Assessing How India’s ‘Fourth Arm of Defence’ Decreased the United States’ Munitions

Michael Lima, D.B.A., is an Ammunition Warrant Officer and has served 21 years in the United States military.  He can be found on Twitter @Mike_k_Lima and provides pro bono consulting in munitions and explosives safety on MikeLimaConsulting.org.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature, nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessing How India’s ‘Fourth Arm of Defence’ Decreased the United States’ Munitions

Date Originally Written:  April 16, 2020.

Date Originally Published:  June 1, 2020.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes in India’s growing military-industrial complex. The article’s point of view is from India towards the United States’ defense security cooperation programs.

Summary:  India has a growing military-industrial complex that includes state-owned enterprises, and has been less reliant on the United States and Russia for munitions production. This complex simultaneously builds political ties with other nations and builds partners and allies in the world. Surround by hostile nations and increasing its industrial base, India increased its internal strength and therefore its influence.

Text:  Mohandas Gandhi said that “Democracy necessarily means a conflict of will and ideas, involving sometimes a war of the knife between different ideas.” He is one of India’s most famous leaders who believed in non-violence, and successfully lead independence from the British without using a gun.

When the discussion of a nation’s industrial base for arms production comes around, three countries come to mind, the United States, China, and Russia. One country that is not associated with arms production in the world stage is the Republic of India. But in 2017, Indian companies ranked in the Top 100 categorized by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute as an emerging producer nation[1]. The achievement in production was due to a combination of defense production facilities and state-owned enterprises. The ‘Make in India’ nation-building initiative has transformed India into a global manufacturing hub[2]. India has shown the ability to produce and export at an international level, but its efforts are concentrated towards internal ordnance production known as its ‘Fourth Arm of Defence.’

At the heart of the Indian ordnance production is the Ordnance Factory Board, under the direction of the Department of Defence Production. This government organization is responsible for vertical integration of munitions with 41 factories, nine training institutes, three regional marketing centers, and four regional Controllers of Safety[3]. The board is one of the oldest and dates to the 1775 colonial period, with the East India Company of England and British authorities’ establishment of Board of Ordnance[4]. Along with the defense facilitates, additional facilities are run by state-owned enterprises such as Hindusthan Aeronautics Limited, Bharat Electronics Limited, and Bharat Dynamics Limited. These enterprises make up most of India’s arms production. With this amount of production, it is difficult to understand why India needs the United States’ armament.

The United States is the second-largest arms supplier to India, and Russia being the first[5]. Through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the United States supports India with major aircraft programs such as AH-64E Apaches and C-17 Globemaster III[6], and sales of armament as the AGM-84L Harpoon Block II air-launched missiles[7]. The Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation of Russia assists India with larger weapon systems such as the T-90S tanks[8] and Russian S-400 surface to air missile systems[9]. The Indian government, with an impressive military-industrial complex, does not yet have the same capabilities as its two leading importers. The Republic of India does a balancing act of building relationships with both the United States and the Russian government while having contested borders with China. Also, of note politically is India’s near war with its main rival Pakistan over the Jammu and Kashmir region[10]. These circumstances have driven India to be independent and less reliant on external support.

The United States arms exports to India decreased by 51%, and Russian arms exports to India were reduced by 47% between the periods of 2010–14 and 2015–19. [11] The ability for India to have major ownership of the supply chain of the military-industrial complex, allows India to produce munitions systems comparable to the United States and Russia. This, in turn, brings about the success required to decrease import sales from both countries. Between 2010–14 and 2015–19, India’s overall arms imports decreased by 32%, which aligns with their stated objective to produce their own major arms, but still have plans for the imports of major systems[12].

Even with an overall decrease in imports, India continues to increase arms imports from other major powers like Israel and France by 175 and 71%, respectively, in the same time frame. Simultaneously reducing dependency on world superpowers and building political ties with other strategic and critical partners throughout the geopolitical spectrum. Additionally, India managed to have an increase of 426% of arms to smaller countries such as Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Mauritius[13]. Showing the capability of their industrial complex to produce and export.

