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Assessing the Impact of U.S. Forces on Pearl Harbor Heeding Multiple Warnings on December 7, 1941

Scott Martin is a career U.S. Air Force officer who has served in a multitude of globally-focused assignments.  He studied Russian and International Affairs at Trinity University and received his Masters of Science in International Relations from Troy University.  He is currently assigned within the National Capitol Region. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing the Impact of U.S. Forces on Pearl Harbor Heeding Multiple Warnings on December 7, 1941

Date Originally Written:  October 27, 2021

Date Originally Published:  November 8, 2021

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that the U.S. did receive significant warnings on the morning of December 7th, 1941 before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. If those warnings had been acted upon in a timely fashion, the author believes that it is likely that the U.S. could have mitigated some of the damage inflicted by the Japanese. However, this author contends that the limited warning time would not have been sufficient to completely defeat the Japanese raid, and thus, Pearl Harbor would still be the event that drew the U.S. into World War II. 

Summary:  A key “what if?” about the attack on Pearl Harbor centers on the lack of U.S. action on the two main warnings received that morning i.e. the USS Ward’s sinking of a Japanese submarine and the Opana Radar Station detection of the first wave of Japanese aircraft. Those warnings could have saved lives, but the limited warning time makes it unlikely the U.S. could have defeated the Japanese attack.

Text:  While most associate the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor with the ultimate in surprise attacks, U.S. Forces did receive warnings of pending action, especially that morning. Chief among the warnings was the USS Ward sinking a Japanese mini-submarine at 0640L, nearly a full hour before the arrival of the first wave of Japanese aircraft. Additionally, at 0701L, an Army radar installation at Opana on the western part of the island of Oahu detected a large mass of possible inbound flying objects, later determined to be the first wave of Japanese carrier-based aircraft. What if the command at Pearl Harbor, instead of ignoring the warnings, decided instead that the Ward and the radar station were the indications of an imminent attack? 

The Ward’s  radioing in that it sank a Japanese sub at the entrance of the harbor was not the first report/sighting of a Japanese submarine that day. At 0357L, the minesweeper USS Condor, reported a periscope near Pearl Harbor during patrol[1]. That information was passed to the Ward for action. Also, U.S. forces throughout the Pacific had been on a war alert status for over two weeks. For most, that meant a likely Japanese strike against locations far to the west of Hawaii[2]. The accounts of the Ward fell into the trap of more warnings/sightings that leadership did not feel warranted additional responses. 

The reporting of the Ward might have increased warning for possible sub-related intrusions, which U.S. Navy Admiral (ADM) Husband E. Kimmel, Commander in Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, felt was a significant threat[3]. However, the sub sighting along might not warrant an increase in harbor air defense actions. The Opana Radar Station, powered on longer than its scheduled 0400-0700 shift, detected multiple inbound contacts to conduct additional training while they waited for transport to leave the station[4]. In the subsequent actions, the inexperienced radar operators, while able to determine several aircraft could be in route, could not positively identify the inbound tracks[5].  Another factor involves the Officer-in-Charge at the information center at Fort Shafter. Upon receiving the call from Opana, he did not seem unduly concerned, as he knew a flight of U.S.-based B-17 were due in that morning[6]. Thus, the first wave of Japanese carrier-based planes made their way towards the island unopposed. 

Where the impact of the Ward’s and any possible change in the assessment of the radar station reporting could have had on the events of that morning would start at approximately 0730L, when ADM Kimmel received the Ward’s report[7]. If ADM Kimmel had called for an increase in the alert status at that point, the fleet would have had nearly 15-20 minutes to prepare for any inbound aggressive actions. While that might not seem like a lot of time, especially on a Sunday morning, the Sailors on ship would have been able to ready their ship-mounted anti-aircraft guns. Of note is that the ships in harbor were preparing for a Monday morning inspection, meaning most of the hatches and doors were open, thus, some warning would see the crews batten down the hatches to secure the ships[8]. 

