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Options to Make COVID19 Lessons Learned Permanent at the United Kingdom’s Intermediate Command and Staff Course (Land)

Grant is a serving officer in the British Army.  This article is an individual submission as the content is not endorsed by Army Division or the Defence Academy.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation:  During the COVID19 pandemic, the United Kingdom’s (UK) Intermediate Command and Staff Course (Land) (ICSC(L)) was modified in several ways which, if made permanent, could improve the output leading to an overall increase in combat capability.

Date Originally Written:  July 20, 2021. 

Date Originally Published:  October 11, 2021.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author has a technical background, recently attended ICSC(L), and believes in contributing to a wider discussion regarding COVID19 lessons learned.

Background:  The options below present a reasonable challenge[1] on how the ICSC(L) is delivered, support the Army’s Digital Transformation[2], and avoid unintentionally stepping back to pre-COVID19 delivery and content.  These options set the conditions for enabling future Integrated Operations by improving decision making.  

Significance:  The aim of ICSC(L) “is to train and educate majors for grade 1 and 2 staff appointments, and commands as majors by developing their leadership, analytical and communication skills, productivity, professionalism and mental agility, …. to develop the intellectual edge needed for success on operations and leadership in government[3]”.   ICSC(L) is traditionally a seven month residential course, but during the past three courses a large portion was delivered online due to COVID19.  This online delivery could continue[4] with no training deficiency identified in previous courses.

Option #1:  Embrace technology.  One of the key benefits of ICSC(L), per the instructor cadre there, is developing a “professional network,” as the students are in the “people business, that requires face to face” content delivery.  Hence on April 19, 2021, during a national lockdown, the course of over 200 students formed up for face to face learning delivered in part socially distanced with everyone sitting in a lecture hall, listening to speakers briefing using the Microsoft Teams application on a large screen at the front.

By the autumn of 2021, a project called “MyMOD Laptop” expects to have delivered 150,000 laptops enabling personnel to work effectively and collaboratively across the world.  If these laptops were issued at the start of ICSC(L)[5], and best practices training on the new tools e.g. Microsoft Teams provided, students could embrace new ways of working regarding collaborative planning and management. 

Risk:  The benefits of face to face lessons are clear.  For example, it is very challenging attempting a modeling exercise on Microsoft Teams.  

Gain:  University courses[6] are delivered in part by online work.  Training as you fight using the same information technology gives students a chance to experiment and develop new styles of working and sets conditions for success as a digital army rather than using labelled up paper handbooks[7].  As U.S. Army General Stanley McCrystal said in 2011, “instead of being able to get all the key leaders for a decision together in a single room and look them in the eye ……I’ve got to use other techniques. I’ve got to use VTC, I’ve got to use chat, I’ve got to use email ….. not just for communication, but for leadership[8]”.

Option #2:  Reduce duplicative instruction.

The post-Cold War era saw UK forces based in Germany lacking the understanding and technical communications to practice a joint approach.  The Army today is much more than ‘The Armored Brigade’ and arguably ceding to ‘Jointery,’ in the information age.  On the last ICSC(L), approximately a quarter of the course’s duration was dedicated to Combat Estimate Planning at Brigade and Division Headquarters.  Students at ICSC(L) saw Combat Estimate Planning as repeating what they had already learned at Junior Officer Tactical Awareness Course (4 weeks) and Junior Command Staff Course (6 weeks).  During COVID19, elements of the Combat Estimate delivery were condensed into a 14-day modular block.  This shortened block suffices as less than a tenth of students are posted into a Division or Brigade Headquarters roles that utilize the Combat Estimate with slightly more than a tenth assigned to roles[9] that use the Tactical Estimate that is briefed just once one the course.  This option leaves four fifths of the course where any estimate is beneficial but not essential.  

Risk:  Some students may, based on their learning style or career focus, need to be refreshed and / or re-taught certain subjects.  Removing duplicative instruction may put them at risk for not learning / retaining the material. 

Gain:  Reducing the overall course duration by shortening repetitive content would reduce the demands on both students and staff.   

Option #3:  Update course content.

ICSC(L) lacked any instruction related to considerations for mitigation of COVID19 in future units nor how, from a Ministry of Defense (MoD) point of view, a pandemic could effect national security operations.  Secondly, while the 2021 Integrated Review mentions the word “Cyber” 156 times, ICSC(L) only allocated a single afternoon lesson for cyber.  Future iterations of ICSC(L) could teach students how to plan for continued operations during a pandemic, and the integration of cyber operations at all levels. This instruction would utilize local knowledge of recent planning and mitigations that the ICSC(L) staff had to implement. 

Risk:  COVID19 and the reported major cyber incident[10] experiences may be too new and too localized and curriculum developed too fast could teach students the wrong things.

Gain:  Though localized, the cyber incident vignette or war story is just as relevant to future operations as Falklands or Iraq briefs and would boost MoD resilience.  “Chatham house rules, on this day on camp we discovered, how it unfolded, what we did and with hindsight, what we wished we had done or known, ideally supported by a subject matter expert.”  Additionally, graduates of ICSC(L) are more likely to have to plan around COVID19 and cyber incidents then develop a major war plan.

Option #4:  Integrate and cohere outside the Army.

Historically, two weeks of ICSC(L) is spent on a U.S. overseas visit.  Due to COVID19 this overseas visit has not happened for the last three ICSC(L) iterations and this time was replaced with two weeks of student research.  With a quarter of each of the ICSC(L) students posted out of the Army and into UK Strategic Command, these two weeks would be better spent learning about the command.  Strategic Command leads with billions of pounds of capabilities that are key to the digital Army of the future.  However, ICSC(L) students only receive a couple of days high-level familiarization[11].  Prioritizing learning about the wider Defence Organization would benefit the students posted into Strategic Command and provide a long term improvement in capabilities provided to the Army.  

Risk:  Permanently removing the overseas trip would hinder UK/U.S. understanding, but could be mitigated by distributed collaboration. 

Gain:  In this option students would achieve a greater understanding of Strategic Command’s capability development and how to influence efforts at inception.  Students would also get to interact with other services speakers[12], former government personnel, subject matter experts, and conference speakers and learn how they think.  All of the preceding would enable Multi Domain Integration and diversify outlooks from the current Land-centric view.  

Option #5:  Modular course delivery over an extended timeframe.

COVID 19 has proven that elements of ICSC(L) can be delivered in a modular format.   The current seven month residential course is for many the last formal and externally assessed training they receive prior to promotion to Lieutenant Colonel.  This option envisions implementing modular content delivery over six years, with completion being a pre-requisite for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. 

Risk:  The current in-person, seven month focused ICSC(L) provides the opportunity for students to develop their professional network and receive individual attention.

Gain:  This option follows Royal Air Force and Royal Navy equivalents with a condensed period of mandatory training with career managers and future employers selecting relevant additional modular elements.  This modular package exploits industry training (such as AGILE / DevSecOps,) relevant to roughly a third of the students being posed to capability and acquisition roles.  This option allows students to work around family commitments such as maternity leave.  Rather than the force losing 400 newly promoted Majors to the traditional seven month long residential ICSC(L) course, a modular option would enable students to remain in situ and, in theory, fills 50 currently gapped jobs in the army. This option would improve wider defense output, reduce the churn of postings while opening up options for attendance from the whole force[13], leading to enhanced networking and diversity of thought.  

Other Comments:  None.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] “The Good Operation,” Ministry of Defense, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/674545/TheGoodOperation_WEB.PDF

[2] “Army Digitalisation: the THEIA programme,”  

[3] Overview of ICSC(L), https://www.da.mod.uk/colleges-and-schools/joint-services-command-and-staff-college/army-division/.

[4] ICSC 17 Army Division Welcome Letter.

[5] International students would need to have limited system permissions similar to how international exchange officers are given limited access to headquarters.

[6] Such as the Cyber Operations MSc offered by Cranfield University, which is available at Shrivenham, a secure military site in partnership with the Defence Academy.

[7] Quote from one of the ICSC(L) course instruction videos where success of a staff officer is judged by how well labelled up their Staff Officers HandBook is.

