An Assessment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cyber Strategy and Cyber Challenges

Ali Crawford has an M.A. from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce where she focused on diplomacy, intelligence, cyber policy, and cyber warfare.  She tweets at @ali_craw.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  An Assessment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cyber Strategy and Cyber Challenges

Date Originally Written:  December 5, 2018.

Date Originally Published:  January 14, 2019.

Summary:  Cyber capabilities are changing the character of warfare.  Nations procure and develop cyber capabilities aimed at committing espionage, subversion, and compromising the integrity of information.  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has evolved to meet these modern challenges by consistently implementing new policies, creating governing structures, and providing education to member-states.

Text:  In 2002, leaders from various nations met in Prague to discuss security challenges at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit.  Agenda items included enhancing capabilities to more appropriately respond to terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to consider the pending memberships of several Eastern European nations, and for the first time in NATO history, a pledge to strengthen cyber defenses.  Since 2002, NATO has updated its cyber policies to more accurately reflect the challenges of a world that is almost exclusively and continuously engaged in hybrid warfare. 

As NATO is a defensive organization, its primary focus is collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.  Early cyber policy was devoted exclusively to better network defense, but resources were limited; strategic partnerships had not yet been developed; and structured frameworks for policy applications did not exist.  When Russian Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks temporarily disrupted Estonian banking and business sectors in 2007, the idea of collective defense was brought to fruition.  Later, in 2008, another wave of vigorous and effective Russian DDoS attacks precluded an eventual kinetic military invasion of Georgia.  This onslaught of cyber warfare, arguably the first demonstration of cyber power used in conjunction with military force, prompted NATO to revisit cyber defense planning[1].  Today, several departments are devoted to the strategic and tactical governance of cybersecurity and policy. 

NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) provides high-level political oversight on all policy developments and implementation[2].  Under the NAC rests the Cyber Defence Committee which, although subordinate to the NAC, leads most cyber policy decision-making.  At the tactical level, NATO introduced Cyber Rapid Reaction teams (CRRT) in 2012 which are responsible for cyber defense at all NATO sites[3].  The CRRTs are the first to respond to any cyber attack.  The Cyber Defence Management Board (CDMB), formerly known as the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Cyber Defence), maintains responsibility for coordinating cyber defense activities among NATO’s civil and military bodies[4].  The CDMB also serves as the most senior advisory board to the NAC.  Additionally, the NATO Consultation, Control, and Command Board serves as the main authority and consultative body regarding all technical aspects and implementation of cyber defense[5]. 

In 2008 at the Bucharest Summit, NATO adopted its first political body of literature concerning cyber defense policy which primarily affirmed member nations’ shared responsibility to develop and defend its networks while adhering to international law[6].  Later, in 2010, the NAC was tasked with developing a more comprehensive cyber defense strategy which eventually led to an updated Policy on Cyber Defense in 2011 to reflect the rapidly evolving threat of cyber attacks[7].  NATO would continue to evolve in the following years.  In 2014, NATO began establishing working partnerships with industry leaders in cybersecurity, the European Union, and the European Defense Agency[8].  When NATO defense leaders met again at the Warsaw Summit in 2016, the Alliance agreed to name cyberspace as a domain of warfare in which NATO’s full spectrum of defensive capabilities do apply[9]. 

Despite major policy developments and resource advancements, NATO still faces several challenges in cyberspace.  Some obstacles are unavoidable and specific to the Internet of Things, which generally refers to a network of devices, vehicles, and home appliances that contain electronics, software, actuators, and connectivity which allows these things to connect, interact and exchange data.  First, the problem of misattribution is likely. Attribution is the process of linking a group, nation, or state actor to a specific cyber attack[10].  Actors take unique precautions to remain anonymous in their efforts, which creates ambiguities and headaches for the response teams investigating a particular cyber attack’s origin.  Incorrectly designating a responsible party may cause unnecessary tension or conflict. 

