Assessing U.S. Space-Focused Governing Documents from the Astropolitik Model of State Competition  

Anthony Patrick is an Officer in the United States Marine Corps.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  Assessing U.S. Space-Focused Governing Documents from the Astropolitik Model of State Competition

Date Originally Written:  March 26, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  April 22, 2019.

Summary:  How the United States invests time and resources into space over the next few decades will have long-term strategic effects.  While current U.S. governing documents focused primarily on space align with the Astropolitik Model of state competition, which focuses on the employment of all instruments of national power, this appears to be incidental.  Without a cohesive suite of documents to focus space efforts, the U.S. could fall behind its competitors.

Text:  On April 18, 2018 the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff released Joint Publication 3-14 Space Operations (JPSO)[1]. The JSPO, along with the 2010 National Space Policy (NSP)[2], the 2011 National Security Space Strategy (NSSS)[3], and the Department of Defense’s Space Policy of 2016 (DOD SP)[4], are meant to guide U.S governmental actions impacting the civilian, commercial, and military efforts in space. These governing documents work together to form the bedrock of American power projection in space. It is key that these governing documents are able to harmonize action along the necessary lines of effort in order to protect U.S national interests. It is also important to assess these documents through appropriate theoretical models on space power projection. Everett C. Dolman ‘s Astropolitik Model, a determinist political theory used to describe the relationship between state power and outer space control, provides such a framework[5]. 

Space by its very nature is a radically different domain of state competition when compared to land, sea, and air. Not only are there differences in how physical objects interact but there are also key differences in the effects of these interactions on the rest of planet. Doctrines of state competition will likely find it best to recognize the global effects of space operations. Satellites can not only effect targeting of fires across a whole combatant command and the navigational abilities of units in that area but also effect the greater network that supports global operations. The JPSO and other governing documents do recognize the global nature of space operations, which will assist planners in “balancing operational level requirements for current support [in an area of operation (AO)] with strategic level requirements to preserve space capabilities for other times and places.” U.S governing documents focused on space also recognize the need for synchronization in procurement programs. Space technology is expensive and takes years to develop, and all four documents describe the necessity for a competitive and flexible U.S space industry with long-term procurement planning that is looking forward to the next battle while also being consistent across political administrations. 

Orbital space is already starting to be crowded by both civilian and governmental satellites from both U.S allies and adversaries. The 2011 NSSS recognized the need for space to be viewed as a contested and competitive domain. This concern was also described in great detail by the JPSO and is evident by the development and testing of anti-satellite capabilities by both the Peoples Republic of China (2007)[6] and the U.S (2008)[7]. While the NSP focuses mainly on the U.S right to self-defense and the importance of alliance building, it also helps guide other governing documents in the right path towards increasing the U.S’s ability to operate in a contested space environment.

Lastly, U.S governing documents focused on space, like the Astropolitik Model, recognize the importance of utilizing all aspects of state power to project power in space. The JPSO describes in detail the mutualistic relationship between space and cyber assets. The DOD SP also mentions the importance of cost sharing between the DOD and other agencies within the U.S government, while the NSP and NSSS recognize the importance of utilizing both civilian, commercial, and military resources to project power into space. 

There are however certain issues with U.S governing documents focused on space when viewed from the Astropolitik Model. First, U.S governing documents focused on space do not attempt to gain complete dominance over the space domain. Controlling certain topographic features in space, from the Earth’s ‘high point’ in the gravity well (geostationary orbit), to the use of Lagrange Points (a point in space where an object is fixed between the gravitational fields of two bodies)[8], can allow a state to dictate what happens in space during state on state conflict. Defensive satellites in geostationary orbit can detect the use of Earth based anti-satellite weapons and trigger countermeasures before they are destroyed.