While the 15-20 minute warning does enable the readying of anti-aircraft guns and for hatches to be secured, it does not leave time for significant aircraft launching. While possible for some alert aircraft to take off, there would be little time for the ground crews to man or move most planes to more secure locations. The Japanese were also able to take advantage in the different threat perception between the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army as U.S. Army Lieutenant General (LTG) Walter C. Short, Commander of the Hawaiian Department, deemed sabotage the greatest threat to the ground-based aircraft.  As such, the majority of the island’s fighters were parked wingtip to wingtip out in the open[9]. Additionally, most of the aircraft were on four-hour alert status, so minutes’ warning would make little impact[10].

A major factor in the confusion and lack of action on the reports from the Ward and the Opana radar station stemmed from the lack of poor communications between the Navy and Army commands. LTG Short did not receive notice of the Ward’s actions and ADM Kimmel did not receive word about the sighting from the radar station. While this disconnect speaks to larger communication issues, the shorter-term issue would be that if Kimmel and Short did speak on the issue of the submarine[11]. If Kimmel contacted Short following the submarine activity, and both men agreed to increase the alert, even with limited time before the Japanese planes entered Oahu airspace, more lives and materiel might have been saved. Given how quickly most Sailors and Soldiers scrambled to gun positions after the shock of the first wave and the response the second wave of Japanese aircraft, any pre-warning/alert before the first wave might have reduced American casualties/increased Japanese losses. 

While an earlier alert call from ADM Kimmel and LTG Short, from the time of the Ward’s actions and the reporting of many inbound aircraft would have further increased America’s defensive posture, it is still likely that the U.S. suffers losses at Pearl Harbor.  In this scenario the Japanese lose more aircraft and don’t inflict as much damage to the U.S. ships in harbor, while the damage to the aircraft parked on the ground remains. In this scenario Pearl Harbor remains a Japanese tactical victory, and the U.S. still enters World War II. However, people will recall the actions of the Ward and the Opana radar detection, and how much worse things might have been had the U.S. not acted on their reporting. 

Endnotes: 

[1] Slackman, M. (1990) Target: Pearl Harbor. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, p.74.

[2] Bar-Joseph, U. and McDermont, R.(2016) “Pearl Harbor and Midway: the decisive influence of two men on the outcomes.” Intelligence and National Security, Vol 31 (No.7), p.952. Most analysts at the time thought that the Japanese would attack either the Philippines, the Malay peninsula or other American island holdings in the Pacific.

[3] Slackman, M. Target: Pearl Harbor. P. 55. Of note, ADM Kimmel, prior to his assignment as Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet, held the rank of RADM (Two Star). The position was a 4-star billet, thus, he was addressed as ADM vs. RADM. After his dimissing from his position in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, he reverted to his original 2-star rank (RADM). 

[4] Twoney, S. (2016). Countdown to Pearl Harbor. The Twelve Days to the Attack. Simon and Shuster, New York. P. XII.

[5] Ibid, P. 275. The radar operators, even as inexperienced as they were, would have been able to determine the presence of 50 airborne signatures, which, if reported to Fort Shafter, would have given the OIC pause, as the US was not sending near that many bombers to Hawaii that morning.

[6] Ibid

[7] Slackman, M. Target: Pearl Harbor, P. 76.

[8] Bar-Joseph and McDermont. “Pearl Harbor and Midway: the decisive influence for two men on the outcomes.” P. 954.

[9] Ibid

[10] Slackman, M. Target: Pearl Harbor, P.135.

[11] Prange, G. (1982) At Dawn We Slept. Penguin Books, New York, P. 497.

Alternative Futures / Alternative Histories / Counterfactuals Assessment Papers Japan Scott Martin United States World War 2
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Boxing Out: Assessing the United States’ Cultural Soft Power Advantage in Africa Over China

Editor’s Note:  This article is part of our Below Threshold Competition: China writing contest which took place from May 1, 2020 to July 31, 2020.  More information about the contest can be found by clicking here.