Second, as with any computer system or network, cyber defenses are only as strong as its weakest link.  On average, NATO defends against 500 attempted cyber attacks each month[11].  Ultimately, the top priority is management and security of Alliance-owned security infrastructure.  However, because NATO is a collection of member states with varying cyber capabilities and resources, security is not linear.  As such, each member nation is responsible for the safety and security of their own networks.  NATO does not provide security capabilities or resources for its members, but it does prioritize education, training, wargaming, and information-sharing[12].

To the east of NATO, Russia’s aggressive and tenacious approach to gaining influence in Eastern Europe and beyond has frustrated the Alliance and its strategic partners.  As demonstrated in Estonia and Georgia, Russia’s cyber power is as equally frustrating, as Russia views cyber warfare as a component of a larger information war to control the flow and perception of information and distract, degrade, or confuse opponents[13].  U.S. Army General Curtis Scaparroti sees Russia using cyber capabilities to operate under the legal and policy thresholds that define war. 

A perplexing forethought is the potential invocation of NATO Article 5 after a particularly crippling cyber attack on a member nation.  Article 5 bounds all Alliance members to the collective defense principle, stating that an attack on one member nation is an attack on the Alliance[14].  The invocation of Article 5 has only occurred one time in NATO history following the September 11 terror attacks in the United States[15].  The idea of proportional retaliation often arises in cyber warfare debates.  A retaliatory response from NATO is also complicated by potential misattribution.

Looking ahead, appears that NATO is moving towards an active cyber defense approach.  Active defense is a relatively new strategy that is a set of measures designed to engage, seek out, and proactively combat threats[16].  Active defense does have significant legal implications as it transcends the boundaries between legal operations and “hacking back.”  Regardless, in 2018 NATO leadership agreed upon the creation and implementation of a Cyber Command Centre that would be granted the operational authority to draw upon the cyber capabilities of its members, such as the United States and Great Britain[17].  Cyber Deterrence, as opposed to strictly defense, is attractive because it has relatively low barriers to entry and would allow the Alliance to seek out and neutralize threats or even to counter Russian information warfare campaigns.  The Command Centre is scheduled to be fully operational by 2023, so NATO still has a few years to hammer out specific details concerning the thin line between cyber defense and offense. 

The future of cyber warfare is uncertain and highly unpredictable.  Some experts argue that real cyber war will never happen, like German professor Thomas Rid, while others consider a true act of cyber war will be one that results in the direct loss of human life[18].  Like other nations grappling with cyber policy decision-making, NATO leadership will need to form a consensus on the applicability of Article 5, what precisely constitutes a serious cyber attack, and if the Alliance is willing to engage in offensive cyber operations.  Despite these future considerations, the Alliance has developed a comprehensive cyber strategy that is devoted to maintaining confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility of sensitive information. 


Endnotes:

[1] Smith, David J., Atlantic Council: Russian Cyber Strategy and the War Against Georgia, 17 January 2014, retrived from http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/russian-cyber-policy-and-the-war-against-georgia; and White, Sarah P., Modern War Institute: Understanding Cyber Warfare: Lessons From the Russia-Georgia War, 20 March 2018, retrieved from https://mwi.usma.edu/understanding-cyberwarfare-lessons-russia-georgia-war/

[2] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Cyber defence, 16 July 2018, retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm

[3] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Cyber defence, 16 July 2018, retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Cyber defence, 16 July 2018, retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm

[8] Ibid; and NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center for Excellence, History, last updated 3 November 2015, https://ccdcoe.org/history.html

[9] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Cyber defence, 16 July 2018, retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm

[10] Symantec, The Cyber Security Whodunnit: Challenges in Attribution of Targeted Attacks, 3 October 2018, retrieved from https://www.symantec.com/blogs/expert-perspectives/cyber-security-whodunnit-challenges-attribution-targeted-attacks

[11] Soesanto, S., Defense One: In Cyberspace, Governments Don’t Know How to Count, 27 September 2018, retrieved from: https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/09/cyberspace-governments-dont-know-how-count/151629/; and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Cyber defence, last modified 18 February 2018, retrieved from https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_02/20180213_1802-factsheet-cyber-defence-en.pdf

[12] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Cyber defence, last modified 18 February 2018, retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm

[13] U.S. Department of Defense, “NATO moves to combant Russian hybrid warfare,” 29 September 2018, retrieved from https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1649146/nato-moves-to-combat-russian-hybrid-warfare/

[14] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Collective defence – article 5, 12 June 2018, retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm

[15] Ibid.

