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U.S. Options to Incentivize People’s Republic of China Behavior

Mel Daniels has served the United States for nearly twenty years. Mel is new to writing. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group or person. 

National Security Situation:  With the pending departure of U.S. President Donald Trump, it remains to be seen how the administration of President Joseph Biden views the People’s Republic of China.

Date Originally Written:  November, 24, 2020. 

Date Originally Published:  January 18, 2021.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The idea that the U.S. should support the responsible rise of China has failed.  Any future foreign policies that support this idea will also fail.  This failure is due to the U.S. not understanding China’s strategic ambitions. Further, continuing this foreign policy harms U.S. national security and ignores thirty years’ worth of evidence[1]. The author believes the risk that China poses to U.S. interests can be mitigated by adopting an incentive-based approach which offers China a choice between harmony and conflict[2].

Background:  There is an effort in the U.S. to return to a welcoming policy towards China. In this policy, the U.S. accepts and encourages China’s rise and seeks to influence China through diplomacy. In theory, this strategy will shape China into a global partner. This theory is predicated on nearly thirty years of efforts, dating back to the early 1980s[3]. This theory assumes that China will adopt fair practices, reduce regional belligerence, and respect human rights. 

Significance:  Foreign policies that welcome China’s rise will result in continued threats to regional allies, violations of human rights, and continued harm to U.S. interests. These foreign policies allow for unchecked and continued Chinese hostility[1]. Continuing to appease China via these policies, hoping China will alter its behavior, is unrealistic. These policies harm the U.S. significantly because they send the message that U.S. policy, in general, is one of appeasement[4].

Option #1:  The U.S. adopts incentive-based policies towards China by linking China’s undesirable behaviors with U.S. commerce. First, the incoming administration would publicly declare China a threat to U.S. national security and the global order. This declaration would be followed by briefing the entire U.S. Congress regarding the true security situation with China and a proposed path forward. Following this, the incoming administration would take actions within the Executive Branch and submit legislative proposals to Congress that would link all commerce between the U.S. and China to China’s human rights record, and its behavior towards U.S. regional allies in Asia, including Taiwan[5].  By linking U.S.-China commerce to China’s undesirable behaviors, China would have to make many hard choices.

Risk:  U.S. actions in Option #1 could cause additional tension and infuriate China and likely incur reprisals. Further, Option #1 would likely harm the U.S. economy as it is linked to Chinese imports. This option would likely worry regional allies in the Indo-Pacific region, forcing some to potentially distance themselves from the U.S. and seek to reassure China of their neutrality, thereby emboldening China to adopt further anti-U.S. policies. Lastly, should the Congress reject the legislative proposals, this rejection would serve to illustrate the limited options the incoming administration has and provide China additional exploitable fissures in the U.S. political system.

Gain:  Option #1 offers a firm approach and stops the failed policies of the last several decades. This option brings to the forefront the realities of the U.S. situation with China. Option #1 forces U.S. law makers to act or abdicate on the issue, with action or inaction being publicly available for all to see [6]. Further, this option officially links U.S. security, the security of U.S. allies, and the security of the international order, to Chinese policies. This option also reaffirms the U.S. as an advocator for democracy and champion of freedom, valuing human rights[6], U.S. interests, and the security of U.S. partners and allies, over the positive impact China has on the U.S. economy. This option forces China to be a positive member of the global order or lose U.S. commerce and access[7].

With regards to the multiple risks associated with Option #1, the majority have either already occurred or are occurring[1]. It is intellectually dishonest to advocate continued appeasement to China in the hope that China alters its actions by ignoring the long history of Chinese actions that threaten U.S. interests[8]. Regarding the risk of angering China, the gain brings an unpleasant truth to the forefront; China is a global competitor and threat to U.S. interests. Linking human rights and destabilization to trade is not a belligerent act. China’s theft of data and intellectual property, gross human rights violations, and threats of war against U.S. regional allies however, are belligerent actions. Option #1 does harm the U.S. economy, initially[9], but offers the U.S. the option to alternatively source imports from nations who align with democratic principles and values human rights[10]. Option #1 also allows the U.S. to further relations with India, which can offer the U.S. the majority of imports currently found in China, at a competitive price[2][10]. 