Scott Martin is a career U.S. Air Force officer who has served in a multitude of globally-focused assignments.  He studied Russian and International Affairs at Trinity University and received his Masters of Science in International Relations from Troy University.  He is currently assigned within the National Capitol Region. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Boxing Out: Assessing the United States’ Cultural Soft Power Advantage in Africa Over China

Date Originally Written:  July 16, 2020.

Date Originally Published:  September 14, 2020.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that as a mechanism to counter China’s rising influence in Africa, the U.S. can leverage some of its soft power advantages. In particular, the popularity of American cultural offerings, such as the National Basketball Association (NBA) offers an opportunity for the U.S. to counter China and its soft power efforts in a geographically critical area of the globe.

Summary:  Chinese investment in hard and soft power in Africa over the past several decades presents a challenge to the U.S. role on the continent. While the Chinese focus in Africa is yielding positive results for China’s image and influence, there are still areas where the U.S. outpaces China. American advantages in soft power, such as the popularity of its cultural exports, like the NBA, offer an opportunity for the U.S. to counter Chinese efforts in Africa.

Text:  Since the Cold War, Chinese investment and engagement in Africa is a strong point of their foreign policy. For several decades, China has pumped billions in economic aid, estimated at over $100 billion[1]. The combination of presenting economic assistance on business terms only without dictating values and lack of historical barriers (ala Western Europe’s colonial past and American insistence on adherence to values such a human rights for economic assistance) has made China a formidable force on the African continent, offering an attractive “win-win” relationship[2]. However, while China dominates when it comes to economic engagement, they have not shut out the West when it comes to various forms of soft power. In particular, U.S.-based forms of entertainment, from movies to sporting events, still out-pace Chinese variants.

Since political scientist Joseph Nye first defined “soft power” in the 1990s as the concept of “when one country gets other countries to want what it wants…in contrast with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants”, the concept has gained many political and academic converts[3]. The Chinese look to promote their soft power capabilities, and it is a stated goal of Chinese leaders since Hu Jintao in 2007[4]. These efforts appear to pay off, as surveys show Africans with positive opinions related to China[5].

Yet, while China makes strides in promoting its soft power, it still faces challenges. For all the positive responses it engenders with its efforts, it has not won over all Africans. In various surveys, many ordinary Africans do not always feel that China’s continued investment in their respective countries benefits them as much as it does political leaders[6]. Additionally, Chinese efforts for the promotion of soft power lack the impact of its Western/U.S. competitors. In cultural examples, to include entertainment, the Chinese lag far behind the U.S. It is in this area that the U.S. can leverage its soft power capabilities to help promote itself and counter some aspects of China power projection.

Many aspects of American culture and entertainment find a home in Africa. American cinematic offers dwarf all other international offering by a significant margin, to include China[7]. American music, especially hip-hop and rhythm and blues, dominate African music channels. An American traveling through the continent is considerably more likely to run across American music than the Chinese equivalent[8]. While the Chinese promote their educational capabilities, more African will look towards American colleges/universities if given the chance to attend[9]. While hard power economic and military investment numbers might favor China, the U.S. continues to hold a significant lead in soft power ratings over China in Africa[9].

In one key example, the U.S.-based NBA is arguably the most popular U.S.-based sports league on the continent. While professional football/soccer might be the most popular international sport, the NBA has grown in global popularity over the past 20 years, which includes Africa. Prior to the suspension of the NBA season due to COVID-19, 40 players born in Africa or descended African-born parents were on NBA rosters, to include reigning league Most Valuable Player Giannis Antetokounmpo and All-Star Joel Embiid[10]. Factor in NBA Hall of Famers such as Dikembe Mutombo and Hakeem Olajuwon, and the NBA has significant connections with Africa. Additionally, NBA merchandising and broadcasting takes in significant money, and previous games played in Africa posted sell-out crowds[11]. At the start of 2020, the NBA established an NBA Africa league for the continent, with participation from multiple countries. While COVID-19 disrupted plans for this league, the NBA will be eager to re-engage with Africa post-pandemic.