[16] Davis, D., Symantec: Navigating The Risky Terrain of Active Cyber Defense, 29 May 2018, retrieved from https://www.symantec.com/blogs/expert-perspectives/navigating-risky-terrain-active-cyber-defense

[17] Emmott, R., Reuters: NATO Cyber Command to be fully operational in 2023, 16 October 2018, retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-cyber/nato-cyber-command-to-be-fully-operational-in-2023-idUSKCN1MQ1Z9

[18] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place”: Dr Thomas Rid presents his book at NATO Headquarters,” 7 May 2013, retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_100906.htm

 

Ali Crawford Assessment Papers Below Established Threshold Activities (BETA) Cyberspace North Atlantic Treaty Organization Policy and Strategy

An Assessment of the Likely Roles of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Systems in the Near Future

Ali Crawford has an M.A. from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce where she focused on diplomacy, intelligence, cyber policy, and cyber warfare.  She tweets at @ali_craw.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.


Title:  An Assessment of the Likely Roles of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Systems in the Near Future

Date Originally Written:  May 25, 2018.

Date Originally Published:  July 16, 2018.

Summary:  While the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) continues to experiment with Artificial Intelligence (AI) as part of its Third Offset Strategy, questions regarding levels of human participation, ethics, and legality remain.  Though a battlefield in the future will likely see autonomous decision-making technology as a norm, the transition between modern applications of artificial intelligence and potential applications will focus on incorporating human-machine teaming into existing frameworks.

Text:   In an essay titled Centaur Warfighting: The False Choice of Humans vs. Automation, author Paul Scharre concludes that the best warfighting systems will combine human and machine intelligence to create hybrid cognitive architectures that leverage the advantages of each[1].  There are three potential partnerships.  The first potential partnership pegs humans as essential operators, meaning AI cannot operate without its human counterpart.  The second potential partnership tasks humans as the moral agents who make value-based decisions which prevent or promote the use of AI in combat situations.  Finally, the third potential partnership, in which humans are fail-safes, give more operational authority to AI systems.  The human operator only interferes if the system malfunctions or fails.  Artificial intelligence, specifically autonomous weapons systems, are controversial technologies that have the capacity to greatly improve human efficiency while reducing potential human burdens.  But before the Department of Defense embraces intelligent weapons systems or programs with full autonomy, more human-machine partnerships to test to viability, legality, and ethical implications of artificial intelligence will likely occur.

To better understand why artificial intelligence is controversial, it is necessary to distinguish between the arguments for and against using AI with operational autonomy.  In 2015, prominent artificial intelligence experts, including Steven Hawking and Elon Musk, penned an open letter in which the potential benefits for AI are highlighted, but are not necessarily outweighed by the short-term questions of ethics and the applicability of law[2].  A system with an intelligent, decision-making brain does carry significant consequences.  What if the system targets civilians?  How does international law apply to a machine?  Will an intelligent machine respond to commands?  These are questions with which military and ethical theorists grapple.

For a more practical thought problem, consider the Moral Machine project from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology[3].  You, the judge, are presented with two dilemmas involving intelligent, self-driving cars.  The car encounters break failure and must decide what to do next.  If the car continues straight, it will strike and kill x number of men, women, children, elderly, or animals.  If the car does not swerve, it will crash into a barrier causing immediate deaths of the passengers who are also x number of men or women, children, or elderly.  Although you are the judge in Moral Machine, the simulation is indicative of ethical and moral dilemmas that may arise when employing artificial intelligence in, say, combat.  In these scenarios, the ethical theorist takes issue with the machine having the decision-making capacity to place value on human life, and to potentially make irreversible and damaging decisions.