[8] Stanley McChrystal, TED Talk, “Listen, learn… then lead,” March 2011, https://www.ted.com/talks/stanley_mcchrystal_listen_learn_then_lead.

[9] Such as the Permanent Joint Headquarters and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allied Rapid Reaction Corps

[10] The Sun Newspaper, 21 Mar 21, Ministry of Defence academy hit by major cyber attack by ‘foreign power, https://www.the-sun.com/news/2555777/mod-defence-academy-cyber-attack-foreign-power/

[11] STRATCOM & DES

[12] Online attendance of the Royal United Service Institute Land Warfare Conference 

[13] It is unlikely that the National Health Service would send a student for the 7-month courses but a two-week military planning-focused event may be appealing.  

Capacity / Capability Enhancement COVID-19 Grant Option Papers Training United Kingdom
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Assessing the Effect of the United Kingdom’s Integrated Review on Operations Below the Threshold of War

Bombardinio is the nom de plume of a staff officer who has served in the British armed forces, with operational experience in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. She presently works for the Ministry of Defence in London where she looks at Defence policy. She has been published in the UK, USA and further afield. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing the Effect of the United Kingdom’s Integrated Review on Operations Below the Threshold of War

Date Originally Written:  August 10, 2021.

Date Originally Published:  August 23, 2021.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is a serving staff officer in the British military. The author believes in the importance of a well-resourced standing military that underpins defense policy for both national spending plans, international policies, and allied engagements.

Summary:  The United Kingdom government’s decision, articulated in the Integrated Review 2021, to concentrate on operating below the threshold of war, with insufficient resource to also maintain an effective warfighting capability is a folly, formulated without regard either to historical precedent or to the contemporary international scene. In these failings, it risks national and international security and Britain’s global position of influence.

Text:

Speak softly and carry a big stick – you will go far.
Theodore Roosevelt

‘Global Britain in a Competitive Age, the Integrated Review of Security, Defense, Development, and Foreign Policy’ describes the United Kingdom (UK) government’s approach to contemporary international relations[1]. For UK Defense, it marks a de facto move from an emphasis on warfighting to one which privileges operating below the threshold of war. International competition below the threshold of war is neither new nor wholly unwelcome, the UK military have operated in this manner for centuries and this new policy recognizes the need for adaptation to reflect the changing character of warfare. The Integrated Review’s weakness lies in its ignorance of both historical experience and contemporary realities, these lacunae risk both national and international security and Britain’s global position.

The Grey Zone, that nebulous and ill-defined no-man’s land between peace and armed conflict, is fundamental to the nature of war[2]. If war is a continuation of politics by violent means, then military operations in the Grey Zone are part of that political continuum, just short of war. The width of the Zone is variable; while at times a personal affront or assault may form sufficient pretext for war – the War of Jenkin’s Ear (1739-48)[3] – on other occasions it will not – the Salisbury Nerve Agent Attack of 2018[4]. This variability is determined by political appetite informed by strategic balance. Political will is not purely the domain of politicians and statesmen, public opinion can affect the resolve of leaders considering armed conflict as a political tool; conversely, the public can be, and often have been, manipulated to support a resort to armed conflict. Whilst the will to fight provides the motivation for war, this is generally tempered by an analysis of the likelihood of success; in 1739, an eight-year old incident was allowed to presage war because Great Britain was confident of military superiority over Spain, in the 2018 nerve agent attack the advantage lay with the culprit.

The decision to concentrate on operating below the threshold of war will fail without considering the danger of crossing that threshold and understanding that the threshold is not self-determined, that freedom of decision is in the hands of the opposition, which will be making its own contiguous calculations with respect to its options. In 1861, the U.S. Navy seized the British ship ‘Trent’ in international waters and arrested two Confederate emissaries heading for Europe. This event led to the deployment of significant British land forces to Canada and naval units along the American east coast. War was only averted by a rapid apology by the Lincoln administration. While not a deliberate operation below the threshold of war, the Trent Affair is illustrative of the danger posed by military operations in a heightened political environment. Those who decided to risk the ire of the British had miscalculated both the appetite of the UK government to go to war and, more significantly, Britain’s military superiority.

The key to operating below the threshold of war is thus two-fold: understanding the adversary, their policy, strategy, risk calculus and appetite for armed conflict and maintaining sufficient credible military power to deter the adversary from retaliating through a resort to war. The Integrated Review identifies two systemic competitors, Russia and China, making it clear that the United Kingdom will seek to confront these nations below the threshold of war. Much of this confrontation will be done through enhancing the ways in which the UK protects itself and its interests and by engaging internationally in an attempt to persuade other countries that the West is a more attractive partner than either Vladimir Putin’s Russia or Communist China. These activities are relatively benign; the problem for UK Defense is that, despite a significant budget, it has failed to achieve value for money; the changed emphasis must hence be financed by significant cuts to conventional capability and thus deterrent effect[5]. In ‘robbing Peter to pay Paul’, the lightweight UK has chosen to enter a tag-team wrestling match, without its heavyweight partner.

Of course, it could be argued that as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the UK retains significant deterrent mass through the Alliance, theoretically this is true – the UK’s activities below the threshold of war are protected by the Treaty – but is that a practical reality[6]? The UK’s strategic decision to confront Russia is a reaction to widespread interference and subversion in Western societies, the perceived aim of which is to weaken and divide political resolve. The problem for the UK is that Russian interference and influence has succeeded in weakening resolve: although limited sanctions have been used by Western nations in response to Putin’s worst excesses, military action has never been in question except in protection of the territorial integrity of NATO nations. If German dependence on Russian gas[7], international tensions caused by Brexit[8], and NATO’s internal disagreements are taken into account, the likelihood of support in reaction to a targeted military strike by Russia begins to look shaky.

Recently, a British destroyer conducting a freedom of navigation mission off the coast of the Crimea was confronted by Russian ships and aircraft and ordered to leave what the Russians define as their territorial waters[9]. Shortly after, Putin threatened that a reoccurrence would be met by weapons against which the Royal Navy would have no defense[10]. If the recent confrontation in the Black Sea were to be repeated, at a time in the near future when the United Kingdom’s conventional deterrent is even more denuded, and a Royal Navy vessel were lost to a Russian hypersonic missile, would NATO nations go to war[11]? Russia may calculate that it has sufficiently eroded the Western will to fight, that outside of alliance borders most allies would be unwilling to enact NATO’s Article V, and that the UK has insufficient credible fighting power to respond, unless by resort to a strategic counterstroke by nuclear or offensive cyber operations, both of which would be irrationally escalatory. In such an instance, the UK would be isolated, her global position weakened, and NATO exposed as a paper tiger. The UK can only avoid this by listening to the wisdom of ages and bolstering her conventional forces, using the other levers of power to stiffen Western resolve, and exercise caution in operating below the threshold of war.

Endnotes:

[1] ‘Global Britain in a Competitive Age’, UK Govt (July 2021). https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/the-integrated-review-2021 

[2] ‘Understanding the Grey Zone’, IISS Blog (April 2019). https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/04/understanding-the-grey-zone

[3] ‘The War of Jenkin’s Ear 1739-48’, Oxford Reference (August 2021). https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100019496 

[4] ’Salisbury poisoning: What did the attack mean for the UK and Russia’, BBC Website (March 2020).  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-51722301  

[5] ‘UK second biggest defence spender in NATO’, UK Defence Journal (March 2021). https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/britain-second-biggest-defence-spender-in-nato/

[6] ‘NATO 2030: “A global Alliance for all seasons”, reality or rhetoric?, European Leadership Network (June 2021). https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/nato-2030-a-global-alliance-for-all-seasons-reality-or-rhetoric/  

[7] ‘Why Nordstream 2 is the world’s most controversial energy project’, The Economist (July 2021). https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2021/07/14/why-nord-stream-2-is-the-worlds-most-controversial-energy-project 

[8] ‘The UK and European Defence: will NATO be enough?, The Foreign Policy Centre (December 2020). https://fpc.org.uk/the-uk-and-european-defence-will-nato-be-enough/ 

[9] ‘British warship deliberately sailed close to Crimea, UK officials say’, The New York Times (24 June 2021).  https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/24/world/europe/russia-uk-defender-crimea.html  

[10] ‘Putin says Russian Navy can carry out ‘unpreventable strike’ if needed’, Reuters (25 June 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-russian-navy-can-carry-out-unpreventable-strike-if-needed-2021-07-25/

[11] ‘No peace – no war. The future of the Russia-NATO relationship’, European Leadership Network (September 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/no-peace-no-war-the-future-of-the-russia-nato-relationship/ 

Assessment Papers Below Established Threshold Activities (BETA) Bombardinio Defense and Military Reform Governing Documents and Ideas United Kingdom
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An Assessment of the Role of Unmanned Ground Vehicles in Future Warfare

Robert Clark is a post-graduate researcher at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, and is a British military veteran. His specialities include UK foreign policy in Asia Pacific and UK defence relations.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  An Assessment of the Role of Unmanned Ground Vehicles in Future Warfare

Date Originally Written:  February 17, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  February 25, 2019.