Option #2:  The U.S. returns to the approach of welcoming China’s rise and seeks to increase access to Chinese markets, in order to influence China long-term through its populace. Concurrently, the U.S. seeks to influence China internationally through the United Nations on significant security and human right issues.  

Risk:  A significant risk associated with Option #2 is that the U.S. will not alter Chinese actions and China will continue to threaten U.S. national interests without penalty.  Further, Option #2 continues to excuse and ignore Chinese hostility, gross human rights violations, and detrimental actions to U.S. security. Lastly, this option continues to hope that China has an intent of peaceful co-existence with other nations and the interests of other nations are respected.

Gain:  The U.S. retains diplomatic options by having commerce with China and tolerates Chinese actions and threats concerning security and human rights violations. Option #2 improves bilateral ties with China. Further, the U.S. reduces the chances of major conflict and reinforces China’s global influence.

Other Comments:  The U.S. policy of welcoming China’s rise has undeniably failed to produce results sought. This policy failed when the Tiananmen Square massacre occurred. This policy failed during the 1996 Taiwanese Straight crises. Most recently, this Policy failed when it became known that China violated the rights of nearly one million Muslim Uighur citizens with impunity.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1]. U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY/COMMERCIAL CONCERNS WITH THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. The Cox Report. Volume 1. January 3rd 1999. Retrieved from: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRPT-105hrpt851/pdf/GPO-CRPT-105hrpt851.pdf

[2]. Karwal, Rajeev. October 13th 2020. A 250 Billion Dollar Opportunity. How India can replace China as the World’s Factory. Retrieved from: https://www.businesstoday.in/opinion/columns/how-can-india-replace-china-as-worlds-factory-component-manufacturing-hub-local-innovation/story/418751.html

[3].Thayer, Bradley. A. April 30th 2020. Real Clear Defense. Why was the U.S so late to recognize the Chinese Threat? Retrieved from: https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/04/30/why_was_the_us_so_late_to_recognize_the_china_threat_115238.html

[4]. Columbia-Harvard: China and the World program. China’s Near Seas Combat Capacities, Naval War College, China Maritime Study 11. February, 2014. Dutton, Peter, Erickson, Andrew, S and others. Retrieved from: https://cwp.sipa.columbia.edu/news/china%e2%80%99s-near-seas-combat- capabilities-cwp-alumni-andrew-erickson

[5]. Human Rights Watch. China’s Global Threat to Human Rights. 2020. Retrieved from: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/global#

[6]. Amnesty International. China 2019. Retrieved from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/china/report-china/

[7]. [7]. Fallows, James. The Atlantic. China’s Great Leap Backward. December 2016 Issue. Retrieved from: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/12/chinas-great-leap-backward/505817/

[8]. Report to Congress, pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Act on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China. Retrieved from: http://archive.defense.gov/news/Jun2000/china06222000.htm

[9].Trump, Donald.  July 21, 2020.  Presidential Executive Order on Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States.  Retrieved from: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-assessing-strengthening-manufacturing-defense-industrial-base-supply-chain-resiliency-united-states/

[10]. United States Census. Trade in Goods with India. 2020. Retrieved from: https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5330.html

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U.S. Military Force Deployment Options to Deter China

Mel Daniels has served in the United States military for nearly twenty years. Mel is new to writing. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group or person.

National Security Situation:  To avoid a war, the U.S. requires additional force deployment options to deter China.

Date Originally Written:  October 28, 2020.

Date Originally Published:  December 14, 2020.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that the U.S. strategy to deter Chinese aggression is failing as a result of strategic mismanagement and procurement efforts that are not properly aligned with operational and intelligence realities. The author believes the risk that China poses to U.S. interests can be mitigated by altering current and future operational concepts and by procuring the correct weapons to deter Chinese aggression.