Assuming autonomous weapons systems do have a place in the future of military operations, what would prelude them?  Realistically, human-machine teaming would be introduced before a fully-autonomous machine.  What exactly is human-machine teaming and why is it important when discussing the future of artificial intelligence?  To gain and maintain superiority in operational domains, both past and present, the United States has ensured that its conventional deterrents are powerful enough to dissuade great powers from going to war with the United States[4].  Thus, an offset strategy focuses on gaining advantages against enemy powers and capabilities.  Historically, the First Offset occurred in the early 1950s upon the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons.  The Second Offset manifested a little later, in the 1970s, with the implementation of precision-guided weapons after the Soviet Union gained nuclear parity with the United States[5].  The Third Offset, a relatively modern strategy, generally focuses on maintaining technological superiority among the world’s great powers.

Human-machine teaming is part of the Department of Defense’s Third Offset strategy, as is deep learning systems and cyber weaponry[6].  Machine learning systems relieve humans from a breadth of burdening tasks or augment operations to decrease potential risks to the lives of human fighters.  For example, in 2017 the DoD began working with an intelligent system called “Project Maven,” which uses deep learning technology to identify objects of interest from drone surveillance footage[7].  Terabytes of footage are collected each day from surveillance drones.  Human analysts spend significant amounts of time sifting through this data to identify objects of interest, and then they begin their analytical processes[8].  Project Maven’s deep-learning algorithm allows human analysts to spend more time practicing their craft to produce intelligence products and less time processing information.  Despite Google’s recent departure from the program, Project Maven will continue to operate[9].  Former Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work established the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team in early 2017 to work on Project Maven.  In the announcement, Work described artificial intelligence as necessary for strategic deterrence, noting “the [DoD] must integrate artificial intelligence and machine learning more effectively across operations to maintain advantages over increasingly capable adversaries and competitors[10].”

This article collectively refers to human-machine teaming as processes in which humans interact in some capacity with artificial intelligence.  However, human-machine teaming can transcend multiple technological fields and is not limited to just prerequisites of autonomous weaponry[11].  Human-robot teaming may begin to appear as in the immediate future given developments in robotics.  Boston Dynamics, a premier engineering and robotics company, is well-known for its videos of human- and animal-like robots completing everyday tasks.  Imagine a machine like BigDog working alongside human soldiers or rescue workers or even navigating inaccessible terrain[12].  These robots are not fully autonomous, yet the unique partnership between human and robot offers a new set of opportunities and challenges[13].

Before fully-autonomous systems or weapons have a place in combat, human-machine teams need to be assessed as successful and sustainable.  These teams have the potential to improve human performance, reduce risks to human counterparts, and expand national power – all goals of the Third Offset Strategy.  However, there are challenges to procuring and incorporating artificial intelligence.  The DoD will need to seek out deeper relationships with technological and engineering firms, not just defense contractors.

Using humans as moral agents and fail-safes allow the problem of ethical and lawful applicability to be tested while opening the debate on future use of autonomous systems.  Autonomous weapons will likely not see combat until these challenges, coupled with ethical and lawful considerations, are thoroughly regulated and tested.


Endnotes:

[1] Paul Scharre, Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J., “Centaur Warfighting: The False Choice of Humans vs. Automation,” 2016, https://sites.temple.edu/ticlj/files/2017/02/30.1.Scharre-TICLJ.pdf

[2] Daniel Dewey, Stuart Russell, Max Tegmark, “Research Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial Intelligence,” 2015, https://futureoflife.org/data/documents/research_priorities.pdf?x20046

[3] Moral Machine, http://moralmachine.mit.edu/

[4] Cheryl Pellerin, Department of Defense, Defense Media Activity, “Work: Human-Machine Teaming Represents Defense Technology Future,” 8 November 2015, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/628154/work-human-machine-teaming-represents-defense-technology-future/

[5] Ibid.