For the U.S., the NBA efforts offer an opportunity to counter Chinese activity, playing to America’s significant soft power advantage. While the NBA is becoming a more international game, the league is still an American corporation, with mainly American stars. While jersey sales focus on the individual names, which will include African players, the designs and logos are still from the American-based teams. Additionally, with the NBA’s current relationship with China severely curtailed after Houston Rockets’ General Manager Daryl Morey retweeted a message support Democratic protestors in Hong Kong, the NBA, facing a pre-COVID-19 shortfall of $400M from Chinese boycotting, is looking for additional revenue streams[12]. A U.S./NBA relationship in Africa can be a version of “win-win.”

While most view soft power as more effective when it is not directly promoted by the power projecting country, the U.S. can leverage its soft power advantages to counter Chinese actions in Africa. When it comes to the promotion of American cultural imports, U.S. officials, while not explicitly stating that the U.S. government supports that activity, can do things such as promote their attendance at such events via social media as well as take advantage of other communication forums to promote the successes of such ventures in Africa. Additionally, when applicable, the U.S. government can promote favorable messaging at efforts to expand U.S.-based cultural exports, such as the release of American-owned movies and music recordings and clear any governmental administrative hold-ups for entities like the NBA to promote their games and products in Africa.

Granted, promotion of American-based culture and entertainment, such as the NBA, cannot offset the extensive Chinese economic investment in Africa, and the U.S. will have to face its own challenges in soft power projection. However, by playing to its strengths, especially in soft power realm, the NBA in Africa can open the door towards showing a positive image and outreach of American and Western values. This NBA actions can also open the door toward future engagements that can both benefit Africa and challenge Chinese efforts. American cultural offerings are not a cure-all magic bullet, but the U.S. does have the ability to leverage them for soft power advantages, which could stem an increasingly powerful China whose influence across Africa is growing.

Endnotes:

[1] Versi, Anver (Aug/Sept 2017).“What is China’s Game in Africa?” New African, 18. https://newafricanmagazine.com/15707.

[2] Tella, Oluswaseun (2016) “Wielding Soft Power in Strategic Regions: An Analysis of China’s Power of Attraction in Africa and the Middle East” Africa Review, 8 (2) 135. https://www.academia.edu/30299581/Africa_Review_Wielding_soft_power_in_strategic_regions_an_analysis_of_Chinas_power_of_attraction_in_Africa_and_the_Middle_East.

[3] Lai, Hongyi (2019) “Soft Power Determinants in the World and Implications for China: A Quantitative Test of Joseph Nye’s Theory of Three Soft Power Resources and of the Positive Peace Argument.” The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, 37(1) 10.

[4] Schmitt, Gary J (19 June 2014) “A Hard Look at Soft Power in East Asia” American Enterprise Institute Research, 5. https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/a-hard-look-at-soft-power-in-east-asia.

[5] Tella, Oluswaseun, “Wielding Soft Power in Strategic Regions” 137.

[6] Langmia, Kehbuma (2011). “The Secret Weapon of Globalization: China’s Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa” Journal of Third World Studies, XXVIII (2), 49. https://www.academia.edu/31196408/THE_SECRET_WEAPON_OF_GLOBALIZATION_CHINAS_ACTIVITIES_IN_SUB-SAHARAN_AFRICA_By_Kehbuma_Langmia.

[7] 2015-2020 Worldwide Box Office, IMDb Pro, Accessed 13 June 2020, https://www.boxofficemojo.com/year/world/?ref_=bo_nb_in_tab

[8] Tella, Oluswaseun. “Wielding Soft Power in Strategic Regions” 161.

[9] Lai, Hongyi. “Soft Power Determinants in the World and Implications for China” 29.

[10] Mohammed, Omar (2 April 2019) “NBA to Invest Millions of Dollars in New African League” Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nba-africa-idUSKCN1RE1WB.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Young, Jabari (2020, 16 Feb). “NBA will Lose Hundreds of Millions of Dollars Due to Rift with China, Commissioner Says” CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/16/nba-will-lose-hundreds-of-millions-of-dollars-due-to-rift-with-china-commissioner-says.html.