Summary:  The British Army’s recent land trials of the Tracked Hybrid Modular Infantry System of Unmanned Ground Vehicles, seeks to ensure that the British Army retains its lethality in upcoming short to medium level intensity conflicts.  These trials align with the announcements by both the British Army’s Chief of General Staff, General Carleton-Smith, and by the Defence Secretary, Gavin Williamson, regarding the evolving character of warfare.

Text:  The United Kingdom’s (UK) current vision for the future role of Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) originates from the British Army’s “Strike Brigade” concept, as outlined in the Strategic Defence Security Review 2015[1]. This review proposed that British ground forces should be capable of self-deployment and self-sustainment at long distances, potentially global in scope. According to this review, by 2025 the UK should be able to deploy “a war-fighting division optimised for high intensity combat operations;” indeed, “the division will draw on two armoured infantry brigades and two new Strike Brigades to deliver a deployed division of three brigades.” Both Strike Brigades should be able to operate simultaneously in different parts of the world, and by incorporating the next generation autonomous technology currently being trialled by the British Army, will remain combat effective post-Army 2020.

The ability for land forces of this size to self-sustain at long-range places an increased demand on logistics and the resupply chain of the British Army, which has been shown to have been overburdened in recent conflicts[2]. This overburdening is likely to increase due to the evolving character of warfare and of the environments in which conflicts are likely to occur, specifically densely populated urban areas. These densely populated areas are likely to become more cluttered, congested and contested than ever before. Therefore, a more agile and flexible logistics and resupply system, able to conduct resupply in a more dynamic environment and over greater distances, will likely be required to meet the challenges of warfare from the mid-2020s and beyond.

Sustaining the British Armed Forces more broadly in densely populated areas may represent something of a shift in the UK’s vision for UGV technology. This UGV technology was previously utilised almost exclusively for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and for Countering-Improvised Explosive Devices for both the military and the police, as opposed to being truly a force-multiplier developing the logistics and resupply chains.

Looking at UGVs as a force multiplier, the Ministry of Defence’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DTSL) is currently leading a three-year research and development programme entitled Autonomous Last Mile Resupply System (ALMRS)[3]. The ALMRS research is being undertaken to demonstrate system solutions which aim to reduce the logistical burden on the entire Armed Forces, in addition to providing new operational capability and to reduce operational casualties. Drawing on both commercial technology as well as conceptual academic ideas – ranging from online delivery systems to unmanned vehicles – more than 140 organisations from small and medium-sized enterprises, to large military-industrial corporations, submitted entries.

The first phase of the ALMRS programme challenged industry and academia to design pioneering technology to deliver vital supplies and support to soldiers on the front line, working with research teams across the UK and internationally. This research highlights the current direction with which the British vision is orientated regarding UGVs, i.e., support-based roles. Meanwhile, the second phase of the ALMRS programme started in July 2018 and is due to last for approximately twelve months. It included ‘Autonomous Warrior’, the Army Warfighting Experiment 18 (AWE18), a 1 Armoured Infantry Brigade battlegroup-level live fire exercise, which took place on Salisbury Plain in November 2018. This live fire exercise saw each of the five remaining projects left in the ALMRS programme demonstrate their autonomous capabilities in combined exercises with the British Armed Forces, the end user. The results of this exercise provided DSTL with user feedback, crucial to enable subsequent development; identifying how the Army can exploit developments in robotics and autonomous systems technology through capability integration.

Among the final five projects short-listed for the second phase of ALMRS and AWE18 was a UGV multi-purpose platform called TITAN, developed by British military technology company QinetiQ, in partnership with MILREM Robotics, an Estonian military technology company. Developing its Tracked Hybrid Modular Infantry System (THeMIS), the QinetiQ-led programme impressed in the AWE18.

The THeMIS platform is designed to provide support for dismounted troops by serving as a transport platform, a remote weapon station, an IED detection and disposal unit, and surveillance and targeting acquisition system designed to enhance a commander’s situational awareness. THeMIS is an open architecture platform, with subsequent models based around a specific purpose or operational capability.

THeMIS Transport is designed to manoeuvre equipment around the battlefield to lighten the burden of soldiers, with a maximum payload weight of 750 kilograms. This 750 kilogram load would be adequate to resupply a platoon’s worth of ammunition, water, rations and medical supplies and to sustain it at 200% operating capacity – in essence, two resupplies in one. In addition, when utilised in battery mode, THeMIS Transport is near-silent and can travel for up to ninety minutes. When operating on the front-line, THeMIS Transport proves far more effective than a quad bike and trailer, which are presently in use with the British Army to achieve the same effect. Resupply is often overseen by the Platoon Sergeant, the platoon’s Senior Non-Commissioned Officer and most experienced soldier. Relieving the Platoon Sergeant of such a burden would create an additional force multiplier during land operations.

In addition, THeMIS can be fitted to act as a Remote Weapons System (RWS), with the ADDER version equipped with a .51 calibre Heavy Machine Gun, outfitted with both day and night optics. Additional THeMIS models include the PROTECTOR RWS, which integrates Javelin anti-tank missile capability. Meanwhile, more conventional THeMIS models include GroundEye, an EOD UGV, and the ELIX-XL and KK-4 LE, which are surveillance platforms that allow for the incorporation of remote drone technology.

By seeking to understand further the roles within the British Armed Forces both artificial intelligence and robotics currently have, in addition to what drives these roles and what challenges them, it is possible to gauge the continued evolution of remote warfare with the emergence of such technologies. Specifically, UGVs and RWS’ which were trialled extensively in 2018 by the British Army. Based upon research conducted on these recent trials, combined with current up-to-date in-theatre applications of such technology, it is assessed that the use of such equipment will expedite the rise of remote warfare as the preferred method of war by western policy makers in future low to medium level intensity conflicts seeking to minimise the physical risks to military personnel in addition to engaging in conflict more financially viable.

Endnotes:

[1] HM Government. (2015, November). National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015. Retrieved February 17, 2019, from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_web_only.pdf

[2] Erbel, M., & Kinsey, C. (2015, October 4). Think again – supplying war: Reappraising military logistics and its centrality to strategy and war. Retrieved February 17, 2019, from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2015.1104669

[3] Defence Science and Technology Laboratory. (2017). Competition document: Autonomous last mile resupply. Retrieved February 17, 2019, from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/accelerator-competition-autonomous-last-mile-supply/accelerator-competition-autonomous-last-mile-resupply

 

Assessment Papers Capacity / Capability Enhancement Emerging Technology Robert Clark United Kingdom
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Alternative Futures: United Kingdom Options in Venezuela

Hal Wilson is a member of the Military Writers Guild, and uses narrative to explore future conflict.  His finalist fiction contest entries have been published by the leading national security journal War on the Rocks, as well as the Atlantic Council’s Art of the Future Project.  His fiction has also been published by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the Australian Army Logistics Training Centre.  Hal graduated with first-class honours in War Studies and History from King’s College, London, and is studying an MA on the First World War. He tweets at @HalWilson_.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation:  In an alternative future, the United States and Brazil will intervene imminently in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The United Kingdom (UK) faces being pulled into the crisis. 