The United States and India have a partnership based on shared values, including democratic principles, and the U.S. supports India’s emergence as a leading global power to ensure regional peace in the Indo-Pacific[14]. With the acknowledgment of India’s advancement as a superpower, the United States will eventually concede that its partner has a military-industrial complex that can rival its own. State-owned enterprises increased the capacity of India’s defense production and technical expertise. While the United States is a leading arms exporter to India, working with India to use both U.S. and Indian arms exporting as an instrument of influence within the Indo-Pacific, will likely be required to offset China’s rise.


Endnotes:

[1] The SIPRI Top 100 Arms-producing and Military Services Companies, 2017. (2018). Retrieved April 15, 2020, from https://www.sipri.org/publications/2018/sipri-fact-sheets/sipri-top-100-arms-producing-and-military-services-companies-2017

[2] Ordnance Factory Board. About Us. (n.d.). Retrieved April 15, 2020, from https://www.makeinindia.com/about

[3] Ordnance Factory Board. OFB in Brief. (n.d.). Retrieved April 15, 2020, from https://ofbindia.gov.in/pages/ofb-in-brief

[4] Ordnance Factory Board. https://ofbindia.gov.in/pages/history

[5] Pubby, M. (2020, March 10). In a first, India figures on arms exporters list. Retrieved April 15, 2020, from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/in-a-first-india-figures-on-arms-exporters-list/articleshow/74557571.cms

[6] The Official Home of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. India. (n.d.). Retrieved April 15, 2020, from https://www.dsca.mil/tags/india

[7] Ibid.

[8] The Moscow Times. (2019, April 09). India to Buy Over 450 Russian Tanks Worth $2Bln – Reports. Retrieved April 15, 2020, from https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/04/09/india-to-buy-over-450-russian-tanks-worth-2bln-reports-a65146

[9] The Moscow Times. (2019, September 05). India’s Russian Arms Purchases Hit’ Breakthrough’ $14.5Bln, Official Says. Retrieved April 15, 2020, from https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/09/05/indias-russian-arms-purchases-hit-breakthrough-145bln-official-says-a67153

[10] Kugelman, M. (2019, December 31). India and Pakistan Are Edging Closer to War in 2020. Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/31/afghanistan-taliban-nuclear-india-pakistan-edging-closer-war-2020

[11] Wezeman, P. D., Fleurant, A., Kuimova, A., Lopes da Silva, D., Tian, N., & Wezeman, S. T. (2020, March). Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019. Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2019

[12] Wezeman, P. D., Fleurant, A., Kuimova, A., Lopes da Silva, D., Tian, N., & Wezeman, S. T. (2020, March). Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019. Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2019

[13] Wezeman, P. D., Fleurant, A., Kuimova, A., Lopes da Silva, D., Tian, N., & Wezeman, S. T. (2020, March). Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019. Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2019

[14] U.S. Relations With India – United States Department of State. (2019, June 21). Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-india

Assessment Papers Capacity / Capability Enhancement India Michael Lima United States

Assessing the Relationship of Sikh-Canadians with Canada and India

Editor’s Note:  This article is the result of a partnership between Divergent Options and a course on nationalism at the George Washington University.


Nikita Khurana is an undergraduate student at the George Washington University in Washington, D.C. She is pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Economics and minoring in International Affairs.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessing the Relationship of Sikh-Canadians with Canada and India

Date Originally Written:  October 19, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  December 9, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author of this piece identifies as a first-generation Indian-American. This article is written in the point of view of Sikhs living in Canada that have a strong religious identity.

Summary:  Canada is home to nearly half a million Sikhs, thus becoming one of the largest Sikh diaspora populations in the world. While most diaspora populations have difficulty settling into their new home countries, political tensions with the Indian state was a driving force in Sikh-Canadian integration. Even though Sikh-Canadians faced discrimination from white Canadians, the Khalistan movement (a Sikh separatist movement) helped create a strong Sikh community within Canada.

Text:  Canada is home to one of the largest Sikh diaspora communities in the world. As of 2011, Sikhs accounted for 1.4% of the Canadian population with over 400,000 residents[1]. Legal immigration from the Indian province of Punjab is the root cause for the prominence of the Sikh religion in Canada. Sikh immigration into Canada can be separated into two waves: the early twentieth century and the 1960s. Due to political differences in their homeland, Sikhs in Canada have been able to integrate into Canadian society and even gain political power, despite the initial unwelcoming actions of white Canadians.