2020 - Contest: PRC Below Threshold Writing Contest Africa Assessment Papers Below Established Threshold Activities (BETA) China (People's Republic of China) Private Sector Scott Martin United States
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Assessment of U.S. Involvement to Counter Hutu Extremists’ Plans for Tutsi Genocide in Early 1994

This article is published as part of the Small Wars Journal and Divergent Options Writing Contest which ran from March 1, 2019 to May 31, 2019.  More information about the writing contest can be found here.

Scott Martin is a career U.S. Air Force officer who has served in a multitude of globally-focused assignments.  He studied Russian and International Affairs at Trinity University and received his Masters of Science in International Relations from Troy University.  He is currently assigned to Ft. Meade, Maryland.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessment of U.S. Involvement to Counter Hutu Extremists’ Plans for Tutsi Genocide in Early 1994

Date Originally Written:  May 31, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  July 29, 2019.

Summary:  The U.S. could have countered the genocide the April 1994 genocide in Rwanda. While it is very difficult to envision a scenario whereby the U.S. conducted unilateral military actions once the genocide started, the various indicators prior to that date offered the U.S. the opportunity, working through the United Nations (UN), to act to prevent the genocide before it started. 

Text:  On April 6, 2019, the world reflected on the 25th anniversary of the genocide of 800,000 Tutsi and sympathetic Hutus by Hutu extremists in Rwanda. Since then, many asked the question “Why didn’t someone stop this?” Since 1994, the U.S. expressed remorse at the genocide in Rwanda. Yet in 1994, the U.S. took pains to avoid direct involvement/action in Rwanda. Given a lack of significant geo-political or economic equities and disgusted by the failures of their humanitarian action in Somalia, the U.S. argued they had no role in Rwanda. Yet, with the U.S. taking a remorseful tone with the Rwandan Genocide, it begs the question: What if the U.S. did take action?

There is no shortage of debate on this issue. Some, such as former United Nations (UN) Ambassador Samantha Power, felt that U.S. military involvement, even on a small scale could have reduced if not halted the genocide[1]. Such actions ranged from the deployment of an Army Brigade (overseas or stateside based) to the use of the Air Force’s Commando Solo Electronic Warfare / Information Operations platform. Others, such as scholar Alan Kuperman, note that the U.S. did not have enough confirmation of genocide until April 20, by which time, most of the killing was completed[2]. Thus, the deployment of U.S. forces, in addition to not being in position to significantly impact the genocide, would place undue burdens on the U.S. military, and present America with another unnecessary U.S. humanitarian quagmire.  Subsequent analyses looked at options from the deployment of 5,000-150,000 troops, but a unilateral U.S.-led deployment, no matter the options, is always seen as unlikely, given the lack of bi-partisan political support in Washington D.C.  

Yet, the genocide did not spontaneously start in April 1994. After Rwandan independence in 1961, the long-standing differences between Hutu and Tutsi populations manifested themselves into multiple conflicts. Since 1990, conflict between displaced Tutsi (Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)) and the Hutu led-military/militia forces plagued the country. Despite international-led efforts to end the warfare, many within the Hutu-dominated government planned for actions to eliminate the Tutsi from Rwanda. The international community had indications of such plans as far back as 1992[3]. From 1990-1993, Hutu militias executed nearly 2000 Tutsi, a preview of Hutu plans[4]. By January 1994, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) received intelligence that the Hutu-led government was actively planning for a mass extermination of all known Tutsi and sympathetic elements within the country. The UNAMIR commander, Canadian General Romeo Dallaire, notified the UN Security Council on 11 January of this development and asked for authorization to deal with this emerging threat[5]. 

It is in this January 1994 scenario that the U.S. could have plausibly acted to counter the genocide, leveraging the UN Security Council to modify and increase the authority and resources of UNAMIR. Instead of working to withdraw forces from Rwanda, the U.S. and the UN Security Council could have reauthorized and increased troop deployments from the 2,500 in country in early 1994[6]. While 5,000 troops (the number requested by Dallaire to aid UNAMIR in 1994) would not be enough to halt a nation-wide genocide if it kicked off, a strong international presence, combined with a public proclamation and demonstration of increasing troop deployments to maintain peace and thwart extremist actions, might have curtailed Hutu ambitions[7]. While a major strategy of the Hutu extremists was to kill several of the international peacekeepers, taking active measures to protect those forces while not redeploying them would also thwart Hutu strategy. 