[6] Katie Lange, DoDLive, “3rd Offset Strategy 101: What It Is, What the Tech Focuses Are,” 30 March 2016, http://www.dodlive.mil/2016/03/30/3rd-offset-strategy-101-what-it-is-what-the-tech-focuses-are/; and Mackenzie Eaglen, RealClearDefense, “What is the Third Offset Strategy?,” 15 February 2016, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/02/16/what_is_the_third_offset_strategy_109034.html

[7] Cheryl Pellerin, Department of Defense News, Defense Media Activity, “Project Maven to Deploy Computer Algorithims to War Zone by Year’s End,” 21 July 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1254719/project-maven-to-deploy-computer-algorithms-to-war-zone-by-years-end/

[8] Tajha Chappellet-Lanier, “Pentagon’s Project Maven responds to criticism: ‘There will be those who will partner with us’” 1 May 2018, https://www.fedscoop.com/project-maven-artificial-intelligence-google/

[9] Tom Simonite, Wired, “Pentagon Will Expand AI Project Prompting Protests at Google,” 29 May 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/googles-contentious-pentagon-project-is-likely-to-expand/

[10] Cheryl Pellerin, Department of Defense, Defense Media Activity, “Project Maven to Deploy Computer Algorithims to War Zone by Year’s End,” 21 July 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1254719/project-maven-to-deploy-computer-algorithms-to-war-zone-by-years-end/

[11] Maj. Gen. Mick Ryan, Defense One, “How to Plan for the Coming Era of Human-Machine Teaming,” 25 April 2018, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/04/how-plan-coming-era-human-machine-teaming/147718/

[12] Boston Dynamic Big Dog Overview, March, 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cNZPRsrwumQ

[13] Richard Priday, Wired, “What’s really going on in those Bostom Dynamics robot videos?,” 18 February 2018, http://www.wired.co.uk/article/boston-dynamics-robotics-roboticist-how-to-watch

Ali Crawford Alternative Futures / Alternative Histories / Counterfactuals Artificial Intelligence / Machine Learning / Human-Machine Teaming Capacity / Capability Enhancement United Nations

Assessment of U.S. Cyber Command’s Elevation to Unified Combatant Command

Ali Crawford is a current M.A. Candidate at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce.  She studies diplomacy and intelligence with a focus on cyber policy and cyber warfare.  She tweets at @ali_craw.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group. 


Title:  Assessment of U.S. Cyber Command’s Elevation to Unified Combatant Command

Date Originally Written:  September 18, 2017.

Date Originally Published:  November 13, 2017.

Summary:  U.S. President Donald Trump instructed the Department of Defense to elevate U.S. Cyber Command to the status of Unified Combatant Command (UCC).  Cyber Command as a UCC could determine the operational standards for missions and possibly streamline decision-making.  Pending Secretary of Defense James Mattis’ nomination, the Commander of Cyber Command will have the opportunity to alter U.S. posturing in cyberspace.

Text:  In August 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump ordered the Department of Defense to begin initiating Cyber Command’s elevation to a UCC[1].  With the elevation of U.S. Cyber Command there will be ten combatant commands within the U.S. military infrastructure[2].  Combatant commands have geographical[3] or functional areas[4] of responsibility and are granted authorities by law, the President, and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to conduct military operations.  This elevation of Cyber Command to become a UCC is a huge progressive step forward.  The character of warfare is changing. Cyberspace has quickly become a new operational domain for war, with battles being waged each day.  The threat landscape in the cyberspace domain is always evolving, and so the U.S. will evolve to meet these new challenges.  Cyber Command’s elevation is timely and demonstrates the Department of Defense’s commitment to defend U.S. national interests across all operational domains.

Cyber Command was established in 2009 to ensure the U.S. would maintain superiority in the cyberspace operational domain.  Reaching full operational capacity in 2010, Cyber Command mainly provides assistance and other augmentative services to the military’s various cyberspace missions, such as planning; coordinating; synchronizing; and preparing, when directed, military operations in cyberspace[5].  Currently, Cyber Command is subordinate to U.S. Strategic Command, but housed within the National Security Agency (NSA).  Cyber Command’s subordinate components include Army Cyber Command, Fleet Cyber Command, Air Force Cyber Command, Marine Forces Cyber Command, and it also maintains an operational relationship with the Coast Guard Cyber Command[6].  By 2018, Cyber Command expects to ready 133 cyber mission force teams which will consist of 25 support teams, 27 combat mission teams, 68 cyber protection teams, and 13 national mission teams[7].