South Asia has been home to numerous religious movements including the creation of Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism. In the late fifteenth century, Guru Nanak established the Sikh religion. Sikhism is a prominent ideology with over 27 million followers, thus making it the fifth largest religion in the world. Followers of Skihism believe that there is a total of ten gurus, including Guru Nanak, and upon the death of the final spiritual leader, the essence of the eternal Guru transferred itself into the sacred Sikh scripture[2].

From their initial migration to Canada, Sikhs were met with profound racial discrimination[3]. This discrimination took the international stage in April of 1914 when the Komagata Maru, a Japanese steamship ship carrying Sikh passengers, was refused entry into Canada[4]. Nonetheless, Sikhs established strong religious institutions through gurudwaras or Sikh temples. South Asian immigration was completely halted until 1920, when wives and children of Sikh-Canadians were finally allowed to enter the country.

In contrast to the American society depicted as a ‘melting pot,’ Canada is seen as a ‘mixed salad’ of cultural differences today, where all faiths, ethnicities, and traditions are accommodated instead of assimilated. However, throughout the twentieth century, white Canadians were resistant to non-white immigrants. From the 1920s to the 1960s, Sikhs in Canada experienced a religious revision. Instead of maintaining traditional practices, children of immigrants adopted Sahajdhari practices. Being a Sahajdhari meant that men were able to break from practices that prevented them from cutting their hair and adopting Canadian dress codes[5].

The second wave of immigration coincided with the birth of the Sikh separatist movement in India. Even though Sikhs and Hindus lived peacefully amongst each other for centuries, tensions arose in the late 1960s when the Sikh population in Punjab gained economic prosperity following the Green Revolution in India. With growing wealth and a flourishing agricultural industry, Punjabi society slowly became increasingly more detached from mainstream Indian culture. In an effort to relieve political stress, Indian Prime Minister Indra Gandhi attempted to transfer the city of Chandigarh to the Punjab province. However, with no success, this olive branch was never fully executed, further strengthening distrust of the Prime Minister amongst the Sikh population. By the 1980s, the Sikh Khalistan movement was in full force.

The Khalistan movement is a separatist movement that calls for an autonomous Sikh nation-state. As scholar Stephen Van Evera suggests that nationalist movements are inherently violent, the Khalistan movement quickly turned violent against the Indian state[6]. In 1984, the Indian army staged a siege of the Golden Temple, a sacred Sikh shrine, in an effort to take down Sikh extremists. After the altercation, more than 1,000 people died, and the temple was nearly destroyed. This results of the siege ignited support from the Sikh diaspora in Canada, both financially and socially. Sikhs in Canada began to fund the separatist movement in India, which resulted in the deterioration of the relationship between Canadian Sikhs and their Indian homeland[7]. Additionally, the sudden violence of the Khalistan movement caused a mass migration of Sikhs to western countries, most prominently in Canada.

The growing Sikh population in Canada has recently become a concern to India. Within the last year, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has become wary of Canada and their foreign policies. Indian officials worry that western governments have become sympathetic to the Sikh separatists and will act in their interests when considering foreign policy[8]. In 2017, the Canadian Parliament declared the siege on the Golden Temple in Punjab a genocide committed by the Indian state against the Sikh religious minority. This genocide declaration has further strained the relationship between Sikh-Canadians and the Indian State. Being a stateless nation, the Sikh population in Canada has essentially become a political organization where they have gained the agency to influence politics in Canada[9]. Thus, the Canadian government has been an active participant in accommodating Sikh-Canadians and Sikh immigrants. On March 2, 2006, the Canadian Supreme court notably struck down a ban on allowing Sikh students to carry a kirpan, ceremonial dagger, in school[10].

Pop culture is another important indicator of the relationship between white Canadians and Sikhs. Within the past century, major pop culture figures of Sikh roots have gained popularity among all Canadians. Most famously, Lilly Singh, also known as iiSuperwomanii, was the highest paid female on the video hosting website YouTube in 2016. She is a vocal Sikh who was born and brought up in the Ontario province of Canada[11].