Background:  The U.S. aims to deter China by forward positioning forces in Japan and the Republic of Korea. Further, by centering its operational concepts on Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and Expeditionary Advanced Basing Operation (EABO)[1], the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps need the appropriate equipment to successfully execute, while remaining able to support the U.S. Air Force in the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons[2]. These concepts are designed to restrict Chinese freedom of maneuver and establish an Americanized version of an Anti-Access and Area Denial bubble (A2/AD).

Significance:  As a result of forward deployment, the entirety of U.S. forces in the region are within striking range of China and suffer from an inferior ratio of forces[3]. The Chinese are also expected to attack first, disabling U.S capabilities in both Japan and the Republic of Korea, which negates joint operational capabilities between the U.S Navy and the U.S Air Force[4]. To further illustrate the significance, and the basis for defense industrial base related Executive Order 13806[5], it would take years for the U.S. to replenish losses[6]. Lastly, if China decided to attack first, the U.S. would suffer significant loses in lives and material, as well as suffer from a humiliating and relatively preventable defeat.

Option #1:  The U.S. alters its current strategy by significantly reducing its forces in Japan and the Republic of Korea to mitigate losses in the event of a Chinese attack. In this option, the U.S. adopts an strategy that leverages the entirety of its power to reposition its forces near strategic key terrain that threaten China’s vulnerable sea lanes of communication, centered around Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and India. The minimal U.S forces located within the First Island Chain could then be reequipped to conduct DMO and EABO operations, focusing on long range A2/AD efforts.

Risk:  The significant risks associated with Option #1 are that U.S. actions could be seen as a withdrawal from Japan and the Republic of Korea and the abandonment of allies. Further, Option #1 may reduce the defense capabilities of Japan and the Republic of Korea, thereby emboldening China.

Gain:  Option #1 deters and if deterrence fails, defeats China without significant losses. China cannot defend their lines of communication and therefore, its commerce and energy imports are held at risk. Further, China’s military is not ideally suited for operations beyond the First Island Chain, far from the Chinese coastline. Option #1 allows the U.S to preserve its combat power and reduce Chinese advantages. Furthermore, Option #1, if explained properly, does not abandon U.S allies or cede the field to China. This option merely repositions to a favorable location that preserves U.S. flexibility, interdicts Chinese lines of communication and maneuvers China into an untenable situation, while retaining minimal U.S forces in Japan and Korea focused on DMO and EABO supporting efforts.

Option #2:  The U.S. alters its current strategy of forward deployment, repositions the majority of its forces found in Japan and the Republic of Korea to Hawaii, and seeks to increase its presence near Australia.

Risk:  A significant risk associated with Option #2 is that the U.S could be seen as abandoning its allies in the region by repositioning its forces to areas that protect Hawaii and Australia.

Gain:  The U.S. retains flexibility by having forces based in Hawaii and significantly reduces Chinese military options by increasing the distance between Chinese forces and U.S forces. This option forces China seek out and bring the U.S. to battle far away from the Chinese coast line which will likely lead to China incurring unacceptable losses in the event of a conflict. Further, the U.S. would retain minimal forces in both Japan and Korea which would allow the U.S. to disperse and maximize its capabilities while exploiting Chinese weaknesses. Option #2 also preserves the U.S. alliance with both Japan and the Republic of Korea, while, containing China, without excessive trip wire forces being endangered. This option in turn continues to force the Chinese to accept conflict with the entirety of forces from the U.S, Japan and the Republic of Korea, while still having to contend with its vulnerable lines of communication, trade and an increasingly alarmed India.

Other Comments:  The U.S. strategy of forward basing and employing DMO and EABO cannot work as due to the incorrect systems being funded and the sheer proximity of Chinese military capabilities to U.S. forces in Japan and the Republic of Korea. DMO and EABO rely upon China not attacking first and rely upon weapons with a significant range that can actually interdict Chinese options. China has closed the capability gap due to our inability to procure the correct weapon systems and platforms for conflict within the First Island Chain. Further, this isn’t news, as China’s agenda has been known since the year 2000[7].