Date Originally Written:  February 2, 2019.

Date Originally Published:  February 11, 2019.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  This article is written from the point of view of the UK National Security Adviser personally briefing 10, Downing Street on potential courses of action.

Background:  The Venezuelan state has collapsed, leaving the country in the grip of growing civil strife.  The recent death of Venezuelan President Nicholas Maduro in last month’s crash of a Cessna Citation – registration number YV2030, frequently used by the Maduro family[1] – failed to leave a clear successor.  As such, the ‘Bolivarian’ armed forces, affiliated militias (‘colectivos’) and even government-aligned criminal networks (‘pranes[2]’) are clashing for control of the socialist regime.

Mounting violence has seen the abduction-and-murder of opposition leader Juan Guaidó by regime intelligence on February 29, 2019[3], followed by last week’s shoot-down of a Puerto Rico Air National Guard C-130J, tail registration 64-0008. C-130J / 64-0008 was supporting in Operation DELIVER COMFORT – the ongoing U.S. effort to airdrop aid over Venezuela. UK Permanent Joint Headquarters in Northwood now confirms that, late yesterday evening, the Bolivarian Navy of Venezuela (BNV) attacked the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Agrippa.

Agrippa, a maritime support ship, was in-region to conduct Atlantic Patrol Tasking North – the UK’s standing patrol to support Caribbean Commonwealth partners and British Overseas Territories (BOTs). While departing Grenada for Monserrat, a single anti-ship missile (AShM) was fired against Agrippa, which successfully destroyed the missile with its Phalanx Close-In-Weapons-System. The BNV patrol boat – most likely Constitución-class, ironically built in the UK during the 1970s[4]  – withdrew immediately after firing.

It remains unclear why the Agrippa was attacked. Even despite recent aggressiveness by the BNV towards U.S. shipping[5], this represents a grave escalation.

Significance:  Without a leadership figure in the Venezuelan capital of Caracas, the Agrippa incident and the loss of 64-0008 to a Man-Portable-Air-Defence-System (MANPADS) demonstrate a probable loss of control over state arsenals. Despite limited professionalism among the armed forces[6], the availability of such sophisticated weapon-systems is a major threat to regional stability. The risk of proliferation of MANPADS on the black-market is a particular concern.

Uproar over the loss of 64-0008 has also made intervention all but certain: repeated[7] warnings[8] to avert an intervention in Venezuela have lost weight in Washington and Brasilia[9]. U.S. enthusiasm in particular is buoyed in direct proportion to the likely share of effort which will be borne by Brazilian troops[10].

Although the UK faces no direct risk, Commonwealth partners and already-vulnerable BOTs stand to suffer if the violence continues to spill-over. A regional Notice to Mariners has been issued, complementing last week’s Notice to Airmen after the loss of 64-0008. The resultant increase of shipping insurance is further disrupting vital supply chains to isolated BOTs such as Monserrat. The UK is obliged to protect these territories.

Option #1:  The UK provides aerial support to the probable U.S.-Brazilian joint humanitarian intervention.

Risk:  Between Brazilian forces and the U.S. Global Response Force[11], the Venezuelan military will be rapidly overrun[12]. It is illustrative to note the Venezuelan Air Force is grounded by flight-safety issues[13] and defections[14] – to the point where DELIVER COMFORT remains unchallenged by any Venezuelan military aircraft.

The primary challenge will be the U.S./Brazilian occupation of major urban centres such as Caracas or Maracaibo. These cities include neighbourhoods dominated by loyalists to the socialist regime, and will pose considerable counter-insurgency challenges. Improvised explosive devices have already been employed by the opposition[15] and it can only be assumed regime loyalists will use similar techniques following an invasion.

UK sealift capacity is largely tied down supporting EXERCISE SAIF SAIREEA 6 in Oman. This conveniently precludes the prospect of large-scale UK ground contribution in Venezuela. The Royal Air Force (RAF) can nevertheless offer FGR4 Typhoons and Voyager aerial tankers to stage out of Puerto Rico, drawing on experience in long-range deployments[16].

Gain:  The UK will win favour in Washington while avoiding the more substantial risks of a ground deployment. By helping to crush the vying armed groups within Venezuela, Caribbean BOTs and Commonwealth partners will be reassured of ongoing UK support to their security.

Option #2:  The UK coordinates the acquisition or sabotage of Venezuelan MANPADS & AShM systems.

Risk:  By targeting sophisticated weapon-systems, we can not only neutralise a key threat to our U.S. & Brazilian allies, but also the main source of disruption to regional Commonwealth partners and BOTs. Bribery or staged purchases can be used to render these weapons harmless, or to have them delivered to UK hands for safekeeping. A similar activity was pursued by the Secret Intelligence Service during the 1982 Falklands War, targeting stocks of the ‘Exocet’ AShM[17].

This route, however, cannot guarantee complete success – especially where MANPADS may be held by regime loyalists, for instance. The risk to UK contacts inside Venezuela will be severe, besides the public-relations risk of UK taxpayer money being used in the illicit trade of arms. As a covert activity, it will also fail to publicly reassure local Commonwealth partners and the BOTs of a diminishing threat.

Gain:  This averts the expense of a full RAF deployment, while delivering results which can speed the U.S./Brazilian occupation of Venezuela – and ultimately assuring improved Caribbean stability. By not directly involving ourselves in the invasion, we also avoid inadvertent attacks against Russian mercenary forces in-country[18], or Russian civilians engaged in arms deliveries to the regime[19].

Option #3:  The UK enhances Royal Navy (RN) patrols in the Caribbean.

Risk:  The RN is currently thinly stretched. Besides ongoing North Atlantic Treaty Organization deployments and ships based at Bahrain, significant resources are tied up in the HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH Maritime Task Group to Singapore. A Type 45 Destroyer, HMS Dido, can nevertheless be made available. With a significant anti-missile capability[20], Dido can intercept any further AShM attacks and better protect local shipping than the Agrippa.

This will, however, fail to address the wider issue of MANPADS proliferation within Venezuela itself. The presence of a single additional air-defence warship will also do little to assist the U.S./Brazilian invasion: Washington may perceive the deployment as a token gesture.

Gain:  This option again averts the potential costs of an RAF engagement in the upcoming invasion of Venezuela, while offering highly visible reassurance to Caribbean Commonwealth partners and BOTs. Shipping insurance may be induced to return to pre-crisis levels, alleviating local supply chain disruptions.

Other comments:  The Venezuelan crisis poses an increasing destabilization risk to already-vulnerable BOTs and Commonwealth friends in the Caribbean. We must take action to assure their safety and prosperity.

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] Bellingcat, (2018, Dec 22)Identifying Aircraft in the Comina Operation in Venezuela https://www.bellingcat.com/news/americas/2018/12/22/identifying-aircraft-in-the-canaima-operation-in-venezuela/

[2] Centre for Strategic & International Studies, (2019, Jan 23) The Struggle for Control of Occupied Venezuela https://www.csis.org/analysis/struggle-control-occupied-venezuela

[3] The New York Times, (2019, Jan 13) Venezuela Opposition Leader is Arrested After Proposing to Take Power https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/13/world/americas/venezeula-juan-guaido-arrest.html

[4] Hazegray.org, (2001, Oct 26) World Navies Today: Venezuela
https://www.hazegray.org/worldnav/americas/venez.htm

[5] Navaltoday.com, (2018, Dec 25) Venezuelan Navy stops ExxonMobil ship in Guyana Dispute
https://navaltoday.com/2018/12/25/venezuelan-navy-stops-exxonmob%E2%80%8Eil-ship-in-guyana-dispute/

[6] Bellingcat, (2018, May 13) “We are going to surrender! Stop shooting!”: Reconstructing Oscar Perez’s Last Hours
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/americas/2018/05/13/we-are-going-to-surrender-stop-shooting-reconstructing-oscar-perezs-last-hours/

[7] Foreign Affairs, (2017, Nov 8) What Would a U.S. Intervention in Venezuela Look Like?
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2017-11-08/what-would-us-intervention-venezuela-look

