India’s advancement as a superpower, the United States will eventually concede that its partner has a military-industrial complex that can rival its own. State-owned enterprises increased the capacity of India’s defense production and technical expertise. While the United States is a leading arms exporter to India, working with India to use both U.S. and Indian arms exporting as an instrument of influence within the Indo-Pacific, will likely be required to offset China’s rise.


Endnotes:

[1] The SIPRI Top 100 Arms-producing and Military Services Companies, 2017. (2018). Retrieved April 15, 2020, from https://www.sipri.org/publications/2018/sipri-fact-sheets/sipri-top-100-arms-producing-and-military-services-companies-2017

[2] Ordnance Factory Board. About Us. (n.d.). Retrieved April 15, 2020, from https://www.makeinindia.com/about

[3] Ordnance Factory Board. OFB in Brief. (n.d.). Retrieved April 15, 2020, from https://ofbindia.gov.in/pages/ofb-in-brief

[4] Ordnance Factory Board. https://ofbindia.gov.in/pages/history

[5] Pubby, M. (2020, March 10). In a first, India figures on arms exporters list. Retrieved April 15, 2020, from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/in-a-first-india-figures-on-arms-exporters-list/articleshow/74557571.cms

[6] The Official Home of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. India. (n.d.). Retrieved April 15, 2020, from https://www.dsca.mil/tags/india

[7] Ibid.

[8] The Moscow Times. (2019, April 09). India to Buy Over 450 Russian Tanks Worth $2Bln – Reports. Retrieved April 15, 2020, from https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/04/09/india-to-buy-over-450-russian-tanks-worth-2bln-reports-a65146

[9] The Moscow Times. (2019, September 05). India’s Russian Arms Purchases Hit’ Breakthrough’ $14.5Bln, Official Says. Retrieved April 15, 2020, from https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/09/05/indias-russian-arms-purchases-hit-breakthrough-145bln-official-says-a67153

[10] Kugelman, M. (2019, December 31). India and Pakistan Are Edging Closer to War in 2020. Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/31/afghanistan-taliban-nuclear-india-pakistan-edging-closer-war-2020

[11] Wezeman, P. D., Fleurant, A., Kuimova, A., Lopes da Silva, D., Tian, N., & Wezeman, S. T. (2020, March). Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019. Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2019

[12] Wezeman, P. D., Fleurant, A., Kuimova, A., Lopes da Silva, D., Tian, N., & Wezeman, S. T. (2020, March). Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019. Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2019

[13] Wezeman, P. D., Fleurant, A., Kuimova, A., Lopes da Silva, D., Tian, N., & Wezeman, S. T. (2020, March). Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019. Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2019

[14] U.S. Relations With India – United States Department of State. (2019, June 21). Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-india

Assessment Papers Capacity / Capability Enhancement India Michael Lima United States

Assessing the Relationship of Sikh-Canadians with Canada and India

Editor’s Note:  This article is the result of a partnership between Divergent Options and a course on nationalism at the George Washington University.


Nikita Khurana is an undergraduate student at the George Washington University in Washington, D.C. She is pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Economics and minoring in International Affairs.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessing the Relationship of Sikh-Canadians with Canada and India

Date Originally Written:  October 19, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  December 9, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author of this piece identifies as a first-generation Indian-American. This article is written in the point of view of Sikhs living in Canada that have a strong religious identity.

Summary:  Canada is home to nearly half a million Sikhs, thus becoming one of the largest Sikh diaspora populations in the world. While most diaspora populations have difficulty settling into their new home countries, political tensions with the Indian state was a driving force in Sikh-Canadian integration. Even though Sikh-Canadians faced discrimination from white Canadians, the Khalistan movement (a Sikh separatist movement) helped create a strong Sikh community within Canada.

Text:  Canada is home to one of the largest Sikh diaspora communities in the world. As of 2011, Sikhs accounted for 1.4% of the Canadian population with over 400,000 residents[1]. Legal immigration from the Indian province of Punjab is the root cause for the prominence of the Sikh religion in Canada. Sikh immigration into Canada can be separated into two waves: the early twentieth century and the 1960s. Due to political differences in their homeland, Sikhs in Canada have been able to integrate into Canadian society and even gain political power, despite the initial unwelcoming actions of white Canadians.