While U.S governing documents focused on space do point out the importance of utilizing the current U.S. alliance structure, none of the mentioned documents describe dominating the topography of space to advance U.S interest in space. The 2010 NSP also does not recognize the inevitable militarization of space. As more and more countries deploy satellites to space, they become part of that nation’s infrastructure. Just like with any key power plant, road, or bridge, nations will, at some point, likely deploy capabilities that will allow them to defend their assets and attack an enemy’s capability. Space is the universal Center of Gravity for any country that integrates national security operations with space-based assets. The 2010 NSP does mention that peaceful use of space allows for national and homeland security activities, but that still does not provide clear guidance on how much militarization U.S policy will allow. Being clear in this matter is important since it will allow planners to begin the proper procurement programs that are needed to defend U.S national security interest. 

It is important to U.S national security interest that the U.S is able to effectively plan and execute operations in the heavens. To accomplish this task, a consistent and well thought approach to governing documents that allows guidance for planners to accomplish the tasks laid out by decision makers in the U.S government is a plus. Adopting these documents in line with the Astropolitik Model allows the U.S to effectively dominate space and secure its peaceful use for all nation. Inaction is this realm could lead to further competition from other states and degrade the U.S’s ability to operate effectively both in space and on Earth. 


Endnotes:

[1] United States., Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2018, April 10). Joint Publication 3-14 Space Operations. Retrieved March 25, 2019, from https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_14.pdf

[2] United States, The White House, The President of the United States. (2010, June 28). National Space Policy of the United States of America. Retrieved March 25, 2019, from https://history.nasa.gov/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf

[3] United States, Department of Defense, Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2011). Naitonal Security Space Strategy Unclassified Summary. Retrieved March 25, 2019, from https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=10828

[4] United States, Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. (2016, November 4). DOD Directive 3100.10 Space Policy. Retrieved March 25, 2019, from https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3100_10.pdf

[5] Dolman, E. C. (2002). Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age. London: Cass.

[6] Weeden, B. (2010, November 23). 2007 Chinese Anti-Satellite Test Fact Sheet. Retrieved March 25, 2019, from https://swfound.org/media/9550/chinese_asat_fact_sheet_updated_2012.pdf

[7] Hagt, E. (2018, June 28). The U.S. satellite shootdown: China’s response. Retrieved March 25, 2019, from https://thebulletin.org/2008/03/the-u-s-satellite-shootdown-chinas-response/

[8] Howell, E. (2017, August 22). Lagrange Points: Parking Places in Space. Retrieved March 26, 2019, from https://www.space.com/30302-lagrange-points.html

Anthony Patrick Assessment Papers Governing Documents Space

Options for Countering the Rise of Chinese Private Military Contractors

Anthony Patrick is a graduate of Georgia State University and an Officer in the United States Marine Corps.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


National Security Situation:  Future threats to United States (U.S.) interests abroad from Chinese Private Military Contractors.

Date Originally Written:  November, 26, 2018.

Date Originally Published:  December 24, 2018.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is a United States Marine Corps Officer and currently attending The Basic School. 

Background:  Over the last six months, the media has been flooded with stories and articles about the possibility of a trade war between the U.S and the People Republic of China (PRC). These talks have mainly focused around specific trade policies such as intellectual property rights and the trade balance between the two nations. These tensions have risen from the PRC’s growing economic influence around the world. While many problems persist between the U.S and the PRC due to the latter’s rise, one issue that is not frequently discussed is the growing use of Private Military Contractors (PMCs) by the PRC. As Chinese companies have moved operations further abroad, they require protection for those investments. While the current number of Chinese PMCs is not large, it has been growing at a worrying rate, which could challenge U.S interests abroad[1]. 