[8] TIME, (2019, Jan 31) I Commanded the U.S. Military in South America. Deploying Soldiers to Venezuela Would Only Make Things Worse
http://time.com/5516698/nicolas-maduro-juan-guaido-venezuela-trump-military/

[9] The Guardian, (2018, Dec 14) Rightwing Venezuelan exiles hope Bolsonaro will help rid them of Maduro
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/13/brazil-bolsonaro-maduro-venezuela-dissidents-rightwing

[10] Twitter, (2019. Feb 2)
https://twitter.com/saveriovivas/status/1091733430151364610

[11] RAND, (2016) Enabling the Global Response Force, Access Strategies for the 82nd Airborne Division https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1161.html

[12] Military Review: The Professional Journal of the US Army, (January 2019) Venezuela, A ‘Black Swan’ Hot Spot
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/Jan-Feb-2019/Delgado-Venezuela/

[13] The Aviationist,(2012, Nov 28) Photo shows pilots ejecting from their jet moments before it crashed into the ground https://theaviationist.com/2012/11/28/k8-crash/

[14] Daily Sabah, (2019, Feb 2) Venezuela air force general defects in rebellion against President Maduro https://www.dailysabah.com/americas/2019/02/02/venezuela-air-force-general-defects-in-rebellion-against-president-maduro

[15] Bellingcat, (2017, Sept 2) The Bombs of Caracas
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/americas/2017/09/02/the-bombs-of-caracas/

[16] Forces Network, (2016, Sept 29) RAF Typhoons Head to Far East Amid Heightened Tensions https://www.forces.net/services/raf/raf-typhoons-head-far-east-amid-heightened-tensions

[17] The Telegraph (2002, Mar 13) How France helped us win Falklands War, by John Nott https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1387576/How-France-helped-us-win-Falklands-war-by-John-Nott.html

[18] The Guardian (2019, Jan 13) Russian mercenaries reportedly in Venezuela to protect Maduro https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/25/venezuela-maduro-russia-private-security-contractors

[19] TASS, (2018, Apr 4) Kalashnikov plant in Venezuela to start production in 2019 http://tass.com/defense/997625

[20] Savetheroyalnavy.com (2015, Sep 28) UK and NATO navies take further small steps in developing ballistic missile defence
https://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/uk-and-nato-navies-take-further-small-steps-in-developing-ballistic-missile-defence/

 

Alternative Futures / Alternative Histories / Counterfactuals Brazil Option Papers United Kingdom Venezuela
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#PartnerArticle – Assessing Nigerian Air Power Employment In Counter Insurgency Operations

The following is an article from our partners at the Conflict Studies And Analysis Project.  During 2019 you will occasionally see their content on our website and vice versa.  The original article can be viewed here.  

Fulan Nasrullah is the Executive Director of the Conflict Studies And Analysis Project At The Global Initiative For Civil Stabilisation. He is national security policy and strategy advisor and conflict researcher. He sometimes tweets via @fulannasrullah.

Murtala Abdullahi is a Junior Associate Researcher with the Conflict Studies And Analysis Project at The Global Initiative For Civil Stabilisation. His areas of focus are on Nigeria’s military, local conflict drivers across Nigeria, conflict prevention, and effects of climate change on national security. He tweets via @murtalaibin.

Conflict Studies And Analysis Project’s content does not contain information of a classified or otherwise official nature, neither does the content represent the position of any governmental or non governmental entity.

Summary – The Nigerian Air Force (NAF), deployed air power in support of the Joint task force: Operation Restore Order and has sustained operational support to Nigerian Army as operational mandate changed. This is in addition to supporting regional Multinational Joint Task Force operations against Boko Haram groups, as well. The performance of the Nigerian Air Force has greatly improved compared to when operations in the Northeast first began, as it has taken on varied missions from Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance( ISR), to close air support to the Army’s manoeuvre units in theatre. However, air operations efficiency is affected by scarce national defence spending and a shortage of aircraft.

Text– Nigeria’s counter insurgency area of operations covers the three northeastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, or over 125,000 square kilometres of land area. This complex terrain encompasses the Nigerian side of Lake Chad with hundreds of islands, the massive Sambisa Forest Area, the Gwoza Hills, and the Mandara Mountains range which mostly hem in the region from the east.

The Nigerian Air Force, began operations against Boko Haram groups in 2010, as military operations under the Joint Task Force (JTF) of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Police and State Security Service were initiated (in succession) under the code names, Restore order I, II and III, to flush out insurgent fighters from built up areas of Borno between December 2011 and mid 2013.

As the conflict escalated, the Nigerian government on May 14, 2013, declared a state of emergency in the three worst affected states (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe) and expanded the JTF operations into Operation Boyona with the objective of securing the nation’s borders and asserting territorial integrity.

As part of Operation Boyona, the Nigerian Air Force conducted air strikes targeted at insurgents camps in July-September 2013 employing NAF’s Mi-35P Hind attack helicopters, in the opening salvo of what was evolving into a campaign of aerial bombardment against insurgent held territory.

Operation Boyona was later renamed Operation Zaman Lafiya with the Nigerian Air Force providing the aerial component in August 2013. The air component was under Boko Karam threat to it’s fixed- and rotary-wing operations, with NAF’s Mi 24V/Mi-35P attack helicopters, F-7NI and Alpha Jets fixed wing attack planes, coming under enemy anti-aircraft fire of up to 30mm caliber, forcing them to fly higher in order to deliver strike packages. This also required the Nigerian Air Force to fit longer-range rockets, removed from its MiG-21s, onto the attack helicopters [1]. By August 2014, the Nigerian air force had carried out 2,468 ground-attack missions against Boko Haram, in addition to conducting 1,443 surveillance missions with its DA-42s, ATR-42s and King Air 350Is, plus 1,479 airlift transport missions [2].

The Boko Haram conflict soon reached its peak between the last quarter of 2014 and early 2015 as the insurgents overran towns and military bases across Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States. The Nigerian Government followed up with a counter-offensive campaign, in tandem with offensives launched by troops of neighbouring Lake Chad countries, to retake the territory overrun by the insurgents.

The Nigerian Air Force component of Operation Zaman Lafiya, played a key role in assisting ground forces in rolling back Boko Haram groups from territories they had occupied. The MI-35P helicopters flew over 900 combat sorties within this period [3]. In July 2015, Nigerian forces, launched Operation Lafiya Dole, replacing Zaman Lafiya.

As part of the new Operation Lafiya Dole, the NAF component of the joint military forces battling the Boko Haram insurgents, was expanded to an air task force with leeway to conduct independent missions [4]. This was in addition to carrying out missions in support of Nigerian Army troops engaged in the Army specific Operations Deep Punch I&II and Operation Last Hold, while also providing air support to the regional MNJTF’s Operations Rawan Gada and Gaman Aiki.

Between Dec. 25, 2015 and the end of January 2016, the Nigerian Air Force conducted 286 strike missions against Boko Haram targets, for a total of 536 flight hours. During the 18 months between July 2015 and mid-January 2017, the air task force (ATF) carried out 2,105 missions across the entire aerial spectrum [5].

From the beginning of Operation Zaman Lafiya and now Operation Lafiya Dole, the Nigerian air force has suffered relatively few losses directly related to the Combat. Two Chengdu F-7Nis, one Alpha Jet, two Mi-35Ps, one A109LUH, and at least two Mi-17s have been shot down or destroyed in accidents over active battlefields.

The Nigerian Air Force’s combined aircraft inventory is estimated at between 200-250 aircraft[6], comprising an estimated three operational C-130Hs, sixteen Alpha Jet E trainer variants acquired in the ‘80s and around twenty Alpha Jet A[7] ground attack aircraft, thirteen Aero L-39 ZA Albatross, ten used Mi-24Vs acquired from the Ukraine, around twenty Mi-35Ps and MI-35Ms acquired from Russia, 10 Pakistani Super Mushshak trainers, two Bell 412, four EC-135 and over a dozen Agusta Westland helicopters. In addition an unknown number of Chinese-built CH-3 rainbow unmanned combat aerial vehicles and indigenous Gulma|Tsaigumi UAV are in service, along with Austrian DA-42 Twin Star light patrol aircraft, ATR-42 maritime patrol aircraft, Super Puma, MI-17 and Beechcraft Super King Air 350i ISR-optimised turboprop aircraft [8].