Sikh immigrants were not initially welcomed with open arms into Canada. Due to racial discrimination by white Canadians, South Asians had a slow assimilation into Canadian society. However, political tensions with the Indian state weakened the connection Sikh immigrants had with their homeland. Hence, integration and assimilation into a new national identity was possible. Sikhs in Canada have risen to political power with nearly twenty Sikh Members of Parliament. While Sikh-Canadians’ connection to India may have been weakened, Sikh identity in Canada was strengthened due to support for the Khalistan movement and Sikh nation, instead of the actual Indian state.


Endnotes:

[1] “History.” Canadian Sikh Heritage. Accessed August 11, 2019. http://canadiansikhheritage.ca/history/.

[2] McLeod, William Hewat. “Sikhism.” Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., June 21, 2019. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sikhism

[3] “Sikhism in Canada.” Sikhism in Canada | The Canadian Encyclopedia. Accessed August 9, 2019. https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/sikhism.

[4] “History.” Canadian Sikh Heritage. Accessed August 11, 2019. http://canadiansikhheritage.ca/history/.

[5] “Who Is a ‘Sehajdhari’?: India News – Times of India.” The Times of India. Accessed August 11, 2019. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Who-is-a-sehajdhari/articleshow/9830416.cms.

[6] Evera, Stephen Van. “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War.” International Security18, no. 4 (1994): 5. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539176.

[7] “Sinews of the Nation: Constructing Irish and Zionist Bonds in the United States” 51, no. 03 (2013). https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.51-1737.

[8] Sunny Hundal @sunny_hundal. “India’s Indifference to the Sikh Diaspora Is Damaging Western Foreign Policy towards the Country.” The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, February 25, 2018. https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/india-sikh-justin-trudeau-separatism-canada-foreign-policy-a8223641.html.

[9] Harris Mylonas & Nadav G. Shelef (2014) Which Land Is Our Land? Domestic Politics and Change in the Territorial Claims of Stateless Nationalist Movements,Security Studies, 23:4, 754-786, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2014.964996

[10] CBC News, “Ban on Sikh kirpan overturned by Supreme Court,” March 2, 2006. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ban-on-sikh-kirpan-overturned-by-supreme-court-1.618238.

[11] Maya Oppenheim @mayaoppenheim. “The Highest-Paid Female YouTuber, and the Astonishing Amount She Earns.” The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, March 6, 2017. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/lilly-singh-youtube-highest-paid-richest-forbes-list-2016-a7458441.html.

 

Assessment Papers Canada India Nikita Khurana

China’s Options Towards the (Re)emerging Quadrilateral Security Dialogue

Adam Ni is a researcher at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University.  His areas of interest include China’s foreign and security policy.  He can be found on Twitter @adam_ni.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


National Security Situation:  The People’s Republic of China (China) is facing the (re)emergence of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad, consisting of the United States, India, Japan and Australia.  The unstated aim of the Quad is to constrain China’s growing power in Asia through possible military and economic cooperation that would raise the cost if Beijing challenges the status quo.

Date Originally Written:  February 28, 2018.

Originally Published:  March 5, 2018.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is a scholar of China’s foreign and security policy.  The article is written from the point of view of Chinese decision-makers considering policy options in response to the Quad’s challenges.

Background:  The Quad can be traced back to 2007 when diplomatic efforts culminated in a multilateral naval exercise off the Bay of Bengal.  While the countries involved contended that their activities were not aimed at China, it was clear that these activities were largely a response to China’s growing power.  However, the Quad was short-lived with Australia pulling out in February 2008 under Chinese pressure[1].

Recently, the Quad has been revived in the face of an increasingly powerful and assertive China with expanded geopolitical ambitions.  In November 2017, officials from the Quad nations met on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in the Philippines and agreed that a “free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region” is in the interest of all countries[2].  This meeting was followed in January by the meeting of the Quad navy chiefs at the Raisina Dialogue in India.  During the meeting, Admiral Harry Harris, the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, characterized China as a “disruptive, transitional force” in the region, and urged Quad nations to take measures against China’s “unilateral ways to change the use of global commons” and uphold “rule-based freedom of navigation[3].”  This sentiment was echoed by the navy chiefs of the other three Quad nations.