Significance:  Many countries have utilized PMCs in foreign operations. The most significant international incidents involving PMCs mainly come from those based in the U.S and the Russian Federation. However, many other countries with interests abroad have increasingly started to utilize PMCs. One of the most significant examples has been the growing use of Chinese PMC’s. These PMCs pose a very unique set of threats to U.S national security interest abroad[2]. First, like most PMC’s, Chinese contractors come mainly from the Peoples Liberation Army and policing forces. This means that the PMCs have a significant amount of military training. Secondly, the legal relationship between the PMC’s and the PRC is different than in most other countries. Since the PRC is an authoritarian country, the government can leverage multiple forms of coercion to force PMC’s into a certain course of action, giving the government a somewhat deniable capability to control foreign soil. Lastly, the Chinese can use PMC’s as a means to push their desired political endstate on foreign countries. With the U.S still being ahead of the PRC militarily, and with both states having nuclear capabilities, conventional conflict is highly unlikely. One way for the Chinese to employ forces to counter U.S. interests abroad is through the use of PMC’s, similar to what Russia has done in Syria[3]. With this in mind, the U.S will need a proactive response that will address this problem both in the short and long term.  

Option #1:  Increase the Department of Defense’s (DoD) focus on training to counter irregular/asymmetric warfare to address the threat posed by PRC PMCs. 

Risk:  The new National Defense Strategy (NDS) focuses on many aspects of the future conventional battlefield like increasing the size of the U.S Navy, cyber operations, and cutting edge weapons platforms[4]. By focusing more of the DoD’s resources on training to counter irregular / asymmetric warfare, the military will not be able to accomplish the goals in the NDS. This option could also lead to a new generation of military members who are more adept at skills necessary for smaller operations, and put the U.S at a leadership disadvantage if a war were to break out between the U.S and a near peer competitor. 

Gain:  Another major conventional war is highly unlikely. Most U.S. near peer competitors are weaker militarily or have second strike nuclear capabilities. Future conflicts will most likely require the U.S. to counter irregular / asymmetric warfare methodologies, which PRC PMCs may utilize.  By focusing DoD resources in this area, the U.S would gain the ability to counter these types of warfare, no matter who employs them. In addition to being better able to conduct operations similar to Afghanistan, the U.S. would also have the tools to address threats posed by PRC PMCs.  Emphasizing this type of warfare would also give U.S actions more international legitimacy as it would be employing recognized state assets and not trying to counter a PRC PMC with a U.S. PMC. 

Option #2:  The U.S. pursues an international treaty governing the use of PMC’s worldwide.  

Risk:   Diplomatic efforts take time, and are subject to many forms of bureaucratic blockage depending on what level the negations are occurring. Option #2 would also be challenging to have an all-inclusive treaty that would cover every nation a PMC comes from or every country from which an employee of these firms might hail. Also, by signing a binding treaty, the U.S would limit its options in foreign conflict zones or in areas where Chinese PMC’s are operating or where the U.S. wants to use a PMC instead of the military.

Gain:  A binding international treaty would help solve most of the problems caused by PMC’s globally and set the stage for how PRC PMC’s act as they proliferate globally[5]. By making the first move in treaty negotiations, the U.S can set the agenda for what topics will be covered. The U.S can build off of the framework set by the Montreux document, which sets a non-binding list of good practices for PMCs[6]. By using the offices of the United Nations Working Group on PMCs the U.S would be able to quickly pull together a coalition of like minded countries which could drive the larger negotiation process. Lastly, Option #2 would help solve existing problems with PMC’s operating on behalf of other countries, like the Russian Federation. 

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendation:  None.


Endnotes:

[1] Swaine, M. D., & Arduino, A. (2018, May 08). The Rise of China’s Private Security (Rep.). Retrieved November 26, 2018, from Carnegie Endowment For International Peace website: https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/08/rise-of-china-s-private-security-companies-event-6886

[2] Erickson, A., & Collins, G. (2012, February 21). Enter China’s Security Firms. Retrieved November 26, 2018, from https://thediplomat.com/2012/02/enter-chinas-security-firms/3/

[3] United States., Department of Defense, (n.d.). Summary of the 2018 National Defense strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (pp. 1-14).