In addition the Nigerian Air Force is expecting delivery of six AgustaWestland AW109, unknown number of Yabhon Flash 20 unmanned aerial vehicle, and an unknown number of CAC/PAC JF-17 fighter-bombers from Pakistan[9].

The Nigerian Air Force has also ordered twelve A29 Super Tucanos, a turboprop aircraft built for the kind of engagements it has to carry out currently, i.e a counterinsurgency. The much criticised $593m deal for these planes, however comes with 100 GBU-12(500lb) Paveway II(PW-II) Tail Kits, 100 GBU-58(250lb) PW-II Tail Kits, 400 laser guided rockets with Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System, 2,000 MK-81 (250lb) bombs, 6,000 Hydra 70 unguided rockets(70mm, 1000 of which are practice rockets), 20,000 rounds of .50/12.7mm calibre machine gun ammunition, seven AN/AAQ-22F electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor and laser designators [10]. Also, these planes will be equipped with software to support forward-looking infra-red targeting pods.

Service operable aircraft increased from about 36 per cent in 2015 to between 78 and 82 per cent currently [11]. This contributed to the Air Task Force in Operation Lafiya Dole’s ability to, from June 1 2015 to October 31 2018, fly 51,852 flight hours in 39,807 day and night sorties including close air support, strike, ISR and humanitarian support missions.

However, despite these improvements, the Nigerian Air Force still faces significant challenges in asserting aerial supremacy over the terrain, despite insurgent air defence capabilities being limited largely to varied calibre anti-aircraft guns (including ZSU-23-4 quad-barreled self-propelled platforms). This is due to the size of the terrain in question, plus a lack of systems to set up and maintain an integrated kill-chain from finding the enemy to maintaining ISR presence over him, to ultimately finishing him off and gathering information to be exploited for analysis purposes. There are improvements to be made in this regard.

Also, logistical challenges including a lack of spare parts, inadequate number of precision guided and stand-off weapons, and a shortage of personnel trained to standard to maintain increasingly complex modern weapons of war will continue to prove a major hindrance to the Nigerian Air Force, at least for the foreseeable future.

End Notes:

[1] Chris Pocock. February 2, 2015.Nigerian Air Power Hindered in Boko Haram Fight. Retrieved from: https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2015-02-02/nigerian-airpower-hindered-boko-haram-fight

[2] Same as No. 1 above

[3] Author’s conversations with ranking NAF officers involved with pertinent operations

[4] Author’s conversations with ranking NAF officers involved with pertinent operations

[5] Author’s conversations with ranking NAF officers involved with pertinent operations

[6] Global fire power. “Nigeria military strength”. Retrieved from: https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=nigeria

[7] Murtala Abdullahi. Options For Supporting Nigerian Air Operations In The Lake Chad Conflict. Conflict Studies And Analysis Project. Retrieved from: https://conflictstudies.gics.live/2019/01/01/options-for-supporting-nigerian-air-operations-in-the-lake-chad-conflict/

[8] Same as No.7 above

[9] Author conversations with ranking Nigerian Air Force officers for this paper.

[10] FederalRegister.Gov. “Arms Sales Notification”. Retrieved from: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/08/28/2017-18201/arms-sales-notification

[11] Author conversations with ranking NAF officers, confirmed by the Nigerian Chief of Air Staff during his presentation at the International Air Power Seminar in Abuja, Nigeria. Chief of Air Staff remarks retrieved from: https://www.today.ng/multimedia/photo/sadique-abubakar-role-public-irregular-warfare-critical-172227

 

Africa Nigeria Partner - Conflict Studies And Analysis Project United Kingdom
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An Assessment Of Britain’s Relations With Nigeria In 2018

The following is an article from our partners at the Conflict Studies And Analysis Project.  During 2019 you will occasionally see their content on our website and vice versa.  The original article can be viewed here.  

Sola Tayo is a BBC journalist, a Senior Associate Fellow at the Conflict Studies And Analysis Project at the Global Initiative For Civil Stabilisation, and an Associate Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs/Chatham House. Sola tweets via @tayos02.

Conflict Studies And Analysis Project’s content does not contain information of a classified or otherwise official nature, neither does the content represent the position of any governmental or non governmental entity.

Summary: Nigeria, one of Africa’s largest economies is facing several internal security threats. Violence has devastated the northeast in the form of an insurgency with Islamic State linked groups while bloody resource based conflicts have at varying times wreaked havoc on the oil and agriculture industries and contributed to wide-scale outbreaks of violence.

Nigeria has traditionally played a role in conflict resolution and its military has been deployed on peacekeeping operations across the continent. But Nigeria’s military has been increasingly deployed to tackle its own internal conflicts. Underfunded ad overstretched,  its military at times struggles to battle better equipped militants.

Although Nigeria is considered a regional powerhouse, it receives a lot of assistance from its western allies – the United Kingdom, the United States and France.

This paper discusses the defence and security relationship between Nigeria and the United Kingdom in 2018.

Text:

Since gaining its independence in 1960, Nigeria has maintained strong relations with the United Kingdom, its former colonial master. The United Kingdom is now one of Nigeria’s strongest allies and as such its security issues are of great concern to London. Nigeria’s location on the edge of the Sahel – a region that has seen an alarming rise in the activity of Islamic State linked insurgents – leave it vulnerable to cross border activity by insurgents. Its struggles with home-grown insurgents are considered a potential threat to global security. The UK, like many of Nigeria’s allies, is worried that the increased presence of the Islamic State in the country could become a threat way beyond Nigeria’s borders.

2018 was an important year for British-Nigerian official relations. Of particular significance was the visit of the British Prime Minister, Theresa May, to Abuja and (Nigeria’s commercial capital) Lagos in August. Nigeria was one of three African countries (including Kenya and South Africa) visited by Mrs May as part of a mission to reset the United Kingdom’s relations with former colonies in Africa as it prepares to leave the European Union this year.

The focus of her visit was to discuss improving bilateral relations between the two countries. Security was very much on the agenda and both countries signed a defence and security agreement[1].

In addition the UK’s Defence Secretary, Gavin Williamson, visited Nigeria in November.  He reiterated the UK’s commitment to the agreement stressing that it was in his country’s interest to help keep Nigeria secure to avoid insurgents establishing a caliphate and plotting attacks against the West.[2]

Nigeria is a key area for defence engagement for the UK and most of the work involves training and intelligence sharing. The British Army and Royal Air Force send Short Term Training Teams (STTTs) to provide infantry training to the Nigerian Army and Air Force.

Most of the UK’s work in Nigeria is focussed on the North East where the insurgency by insurgent groups has claimed more than 100,000 lives since 2009[3]. The insurgency has also displaced more than 2 million Nigerians and, in 2016, put more than 5 million people in the region at risk of food shortages when aid workers were unable to enter the region with supplies[4].

 The United Kingdom says the defence and security agreement will transform the way both countries work together to combat shared threats. The UK will expand its current programme of training for Nigeria’s military as well as offering a broader supply of equipment.

The provision of training and equipment is centred around protecting soldiers from the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and includes the gifting of a range of £775,000 worth of counter IED equipment to the Nigerian army.

The UK also pledged to – for the first time – train full army units (as opposed to the current system where individual soldiers are trained) before they are deployed to the North East.

The UK has avoided providing Nigeria with arms because of allegations of human rights abuses by its military so the Prime Minister’s pledge to review this will give the Nigerian army a boost in its fight against the militants.

Education has suffered as a result of the insurgency.  Schools have been destroyed or closed, there is a chronic shortage of teachers (many have fled) and there are few crisis response systems in place to protect civilians from attacks by terrorists. Under the agreement both countries will work together on a £13 million programme to educate 100,000 children living in the affected areas of the region.