Significance:  While it is still too early to tell what the Quad would entail, in theory, it aims to constrain China’s growing power and to ameliorate China’s behavior by altering Beijing’s strategic calculus.  The military dimension of the Quad could take the form of expanded military cooperation that would raise the cost for China to use or threaten the use of force, including in relation to the East and South China Seas.  The economic dimension could take the form of expanded economic and infrastructure cooperation that would compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a grand plan to reshape the world economy with China at the center.

Option #1:  Reassurance.  China continues to emphasize to the Quad nations its intent to develop peacefully through public statements and diplomatic channels.

Risk:  Without pushing back against the Quad, the Quad nations and others in the region may believe that China is unwilling to impose a cost on them for challenging China’s security and economic interests.  This lack of push back may lead to further coalescence of the Quad and may even draw in other states in the region that have become wary of China’s growing power, including those that have territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea.

Gain:  Option #1 may help to undermine the narrative of an ambitious China with a willingness to adopt coercive means to protect and advance its interests.  This option would strengthen the arguments of domestic forces in the Quad nations that advocate a softer approach in responding to Chinese power.

Option #2:  Punishment.  China applies a high degree of economic and diplomatic pressure on Quad nations to demonstrate the cost of challenging China’s interests and thus deter further challenges.  This option could take the form of economic coercion, formal diplomatic protests, and the downgrading of bilateral cooperation in key fields.

Risk:  Option #2 would strengthen the rationale for the Quad and the argument for constraining China’s power in the first place by demonstrating China’s willingness to adopt coercive measures against those that challenge its interests.  This option may further exacerbate the negative perception of China among the Quad nations, especially where there is already a lively debate about China’s influence (such as in Australia and the United States).  In addition, economic coercion may damage the Chinese economy and in the long run make the target economies less dependent on China.

Gain:  China demonstrating strength and resolve early on may lead to the collapse of the Quad if the Quad nations are not willing to pay the high cost of challenging China’s interests.  For example, Australia is highly dependent on China for trade and investment flows.  The Chinese government could put in place measures to reduce Chinese tourists or students from going to Australia and link these restrictions to Australia’s involvement with the Quad.  Such measures may also deter other regional countries from cooperating with the Quad against China’s interests.

Option #3:  Reassurance and caution.  China continues to emphasize its peaceful intent while also signaling its willingness to impose an economic and political cost on the Quad nations should they continue to challenge China’s interests.

Risk:  Option #3 may not be effective due to a lack of concrete cost imposed on the Quad nations, through, for example, coercive economic measures.  At the same time, the cautioning may be interpreted as an aggressive warning of China’s coercive intent, further exacerbating public anxiety in the Quad nations.

Gain:  This approach may be enough to forestall the further development of the Quad through providing reassurance but also signals China’s resolve to protects its interests.  Option #3’s key benefit is that it does not incur large political or economic cost for China immediately, but hinges Chinese retaliation on further Quad activities.

Other Comments:  The revived Quad is still in the early stages of its development, and it is too early to tell what the Quad would entail.  The above options are presented on the basis that the Quad may involve military and economic dimensions that challenge China’s interests, including its territorial claims in the South China Sea as well as its Belt and Road Initiative.  Given the diversity of strategic interests between the Quad nations in relation to China, there is a likelihood that the Quad will not develop beyond a mechanism for dialogue.

Recommendation:  None.


Endnotes:

[1] Indrani Bagchi, “Australia to pull out of ‘quad’ that excludes China,” Times of India, February 6, 2008. Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Australia-to-pull-out-of-quad-that-excludes-China/articleshow/2760109.cms.

[2] “India-Australia-Japan-U.S. Consultations on Indo-Pacific (November 12, 2017),” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, November 12, 2017. Available at: http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29110/IndiaAustraliaJapanUS_Consultations_on_IndoPacific_November_12_2017

[3] “‘China a disruptive power,’ say navy chiefs of Quadrilateral nations,” Times of India, January 19, 2018. Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/china-a-disruptive-power-quad-nations-navy-chiefs/articleshow/62562144.cms.

Adam Ni Australia China (People's Republic of China) India Japan Option Papers United States