[4] Gibbons-neff, T. (2018, May 24). How a 4-Hour Battle Between Russian Mercenaries and U.S. Commandos Unfolded in Syria. Retrieved November 25, 2018, from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/middleeast/american-commandos-russian-mercenaries-syria.html

[5] Guardians of the Belt and Road. (2018, August 16). Retrieved November 26, 2018, from https://www.merics.org/en/china-monitor/guardians-of-belt-and-road

[6] Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Directorate of International Law. (2008, September 17). The Montreux Document. Retrieved November 26, 2018, from https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf

Anthony Patrick Below Established Threshold Activities (BETA) China (People's Republic of China) Irregular Forces Non-Government Entities Option Papers

U.S. Options for Responding to Sharp Power Threats

Anthony Patrick is a student at Georgia State University where he majors in political science and conducts research on Sharp Power.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


National Security Situation:  Threats to U.S. and allied nations by sharp power actions (defined below).

Date Originally Written:  June 16, 2018.

Date Originally Published:  July 30, 2018.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is an undergraduate student of defense policies and an Officer Candidate in the United States Marine Corps.  This article is written with the base assumption that foreign actions against the U.S political system is a top national security challenge and a continuing threat.

Background:  Recent U.S. news cycles have been dominated by the Mueller investigation into Russian interference in the U.S political system.  Other allied nations such as the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand have also recently dealt with foreign political influence campaigns[1].  While historically nations have projected power either through military might (hard power) or cultural influence (soft power), rising authoritarian actors like the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, Iran, and North Korea are resulting to a hybrid mix of classical power projection through emerging technologies with revisionist intent in the international system known as sharp power[2].  Sharp power is more direct than soft power, not as physically destructive as hard power, and does not cause enough damage to justify a military response like Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

Sharp power actions are normally covert in nature allowing the perpetrator plausible deniability.  Given the combined military and economic power of western democracies, sharp power is the preferred method for disruptive actions against the international order by authoritarian powers.  The effectiveness of sharp power is amplified by the open nature of democratic societies, especially in the information age[3].  Other examples of sharp power attacks include the North Korean hacking of Sony Pictures, the Iranian hacking of a dam in New York, PRC surveillance of Chinese students in foreign classrooms[4], and Russian actions in Ukraine and Moldova[5]. 

Significance:  The effects of sharp power actions can be very dangerous for western democracies.  One effect is a decrease in democratic legitimacy in an elected government.  When the citizens question if it was themselves or foreign actors who helped elect a government, that government is hamstrung due to a lack of legitimacy.  This lack of legitimacy can create new divisions or heighten polarization in the targeted countries.  Foreign actors can use the internet as a guise, pretend to be domestic actors, and push extreme ideas in communities, creating the potential for conflict.  This series of effects has already happened in U.S communities, where Russian actors have organized a protest and the counter protest[6].  These new divisions can also heighten political infighting, diverting political resources from international problems to deal with issues in the domestic sphere.  This heightened political infighting can give these revisionist actors the breathing room they need to expand their influence.  The increasing prevalence of these effects is a direct threat to U.S national security, chipping away at the government’s freedom of action and diverting resources to the domestic sphere away from international problems. 

Option #1:  Adopt military operational planning methodologies like Effects Based Operations (EBO) and Systematic Operational Design (SOD) at the interagency level to organize a response to adversary sharp power actions.

Risk:  The U.S also has the largest pool of soft power in the world and reverting to sharp power actions would hurt that important U.S resource[7].  Also, since these adversary countries are not as open, targeting would be a difficult task, and actions against the wrong group could be used as a rallying cry in the adversary country.  This rallying cry would give these adversaries a greater mandate to continue their actions against western democracies.  Lastly, successful sharp power actions against authoritarian countries could lead to more destructive domestic instability, harming allies in the region and disrupting global trading networks[8].