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) Handbook Considerations for Force Development and Employment 1 June 2018. Retrieved from: https://mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Expeditionary-Advanced-Base-Operations-EABO-handbook-1.1.pdf

[2] U.S. Naval War College. Air Sea Battle Service Collaboration. 2013. Retrieved from: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/csf/1/ and A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER. (MARCH 2015). Retrieved from: http://www.navy.mil/local/maritime/150227-CS21R-Final.pdf

[3] The RAND Corporation: National Security Research Division: Shaking the Heavens and Splitting the Earth: Chinese Air Force Employment Concepts in the 21st Century. By Roger Cliff, John Fei, Jeff Hagen, and others 2015. Retrieved from: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG915.pdf and Columbia-Harvard: China and the World program. China’s Near Seas Combat Capacities, Naval War College, China Maritime Study 11. February, 2014. Dutton, Peter, Erickson, Andrew, S and others. Retrieved from: https://cwp.sipa.columbia.edu/news/china%E2%80%99s-near-seas-combat-capabilities-cwp-alumni-andrew-erickson

[4] U.S. Naval War College. Air Sea Battle Service Collaboration. 2013.

[5] Trump, Donald. July 21, 2020. Presidential Executive Order on Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States. Retrieved from: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-assessing-strengthening-manufacturing-defense-industrial-base-supply-chain-resiliency-united-states

[6] Haper, Jon. January 24th, 2020. National Defense Magazine: Vital Signs 2020: Industrial Base Could Struggle to Surge Production in Wartime. Retrieved from: https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/1/24/industrial-base-could-struggle-to-surge-production-in-wartime

[7] Report to Congress, pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Act on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China. Retrieved from: http://archive.defense.gov/news/Jun2000/china06222000.htm and Holmes, James. (2015, February, 3rd). The Diplomat. The Long Strange Trip of China’s First Aircraft Carrier Liaoning: And what it says about Beijing’s naval ambitions. Retrieved from: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/03/the-long-strange-trip-of-chinas-first-aircraft-carrier-liaoning

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Options to Improve U.S. Army Ground Combat Platform Research and Development

Mel Daniels has served in the United States military for nearly twenty years. Mel is new to writing. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group or person.

National Security Situation:  The modernization of U.S. Army ground combat platforms includes risks that are not presently mitigated.

Date Originally Written:  August, 16, 2020.

Date Originally Published:  November 23, 2020.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that the U.S. Army’s over reliance on immature technologies are a risk to national security. Further, the author believes that the risk can be mitigated by slowing development and reducing research and development (R&D) investments while reinvesting in proven material solutions until new systems prove technologically reliable and fiscally feasible to implement.

Background:  The U.S. Army is investing in programs that remain unproven and are unlikely to provide the capabilities sought. Specifically, the Army is heavily investing in its Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) and remote combat vehicles[1]. These programs are predicated on optimal battlefield conditions. Firstly, the assumption exists that enemy forces will not be able to degrade or destroy the battlefield network required to operate unmanned vehicles. Secondly, the risk of the enemy developing weapons that specifically target transmissions coming from control vehicles is a factor that needs to be taken seriously in threat assessments and in planning purposes[2].

Significance:  If the Army’s assumptions are incorrect and if these efforts fails to procure reliable and sustainable ground combat platforms for future operations, there will not be additional resources to mitigate this failure. Moreso, if the Army procures vulnerable systems that fail to deliver effects promised, the Army risks catastrophic defeat on the battlefield.

Option #1:  The U.S. Army could reduce and spread out its R&D investments to further invest in its legacy combat forces to offset the risks associated with funding unproven and unreliable technologies.

Risk:  The significant risks associated with Option #1 are that the technological investments needed for future capabilities will be delayed. The Army would lose its plan for fielding, as the Army will not fully field the OMFV until the early 2030’s, assuming there are no complications to the program of record. Additionally, Robotic Combat Vehicles (RCV) would be delayed until they can also be realistically evaluated. Lastly, investments into legacy systems could threaten the need for future platforms.