In this scenario, the U.S. would have provided political and logistical support. The U.S. faced logistical challenges dealing with a land-locked country, but its airpower had the capability to use existing airfields in Rwanda and neighboring countries[8]. While Hutu extremists could target U.S. assets and personnel, they were more likely not to directly interfere with international forces. During the actual genocide, while Hutu extremists killed 10 Belgian peacekeepers, Tutsis protected by the limited number of international forces usually found themselves safe from attack[9]. Even in situations where Hutu killers greatly outnumbered international forces, the Hutu did not attack the international peacekeepers[10]. 

This is not to say that increased authorities and manpower for the UN Peacekeepers would have solved all the problems. How the UN could have dealt with the Tutsi forces looking to reenter Rwanda and defeat the Hutu forces presented a difficult long-term problem. The Hutu extremists would not have simply stopped their efforts to drum up support for Tutsi elimination. It is possible the Hutu extremists would look to target UN forces and logistics, especially if it was an American asset, in a repeat of Somalia. Even by offering American equipment and indirect support, domestic political support would be tenuous at best and U.S. President William Clinton’s opponents would use those actions against him, with Clinton’s party still suffering historic losses in the 1994 midterm elections. It is possible that the Hutu and Tutsi would try to wait out the UN forces, coming to a “peaceful” government, only to hold their fire until after the peacekeepers are sent home. 

Yet, acting through the UN Peacekeepers before April might have stopped the genocide and all the ills that followed. While Paul Kagame may never come to power and Rwanda’s economic and social resurgence would have taken a different path, there may have been hundreds of thousands of Rwandans still alive to make their mark in improving the life of the nation. Additionally, the Hutu extremists may not have been so active in spreading their ethnic hatreds beyond their borders. The Congo Wars of the late 1990s/early 2000s have their genesis in the Hutu extremists who fled into the refugee camps[11]. If there is no mass displacement of those extremists into Democratic Republic of Congo, perhaps Africa avoids a brutal conflict and over 5 million lives are saved[12]. Perhaps assisting the UNAMIR with U.S. support/logistics might not have been a popular move in 1994, but if executed, the U.S. may not have to look back in 2019 to say “We should have done something.” 

Endnotes:

[1] Power, Samantha (2001, September). Bystanders to Genocide. The Atlantic. retrieved 15 Mar 2019 from (https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/. 

[2] Kuperman, Alan J (2000, January/February). Rwanda in Retrospective. Foreign Affairs (Vol 79, no.1) 101. 

[3] Stanton, Gregory H. (2004, June). Could the Rwandan Genocide have been Prevented? Journal of Genocide Research. 6(2). 212

[4] Ibid 

[5] Ibid

[6] Rauch, J. (2001) Now is the Time to Tell the Truth about Rwanda, National Journal, 33(16) retrieved 14 Mar 2019 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=4417527&site=ehost-live

[7] Wertheim, Stephen. (2010). A Solution from Hell: The United States and the Rise of Humanitarian Interventionism, 1991-2003. Journal of Genocide Research, 12(3-4), 155. 

[8] Stanley, George (2006) Genocide, Airpower and Intervention, 71. 

[9] Power, Samantha (2001, September). Bystanders to Genocide. The Atlantic. retrieved 15 Mar 2019 from https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/.

[10] Ibid

[11] Beswick, Danielle (2014). The Risks African Military Capacity Building: Lessons from Rwanda. African Affairs, 113/451, 219. 

[12] Reid, Stuart A (Jan/Feb 2018). Congo’s Slide into Chaos. How a State Fails. Foreign Affairs, 97/1. 97. 

2019 - Contest: Small Wars Journal Assessment Papers Mass Killings Rwanda Scott Martin