Gain:  By utilizing sharp power methodologies, the U.S would be able to strike back at opposing countries and deter further actions against the U.S.  The U.S has a large pool of resources to pull from in the interagency, and only needs a methodology to guide those resources.  Military style operational planning like EBO and SOD contain important theoretical constructs like System of System Analysis, Center of Gravity, and the constant reviewing of new information[9][10].  This planning style fits well for sharp power actions since it allows the government to create an operational plan for directed international political actions.  The U.S government can pull from the wealth of knowledge within the Department of Defense on how to combine these various frameworks to achieve sharp power action given their experience with designing complex operations on the joint level[11].  Successful actions would also give the U.S more leverage in negotiations with these countries on other areas and would divert their political resources from international actions 

Option #2:  Congress passes a Goldwater-Nichols-like Act to create a horizontal organization within the interagency, to address sharp power threats[12].

Risk:  Such reform would be substantial and would take a long time to implement.  The length of this process could delay any government response to both continued foreign interference and other international problems.  The congressional process is historically slow and designing the bill would also take a substantial amount of time.  Different agencies have set rules, procedures, and operating cultures, and changing those enough to allow effective interagency cooperation would also be difficult.  Option #2 would not change the defensive posture of the U.S government, thus it would not create the desired deterrent effect. 

Gain:  Streamlining the interagency process would increase the government’s ability to counter sharp power threats.  Option #2 would lead to better allocation of resources, more intelligence sharing, better allocation of authority during interagency deliberations, and provide more clarity on rules, regulations, and processes that govern interagency cooperation.  By adopting this reform, the national security council would be able to give task to a joint structure instead of a single lead agency.  This joint structure could operate like the joint command within the Department of Defense and create broad policy for interagency work[13].  By keeping a defensive posture, the U.S would also be able to protect its soft power appeal[14]. 

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendations:  None.


Endnotes:

[1]  Kurlantzick, J. (2017, December 13). Australia, New Zealand Face China’s Influence. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/australia-new-zealand-face-chinas-influence

[2] National Endowment for Democracy. (2017, December 5). Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence. Retrieved from https://www.ned.org/sharp-power-rising-authoritarian-influence-forum-report/

[3]  Wanless, A., & Berk, M. (2018, March 7). The Strategic Communication Ricochet: Planning Ahead for Greater Resiliency. Retrieved from https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/3/7/the-strategic-communication-ricochet-planning-ahead-for-greater-resiliency

[4]  Sulmeyer, M. (2018, March 22). How the U.S. Can Play Cyber-Offense. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-03-22/how-us-can-play-cyber-offense

[5]  Way, L. A. (2018, May 17). Why Didn’t Putin Interfere in Armenia’s Velvet Revolution? Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/armenia/2018-05-17/why-didnt-putin-interfere-armenias-velvet-revolution

[6]  Lucas, R. (2017, November 01). How Russia Used Facebook To Organize 2 Sets of Protesters. Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/2017/11/01/561427876/how-russia-used-facebook-to-organize-two-sets-of-protesters

[7]  Nye, J. S., Jr. (2018, January 24). How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-01-24/how-sharp-power-threatens-soft-power

[8]  Breen, J. G. (2017). Covert Actions and Unintended Consequences. InterAgency Journal,8(3), 106-122. Retrieved from http://thesimonscenter.org/featured-article-covert-action-and-unintended-consequences/

[9]  Strange, J., Dr., & Iron, UK Army, R., Colonel. (n.d.). Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities(United States, Department of Defense, United States Marine Corps War College).

[10]  Vego, M. N. (2006). Effects-based operations: A critique. National Defense University, Washington D.C. Institute for National Strategic Studies.

[11]  Beutel, C. (2016, August 16). A New Plan: Using Complexity In the Modern World. Retrieved    from https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2016/8/16/a-new-plan-using-complexity-in-the-modern-world

[12]  Dahl, U.S. Army, K. R., Colonel. (2007, July 1). New Security for New Threats: The Case for Reforming the Interagency Process. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/research/new-security-for-new-threats-the-case-for-reforming-the-interagency-process/

[13]  United States, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2018). Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning.

[14]  Nye, J. S., Jr. (summer 2004). Soft Power and American Foreign Policy. Political Science Quarterly,119(2), 255-270. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20202345

Anthony Patrick Below Established Threshold Activities (BETA) Deterrence Major Regional Contingency Option Papers United States