Admiral Michael Rogers of the United States Navy currently heads Cyber Command.  He is also head of the NSA.  This “dual-hatting” of Admiral Rogers is of interest.  President Trump has directed SecDef James Mattis to recommend a nominee to head Cyber Command once it becomes a UCC.  Commanders of Combatant Commands must be uniformed military officers, whereas the NSA may be headed by a civilian.  It is very likely that Mattis will nominate Rogers to lead Cyber Command[8].  Beyond Cyber Command’s current missions, as a UCC its new commander would have the power to alter U.S. tactical and strategic cyberspace behaviors.  The elevation will also streamline the time-sensitive process of conducting cyber operations by possibly enabling a single authority with the capacity to make independent decisions who also has direct access to SecDef Mattis.  The elevation of Cyber Command to a UCC led by a four-star military officer may also point to the Department of Defense re-prioritizing U.S. posturing in cyberspace to become more offensive rather than defensive.

As one can imagine, Admiral Rogers is not thrilled with the idea of splitting his agencies apart.  Fortunately, it is very likely that he will maintain dual-authority for at least another year[9].  The Cyber Command separation from the NSA will also take some time, pending the successful confirmation of a new commander.  Cyber Command would also need to demonstrate its ability to function independently from its NSA intelligence counterpart[10].  Former SecDef Ash Carter and Director of Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper were not fans of Rogers’ dual-hat arrangement.  It remains to be seen what current SecDef Mattis’ or DNI Coats’ think of the “dual hat” arrangement.

Regardless, as this elevation process develops, it is worthwhile to follow.  Whoever becomes commander of Cyber Command, whether it be a novel nominee or Admiral Rogers, will have an incredible opportunity to spearhead a new era of U.S. cyberspace operations, doctrine, and influence policy.  A self-actualized Cyber Command may be able to launch Stuxnet-style attacks aimed at North Korea or speak more nuanced rhetoric aimed at creating impenetrable networks.  Regardless, the elevation of Cyber Command to a UCC signals the growing importance of cyber-related missions and will likely encourage U.S. policymakers to adopt specific cyber policies, all the while ensuring the freedom of action in cyberspace.


Endnotes:

[1] The White House, “Statement by President Donald J. Trump on the Elevation of Cyber Command,” 18 August 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/18/statement-donald-j-trump-elevation-cyber-command

[2] Unified Command Plan. (n.d.). Retrieved October 27, 2017, from https://www.defense.gov/About/Military-Departments/Unified-Combatant-Commands/

[3] 10 U.S. Code § 164 – Commanders of combatant commands: assignment; powers and duties. (n.d.). Retrieved October 27, 2017, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/164

[4] 10 U.S. Code § 167 – Unified combatant command for special operations forces. (n.d.). Retrieved October 27, 2017, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/167

[5] U.S. Strategic Command, “U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM),” 30 September 2016, http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Factsheets/Factsheet-View/Article/960492/us-cyber-command-uscybercom/

[6] U.S. Strategic Command, “U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM),” 30 September 2016, http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Factsheets/Factsheet-View/Article/960492/us-cyber-command-uscybercom/

[7] Richard Sisk, Military, “Cyber Command to Become Unified Combatant Command,” 18 August 2017, http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/08/18/cyber-command-become-unified-combatant-command.html

[8] Department of Defense, “The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy,” 2015, https://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0415_Cyber-Strategy/

[9] Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Ellen Nakashima, The Washington Post, “President Trump announces move to elevate Cyber Command,” 18 August 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/08/18/president-trump-announces-move-to-elevate-cyber-command/

[10] Ibid.

Ali Crawford Assessment Papers Cyberspace United States