South Asia has been home to numerous religious movements including the creation of Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism. In the late fifteenth century, Guru Nanak established the Sikh religion. Sikhism is a prominent ideology with over 27 million followers, thus making it the fifth largest religion in the world. Followers of Skihism believe that there is a total of ten gurus, including Guru Nanak, and upon the death of the final spiritual leader, the essence of the eternal Guru transferred itself into the sacred Sikh scripture[2].

From their initial migration to Canada, Sikhs were met with profound racial discrimination[3]. This discrimination took the international stage in April of 1914 when the Komagata Maru, a Japanese steamship ship carrying Sikh passengers, was refused entry into Canada[4]. Nonetheless, Sikhs established strong religious institutions through gurudwaras or Sikh temples. South Asian immigration was completely halted until 1920, when wives and children of Sikh-Canadians were finally allowed to enter the country.

In contrast to the American society depicted as a ‘melting pot,’ Canada is seen as a ‘mixed salad’ of cultural differences today, where all faiths, ethnicities, and traditions are accommodated instead of assimilated. However, throughout the twentieth century, white Canadians were resistant to non-white immigrants. From the 1920s to the 1960s, Sikhs in Canada experienced a religious revision. Instead of maintaining traditional practices, children of immigrants adopted Sahajdhari practices. Being a Sahajdhari meant that men were able to break from practices that prevented them from cutting their hair and adopting Canadian dress codes[5].

The second wave of immigration coincided with the birth of the Sikh separatist movement in India. Even though Sikhs and Hindus lived peacefully amongst each other for centuries, tensions arose in the late 1960s when the Sikh population in Punjab gained economic prosperity following the Green Revolution in India. With growing wealth and a flourishing agricultural industry, Punjabi society slowly became increasingly more detached from mainstream Indian culture. In an effort to relieve political stress, Indian Prime Minister Indra Gandhi attempted to transfer the city of Chandigarh to the Punjab province. However, with no success, this olive branch was never fully executed, further strengthening distrust of the Prime Minister amongst the Sikh population. By the 1980s, the Sikh Khalistan movement was in full force.

The Khalistan movement is a separatist movement that calls for an autonomous Sikh nation-state. As scholar Stephen Van Evera suggests that nationalist movements are inherently violent, the Khalistan movement quickly turned violent against the Indian state[6]. In 1984, the Indian army staged a siege of the Golden Temple, a sacred Sikh shrine, in an effort to take down Sikh extremists. After the altercation, more than 1,000 people died, and the temple was nearly destroyed. This results of the siege ignited support from the Sikh diaspora in Canada, both financially and socially. Sikhs in Canada began to fund the separatist movement in India, which resulted in the deterioration of the relationship between Canadian Sikhs and their Indian homeland[7]. Additionally, the sudden violence of the Khalistan movement caused a mass migration of Sikhs to western countries, most prominently in Canada.

The growing Sikh population in Canada has recently become a concern to India. Within the last year, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has become wary of Canada and their foreign policies. Indian officials worry that western governments have become sympathetic to the Sikh separatists and will act in their interests when considering foreign policy[8]. In 2017, the Canadian Parliament declared the siege on the Golden Temple in Punjab a genocide committed by the Indian state against the Sikh religious minority. This genocide declaration has further strained the relationship between Sikh-Canadians and the Indian State. Being a stateless nation, the Sikh population in Canada has essentially become a political organization where they have gained the agency to influence politics in Canada[9]. Thus, the Canadian government has been an active participant in accommodating Sikh-Canadians and Sikh immigrants. On March 2, 2006, the Canadian Supreme court notably struck down a ban on allowing Sikh students to carry a kirpan, ceremonial dagger, in school[10].

Pop culture is another important indicator of the relationship between white Canadians and Sikhs. Within the past century, major pop culture figures of Sikh roots have gained popularity among all Canadians. Most famously, Lilly Singh, also known as iiSuperwomanii, was the highest paid female on the video hosting website YouTube in 2016. She is a vocal Sikh who was born and brought up in the Ontario province of Canada[11].