Gain:  If the Army elected Option #1, it would have the time to properly and realistically test RCV’s, OMFV and Manned-Unmanned Teaming concepts (MUM-T). This additional testing reduces the chances of investing significant resources into a programs that do not deliver as promised. It also reduces disingenuous and fraudulent claims prior to further funding requests. Simply put, the chances of ineffective systems being funded would be mitigated because proper and realistic testing from an independent entity would occur first. The Army would also gain additional capabilities for its current systems that otherwise would not be upgraded but yet will remain in service for decades.

Option #2:  The Army consolidates their modernization efforts and cancels select requirements. Currently the Army funds 4 major ground combat programs; the Mobile Protected Firepower, RCV program (Heavy, Medium and Light), OMFV, and CROWS-J/30mm. The Army could cancel the MPF program because the program is questionable due to its inability to defeat enemy near peer armored threats that will likely be encountered[3]. This cancelation would allow the Army to invest into the RCV light program, armed with the 50mm cannon and Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM). The Army would retain a viable anti fortification and direct fire support vehicle, while reducing needless expenses. Further, the Army could cancel or delay the unmanned requirement of the OMFV until the technology and network is fully secured and matured, with no limitations or risks.

Risk:  A significant risk associated with Option #2 is that the Army will not get a light tank or get RCV Medium or Heavy platforms and it will not receive the “optionally manned” portion of the OMFV until later. The risk with not obtaining these desired capabilities mean that the Army would have to accept an alternative material solution that defeats enemy fortifications and armor as opposed to the MPF.

Gain:  The Army retains its desired capabilities while maximizing resources. The Robotic Combat Vehicle-(Light), armed with a 50mm cannon and ATGM’s, is less expensive, lighter and carries more ammunition than the MPF. Further, the RCV-L is better armed to defeat enemy armored threats, as the MPF’s 105mm cannon is inadequate to defeat enemy tanks[3]. Additionally, by removing the unmanned requirement from the OMFV, the Army would gain savings and reduce reliance on unproven technologies, reducing risk of battlefield defeat[4]. This option enables the Army to retain remote controlled concepts by shifting the focus to the RCV-L and equipping the Infantry Brigade Combat Team community with it, as opposed to the Army risking its combat strength and forcing immature technologies upon the Armored Brigade Combat Team community, which is the Army’s main combat formation for near peer conflict.

Other Comments:  The Army is heavily investing in vulnerable technologies without first ensuring it has an effective network able to completely support the operational concepts it desires. Without ensuring that the required network will be immune to enemy countermeasures, these technologies will not fully support operational requirements. Further, the costs associated with these efforts are already exceeding 60 billion dollars, and do not afford the service increased lethality or survivability, even by common English definitional sense. Army R&D efforts will continue to be at risk if they refuse to allow independent agencies full access and evaluation rights prior to further funding.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] Freedberg Jr, Sydney. August 6th, 2020. Breaking Defense. GAO Questions Army’s 62B Cost Estimates for Combat Vehicles. Retrieved from: https://breakingdefense.com/2020/08/gao-questions-armys-62b-cost-estimates-for-combat-vehicles

[2] Trevithick, Joseph. May 11th 2020. The War Zone: This is What Ground Forces Look like to an Electronic Warfare System and Why It’s A Big Deal. Retrieved from: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/33401/this-is-what-ground-forces-look-like-to-an-electronic-warfare-system-and-why-its-a-big-deal

[3] Central Intelligence Agency. Gorman, Paul. Major General, USA. US Intelligence and Soviet Armor. 1980. Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000624298.pdf

[4] Collins, Liam. Colonel, USA. July 26th 2018. Association of the United States Army: Russia Gives Lessons in Electronic Warfare. Retrieved from: https://www.ausa.org/articles/russia-gives-lessons-electronic-warfare

Budgets and Resources Emerging Technology Mel Daniels Option Papers Research and Development U.S. Army