The UK under this agreement, committed to help Nigeria to implement a crisis response mechanism to help civilians keep safe. In addition the UK has offered to help with teacher training in conflict zones.The United Kingdom also hopes its investment in education will help to reduce the ability of insurgent groups to attract impressionable people by engaging communities to counter the propaganda used as a recruitment tool.

The agreement also encompasses cooperation on improving policing (which is chronically under-resourced in Nigeria), tackling kidnapping, human trafficking and other organised crime, corruption (through the creation of a civil asset recovery task force to help recover stolen assets) and the ongoing issue of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.

The UK’s Defence Secretary in 2018, also announced the establishment of the UK’s first specialist army training team to tackle sexual violence and the use of female and child suicide bombers.  The team will primarily work in east Africa where the militant group Al-Shabaab has brutalised civilian populations in Somalia and the region. It is expected that afterwards the training will expand to Nigeria which has seen a rise in the use child and female suicide bombers by Boko Haram insurgents.

Nigeria is also experiencing another devastating conflict in the form of violent clashes between farmers and cattle herders.  Although the roots of the violence is largely resource based, the demographic of the parties involved and the way it has been reported by the media has led to it being labelled a conflict based on religion.

The herder/farmer violence is said to have claimed at least 2000 lives in 2018 alone[5]. The outbreaks of violence are not new but have taken an increasingly bloody turn in recent times.  So concerned is the UK that British parliamentarians – through a cross party parliamentary group on religious freedom –  have been engaged in debates on the subject.

The UK parliamentarians – many of who see it as a conflict based on religious discrimination – are pressuring UK government ministers to get tough on Nigeria for not doing enough to protect mainly (but not exclusively) Christian farmers against violence from armed Muslim herders from the Fulani ethnic group.

Although a reaction to the farmer/herder violence has yet to form a part of the UK’s engagement with Nigeria, it has been the purpose of visits to affected areas by UK parliamentarians.  The UK’s Minister for Africa said it was something she and the Prime Minister discussed with president Buhari and during their visit to Nigeria[6].

At the end of 2018 the UK Foreign Secretary commissioned a review into the persecution of Christians around the world[7].  The review will cover particular countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Officials from the Foreign Office have said the aim of the review is to eventually produce policy recommendations to protect religious minorities.

It is expected that Nigeria will be one of the countries studied in the review – despite Christianity not being a minority religion.

Last year saw a lot of activity and interest in Nigeria and the Sahel region from the United Kingdom, as it seeks to increase its footprint and extend its influence in Nigeria’s immediate region.

End Notes:

[1] UK. UK And Nigeria Step Up Cooperation To End Boko Haram Threat. Retrieved from; https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-nigeria-step-up-cooperation-to-end-boko-haram-threat

[2] Daily Mail. British Defence Secretary Warns Nigerian Jihadists Pose Growing Threat To Britain. Retrieved from: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6404117/Defence-Secretary-warns-jihadists-Nigeria-pose-growing-threat-Britain.html

[3] Premium Times. 100,00 Killed In Boko Haram Conflict. Retrieved from: https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/223399-shocking-revelation-100000-killed-two-million-displaced-boko-haram-insurgency-borno-governor-says.html

[4] https://www.unocha.org/story/five-things-know-about-crisis-nigeria

[5] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/12/nigeria-government-failures-fuel-escalating-conflict-between-farmers-and-herders-as-death-toll-nears-4000/

[6] “Colleagues have asked about the role of the UK Government, who are of course extremely concerned about the violence. It is destroying communities and poses a grave threat to Nigeria’s stability, unity and prosperity. It poses significant risks to the peaceful conduct of next year’s important presidential elections; so we take every opportunity to raise our concerns with the Nigerian Government at every level. When the Prime Minister and I were in Nigeria in August, she discussed the issue with President Buhari, and I was able to raise it with the Vice-President and Foreign Minister.”    — https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2018-11-27/debates/818A5775-5E16-4C15-84CB-8DA497FD0FBB/NigeriaArmedViolence(RuralCommunities)

[7] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-announces-global-review-into-persecution-of-christians

Nigeria Partner - Conflict Studies And Analysis Project United Kingdom
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Options for Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Five Eyes Alliance

Dan Lee is a government employee who works in Defense, and has varying levels of experience working with Five Eyes nations (US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand).  He can be found on Twitter @danlee961.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation:  Options for Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Five Eyes Alliance

Date Originally Written:  September 29, 2018.

Date Originally Published:  October 29, 2018.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The article is written from the point of view of Five Eyes national defense organizations. 

Background:  The Five Eyes community consists of the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), Canada, Australia and New Zealand; its origins can be traced to the requirement to cooperate in Signals Intelligence after World War Two[1]. Arguably, the alliance is still critical today in dealing with terrorism and other threats[2].

Autonomous systems may provide the Five Eyes alliance an asymmetric advantage, or ‘offset’, to counter its strategic competitors that are on track to field larger and more technologically advanced military forces. The question of whether or not to develop and employ Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) is currently contentious due to the ethical and social considerations involved with allowing machines to choose targets and apply lethal force without human intervention[3][4][5]. Twenty-six countries are calling for a prohibition on LAWS, while three Five Eyes partners (Australia, UK and the US) as well as other nations including France, Germany, South Korea and Turkey do not support negotiating new international laws on the matter[6]. When considering options, at least two issues must also be addressed.

The first issue is defining what LAWS are; a common lexicon is required to allow Five Eyes partners to conduct an informed discussion as to whether they can come to a common policy position on the development and employment of these systems. Public understanding of autonomy is mostly derived from the media or from popular culture and this may have contributed to the hype around the topic[7][8][8]. Currently there is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a fully autonomous lethal weapon system, which has in turn disrupted discussions at the United Nations (UN) on how these systems should be governed by the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCWUN)[10]. The US and UK have different definitions, which makes agreement on a common position difficult even amongst like-minded nations[11][12]. This lack of lexicon is further complicated by some strategic competitors using more liberal definitions of LAWS, allowing them to support a ban while simultaneously developing weapons that do not require meaningful human control[13][14][15][16].

The second issue one of agreeing how autonomous systems might be employed within the Five Eyes alliance. For example, as a strategic offset technology, the use of autonomous systems might mitigate the relatively small size of their military forces relative to an adversary’s force[17]. Tactically, they could be deployed completely independently of humans to remove personnel from danger, as swarms to overwhelm the enemy with complexity, or as part of a human-machine team to augment human capabilities[18][19][20].

A failure of Five Eyes partners to come to a complete agreement on what is and is not permissible in developing and employing LAWS does not necessarily mean a halt to progress; indeed, this may provide the alliance with the ability for some partners to cover the capability gaps of others. If some members of the alliance choose not to develop lethal systems, it may free their resources to focus on autonomous Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) or logistics capabilities. In a Five Eyes coalition environment, these members who chose not to develop lethal systems could provide support to the LAWS-enabled forces of other partners, providing lethal autonomy to the alliance as whole, if not to individual member states.

Significance:  China and Russia may already be developing LAWS; a failure on the part of the Five Eyes alliance to actively manage this issue may put it at a relative disadvantage in the near future[21][22][23][24]. Further, dual-use civilian technologies already exist that may be adapted for military use, such as the Australian COTSbot and the Chinese Mosquito Killer Robot[25][26]. If the Five Eyes alliance does not either disrupt the development of LAWS by its competitors, or attain relative technological superiority, it may find itself starting in a position of disadvantage during future conflicts or deterrence campaigns.

Option #1:  Five Eyes nations work with the UN to define LAWS and ban their development and use; diplomatic, economic and informational measures are applied to halt or disrupt competitors’ LAWS programs. Technological offset is achieved by Five Eyes autonomous military systems development that focuses on logistics and ISR capabilities, such as Boston Dynamics’ LS3 AlphaDog and the development of driverless trucks to free soldiers from non-combat tasks[27][28][29][30].

Risk:  In the event of conflict, allied combat personnel would be more exposed to danger than the enemy as their nations had, in essence, decided to not develop a technology that could be of use in war. Five Eyes militaries would not be organizationally prepared to develop, train with and employ LAWS if necessitated by an existential threat. It may be too late to close the technological capability gap after the commencement of hostilities.