Sikh immigrants were not initially welcomed with open arms into Canada. Due to racial discrimination by white Canadians, South Asians had a slow assimilation into Canadian society. However, political tensions with the Indian state weakened the connection Sikh immigrants had with their homeland. Hence, integration and assimilation into a new national identity was possible. Sikhs in Canada have risen to political power with nearly twenty Sikh Members of Parliament. While Sikh-Canadians’ connection to India may have been weakened, Sikh identity in Canada was strengthened due to support for the Khalistan movement and Sikh nation, instead of the actual Indian state.


Endnotes:

[1] “History.” Canadian Sikh Heritage. Accessed August 11, 2019. http://canadiansikhheritage.ca/history/.

[2] McLeod, William Hewat. “Sikhism.” Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., June 21, 2019. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sikhism

[3] “Sikhism in Canada.” Sikhism in Canada | The Canadian Encyclopedia. Accessed August 9, 2019. https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/sikhism.

[4] “History.” Canadian Sikh Heritage. Accessed August 11, 2019. http://canadiansikhheritage.ca/history/.

[5] “Who Is a ‘Sehajdhari’?: India News – Times of India.” The Times of India. Accessed August 11, 2019. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Who-is-a-sehajdhari/articleshow/9830416.cms.

[6] Evera, Stephen Van. “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War.” International Security18, no. 4 (1994): 5. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539176.

[7] “Sinews of the Nation: Constructing Irish and Zionist Bonds in the United States” 51, no. 03 (2013). https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.51-1737.

[8] Sunny Hundal @sunny_hundal. “India’s Indifference to the Sikh Diaspora Is Damaging Western Foreign Policy towards the Country.” The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, February 25, 2018. https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/india-sikh-justin-trudeau-separatism-canada-foreign-policy-a8223641.html.

[9] Harris Mylonas & Nadav G. Shelef (2014) Which Land Is Our Land? Domestic Politics and Change in the Territorial Claims of Stateless Nationalist Movements,Security Studies, 23:4, 754-786, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2014.964996

[10] CBC News, “Ban on Sikh kirpan overturned by Supreme Court,” March 2, 2006. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ban-on-sikh-kirpan-overturned-by-supreme-court-1.618238.

[11] Maya Oppenheim @mayaoppenheim. “The Highest-Paid Female YouTuber, and the Astonishing Amount She Earns.” The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, March 6, 2017. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/lilly-singh-youtube-highest-paid-richest-forbes-list-2016-a7458441.html.

 

Assessment Papers Canada India Nikita Khurana

China’s Options Towards the (Re)emerging Quadrilateral Security Dialogue

Adam Ni is a researcher at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University.  His areas of interest include China’s foreign and security policy.  He can be found on Twitter @adam_ni.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


National Security Situation:  The People’s Republic of China (China) is facing the (re)emergence of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad, consisting of the United States, India, Japan and Australia.  The unstated aim of the Quad is to constrain China’s growing power in Asia through possible military and economic cooperation that would raise the cost if Beijing challenges the status quo.

Date Originally Written:  February 28, 2018.

Originally Published:  March 5, 2018.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is a scholar of China’s foreign and security policy.  The article is written from the point of view of Chinese decision-makers considering policy options in response to the Quad’s challenges.

Background:  The Quad can be traced back to 2007 when diplomatic efforts culminated in a multilateral naval exercise off the Bay of Bengal.  While the countries involved contended that their activities were not aimed at China, it was clear that these activities were largely a response to China’s growing power.  However, the Quad was short-lived with Australia pulling out in February 2008 under Chinese pressure[1].

Recently, the Quad has been revived in the face of an increasingly powerful and assertive China with expanded geopolitical ambitions.  In November 2017, officials from the Quad nations met on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in the Philippines and agreed that a “free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region” is in the interest of all countries[2].  This meeting was followed in January by the meeting of the Quad navy chiefs at the Raisina Dialogue in India.  During the meeting, Admiral Harry Harris, the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, characterized China as a “disruptive, transitional force” in the region, and urged Quad nations to take measures against China’s “unilateral ways to change the use of global commons” and uphold “rule-based freedom of navigation[3].”  This sentiment was echoed by the navy chiefs of the other three Quad nations.

Significance:  While it is still too early to tell what the Quad would entail, in theory, it aims to constrain China’s growing power and to ameliorate China’s behavior by altering Beijing’s strategic calculus.  The military dimension of the Quad could take the form of expanded military cooperation that would raise the cost for China to use or threaten the use of force, including in relation to the East and South China Seas.  The economic dimension could take the form of expanded economic and infrastructure cooperation that would compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a grand plan to reshape the world economy with China at the center.

Option #1:  Reassurance.  China continues to emphasize to the Quad nations its intent to develop peacefully through public statements and diplomatic channels.

Risk:  Without pushing back against the Quad, the Quad nations and others in the region may believe that China is unwilling to impose a cost on them for challenging China’s security and economic interests.  This lack of push back may lead to further coalescence of the Quad and may even draw in other states in the region that have become wary of China’s growing power, including those that have territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea.

Gain:  Option #1 may help to undermine the narrative of an ambitious China with a willingness to adopt coercive means to protect and advance its interests.  This option would strengthen the arguments of domestic forces in the Quad nations that advocate a softer approach in responding to Chinese power.

Option #2:  Punishment.  China applies a high degree of economic and diplomatic pressure on Quad nations to demonstrate the cost of challenging China’s interests and thus deter further challenges.  This option could take the form of economic coercion, formal diplomatic protests, and the downgrading of bilateral cooperation in key fields.

Risk:  Option #2 would strengthen the rationale for the Quad and the argument for constraining China’s power in the first place by demonstrating China’s willingness to adopt coercive measures against those that challenge its interests.  This option may further exacerbate the negative perception of China among the Quad nations, especially where there is already a lively debate about China’s influence (such as in Australia and the United States).  In addition, economic coercion may damage the Chinese economy and in the long run make the target economies less dependent on China.

Gain:  China demonstrating strength and resolve early on may lead to the collapse of the Quad if the Quad nations are not willing to pay the high cost of challenging China’s interests.  For example, Australia is highly dependent on China for trade and investment flows.  The Chinese government could put in place measures to reduce Chinese tourists or students from going to Australia and link these restrictions to Australia’s involvement with the Quad.  Such measures may also deter other regional countries from cooperating with the Quad against China’s interests.

Option #3:  Reassurance and caution.  China continues to emphasize its peaceful intent while also signaling its willingness to impose an economic and political cost on the Quad nations should they continue to challenge China’s interests.

Risk:  Option #3 may not be effective due to a lack of concrete cost imposed on the Quad nations, through, for example, coercive economic measures.  At the same time, the cautioning may be interpreted as an aggressive warning of China’s coercive intent, further exacerbating public anxiety in the Quad nations.

Gain:  This approach may be enough to forestall the further development of the Quad through providing reassurance but also signals China’s resolve to protects its interests.  Option #3’s key benefit is that it does not incur large political or economic cost for China immediately, but hinges Chinese retaliation on further Quad activities.

Other Comments:  The revived Quad is still in the early stages of its development, and it is too early to tell what the Quad would entail.  The above options are presented on the basis that the Quad may involve military and economic dimensions that challenge China’s interests, including its territorial claims in the South China Sea as well as its Belt and Road Initiative.  Given the diversity of strategic interests between the Quad nations in relation to China, there is a likelihood that the Quad will not develop beyond a mechanism for dialogue.

Recommendation:  None.


Endnotes:

[1] Indrani Bagchi, “Australia to pull out of ‘quad’ that excludes China,” Times of India, February 6, 2008. Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Australia-to-pull-out-of-quad-that-excludes-China/articleshow/2760109.cms.

[2] “India-Australia-Japan-U.S. Consultations on Indo-Pacific (November 12, 2017),” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, November 12, 2017. Available at: http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29110/IndiaAustraliaJapanUS_Consultations_on_IndoPacific_November_12_2017

[3] “‘China a disruptive power,’ say navy chiefs of Quadrilateral nations,” Times of India, January 19, 2018. Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/china-a-disruptive-power-quad-nations-navy-chiefs/articleshow/62562144.cms.

Adam Ni Australia China (People's Republic of China) India Japan Option Papers United States