Gain:  The Five Eyes alliance’s legitimacy regarding human rights and the just conduct of war is maintained in the eyes of the international community. A LAWS arms race and subsequent proliferation can be avoided.

Option #2:  Five Eyes militaries actively develop LAWS to achieve superiority over their competitors.

Risk:  The Five Eyes alliance’s legitimacy may be undermined in the eyes of the international community and organizations such as The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the UN, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Public opinion in some partner nations may increasingly disapprove of LAWS development and use, which could fragment the alliance in a similar manner to the Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty[31][32].

The declared development and employment of LAWS may catalyze a resource-intensive international arms race. Partnerships between government and academia and industry may also be adversely affected[33][34].

Gain:  Five Eyes nations avoid a technological disadvantage relative to their competitors; the Chinese information campaign to outmanoeuvre Five Eyes LAWS development through the manipulation of CCWUN will be mitigated. Once LAWS development is accepted as inevitable, proliferation may be regulated through the UN.

Other Comments:  None

Recommendation:  None.

Endnotes:

[1] Tossini, J.V. (November 14, 2017). The Five Eyes – The Intelligence Alliance of the Anglosphere. Retrieved from https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-five-eyes-the-intelligence-alliance-of-the-anglosphere/

[2] Grayson, K. Time to bring ‘Five Eyes’ in from the cold? (May 4, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/time-bring-five-eyes-cold/

[3] Lange, K. 3rd Offset Strategy 101: What It Is, What the Tech Focuses Are (March 30, 2016). Retrieved from http://www.dodlive.mil/2016/03/30/3rd-offset-strategy-101-what-it-is-what-the-tech-focuses-are/

[4] International Committee of the Red Cross. Expert Meeting on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Statement (November 15, 2017). Retrieved from https://www.icrc.org/en/document/expert-meeting-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems

[5] Human Rights Watch and
Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic. Fully Autonomous Weapons: Questions and Answers. (October 2013). Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/10.2013_killer_robots_qa.pdf

[6] Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. Report on Activities Convention on Conventional Weapons Group of Governmental Experts meeting on lethal autonomous weapons systems – United Nations Geneva – 9-13 April 2018. (2018) Retrieved from https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/KRC_ReportCCWX_Apr2018_UPLOADED.pdf

[7] Scharre, P. Why You Shouldn’t Fear ‘Slaughterbots’. (December 22, 2017). Retrieved from https://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/military-robots/why-you-shouldnt-fear-slaughterbots

[8] Winter, C. (November 14, 2017). ‘Killer robots’: autonomous weapons pose moral dilemma. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/killer-robots-autonomous-weapons-pose-moral-dilemma/a-41342616

[9] Devlin, H. Killer robots will only exist if we are stupid enough to let them. (June 11, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jun/11/killer-robots-will-only-exist-if-we-are-stupid-enough-to-let-them

[10] Welsh, S. Regulating autonomous weapons. (November 16, 2017). Retrieved from https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/regulating-autonomous-weapons/

[11] United States Department of Defense. Directive Number 3000.09. (November 21, 2012). Retrieved from https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=726163

[12] Lords AI committee: UK definitions of autonomous weapons hinder international agreement. (April 17, 2018). Retrieved from http://www.article36.org/autonomous-weapons/lords-ai-report/

[13] Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects – Geneva, 9–13 April 2018 (first week) Item 6 of the provisional agenda – Other matters. (11 April 2018). Retrieved from https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/E42AE83BDB3525D0C125826C0040B262/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.7.pdf

[14] Welsh, S. China’s shock call for ban on lethal autonomous weapon systems. (April 16, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.janes.com/article/79311/china-s-shock-call-for-ban-on-lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems

[15] Mohanty, B. Lethal Autonomous Dragon: China’s approach to artificial intelligence weapons. (Nov 15 2017). Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/lethal-autonomous-weapons-dragon-china-approach-artificial-intelligence/

[16] Kania, E.B. China’s Strategic Ambiguity and Shifting Approach to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. (April 17, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-strategic-ambiguity-and-shifting-approach-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems

[17] Tomes, R. Why the Cold War Offset Strategy was all about Deterrence and Stealth. (January 14, 2015) Retrieved from https://warontherocks.com/2015/01/why-the-cold-war-offset-strategy-was-all-about-deterrence-and-stealth/

[18] Lockie, A. The Air Force just demonstrated an autonomous F-16 that can fly and take out a target all by itself. (April 12, 2017). Retrieved from https://www.businessinsider.com.au/f-16-drone-have-raider-ii-loyal-wingman-f-35-lockheed-martin-2017-4?r=US&IR=T

[19] Schuety, C. & Will, L. An Air Force ‘Way of Swarm’: Using Wargaming and Artificial Intelligence to Train Drones. (September 21, 2018). Retrieved from https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/an-air-force-way-of-swarm-using-wargaming-and-artificial-intelligence-to-train-drones/

[20] Ryan, M. Human-Machine Teaming for Future Ground Forces. (2018). Retrieved from https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Human_Machine_Teaming_FinalFormat.pdf

[21] Perrigo, B. Global Arms Race for Killer Robots Is Transforming the Battlefield. (Updated: April 9, 2018). Retrieved from http://time.com/5230567/killer-robots/

[22] Hutchison, H.C. Russia says it will ignore any UN ban of killer robots. (November 30, 2017). Retrieved from https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-will-ignore-un-killer-robot-ban-2017-11/?r=AU&IR=T

[23] Mizokami, K. Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot – What could possibly go wrong? (July 20, 2017). Retrieved from https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a27393/kalashnikov-to-make-ai-directed-machine-guns/

[24] Atherton, K. Combat robots and cheap drones obscure the hidden triumph of Russia’s wargame. (September 25, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2018/09/24/combat-robots-and-cheap-drones-obscure-the-hidden-triumph-of-russias-wargame/

[25] Platt, J.R. A Starfish-Killing, Artificially Intelligent Robot Is Set to Patrol the Great Barrier Reef Crown of thorns starfish are destroying the reef. Bots that wield poison could dampen the invasion. (January 1, 2016) Retrieved from https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-starfish-killing-artificially-intelligent-robot-is-set-to-patrol-the-great-barrier-reef/

[26] Skinner, T. Presenting, the Mosquito Killer Robot. (September 14, 2016). Retrieved from https://quillorcapture.com/2016/09/14/presenting-the-mosquito-killer-robot/

[27] Defence Connect. DST launches Wizard of Aus. (November 10, 2017). Retrieved from https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/1514-dst-launches-wizard-of-aus

[28] Pomerleau, M. Air Force is looking for resilient autonomous systems. (February 24, 2016). Retrieved from https://defensesystems.com/articles/2016/02/24/air-force-uas-contested-environments.aspx

[29] Boston Dynamics. LS3 Legged Squad Support Systems. The AlphaDog of legged robots carries heavy loads over rough terrain. (2018). Retrieved from https://www.bostondynamics.com/ls3

[30] Evans, G. Driverless vehicles in the military – will the potential be realised? (February 2, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.army-technology.com/features/driverless-vehicles-military/

[31] Hambling, D. Why the U.S. Is Backing Killer Robots. (September 15, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/research/a23133118/us-ai-robots-warfare/

[32] Ministry for Culture and Heritage. ANZUS treaty comes into force 29 April 1952. (April 26, 2017). Retrieved from https://nzhistory.govt.nz/anzus-comes-into-force

[33] Shalal, A. Researchers to boycott South Korean university over AI weapons work. (April 5, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tech-korea-boycott/researchers-to-boycott-south-korean-university-over-ai-weapons-work-idUSKCN1HB392

[34] Shane, S & Wakabayashi, D. ‘The Business of War’: Google Employees Protest Work for the Pentagon. (April 4, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/google-letter-ceo-pentagon-project.html

 

Artificial Intelligence / Machine Learning / Human-Machine Teaming Australia Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) Autonomous Weapons Systems Canada Dan Lee New Zealand Option Papers United Kingdom United States